u/WhatARotation

r/amiuglytruth is exactly what it purports to be: a subreddit where people post pictures of themselves and ask others for their opinion on whether they are ugly. Putting the obvious toxicity that such a community is bound to generate aside

A recent post in the sub by a 24 year old woman, caused quite a bit of arguing in the comments section over the poster’s weight.

https://www.reddit.com/r/amiuglytruth/s/yl54FupJAv

One commenter quickly latched onto her manner of presenting herself, and extrapolated on her character from it.

“The fillers and kissing face is ugly honestly you look like the definition of bad choices.”

“ooh harsh. i dont think shes ugly at all. people are so quick to judge.”

Another commenter immediately brings up her weight, which leads to an ensuing flame war over the attractiveness of not being skinny, complete with accusations of simping and violating the purpose of the sub:

“You’re not ugly but don’t let the “Thicc” girl hype train ruin your life too. You are mid. Your looks are just above average but you have a gut and flabby arms. Dye your hair back to normal too.”

“Def not mid. She's very pretty, and her hair looks great. Quit acting like she's 300 lbs by saying "flabby arms" and "has a gut." While she could benefit from losing a bit of weight, that doesn't automatically make her mid.

Objectively, her facial features look very symmetrical. Her nose is slim, and her lips look plump. All features that point to being attractive.”

This last comment, which asserts that OP is significantly better looking than average, immediately prompts some rebuttals:

“I could walk outside throw a paper plane off my balcony and hit ten women that look just like her and five that are objectively better looking because they don’t have a gut. I didn’t call her ugly. I didn’t even call her fat. I just said she’s out of shape basically. I even said her looks are above average. She’s not very pretty. Good looking at best. You said it yourself she can benefit from losing weight. That’s what makes her mid. You’re making it too personal with your personal preference. You should really take a look at the rules for this sub again. If you want to simp for women looking for attention there are places you’ll enjoy much more than here. These women come here for the truth and sometimes the truth is ugly even if they aren’t.”

“No man don’t gas her up. She is definitely pretty. Not ugly, but certainly mid.”

u/curryMax21 seizes on this last comment as an opportunity to absolutely eviscerate the OP’s looks, which prompts some people to defend them. At this point, things get ugly, with accusations of simping being hurled in retaliation:

“I would dare say significantly below mid. She looks average at best with a pound of face paint and could stand to skip a few pizza nights”

“Ten bucks says you’re “significantly below mid”. Your comment absolutely stinks of projection.”

“Bro calm down. 🤣 why are you so pressed. Most people are mid. It just means average. She’s not going to dm you and ask you to smash just because you’re hyping her up.”

“Is this satire?

You commented on my reply to the last guy… so you clearly read the part where I pointed out that I only spoke about him, and didn’t even mention OP.

Your reply literally focused on the part where I said that I was only here for the comments, not the pictures of attention seekers.

I haven’t hyped her up. I haven’t even complimented her.

And, spoiler alert: I’m not about to. Because I genuinely don’t care if she even read my comment, as it wasn’t directed toward her. It was only about her in a marginal and wholly unavoidable way…

But, hey… if you wanna think I’m here to clamor for someone’s attention in the most indirect possible way, instead of just accepting that I’m here for the far more obvious (and flatly stated) reason… ok. I wouldn’t stop you even if I could. Cause you’re just as important to me as she is… and that’s not at all.

Although… to be fair to you… I have spent 100% more time and effort addressing you specifically, than her. So I guess that means you’re the real MVP.

Congrats, or something.”

“Here comes the simp army 🤦”

Another user comments negatively on OP’s apparent promiscuity:

“You look like I'd catch something TBH.”

“Catch what”

“Some random STI”

“Ahh the best game. Dont know what you'll get haha”

Another comment thread also frames OP’s weight negatively, but this one doesn’t devolve into as much of a battle as the first one:

“You're at the edge of chubby.. try not to gain more weight”

“Edge of what? Chubby and morbidly obese?”

“In what made up reality is this girl anywhere near “morbidly obese”?

What a ridiculous thing to say.”

I didn’t scroll down to read most of the comments, so there may be more drama.

At arguably the height of the “woke” movement back in 2019, NFL Quarterback Colin Kaepernick successfully lobbied Nike to remove shoes displaying the Betsy Ross flag from their product lineup, because he regarded the flag as a symbol of slavery, being that it hearkens back to a period where slavery was widely practiced in America.

At the time, I sharply disagreed with this characterization, as for me, that flag has always stood for the founding ideals of liberal democracy, natural rights, and equality under the law, even if they weren’t fully realized at the time the flag was in use.

As I have matured, I still view the flag with reverence and believe it to be in general a positive symbol (as it ultimately is still a an American flag), but I can now understand how others would feel differently. How do you view it, other early versions of the American flag, and early American history in general?

The language used by most circuits seems to hold that the crime of mail fraud requires a “specific intent to defraud”, which in the Supreme Court’s 1980 Bailey case was roughly mapped to MPC-style “purpose”. The third circuit goes even further, saying in its model jury instructions that the required intent to defraud is an “intent or *purpose* to deceive or cheat”.

However, in Shaw v U.S., the Supreme Court construed the similarly constructed bank fraud statute only requires knowledge, because the statute specifically prohibits “knowingly [executing] a scheme or artifice to defraud”, rather than purposefully doing so, and says that “We have found no relevant authority in the area of mail fraud, wire fraud, financial frauds, or the like supporting Shaw’s view [that purpose, rather than mere knowledge, is required]”. This would seem to end the inquiry.

However, the court’s reasoning was built on Congress’ use of the word “knowingly”, which is absent from the mail and wire fraud statutes. Furthermore, the sixth circuit continues to speak in purposive terms when describing mail/wire fraud, while conforming its bank fraud jurisprudence to the Supreme Court’s holding in Shaw. Thus I am uncertain what the proper standard of mens rea is for mail/wire fraud.

How has the standard been understood in actual litigation?

Many people here say that if a law is in the books, it should be enforced. That is a perfectly valid “rule of law” ideal. My question is how far that logic should extend when the practical enforcement reality sharply diverges from the law as written.

The canonical example of what I’m describing is a marijuana dispensary in a state where medical/recreational marijuana is legal. The federal government technically has the power to shut down every one of these dispensaries, arrest every one of their employees, charge said employees with and convict most of them of felony distribution of a controlled substance, and force them to forfeit all of their salaries as the proceeds of a Controlled Substances Act violation. You might say “but u/whatarotation, where’s the required interstate commerce nexus for purely intrastate activity”, at which point I’d point you to Gonzales v Raich.

Another example is the federal death penalty. Should it be sought by prosecutors for crimes committed exclusively in states that have abolished capital punishment?

I am sure there are numerous other examples of what I’m talking about, but for some reason they escape me. I don’t really have an opinion on this issue, so I’m interested in hearing the arguments from both sides.

Currently, Civil Asset Forfeiture (at least federally) has a statute of limitations that begins to run only when the government discovers the underlying criminal offense, or the property’s connection to said offense, whichever is later.

Should this regime be changed to more closely match the manner in which the statute of limitations operates for criminal prosecutions, which is that the clock begins to run from the moment the crime is committed, rather than from when the government discovers it? Why or why not?

The argument for making the statute of limitations run from when the crime is committed is the general principle of finality in law: somebody who transported a small amount of drugs in their car back in 2005 and causes no harm generally shouldn’t be burdened decades later with the worry that the government will come and seize the motor vehicle for an offense which for all intents and purposes is so old nobody remembers it or really cares.

The argument against making such a change is that it would further incentivize criminals to conceal their crimes and hamper the interests of justice in cases where the criminals successfully evade detection.

I am aware that many want civil forfeiture abolished entirely, but it does have its (very narrow) legitimate uses (like when the perpetrator is unable to be tried). I agree that the burden of proof (preponderance of the evidence) is way too lenient, however, as currently employed.

In US v Williams (2008), the Supreme Court upheld an anti-CSAM pandering statute (18 USC S 2252A(3)(b)) as constitutional—this seems like a really positive result, as I think we can all agree that CSAM is awful and needs to be thwarted in every conceivable way.

However, the statute is so broadly worded, and was so broadly interpreted by Justice Scalia’s opinion, that it seems to sweep a nearly limitless variety of conduct that has objectively nothing to do with CSAM based solely on the defendant’s private (albeit dark) thoughts.

Suppose, for instance, somebody points at literally anything while privately thinking “I hope this point offers the thing I’m pointing at as CSAM.” This would appear to satisfy the statute’s “intended to cause another to believe” clause, as interpreted by Justice Scalia, because he says that the clause doesn’t require an objective recipient to actually believe anything—it only turns on the defendant’s intent. And it would satisfy the actus reus as well, because Justice Scalia defines “presents” as “showing to another with a view to his acquisition”.

How about another one? Suppose somebody hands literally anything to another person while rotating their wrist 1 degree and thinking to themselves “I hope that the wrist rotation causes them to believe that the thing I’m holding contains CSAM”. This would also appear to violate the statute as construed by Justice Scalia, for one is plainly “distributing”, and the subjective intent prong is plainly satisfied by stipulation.

Now you might say, “but how would they be able to prove it?” Well suppose our defendant keeps a diary of every dark thought that comes to them. Then we do have evidence, but even then, such a question is really just attempting to dodge the substantive law point I’m raising, which is substantive: whether Congress constitutionally criminalized a near limitless variety of innocuous-seeming acts based solely on the actor’s mental state.

Suppose Congress passed the following law:

“Whoever, having been selected to serve on a federal jury, knowingly returns a verdict contrary to that which such juror in good faith believes the evidence has shewn, shall be fined under this title or imprisoned for not more than three years, or both.”

Would it pass constitutional muster?

Basically, Fanduel (a sports gambling company) has a VIP program whereby they encourage high-dollar gamblers to continue betting. A man, Terry Thompson, who was targeted by this program is suing the company after losing over 1.5 million dollars to his gambling addiction. The lawsuit specifically names a Cameo video prepared at the request of the man’s representative at Fanduel in which baseball star Bryce Harper wishes Thompson an extra special Thanksgiving and references his son by name, presumably to entice Thompson to continue gambling.

Should Congress take action in response to these predatory companies, up to and including banning sports gambling nationwide?

18 U.S.C. § 1730 is a misdemeanor criminal offense that prohibits anybody not affiliated with the letter-carrying branch of the postal service from wearing the official uniform or badge. It contains only one exception: actors in a theatrical, television, or movie performance.

It appears, then, that the statute's language would cover a minor dressed up as a mailman for Halloween, with the only qualification being that the federal age of criminal responsibility is 11. Of course, wearing a Halloween costume is classic expressive conduct, so the First Amendment is implicated. My question is essentially whether the government may constitutionally obtain a conviction of the child for this conduct.

The answer is more complicated than it first appears. Because the regulation only incidentally burdens speech, O’Brien seems to apply. The first two prongs of the O’Brien test (within constitutional power, important/substantial interest) are easily satisfied. The third prong “interest unrelated to expression” is more debatable. The fourth factor: “no greater than essential” is more debatable. If the court uses the actual O’Brien wording, the government likely loses the case. However, the court has neutered that final factor since O’Brien by construing it to mean that the neutral regulation promotes a substantial interest that would be achieved less effectively without it. So is punishing a 12 year old’s Halloween costume truly constitutional?

Bonds is essentially the answer to “what if Mike Trout started using PEDs right now”?

To put Bonds into perspective, through the end of his age-34 season, he had 103.7 bWAR to Trout’s 90.6.

Basically, suppose Trout was slightly better, and then further suppose that he played another 8 years after this one, slashing .322/.517/.724, averaging 9.7 bWAR/162 over that span, and you have Bonds’ career.

18 U.S.C. § 1730 is a misdemeanor criminal offense that prohibits anybody not affiliated with the letter-carrying branch of the postal service from wearing the official uniform or badge. It contains only one exception: actors in a theatrical, television, or movie performance.

It appears, then, that the statute's language would cover a minor dressed up as a mailman for Halloween, with the only qualification being that the federal age of criminal responsibility is 11. Of course, wearing a Halloween costume is classic expressive conduct, so the First Amendment is implicated. My question is essentially whether the government may constitutionally obtain a conviction of the child for this conduct.

The argument for “immaterial attempted fraud” is relatively straightforward: Attempt is consistently understood to be evaluated under the defendant’s believed circumstances. The materiality of a statement can be thought of as “just another circumstance”, because it is a factual inquiry into whether the statement is capable of influencing a decision. That begs the question: does materiality in attempted fraud cases (such as under 18 USC S 1349) get replaced with a requirement that a defendant only believe their statement is influential?

I am highly conflicted on this question. On the one hand, the Solicitor General regarded it as serious enough to raise to the Supreme court in 1998 in a related context (see Neder v U.S., holding that materiality is an element of the completed wire/mail/bank fraud offenses). The SG’s argument was as follows:

“In any event, when a defendant intends to defraud another but devises a scheme that in the circumstances turns out to be immaterial to its intended victim, he is properly viewed as having attempted to commit fraud or false pretenses. It is no defense to a charge of criminal attemptthat the means the defendant chose to commit the completed offense turned out in the circumstances to be inadequate.See, e.g., Model Penal Code § 5.01 cmt. 3(a), at 311-312 (1985)(discussing, inter alia, case in which defendant attempted tokill using poison incapable of producing death). See generally United States v. Hsu, 155 F.3d 189, 202-203 & n.19 (3dCir. 1998) (weight of federal authority follows Model Penal Code approach to principles of criminal attempt). Norshould it be a defense to a charge of attempted fraud that thedefendant’s deceptive scheme, though intended to defraud, turned out in the circumstances to be incapable of deceiving, or unimportant to, the intended victim. Cf. Model Penal Code § 5.01 cmt. 3(c), at 318 n.92 (defendant who sought tosuborn perjury properly guilty of attempted subornationeven if false testimony sought turned out to be immaterial; criticizing contrary view reflected in early state decision asresting on incorrect view that materiality is matter of law). Put differently, a defendant who intends to defraud but usesinadequately deceptive means is properly viewed as guilty of attempted fraud for the precise reason that petitioner identifies (Br. 36 n.18): if the scheme had worked as intended, the defendant would have defrauded his victim."

The Neder court was not persuaded that materiality should be excluded from the substantive offense, which begs the question of whether it should be excluded from the attempted offense.

The strongest objection to the theory I could find is Supreme Court decisions, describing materiality as the “demanding”, “principled basis for separating everyday misstatements from actionable fraud”, saying it “substantially narrows the universe of actionable misrepresentations”, and that “[m]ateriality of falsehood is an element of, and thus a limit on, the federal fraud statutes”

If a prosecutor could satisfy the element by simply slapping the word “attempt” in front of the charge, and using evidence of intent to deceive as probative of the defendant believing their statement had that capability, the Supreme Court’s language would become essentially meaningless.

Therefore, I essentially ask you what is the proper understanding of materiality in attempted fraud cases. Does it remain a substantive limitation on fraud liability, or does it become essentially a subjective belief element?

I’m trying to understand how broadly materiality sweeps in federal fraud, because I’ve heard differing conceptions of it. One concept is whether a statement “has a natural tendency to influence, or is capable of influencing, the decision making process of the body to which it was addressed.” Another is whether a statement “would likely be regarded as important by a reasonable decision-maker” or whether the maker “knew or had reason to know that the recipient would likely regard it as important”.

Suppose a candidate for an ultra-competitive job with a hiring rate of roughly 1% is in the middle of a multiple-hours long interview. They are asked “That was a nice company you interned for, why didn’t you return?” Their response is “the commute was untenable.” The commute was indeed not going to be tenable long term, but the statement is a lie as to their reason for not returning. They had actually applied for a return offer and were rejected (despite strong performance reviews and along with nearly everybody else in the office). Is this material?

The argument for materiality is that in a competitive hiring process, any information that makes a candidate look more favorable could tip the scales, so concealing the lack of a return offer would be material. The argument against is that materiality was described by the Supreme Court as the “demanding”, “principled basis for separating everyday misstatements from actionable fraud”, and defining lies like as material strips the doctrine of all limiting functionality. My question is essentially which should prevail if we apply doctrine faithfully.