At first glance, OYO's numbers look impressive.

In 9MFY26, OYO reported ₹6,940 Cr in revenue compared to ₹6,252 Cr in FY25—an 11% growth.

But after digging into the UDRHP, the story looks very different.

Growth by Geography

• India: -10%
• UK: -38%
• Europe: -1%
• US: +51%

The US alone added roughly 13 percentage points of growth, while weakness in other regions dragged overall growth down to 11%.

In simple words, without the US, OYO's consolidated growth would have looked far weaker.

The US Has Become OYO's Growth Engine

The numbers become even more interesting when you look at Gross Booking Value (GBV).

• Total GBV: ₹22,946 Cr
• US GBV: ₹12,022 Cr (52% of total GBV)

Now compare that with FY24.

Back then, the US contributed only ₹971 Cr, or roughly 9% of total GBV.

That means US GBV has grown by approximately 131%, becoming the single biggest contributor to OYO's topline growth.

The Surprising Part

OYO operates 293,554 storefronts globally.

Yet the US has only 2,087 storefronts—around 1% of its global network.

Despite that, the US contributes:

• 27% of revenue
• 52% of Gross Booking Value

That's an extraordinary level of productivity compared to the rest of OYO's network.

But Is This Organic Growth?

Here's where things become important.

The sharp jump in the US business coincides with OYO's acquisition of G6 Hospitality for around ₹4,460 Cr.

This suggests that a significant portion of OYO's recent growth is inorganic, driven by acquisitions rather than underlying expansion of its existing business.

Meanwhile, the acquisition also increased leverage.

Total borrowings have risen to around ₹7,485 Cr, compared with roughly ₹3,603 Cr earlier.

What About India?

India remains OYO's home market.

Yet the Indian business has delivered only around 3.5% CAGR over the last three years, barely keeping pace with inflation.

The latest reported period even shows a 10% decline in India.

This raises an important question.

If the domestic business continues to struggle while growth increasingly depends on acquired international assets, how sustainable is the current growth trajectory?

Why the IPO Matters

According to the UDRHP, OYO plans to use approximately ₹4,987 Cr, or nearly 77% of the IPO proceeds, for debt repayment.

That tells us reducing leverage is one of the primary objectives of the IPO.

My Biggest Question

The US acquisition has undoubtedly transformed OYO's reported numbers.

But investors should ask:

When will OYO's core Indian business return to sustainable growth?

Because long-term value creation will depend not only on successful acquisitions but also on reviving the business in its largest and most strategic home market.

Source: OYO UDRHP. Figures are based on company disclosures and my analysis of the filing.

At first glance, OYO's numbers look impressive.

In 9MFY26, OYO reported ₹6,940 Cr in revenue compared to ₹6,252 Cr in FY25—an 11% growth.

But after digging into the UDRHP, the story looks very different.

Growth by Geography

• India: -10%
• UK: -38%
• Europe: -1%
• US: +51%

The US alone added roughly 13 percentage points of growth, while weakness in other regions dragged overall growth down to 11%.

In simple words, without the US, OYO's consolidated growth would have looked far weaker.

The US Has Become OYO's Growth Engine

The numbers become even more interesting when you look at Gross Booking Value (GBV).

• Total GBV: ₹22,946 Cr
• US GBV: ₹12,022 Cr (52% of total GBV)

Now compare that with FY24.

Back then, the US contributed only ₹971 Cr, or roughly 9% of total GBV.

That means US GBV has grown by approximately 131%, becoming the single biggest contributor to OYO's topline growth.

The Surprising Part

OYO operates 293,554 storefronts globally.

Yet the US has only 2,087 storefronts—around 1% of its global network.

Despite that, the US contributes:

• 27% of revenue
• 52% of Gross Booking Value

That's an extraordinary level of productivity compared to the rest of OYO's network.

But Is This Organic Growth?

Here's where things become important.

The sharp jump in the US business coincides with OYO's acquisition of G6 Hospitality for around ₹4,460 Cr.

This suggests that a significant portion of OYO's recent growth is inorganic, driven by acquisitions rather than underlying expansion of its existing business.

Meanwhile, the acquisition also increased leverage.

Total borrowings have risen to around ₹7,485 Cr, compared with roughly ₹3,603 Cr earlier.

What About India?

India remains OYO's home market.

Yet the Indian business has delivered only around 3.5% CAGR over the last three years, barely keeping pace with inflation.

The latest reported period even shows a 10% decline in India.

This raises an important question.

If the domestic business continues to struggle while growth increasingly depends on acquired international assets, how sustainable is the current growth trajectory?

Why the IPO Matters

According to the UDRHP, OYO plans to use approximately ₹4,987 Cr, or nearly 77% of the IPO proceeds, for debt repayment.

That tells us reducing leverage is one of the primary objectives of the IPO.

My Biggest Question

The US acquisition has undoubtedly transformed OYO's reported numbers.

But investors should ask:

When will OYO's core Indian business return to sustainable growth?

Because long-term value creation will depend not only on successful acquisitions but also on reviving the business in its largest and most strategic home market.

Source: OYO UDRHP. Figures are based on company disclosures and my analysis of the filing.

I spent a few hours reading OYO's UDRHP because I wanted to understand where OYO's recent growth was actually coming from.

In 9M FY26, OYO reported ₹6,940 Cr in revenue, compared with ₹6,252 Cr in FY25—an 11% increase that looks impressive at first glance.

But after digging into the geographic breakdown, I think the headline only tells part of the story.

Regional Growth

• India: -10%
• UK: -38%
• Europe: -1%
• US: +51%

Based on the numbers, the US alone appears to have contributed roughly 13 percentage points of growth, while the other major geographies dragged consolidated growth back to 11%.

Then I looked at Gross Booking Value (GBV).

• Total GBV (9M FY26): ₹22,946 Cr
• US GBV: ₹12,022 Cr (52% of total)

What surprised me even more is that in FY24, the US contributed only around ₹971 Cr, or roughly 9% of total GBV.

That's a massive jump in just two years.

Another interesting finding:

OYO operates 293,554 storefronts globally.

The US has only 2,087 storefronts, which is less than 1% of the total network.

Yet those properties contribute:

• 27% of revenue
• 52% of GBV

That's an incredible level of productivity per storefront.

The biggest reason appears to be OYO's acquisition of G6 Hospitality (Motel 6 & Studio 6) for around ₹4,460 Cr.

The acquisition clearly helped grow the top line, but it also came with a cost.

Debt increased from around ₹3,603 Cr to approximately ₹7,485 Cr, which also explains why OYO plans to use about ₹4,987 Cr (77% of the IPO proceeds) to repay debt.

The US business looks strong.

But India's business has grown at only around 3.5% CAGR over the last three years, and the latest reported period even shows a 10% decline.

So my biggest question is:

Can OYO sustain this growth without acquisitions, and when does the India business start contributing meaningfully again?

I'm not saying the G6 acquisition was a bad decision—it appears to have strengthened OYO's business.

I just think the headline 11% growth doesn't tell the full story unless you look at where that growth is actually came from.

Source: OYO UDRHP

Would love to hear what everyone else thinks. Did I miss anything in the filing?

📉 Turtlemint Fintech

• Listed at ₹134.90 on NSE and ₹136 on BSE
• Around 11% below its IPO issue price

📊 CSM Technologies

• IPO Price Band: ₹107–113
• Raised ₹20 crore from anchor investors
• Closed with just 66% subscription

With one IPO listing at a discount and another failing to achieve full subscription, investors appear to be becoming more selective after months of strong IPO activity.

Could this mark the start of a more cautious phase for IPOs, especially in the fintech and SME space?

Everyone is talking about Meta investing in CRED at a ₹41,830 Cr valuation.

Most discussions stop there.

But almost nobody is asking a more interesting question:

Why would Meta invest in a company that lost ₹1,457 Cr last year?

So I compared CRED with Paytm to understand what the market might be valuing.

Here are a few numbers that stood out:

• Paytm: 7.2 Cr monthly active users
• CRED: 1.26 Cr monthly active users

So CRED has only 17% of Paytm's user base.

Now look at payment volume.

• Paytm: ₹18.9 lakh Cr
• CRED: ₹8.5 lakh Cr

Despite having just 17% of the users, CRED already processes 44% of Paytm's payment volume.

Then I looked at monetization.

• CRED ARPU: ₹2,171
• Paytm ARPU: ₹958

That's 2.3x higher revenue per user.

Revenue yield is also surprisingly similar.

• CRED: 0.32%
• Paytm: 0.36%

And finally, growth.

• CRED Revenue CAGR (5 years): 96%
• Paytm Revenue CAGR (5 years): 20%

This changed how I looked at the company.

CRED doesn't seem to be optimizing for the largest user base.

It seems to be optimizing for the highest-value customer base.

Payments are probably just the acquisition channel.

The real opportunity is cross-selling lending, insurance, investing and other financial products to affluent users.

I'm not saying Meta invested because of this alone—only Meta knows its investment thesis.

But after comparing the numbers, it's easier to understand why the market is willing to value CRED differently from a typical payments company.

Curious to hear what others think.

Does CRED deserve a premium valuation, or is the market paying too much for growth?

Everyone is talking about Meta investing in CRED at a ₹41,830 Cr valuation.

Most discussions stop there.

But almost nobody is asking a more interesting question:

Why would Meta invest in a company that lost ₹1,457 Cr last year?

So I compared CRED with Paytm to understand what the market might be valuing.

Here are a few numbers that stood out:

• Paytm: 7.2 Cr monthly active users
• CRED: 1.26 Cr monthly active users

So CRED has only 17% of Paytm's user base.

Now look at payment volume.

• Paytm: ₹18.9 lakh Cr
• CRED: ₹8.5 lakh Cr

Despite having just 17% of the users, CRED already processes 44% of Paytm's payment volume.

Then I looked at monetization.

• CRED ARPU: ₹2,171
• Paytm ARPU: ₹958

That's 2.3x higher revenue per user.

Revenue yield is also surprisingly similar.

• CRED: 0.32%
• Paytm: 0.36%

And finally, growth.

• CRED Revenue CAGR (5 years): 96%
• Paytm Revenue CAGR (5 years): 20%

This changed how I looked at the company.

CRED doesn't seem to be optimizing for the largest user base.

It seems to be optimizing for the highest-value customer base.

Payments are probably just the acquisition channel.

The real opportunity is cross-selling lending, insurance, investing and other financial products to affluent users.

I'm not saying Meta invested because of this alone—only Meta knows its investment thesis.

But after comparing the numbers, it's easier to understand why the market is willing to value CRED differently from a typical payments company.

Curious to hear what others think.

Does CRED deserve a premium valuation, or is the market paying too much for growth?

Price Band: ₹107–113
📌 Lot Size: 132 Shares
📌 Retail Investment: ₹14,916
📌 Anchor Book: ₹20 Cr

Usually, when anchor investors come in before an IPO, the grey market gets excited.

This time?

Anchors invested ₹20 crore, but GMP is barely moving.

Either:
✅ Smart money sees value that retail hasn't noticed yet

OR

❌ The market isn't convinced despite the anchor participation.

Personally, I'd be watching QIB and HNI subscriptions much more closely than GMP over the next few days.

The real question:

If institutional demand turns out to be strong, is a 3.54% GMP actually underestimating this IPO?

What's everyone seeing in the financials that the market might be missing?

Apply, avoid, or wait-and-watch?

Issue split:
📌 50% QIB
📌 15% NII/HNI
📌 35% Retail

Lot size: 88 shares
Listing: BSE & NSE

Interesting to see whether institutions lead the demand here or if retail investors drive subscriptions.

Too early to judge, but category-wise subscription data could tell the real story.

What are your thoughts—subscribe or skip? 🤔

#IPO #KnackPackagingIPO #IPOWatch

While reading the Jio IPO DRHP, I found a statistic that completely changed how I look at Jio's broadband business.

Most people think Jio became India's broadband leader because of fibre.

The numbers suggest AirFiber may have been the real growth engine.

Jio's broadband subscribers:

• FY24: 11.2M
• FY25: 17.4M
• FY26: 27.1M

AirFiber subscribers:

• FY24: 0.7M
• FY25: 5.6M
• FY26: 12.9M

That means AirFiber added 12.2M subscribers since launch.

Out of Jio's total 15.9M broadband additions, AirFiber contributed nearly 77%.

That's much larger than I expected.

The interesting part is that AirFiber solves one of the biggest problems in broadband deployment: fibre rollout takes time.

Instead of waiting for trenching, approvals and last-mile fibre installation, Jio used its wireless network to rapidly connect homes.

The result?

• 27.1M broadband subscribers
• 42% fixed broadband market share
• 67.56% share of industry net additions in FY26
• 77.49% share in advanced FWA

What surprised me even more is that India still has only ~20% fixed broadband penetration.

According to the DRHP, subscribers are expected to grow from 63.6M to 150.4M by FY31.

So despite Jio's leadership, the market still appears to be in the early innings.

One thing that caught my eye on the risk side:

Rental expenses increased from ₹1,894 Cr in FY25 to ₹3,907 Cr in FY26.

Management links this largely to equipment required for broadband expansion.

Since AirFiber depends on routers, receivers and customer-premise equipment, I wonder how much future economics depend on hardware and semiconductor costs remaining favorable.

My biggest takeaway:

Jio's broadband story may be less about fibre and more about AirFiber than most investors realize.

Would love to hear from people tracking the Jio IPO.

What do you think about the Jio IPO?

When I first came across ESDS, I assumed it was another small data centre company.

And when I think about data centre businesses, I usually think about scale.

More land.
More buildings.
More power capacity.
More servers.

The industry's biggest players are spending billions to build larger and larger infrastructure footprints, so naturally I expected ESDS to follow a similar playbook.

But after going through the DRHP, annual reports, and investor presentations, I came away with a different impression.

The company operates only around 7 MW of data centre capacity, yet it generates EBITDA margins above 40% and ROCE of around 24%.

That immediately made me curious.

The first thing that stood out was that ESDS isn't really a pure data centre company.

Its revenue mix is roughly:

• IaaS (Cloud Infrastructure): 58%
• Managed Services: 21%
• SaaS Solutions: 21%

Nearly 42% of revenue comes from managed services and software-related offerings rather than pure infrastructure.

Another interesting point was that one of its Navi Mumbai data centres is leased from Yotta. Instead of aggressively owning infrastructure, management seems focused on building cloud, managed services, and SaaS capabilities on top of existing infrastructure.

The customer stickiness also caught my attention.

According to company disclosures, around 91% of customers were using all three service categories by H1 FY25.

That suggests the company has been reasonably successful in cross-selling customers from infrastructure into higher-value services.

Financially, the company has shown strong improvement over the last few years.

Revenue grew from around ₹198 Cr in FY22 to ₹377 Cr in FY25.

EBITDA grew from ₹62 Cr to ₹154 Cr during the same period.

ROCE improved from around 14% to 24%.

For a company operating in digital infrastructure, those numbers are quite impressive.

At the same time, there are some obvious concerns.

The company is much smaller than players like Yotta, CtrlS, Nxtra, and even AI-focused players like E2E Networks.

The stock also trades at premium valuation multiples (around 92x earnings), meaning a lot of future growth is already being priced in.

My biggest takeaway is that ESDS doesn't look like a traditional data centre operator.

It looks more like a cloud, managed services, and SaaS business that happens to operate data centres.

I'm still trying to figure out whether the market is correctly valuing that distinction or whether the current valuation already reflects most of the opportunity.

Would love to hear thoughts from people who have tracked the company longer.

What am I missing here?

What's the strongest bear case against ESDS?

India's IPO market is seeing two very different narratives unfold this week.

🚀 Turtlemint's IPO opened today at a price band of ₹144–152 per share, valuing the insurtech company at more than ₹4,500 crore. The company has already raised ₹397 crore from anchor investors, suggesting strong institutional participation.

However, the grey market is signaling a more cautious approach, with GMP currently hovering around 1.5%.

At the same time...

📉 Nifty IT fell nearly 6.5% after Accenture cut its guidance, triggering a sharp selloff across technology stocks globally.

This puts the spotlight on CSM Technologies, whose IPO is approaching amid one of the weakest sentiment periods for IT stocks in recent months.

Things Worth Watching

• Will the IT sector correction impact CSM Technologies' subscription demand?
• Can a strong GMP survive if tech stocks continue to decline?
• Does Turtlemint's relatively muted GMP indicate a broader cooling in IPO enthusiasm?

My View

The interesting part isn't Turtlemint.

The bigger story may be whether upcoming IPOs can attract investor demand when sector sentiment turns negative.

We've seen in the past that strong businesses can still command healthy subscriptions despite weak market conditions. But short-term listing performance often depends heavily on sentiment.

Are you planning to subscribe to Turtlemint?

The National Stock Exchange has finally filed its DRHP for a ₹30,000 crore IPO, potentially making it the largest IPO in Indian market history.

A few key developments from today's private market landscape:

🏛️ NSE files DRHP

• IPO size: ₹30,000 Cr
• Could become India's largest-ever IPO
• SBI expected to be the largest OFS participant
• Major milestone for unlisted NSE shareholders

💻 CSM Technologies IPO

• Price band: ₹107–₹113/share
• Subscription: June 24–29
• 50% reserved for QIBs

🐾 Vetic raises $40 million

• Funding led by Bessemer Venture Partners
• One of the larger funding rounds in India's pet healthcare sector
• Capital to be used for expansion and technology upgrades

Are Indian IPO markets entering another strong cycle with NSE, Jio, Razorpay, and other large listings on the horizon?

A lot happened in private markets today.

📱 Jio may file IPO papers before Reliance AGM

Reports indicate Jio could file its DRHP ahead of the Reliance AGM this Friday. If true, this could officially kickstart India's biggest IPO story .
🎧 Pocket FM preparing for India IPO

Pocket FM is reportedly exploring a reverse flip from the US back to India as it moves closer to a public listing.

Interesting to see more startups choosing India over overseas markets for IPOs.
🏭 Utkal Specialty lists at issue price

Despite subscriptions, the stock listed flat at ₹66.

Another reminder that SME IPO subscription numbers don't automatically translate into listing gains.

My thoughts:

• Jio IPO is the biggest near-term catalyst for the unlisted market.

• Reverse flips are becoming a trend, not an exception.

• SME investors are becoming far more selective than they were 2-3 years ago.

I've been looking into Parag Parikh Financial Advisory Services (PPFAS), which is currently trading in the unlisted market at around ₹17,950 per share, and I'm trying to determine whether the current valuation is justified.

What Makes PPFAS Interesting?

PPFAS has been one of the fastest-growing AMCs in India over the last decade.

• AUM has grown to over ₹1.6 lakh crore
• Revenue CAGR of approximately 67% over the last 5 years
• Profit CAGR of approximately 93% over the last 5 years
• ROE of around 47%
• EBITDA margin of nearly 79%
• PAT margin of around 57%
• Investor base has grown from less than 2,000 investors in FY14 to nearly 49 lakh investors in FY25

The broader mutual fund industry has also expanded significantly, from around ₹12 lakh crore AUM in FY15 to more than ₹74 lakh crore today, suggesting there is still a long runway for growth.

The Biggest Risk

One thing that stood out to me is the concentration risk.

Around 88% of PPFAS's AUM comes from a single scheme — the Parag Parikh Flexi Cap Fund.

If the fund underperforms for a prolonged period or sees reduced inflows, it could impact overall AUM growth and profitability.

The Valuation Debate

At the current unlisted market price, PPFAS is trading at approximately:

• P/E: 55x
• P/B: 21x
• EV/EBITDA: 40x

These multiples are higher than most listed AMC peers such as:

• HDFC Asset Management Company
• ICICI Prudential Asset Management Company
• Nippon Life India Asset Management

However, PPFAS has also delivered significantly stronger growth than most of these peers.

The Counterargument

While the stock looks expensive on traditional valuation metrics, its PEG ratio is lower than many listed AMCs, suggesting investors may actually be paying less for each unit of growth compared to peers.

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