u/fidhaz007

Let's suppose Bob has free will under Classical theism.

ie God created Bob with free will.

It's Monday morning and Bob can either choose to drink coffee or tea as he likes both. Bob freely chooses tea.

But, that's merely a contingent fact. Bob could've chosen coffee instead.

God is Causally Responsible for creating this particular Possible world where Bob chooses tea this Monday. God could've actually Actualized a possible world where Bob chose coffee instead of tea. God isn't merely an Omniscient Observer who's causally isolated from us, but is the Necessary Being who sufficiently explains every contingency. God could've made a world where every single Contingent fact is the same EXCEPT Bob choosing tea and making that to a coffee.

So from God's pov, God can never create Free agents. Because God could easily create a possible world where the "free" agent does X instead of Y.

You don't need to agree with the Metaphysical modality presented by the Contingency argument for this to work. You could be a theist like Richard Swinburne who thinks God is also a contingenct being (Brute). This argument still holds as God is Causally Responsible for every other Contingent facts except himself (since he's Brute).

Edit:some grammatical errors

Your conscious identity of self is as much fragile in the dualist classical theist world view as it is in the materialistic world view.

If you are only atoms forming neurons firing, then there is this thought experiment where in a really powerful machine can be used to teleport you. How it teleports is, it breaks you down atom by atom at location N and reassembles you at location M with similar atoms. But the issue is, is it really you at M or a new person with your past memories thinking it's you. Suppose the machine malfunctioned, and it didn't destroy you at N but also creates a copy of you at M. Now we have two person saying they are YOU, yourself and this clone. So we intuitively say that it's not really YOU at the other end of the teleportation machine even if it's the exact same atom to atom replica. This sort of existential dread won't happen if we were all souls?

Instead of the machine, suppose it's God.

God decides to annihilate your soul out of existence. But then God decides "naah I'll let him be" and brings you back. But is the person back really YOU? Suppose instead of annihilating God "accidentally" (or choose) to make another copy of your soul. So how there's two YOU. But even then, you intuitively feel like YOU are the already existing soul and not the one currently made. So in the case of annihilation and bringing back too, once your gone, can you really come back?

This makes the case almost symmetrical. Having soul doesn't solve any Existential issue. Your existence and self identity is still very much at stake at both world view.

There's a popular argument against Classical theism called Divine Hiddenness argument by J. L. Schellenberg.

It's basically that, God is hiding from people who are open to believing in him if he actually just made an appearance. Such a God doesn't seem like the one who's interested in you.

So, would you believe in God if God actually made an appearance or would you think you just had a schizophrenic episode? What if God changes something tangible like your bank balance or your appearance. Would you believe it's a Divine encounter or some higher alien civilization is pulling a prank on you.

On the rise of Godmen in India this is something fun to think about as well. If a Godman did in fact do something you couldn't explain, would you think he's Divine or that he's pulling a prank. How elaborate must "something" be so you actually think he's not actually pulling a prank. Does no matter any amount of unexplainable stuff he does, you'll still remain unconvinced?

I think people who believe in these Babas and Godman are not stupid, but they simply have a low threshold for what a divine act is since they grew up in a culture where the Divine is said to be real.

This argument came to light among many Indian atheists and theists during the Javed Akhtar vs Mufti debate. I would like to explain the argument:

(1) Laying the Metaphysical grounds

Cosmological arguments generally have an underlying principles. In the case of the Kalam Cosmological argument, it's the Principle of Causality. That is, everything that begins must have a cause. In the case of the Contingency Argument the principle is the Principle of Sufficient Reason also known as PSR.

PSR is basically saying that every Contingent fact C has a sufficient explanation E where if E obtains then C obtains.

Now this might be confusing, what's a contingent fact? What does "if E then C" mean?

Let's take two propositions (statements that can be true or false).

(i) This triangle has 3 sides.

(ii) This Car is Red.

Don't you see how the second statement COULD'VE BEEN false. The Car doesn't have to be Red, it could've been Blue, Yellow or any colour. But the first statement has to be True, a triangle is by definition a polygon with 3 sides. The first fact is Necessarily true, while the second one is contingently true (or false).

Another example of a Necessary fact is something "All bachelors are unmarried". Or "1+1=2". Examples of Contingent facts are things are "Modi is the PM of India". It could've been otherwise.

So we see that Necessary Truths are Self supporting. Meaning, their truth is sort of contained in themselves. But a Contingent truth isn't. Like, "The car is red" is probably explained by the fact that "the manufacturer made it like that".

PSR suggests that All Contingent Facts have a Sufficient Explanation.

Now, PSR is something we apply in our day to day life, in Science, or any academic field for that matters.

If someone has a Disease, we do ask "what sufficiently explains it". Since, it could've been the case that she never had the disease, but she has it, so something must explain this Contingent fact.

Now what does "if E obtains, then C obtains" mean?

C here is the Contingent fact, and E is the explanation.

Example:

Suppose the Contingent Fact is "Tom has an upset stomach".

What sufficiently explains this? Well let's try some suggestions. "Tom drank milk". Does this sufficiently explain his upset stomach? Well you said "Sam also drank milk, but Sam didn't get an upset stomach". So what this means is, the Sufficient Explanation E cannot be "Tom drank milk" because we don't obtain the Contingent fact simply by obtaining this Explanation. Now let's make E as "Tom has Lactose intolerance and Drank Milk". Now does this sufficiently explain it? Let's see. Jim also has lactose intolerance and he also drank milk, but he didn't get upset stomach. So does that doesn't sufficiently explain Tom's upset stomach. So now you dig deep, turns out Jim drank plant based milk but Tom drank Cow milk with lactose in it.

So we have our sufficient explanation, E = "if someone drank Cow milk with lactose in it and they have Lactose intolerance" then we obtain C = "they will get an upset stomach".

So if E is obtained, it's GUARANTEED that C is obtained, there is no OTHER WAY.

If you have E and you still didn't get C, means the explanation E doesn't SUFFICIENTLY explain the Contingent fact C.

Now I hope it's clear what a Sufficient Explanation is. It's not a typical layman explanation you have in day to day life, but a Sufficient Explanation guarantees its "effect" or the Contingent fact.

So if we take PSR as a valid metaphysical principle, now we can run the Contingency argument. Which is that, every Contingent fact must have a Sufficient Explanation as to why's it's true.

Now let's talk about Contingent existence, which is something that COULD'VE failed to exist. Like, you, me, the earth, or the atoms in your left toe. These things could've failed to exist. But they do exist, so what SUFFICIENTLY explains it? Now, you could say, I exist because my parents, the earth exist because of the Sun etc. You can appeal to other contingent entities as sufficient explanation, now what about those contingent entities?

(1) Take a Contingent Set B which is the totality of all the Contingent Existence. So it includes things like "The Universe exists", "The earth exists”, "Mosquito that spreads Malaria exists" etc etc etc. Literally every Contingent existence you could think of.

(2) By PSR, B has a Sufficient explanation.

(3) The explanation of B cannot itself be another Contingent existence. Why? Because then it will be a part of B, i.e. circular explanation.

(4) So the Sufficient explanation for B must therefore be Necessary.

Therefore a Necessary Existence E which explains the totality of all Contingent fact B.

(2) From Necessary Existence to God.

This is where it is shown that this Necessary Existence is God and not a Natural entity.

(i)The Necessary Existence cannot have any quantitative traits.

(ii)Natural entites do have quantitative traits like Mass, volume, charge, field or any quantity for that matters.

Therefore the Necessary Existence cannot be a Natural entity, but outside the natural domain.

Why can't it have any quantitative traits? Well if it has some quantity x, we can ask why it must be x and not x+1 or x-1. So the Necessary Existence must be purely qualitative in nature. It's powers (casual/explanatory power) shouldn't be limited to some value but be unlimited.

Therefore it is God.

Note: I'm not able to post in r/atheismindia for sm reason so posting it here since the audience demographic is similar. This is not a defence of Contingency argument, but an explanation for atheists and theists alike.

Suppose God said: Whoever follows my command will be taken to Hell and whoever disobeys will be taken to Heaven.

Would you still follow God's Commands? Would the theist still consider following God's commands as the objectively right thing to do even if it will render an eternity in Hell?

I think at some philosophical level the theist does think that suffering and wellbeing are grounds for what is Good and Bad and you don't need God to tell it.

It's a separate question as to whether God can in fact make such a counter intuitive rule, some might say "it goes against his nature". Let's all be humble about Divine psychology and not make assumptions about an Omniscient Mind with our primate brain and run with the thought experiment.

As a Moral anti-realist I don't see my belief in meta ethics changing even if I start believing in God.

I'll first lay the grounds on what I see as Morality.

What do we mean when we say "Good"? And I don't mean in a moral context. Just any lay context. Something is "Good" if it aligns with a particular value. Suppose I say "Samsung S24 is a GOOD phone", what do I mean by it? Well, there are some values I hold as to what a phone OUGHT to be, and Samasung S24 does meet those criteria or aligns with it, therefore it's a Good phone. Now for someone else Samasung S24 might not be a Good phone because they have different values. They probably value Camera quality in which case iPhones would be a Good phone for them. They might say "Vivo is a bad phone" if they suspect it has terrible camera quality and therefore doesn't align with their value.

Now back to Morality, what do you mean by "Murder is Bad"? Here "Bad" simply means, there are some values I have on how an action must be in accordance with human well-being, suffering or some principle and murdern doesn't align with it. Or something like "Charity is Good", charity aligns with my values.

You can't say one value is better than another without appealing to a higher value to compare them. So inevitably you end up with some Brute value.

So far we have not introduced God or the Divine.

How does having God change this fact? All I see is "Good" still remains as a term that tells you how much an act aligns with a value, only that this time the value is God's commands or something along the line.

So let's take the act of following God's commands. Is it Good to follow God's commands? You can't appeal to god's commands to say it's Good to follow God's commands, as that's plain circular. So what's the value? I'm assuming it's something like "i get to go to heaven, so it's Good" (in which case what you value is your pleasure), or "yes God is my creator" (in which case what you value is your creator's commands). It is ultimately what YOU value. This is no different from any atheist who values human well-being or some Deontic principle.

What I have seen some theist do is say vague statements like "God is Goodness". Like, that doesn't mean anything or convey any meaningful fact about Goodness. I simply have to push back and ask what "Goodness is". Is it identical to God? Like we say "A bachelor is unmarried" when they are identical and we can substitute one to another. Or is "Goodness" a predicate like Omnipotence where we say "God is Omnipotent" implying "God is someone who can do anything that's logically possible" since X is Omnipotent implies X is someone who can do anything Logically possibe. That's what the theist must clarify if they appeal to statements like "God's Nature is Good" or "God is Goodness" or anything similar.

Ie, what does God bring to the table that isn't already there?

I was looking into Contingency Argument and the idea that God is a Metaphysical Necessary Being as the conclusion.

I understand logical modality like this:

Something is Logically impossible if it entails a Contradiction.

Something is Logically possible, if it doesn't entail a contradiction.

Logically Necessary - negation leads to Contradiction.

I also understand Nomological modality where instead of logical Contradiction it's a violation of Natural laws.

Ie, there are some axioms that exist within these modalities. Laws of Logic, laws of nature. But in case of metaphysical modality i really don't see what it is. Is it conceivability?

1. If God is omniscient, then God knows what would convince me of His existence right now. (P → Q)

2. If God knows what would convince me of His existence right now, and God wants me to know that He exists, then I will be convinced right now. ((Q ∧ R) → S)

3. If I will be convinced right now, then I believe in God. (S → T)

4. If I believe in God, then I am not a nonresistant nonbeliever. (T → ¬F)

5. I am a nonresistant nonbeliever. (F)

6. God is omniscient. (P)

7. God knows what would convince me of His existence right now. (Q){From 1 and 6, Modus Ponens}

8. I do not believe in God. (¬T){From 4 and 5, Modus Tollens}

9. I will not be convinced right now. (¬S){From 3 and 8, Modus Tollens}

10. It is not the case that God knows what would convince me right now and God wants me to know he exists. (¬(Q ∧ R)){From 2 and 9, Modus Tollens}

11. Either God does not know what would convince me, or God does not want me to know he exists. (¬Q ∨ ¬R){De Morgan’s Law on 10}

12. But God knows what would convince me right now. (Q){From 7}

13. Therefore, God does not want me to know that He exists. (¬R){Disjunctive Syllogism from 11 and 12}

Conclusion (C):

Therefore, it is false that God wants me to know that He exists.

(This breaks the classical theistic view that God or whatever is at the foundation of reality wants you to be in some personal relationship with it)

\*\*Clarification\*\*

Premise 2 is actually doing the most heavy lifting here since many theist might reject it because they think 'God have the ability and want you to belive in him, and still not do anything because <free will, soul building etc>". But this argument can be dismissed since beliefs are not under your Will anyway. You can't will into believing in God any more than you can belive that the moon is made of cheese. Beliefs are infact not under your control, it's purely based on what convinces you.