I have started tracking OYO's IPO journey recently and honestly, most people are still reacting to the old OYO story.

The version most people remember:

• SoftBank-fueled hypergrowth
• Huge losses
• Layoffs
• Two failed IPO attempts
• Valuation collapse
• Governance concerns

That story was real. But the company filing again in 2026 is a very different company from the one that tried listing in 2021.

Not financial advice, just analysis. Curious what others here think.

Quick context

• Third confidential DRHP filed: January 2026
• IPO size: ₹6,650 crore
• Target valuation: $7–8 billion
• Structure: all fresh issue, no reported OFS
• FY24: first annual profit (₹229 crore)
• Motel 6 acquisition completed: December 2024

The biggest difference vs earlier filings

This IPO is no longer primarily about investor exits.

The 2023 filing was OFS-heavy, most of the money raised would've gone to existing shareholders, not the company. Current reporting suggests the 2026 filing is entirely fresh issue. Capital goes into OYO itself.

That changes the IPO psychology materially. Compare the three attempts side by side:

SoftBank is reportedly not participating in an OFS either. Whether that signals confidence in future upside or just better timing is debatable but it's a cleaner signal than a distressed seller trying to exit at any price.

The Motel 6 acquisition changed the story more than people realize

In December 2024, OYO acquired Motel 6 and Studio 6 from Blackstone for $525 million reportedly adding around 1,500 US properties and $1.7 billion in gross annual revenue.

This wasn't just a growth acquisition. It fundamentally changed the scale and classification of the company.

Before this, you could still broadly frame OYO as a travel-tech / franchise business.

Now it sits somewhere between:

• Hotel operator
• Franchise network
• Branded budget hotel chain
• Hospitality platform

Public markets assign very different multiples to each. That's part of why the valuation debate is so wide - both bulls and bears have room to argue.

Reported Q1 FY26 Gross Booking Value crossed ₹7,200 crore after Motel 6 consolidation, while reported net revenue was closer to ₹2,000 crore. The scale clearly moved - the bigger question is whether margins scale with it.

The profitability story is finally real

This is probably the single biggest change vs the earlier attempts.

The important part isn't just that FY24 was profitable. It's how they got there - exiting weak international markets, renegotiating minimum guarantee contracts, cutting aggressive expansion, and prioritizing margins over optics.

The company stopped behaving like a startup chasing valuation and started behaving more like a business preparing for market scrutiny. That's a meaningful shift.

What's still not clean

Motel 6 integration is unproven. Revenue has moved. Margins haven't been fully tested. OYO's earlier international bets - Europe, Southeast Asia, the Middle East mostly ended in retreat. Running 1,500 physical US properties is a fundamentally different operational problem. If integration works, it justifies the $7–8B valuation. If it doesn't, it complicates everything.

One profitable year doesn't make a cycle. FY24 profit came in a decent travel environment. Hospitality is cyclical. The business hasn't been stress-tested at this scale through a real downcycle yet.

Three filings plus the CCPS episode is a long memory. In 2024, OYO proposed a CCPS bonus share structure that would have given insiders a higher ratio than regular shareholders. It was withdrawn under pressure in November 2025 and replaced with a universal 1:1. Resolved but it happened reactively, not proactively. Fund managers don't evaluate these things in isolation.

The founder leverage structure still hangs over the story. Ritesh Agarwal's $2 billion financing from 2019 doesn't disappear at IPO — it gets resolved through it. That doesn't make the structure automatically bad, but large investors will scrutinize the incentive alignment carefully when IPO timing directly affects leverage resolution.

What the market is actually underwriting at $7–8 billion

At this valuation, public-market investors are effectively betting that:

• Motel 6 integration works and adds to margins, not just revenue
• Profitability scales further through a full travel cycle
• Governance stabilizes and the third filing holds up to scrutiny
• OYO earns a valuation framework closer to a scaled hospitality business than a startup turnaround story

That's a lot for the market to underwrite simultaneously. The bullish and cautious readings are both legitimate. Public markets will decide whether the price holds.

The real IPO story

The first phase of OYO was about proving it could grow fast. That phase ended badly.

The current phase is about proving the business can become durable.

And that's probably the more interesting question now — not whether OYO can scale, but whether it can sustain.

Three things I'm curious what you guys think :

• Does Motel 6 actually justify the valuation reset from $2.7B to $7–8B?
• Does the all-fresh-issue structure materially improve IPO quality in your view?
• How much weight would you place on the governance history at this point?

Been tracking Zepto closely ahead of the IPO, most of what I see online is either hype or surface level.

Tried to break down what actually matters - valuation, structure, unit economics, and a couple of things most coverage gets flat out wrong.

Not financial advice. Happy to be challenged.

Quick context:

• Valuation: $7–8B
• IPO size: ₹11,000 Cr
• Structure: mostly fresh issue (not OFS heavy)
• Status: DRHP filed confidentially with SEBI
• Timeline: July - Sep 2026

The first thing to understand

At this valuation, Zepto is not being priced as a delivery app.

It's being priced as a high-frequency retail system, one that combines inventory led commerce, advertising revenue, and subscription behaviour.

That's a very different lens. And it assumes a lot has to go right.

The number everyone quotes - and why it's misleading

You'll see this everywhere: ₹4,223.9 Cr revenue (FY24)

True. But easy to misread.

Zepto reports gross revenue - full value of goods sold. Blinkit / Instamart report net revenue - commissions only (15–20% of GMV).

So when people compare:

Zepto: ₹4,200 Cr
Blinkit: ₹5,200 Cr

They're not comparable.

On a like-for-like basis:

Zepto -₹1500 – 2000 Cr

That's not a rounding error, it's a different business.

What has actually improved:

• Losses narrowed: ₹2,371 Cr to ₹1,248 Cr (FY23 - FY24)
• Contribution margins turned positive (late 2023)
• EBITDA breakeven guidance: late 2026 (CFO Ramesh Bafna)

Still loss making but direction matters more than the number right now.

The part most people are underestimating

Zepto isn't just a delivery business anymore.

Ads (Jarvis)

• ₹1,000 Cr annualized revenue
• High margin - no incremental logistics cost

Zepto Pass

• 4M+ subscribers
• Increases order frequency and retention

If these scale, the business starts looking less like delivery and more like a retail + ads hybrid. We've seen this play out with Amazon and Zomato - it tends to start small, then matter disproportionately.

What the valuation is really saying

At $7–8B, the market is not pricing potential. It is pricing execution that hasn't fully played out yet.

At this valuation, the margin for error is thin.

For the story to hold:

• Ads need to scale
• Subscription needs to stick
• Store-level economics need to improve consistently

If that happens then narrative works. If not then valuation looks stretched.

That gap is where most IPO stories either hold - or break.

The IPO structure (important, often ignored)

This is expected to be fresh issue heavy - money goes into Zepto for growth capital, not primarily to exiting investors. That's a very different signal from an OFS-led IPO.

Curious how many people actually factor this in when evaluating IPOs.

The grey market "crash" that isn't a crash

People quoting ₹2,750 to ₹45 as a collapse. It's not.

Zepto massively increased share count during the reverse flip from Singapore to India. At ₹45 with 15.1 billion shares outstanding:

• Implied market cap is ₹67,957 Cr ($8.1B)
• That's actually above the last private round ($7B)

Signal is moderation, not panic. Market cap is the number that matters - not share price in isolation.

Risks that actually matter

• Regulatory: CCI probe on predatory pricing - underreported and material
• Execution: expansion beyond dense urban clusters where economics tighten
• Competition: Blinkit and Instamart are not standing still
• Org signals: 500 layoffs + leadership exits pre-IPO worth watching

None are fatal. But none are trivial either.

TL;DR:

• DRHP filed, IPO likely July–Sept 2026
• $7–8B valuation already prices in strong execution
• Revenue comparisons (gross vs net) are misleading
• Ads + subscription could reshape the business
• Fresh issue - capital goes into company, not exits
• Grey market "drop" is a share restructuring effect
• Real question: can Jarvis and Zepto Pass scale fast enough to justify the valuation?

Quick commerce was built on speed. Public markets will price it on efficiency.

Does the Jarvis ads layer actually change the unit economics here - or is this the same pre-profit IPO narrative in a different form?

Been following the Flipkart IPO story for a while. Figured I'd put together everything that actually matters in one place because most of what I've seen shared here is either outdated or misses the key structural point.

The narrative hasn't changed much. The structure has.

Not financial advice. Just analysis. Happy to be challenged in the comments.

Quick facts:

• Revenue FY25: ₹82,787 Cr
• Net loss FY25: ₹5,189 Cr
• Estimated valuation: ₹2.9 - 3.1 lakh Cr ($34.7 - 36.3B)
• Promoter: Walmart (85%)
• IPO type: Likely OFS-heavy
• Status: Pre-filing (no DRHP yet)

Why 2026 is different from the last five years of "Flipkart IPO soon"

The single biggest barrier was always the domicile issue. Flipkart was incorporated in Singapore. Listing on Indian exchanges with a foreign holding structure was structurally messy.

That's done. India re-domicile was completed in 2025.

Also worth noting - the PhonePe separation happened in December 2022. Whatever valuation you're thinking about for Flipkart, it no longer includes PhonePe. Cleaner story, but smaller one.

On the losses - this is where I think a lot of takes go wrong

Yes, ₹5,189 Cr loss in FY25 sounds bad.

But the losses have been narrowing consistently. The driver is investment - in logistics, quick commerce buildout, tech - not an inability to make money at the unit level.

Walmart has guided toward profitability around the IPO window.

And Google put in $350M in May 2024. Not an exit - a fresh bet at current valuations.

The thing most posts completely miss: who is actually selling

This is the part I want to highlight because I've seen almost no one discussing it seriously.

If the IPO is predominantly OFS - which multiple reports suggest - then Walmart is selling its shares to public investors.

That means IPO proceeds go to Walmart. Not to Flipkart.

A fresh issue raises money for the company to grow. An OFS raises money for the existing shareholder to exit (or partially exit).

This isn't automatically bad. But it completely changes how you should think about the investment. You're not funding Flipkart's next phase. You're buying Walmart's stake at a price Walmart is comfortable selling at.

That's worth pausing on.

Curious how many people here actually check OFS vs fresh issue before applying to IPOs.

The harder question isn't "will it list?" - it's "what are you actually paying for?"

Last transaction data (December 2023) pegged it at $34.7 - 36.3B. That's already a significant correction from the $35 - 38B range people were quoting in 2021 - 2022.

At this valuation, the market is pricing in continued market leadership AND a credible path to profitability. There's not much room built in for execution stumbles.

Quick SOTP sanity check:

• Core e-commerce (48% market share, loss-making): 2-3x revenue
• Flipkart Minutes (quick commerce): pre-profitability comps (Blinkit-style)
• Myntra (fashion, profitable): closer to Nykaa style multiples
• Super Money (UPI + fintech, 60M+ users): optionality, hard to price

Whether the combined number justifies 2.9 - 3.1 lakh Cr is genuinely debatable. The answer depends on when profitability lands and what the OFS/fresh issue split looks like in the DRHP.

What I'm watching before forming a stronger view:

• SEBI DRHP filing - the actual starting gun
• Fresh issue vs OFS split in the DRHP
• Walmart's lock-in period post-listing
• Any FY26 profitability guidance
• Flipkart Minutes expansion pace - best signal for quick commerce conviction

TL;DR:

→ IPO is structurally closer (re-domicile done)
→ Still loss-making, but improving
→ Likely OFS-heavy - Walmart selling, not Flipkart raising
→ $35B valuation already prices in strong execution
→ DRHP will be the real moment of truth

Curious what others think - particularly on the valuation. Does the SOTP hold up at 3 lakh Crore or does it need a clear profitability timeline before that multiple is justified?

Not a SEBI registered advisor. Not financial advice. All figures from public sources.

I’ve been tracking the unlisted space for a while, and PharmEasy (API Holdings) is probably one of the more extreme “valuation reset” stories in the Indian ecosystem.

In 2021, they filed for an IPO at around a $5.4 billion valuation. That was peak 'growth at all costs*'* era.

Fast forward to now - in the unlisted markets (as of April 2026), shares seem to be trading roughly in the ₹5.5 - 6.5 range depending on the deal.

That’s not just a correction. It’s basically a reset of the entire business.

1. The Thyrocare bet (and the debt that came with it)

The 4,500+ crore Thyrocare acquisition made a lot of sense strategically as diagnostics is a solid, relatively stable business.

But it also introduced leverage into the system.

And that became a problem once the funding environment changed. The Goldman Sachs structured debt piece didn’t help either.

By 2023, the pressure was pretty visible. The ₹3/share rights issue wasn’t just dilution, it was survival capital.

2. The business didn’t disappear - it got leaner

What’s interesting is that the business itself didn’t break.

From what recent numbers suggest:

• Revenue seems to have stabilized in the ₹5,500 - 6,000 Cr range
• Losses have come down meaningfully from peak burn levels
• There are signs that operational cash burn has reduced sharply

So the shift seems to be:

Growth → survival → now trying to stabilize

3. Founder step-back (recent signal)

Another recent development - three of the co-founders have stepped back from day-to-day roles.

They’re still on the board, but operational control is now with a more execution focused team.

This usually happens when companies move from 'scale fast' mode to 'fix the business' mode.

4. What the unlisted market is pricing in now

The market feels very different compared to a few years ago.

• Valuation seems to be somewhere in the $500M–700M range
• Pricing is still quite opaque (depends a lot on lot size and counterparties)
• Sentiment has shifted from 'is this going to zero?' to 'is this a recovery trade?'

IPO doesn’t look immediate, but the balance sheet situation seems more stable than before.

My takeaway

PharmEasy today feels like a different company with the same name.

The cap table has been reset, early investors have taken large haircuts, and the founders are less involved operationally.

But as a business, it might actually be in a more sustainable position now than it was during the $5B phase.

The question is whether that eventually translates into a credible IPO story again - or if it just settles into a smaller, steady business.

Curious if anyone here has seen recent unlisted deals for API Holdings especially around pricing, lot sizes, or demand.

(I’ve been following a few similar 'reset' situations in the unlisted space - happy to share more if people are interested.)

Quick backstory

NSE first filed for an IPO back in December 2016 and then it just stalled.

The main overhang was the co-location issue, where certain brokers were alleged to have gained faster access to market data through server proximity advantages.

Over the years, SEBI passed multiple orders and penalties, and the IPO never really moved forward.

More recently (2024), parts of the co-location matter were disposed off, which many see as the biggest regulatory overhang getting cleared.

That’s when IPO discussions quietly started picking up again.

What’s happened recently

Over the last couple of weeks, there’s been a noticeable pickup:

• NSE reportedly called all major merchant bankers for a joint meeting
• As per media reports, DRHP filing could happen around June 2026
• Potential listing timeline being discussed: before end of 2026
• An OFS window has opened for existing shareholders (with eligibility conditions)

IPO structure (as per current chatter):

• Likely pure OFS
• Estimated size: 20,000–23,000 Cr
• Stake dilution: 4 – 4.5%
• No fresh capital raise

The financials (FY25)

This is where NSE really stands out:

• Revenue: 17,141 Cr (+16% YoY)
• Net Profit: 12,188 Cr (+47% YoY)
• Net Margin: 71%
• EBITDA: 12,881 Cr
• Dividend: 35/share (incl. special dividend)

Personally I find the 71% net margin almost offensive for a business that basically has no real competitor in derivatives. BSE exists but let's be honest.

Market position

NSE is basically dominant in derivatives.

It handles 90%+ of India’s equity derivatives volume, which makes this close to a market infrastructure monopoly in that segment.

Unlisted market pricing

• Current price: 1,900
• 52-week range: 1,650 – 2,470
• Implied market cap: 4.7–5 lakh crore

That already puts it in the league of India’s largest financial institutions.

Valuation — this is where it gets interesting

At ₹1,900, NSE is trading at roughly 39–40x FY25 earnings.

For context:

• CME Group: 25x
• LSEG: 35x
• BSE (India): 60–70x

So depending on what you benchmark against:

• Looks expensive globally
• Looks cheaper vs BSE in Indian context

The real question

If you’re buying at ₹1,900 in the unlisted market, you’re basically betting on three things:

1. IPO actually happens on expected timeline
2. Listing valuation holds or expands
3. No fresh regulatory surprises

And none of these are guaranteed.

What I’m personally watching

• Whether DRHP actually gets filed by June (or slips)
• Impact of SEBI’s F&O tightening on volumes
• Any anchor / institutional interest pre-IPO

Bottom line:
This is probably one of the most important IPOs India will see when it happens.

Curious how others are looking at this -
1.Would you buy at current levels or wait for IPO clarity?
2. And for those already holding unlisted - are you planning to exit at listing or hold post-IPO?

Hey everyone! I'm u/ankur_r12, a founding moderator of r/PreIPOIndia.

This is a space to talk about pre-IPO and unlisted shares in India, basically everything that happens before a company gets listed.

We’ll be discussing things like:

• Unlisted share prices & availability
• Grey market trends
• Upcoming IPOs
• Early-stage investment opportunities
• And honest takes on what’s worth tracking (and what’s not)

What to post

Share anything the community would find useful or interesting:

• Price updates or deal insights
• Questions about buying/selling unlisted shares
• IPO expectations or analysis
• News or updates around companies likely to go public

Even if you're just getting started, feel free to ask basic questions - that’s what this space is for.

Community vibe

The goal is simple - keep it real and helpful.
No hype, no spam, no “guaranteed returns” nonsense.

Just genuine discussions and learning from each other.

How to get started

• Drop a quick intro in the comments 👇
• Share your first post (even a simple question works)
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Thanks for being part of the early group here.
Let’s build something genuinely useful together.