Hi everyone!

I’m a CA professional with experience in tax and audit. If you’re looking for help filing your Income Tax Return this season, I’d be happy to assist.

All ITRs
Crypto
Capital gains (stocks & mutual funds)
AIS/26AS reconciliation
Choosing the right tax regime
Maximizing eligible deductions and ensuring accurate filing

Whether it’s your first time filing or you just want a second opinion before submitting, feel free to DM me. Happy to answer basic tax questions too!
Thanks, and hope everyone gets their refunds quickly! 😊

Will get the allotment?

If yes than will be it be sold in market price because of high lot size and low trading in sme stocks?

Kuku Technologies (formerly Mebigo Labs, the company behind Kuku FM and Kuku TV) confidentially filed its DRHP with Securities and Exchange Board of India (SEBI) in June, looking to raise Rs 2,500-3,000 crore at a valuation of up to Rs 15,000 crore. Media reports peg FY26 revenue at roughly Rs 1,400 crore, up sevenfold. Kotak Mahindra Bank - Corporate, Institutional & Investment Banking, Jefferies, JM Financial Ltd and Axis Bank are running the book.

Before you decide where to place your application, here is what the last audited filing -- FY25, under MCA -- actually shows.

1. The growth is real, but the audited base is small

Revenue went from Rs 41.2 crore in FY23 to Rs 88.0 crore in FY24 to Rs 241.5 crore in FY25, a 5.9x jump in two years. The company carries zero borrowings through this entire period. This is the part of the story the Rs 1,400 crore FY26 headline is built on top of, and it has not yet been audited.

2. Losses widened as revenue nearly tripled

EBITDA went from Rs -108.6 crore in FY24 to Rs -159.9 crore in FY25 even as revenue rose Rs 153.6 crore. Net loss deepened from Rs -95.7 crore to Rs -152.7 crore, a 59.5% deterioration. At the EBITDA line, the company is still losing 66.2% of what it earns in revenue.

3. The improved cash burn came from working-capital not earnings

Free cash flow improved from Rs -112.6 crore to Rs -43.9 crore, a 61% reduction. But Rs 109.7 crore of that came from payables and other current liabilities rising -- Rs 59.3 crore from trade payables, Rs 79.6 crore from other current liabilities -- not from the business burning less. If these balances normalise, burn reverts toward FY24 levels.

4. Net worth nearly halved in a single year.

Net worth fell from Rs 246.1 crore in FY24 to Rs 99.1 crore in FY25 as losses ate into capital. The offsetting positive: Rs 117.0 crore of cash and Rs 88.7 crore of current investments, still with zero debt. But the equity cushion going into an IPO is thin.

5. There is a legal overhang sized against that thin net worth.

An income-tax demand of Rs 83.9 crore -- tied to Series B CCPS share premium -- equals 84.6% of FY25 net worth. Public reporting also references an IP suit from Pocket FM seeking Rs 85.7 crore with injunctive risk. Either one going the wrong way materially dents the equity base.

Verdict: the underlying business is debt-free, has prepaid cash collection, and a genuine regional-language content business share. But the FY26 revenue sits on top of an FY25 audited base that is smaller, more loss-making, and thinner on net worth than the valuation suggests. Read the DRHP for backing of FY26 provisional numbers and how the tax/IP litigation resolution.

SBI Funds Management or SBI MF IPO is remoured to open mid july. While not confirmed yet but it will likely have shareholder quota so if you are gonna apply for the IPO and want to be eligible for Shareholder Quota so you can apply in two quota simultaneously i.e. Retail+ShareHolder or HNI+Shareholder buy 1 share of SBI just in case. No reserved Shareholder Quota DRHP but they can change add it when filing RHP though chances are said to be slim.

Note:- No shareholder quota atleast till now. Just a slim chance there might be. Writing cause people are not reading whole para.

Will share more updates

I'm trying to understand the investment thesis behind Cordelia Cruises after its IPO.

It listed around 15–19% below the IPO price on Day 1, but on the very next day it hit the upper circuit.

I have a few questions:

1. What caused such a sharp reversal in sentiment within a day?
2. Is this just short-term momentum and short covering, or are institutional investors accumulating the stock?
3. Even after the listing correction, do you think the company is still trading at an expensive valuation based on its current earnings?
4. Since Cordelia is currently the dominant player in India's domestic cruise industry, does it deserve a valuation premium because of its first-mover advantage?
5. The Indian government has been talking about expanding cruise tourism by 2029 through port infrastructure and tourism initiatives. How much of this future growth is already priced into the stock?
6. Do you see this as a good long-term (5–10 year) investment, or is the current optimism getting ahead of fundamentals?

I'd especially appreciate insights from anyone who has read the DRHP or analyzed the company's financials rather than just looking at the listing gains/losses.

At first glance, OYO's numbers look impressive.

In 9MFY26, OYO reported ₹6,940 Cr in revenue compared to ₹6,252 Cr in FY25—an 11% growth.

But after digging into the UDRHP, the story looks very different.

Growth by Geography

• India: -10%
• UK: -38%
• Europe: -1%
• US: +51%

The US alone added roughly 13 percentage points of growth, while weakness in other regions dragged overall growth down to 11%.

In simple words, without the US, OYO's consolidated growth would have looked far weaker.

The US Has Become OYO's Growth Engine

The numbers become even more interesting when you look at Gross Booking Value (GBV).

• Total GBV: ₹22,946 Cr
• US GBV: ₹12,022 Cr (52% of total GBV)

Now compare that with FY24.

Back then, the US contributed only ₹971 Cr, or roughly 9% of total GBV.

That means US GBV has grown by approximately 131%, becoming the single biggest contributor to OYO's topline growth.

The Surprising Part

OYO operates 293,554 storefronts globally.

Yet the US has only 2,087 storefronts—around 1% of its global network.

Despite that, the US contributes:

• 27% of revenue
• 52% of Gross Booking Value

That's an extraordinary level of productivity compared to the rest of OYO's network.

But Is This Organic Growth?

Here's where things become important.

The sharp jump in the US business coincides with OYO's acquisition of G6 Hospitality for around ₹4,460 Cr.

This suggests that a significant portion of OYO's recent growth is inorganic, driven by acquisitions rather than underlying expansion of its existing business.

Meanwhile, the acquisition also increased leverage.

Total borrowings have risen to around ₹7,485 Cr, compared with roughly ₹3,603 Cr earlier.

What About India?

India remains OYO's home market.

Yet the Indian business has delivered only around 3.5% CAGR over the last three years, barely keeping pace with inflation.

The latest reported period even shows a 10% decline in India.

This raises an important question.

If the domestic business continues to struggle while growth increasingly depends on acquired international assets, how sustainable is the current growth trajectory?

Why the IPO Matters

According to the UDRHP, OYO plans to use approximately ₹4,987 Cr, or nearly 77% of the IPO proceeds, for debt repayment.

That tells us reducing leverage is one of the primary objectives of the IPO.

My Biggest Question

The US acquisition has undoubtedly transformed OYO's reported numbers.

But investors should ask:

When will OYO's core Indian business return to sustainable growth?

Because long-term value creation will depend not only on successful acquisitions but also on reviving the business in its largest and most strategic home market.

Source: OYO UDRHP. Figures are based on company disclosures and my analysis of the filing.

Did anyone get the confirmation msg or mail?

SBI Funds Management has already filed its DRHP, and the issue is expected to be a complete OFS of around 20.37 crore shares.

Reports are suggesting an early/mid-July launch, but the final dates, price band and issue value are still awaited.

The brand and AUM scale will obviously attract attention, but since the company itself won’t receive any IPO proceeds, valuation will probably matter a lot.

Would you apply because of the SBI name and AMC business, or wait to see how it is priced?

Is the allotment our for CSM tech...it was mentioned on 30th June...but I couldn't verify it anywhere?

Just checked......No body got the allotment in my frnd circle approx 30 PANs.

Nyways here's the link : https://ipo.bigshareonline.com/ipo\_status.html

Hope u guys are lucky.......

same as title

Everyone is talking about Meta investing in CRED at a ₹41,830 Cr valuation.

Most discussions stop there.

But almost nobody is asking a more interesting question:

Why would Meta invest in a company that lost ₹1,457 Cr last year?

So I compared CRED with Paytm to understand what the market might be valuing.

Here are a few numbers that stood out:

• Paytm: 7.2 Cr monthly active users
• CRED: 1.26 Cr monthly active users

So CRED has only 17% of Paytm's user base.

Now look at payment volume.

• Paytm: ₹18.9 lakh Cr
• CRED: ₹8.5 lakh Cr

Despite having just 17% of the users, CRED already processes 44% of Paytm's payment volume.

Then I looked at monetization.

• CRED ARPU: ₹2,171
• Paytm ARPU: ₹958

That's 2.3x higher revenue per user.

Revenue yield is also surprisingly similar.

• CRED: 0.32%
• Paytm: 0.36%

And finally, growth.

• CRED Revenue CAGR (5 years): 96%
• Paytm Revenue CAGR (5 years): 20%

This changed how I looked at the company.

CRED doesn't seem to be optimizing for the largest user base.

It seems to be optimizing for the highest-value customer base.

Payments are probably just the acquisition channel.

The real opportunity is cross-selling lending, insurance, investing and other financial products to affluent users.

I'm not saying Meta invested because of this alone—only Meta knows its investment thesis.

But after comparing the numbers, it's easier to understand why the market is willing to value CRED differently from a typical payments company.

Curious to hear what others think.

Does CRED deserve a premium valuation, or is the market paying too much for growth?