Hello again. I've been deep in this for a while and finally put everything into one place.
Sharing the spreadsheet link in the comments below.

How I compiled this

Pulled 881 days of daily short data (Jan 2023 to May 2026) directly from the Ortex API - short interest shares, availability shares, borrow utilization, and avail % of SI. Cross-referenced every major holder using SEC EDGAR filings: the Pale Fire 13D/A (Apr 28 2026), Continental 13G/A (Mar 31 2026), Senkypl Form 4s, and the Q1 2026 10-Q for the current share count. Built a True Float Model from scratch rather than trusting Ortex's mechanical float calculation. Tracked the full institutional ownership table from Ortex to see who is adding vs. reducing.

The numbers that matter

Short interest has nearly tripled since January 2023 - from 4.7M shares to 13.7M shares, while the stock has been cut in half. Shorts have been adding into weakness the entire time.

Availability vs. SI tells the real story. In mid-2024, there were 670% more available shares to borrow than shares short. Today that number is 2.2%. The borrow market has essentially closed.

The Ortex float is misleading in my opinion. Their reported float is 23.96M shares. When you subtract the holders who have demonstrated they are not selling - Pale Fire (10.18M shares, zero sales, avg cost $8.60), Continental/Gorzynski (3.62M, added 691K in Q1 2026), Windward (2.21M, added 272K in Q1 2026), Linmar, Garnet, Divisadero, and several individuals - you get a true tradeable float closer to 12.7M shares.

At 13.7M shares short against a 12.7M true float, SI exceeds 100% of the realistic tradeable float.

Key metrics as of May 18, 2026

SI shares: 13.73M
SI % of Ortex float: 57.3%
SI % of true float (base case): 74.3% (my opinion)
SI % of true float (realistic): 108.4% (my opinion)
Borrow utilization: 86.9%
Avail % of SI: 2.2%
Squeeze Pressure Index: 49.8

What the spreadsheet contains

Definitions sheet - plain English explanation of every metric and why it matters for this specific setup

Data and Ratios - 881 rows of daily Ortex data with 10 derived ratios including a Squeeze Pressure Index, SI Coverage Ratio, Supply Gap, and 30-day momentum columns

Squeeze Dashboard - summary KPIs at a glance

Key Milestones - exact dates when each threshold was crossed (SI at 40%, 45%, 50%, 55%, borrow util at 80%, 85%, 90%)

True Float Model - step by step float reconstruction from the Q1 2026 10-Q share count through each locked holder, with every source cited

Institutional Ownership - full Ortex holder table with 51 institutions, color coded by who is adding vs. reducing

Charts - 5 line charts covering all major metrics over the full 3 year period

This is research I did for my own position.
Do your own diligence.

You read the fundamental case. Now let me show you the plumbing.

I rebuilt the entire ownership stack from scratch as best I could. 120+ filers, cross-referenced across every 13D, 13G, 13F, and Form 4 filed. Even had Claude double check to be sure. What I found is that the float most people think exists doesn't. (in my opinion)

I wont dive into that since my prior post covers it.
This post uncovers the hidden leverage in the plumbing. The things that might worry bulls, shouldn't.

The Notes Aren't the Problem for a Short Squeeze in the slightest.
They're an Exit Ramp for GRPN and a catapult for further short covering.

The bear case on the balance sheet used to have teeth. $244M in convertible debt, near-term maturities, a company that couldn't refinance at gunpoint.

That was then. Last June, Groupon exchanged the 2026 and 2027 notes into a single new series, 4.875% Convertible Senior Notes due 2030. Nothing callable until July 2028, nothing due until 2030.

But here's what nobody is talking about as a shareholder.
We want the conversion price on those 2030 notes to execute.
Yes, I said it. I want that dilution at those levels and here's why.

Think about what that means in the context of a squeeze. The notes don't even become convertible until the stock sustains above $70.25, that's 130% of the $54.04 conversion price, for at least 20 out of 30 trading days in a prior calendar quarter. So at $55, $60, $65, noteholders are just sitting there watching the move with zero ability to convert and sell into it. The conversion window doesn't even open until the quarter after the stock has proven it can hold above $70. Even at that point, yes noteholders control whether to convert (once the window opens). Groupon controls how they settle it when conversion happens. Whether that's cash, stock, or a mix (probably would be heavier on the stock side if I'm being realistic). Senkypl is not going to dilute Pale Fire's position if he doesn't have to. $244 million of balance sheet debt would be wiped out immediately and the only way it even starts to become a discussion for existing shareholders is if the stock first sustains above $70.

The bears built their whole balance sheet argument on debt that, at squeeze prices, converts itself out of existence. The best part, it doesn't even hurt us.

Senkypl is pushing buybacks hard, we saw that last quarter, retiring float periodically, but more that their Free Cash Flow, that's aggressive. He's the largest shareholder. He feels every newly issued share personally. He's not going to sit on a approximately $223M remaining buyback authorization and watch conversion significantly dilute Pale Fire's position without doing something about it. The buyback are periodically taking out chunks of shares that would lighten the blow of dilution if complete conversion happened.

So the sequence, if this moves: shorts cover into an 8.9M loanable supply (based on my previous analysis) backing 13.87M of reported short interest. Stock trades through $54. Notes convert if it maintains a price level of $70.25 for at least 20 out of 30 trading days in a prior calendar quarter. $244M of debt gone. Buyback absorbs any true impact of the dilution. Groupon exits the squeeze with a cleaner balance sheet than it had going in.

The shorts didn't just pick the wrong stock. They accidentally built the mechanism for the company's own recapitalization.

CEO's PSU's

Let's talk about what Senkypl actually signed up for.

The total grant was 1,393,948 PSUs, split equally across four price hurdles. Every hurdle cleared puts another 348,487 shares into play, vesting in thirds across May 2025, May 2026, and May 2027.

The ladder looks like this:
Tranche 1 at $14.86: Cleared.
Tranche 2 at $20.14: Cleared on the run to $43.
Tranche 3 at $31.01: Cleared on the run to $43.
Tranche 4 at $68.82: Not cleared. 348,487 shares sitting there waiting.

Source for the above: (https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/1490281/000149028124000069/exhibit103-ceonoticeofgran.htm)

He gets paid at every rung he clears, not just the top. The structure is designed so that every dollar of stock price performance delivers more. But the final 348,487 shares, the ones tied to $68.82, don't move until the stock gets there and holds a 90-day VWAP above that level.

Before anyone raises dilution, the total remaining PSU overhang is roughly 348,487 shares on that final tranche plus whatever partial vesting remains on the earlier tranches. Against 39.2 million shares outstanding, it's rounding error.

He's not a hired-gun CEO collecting a base salary either way. His 2025 base salary was $150,000 and a nice bonus ($54,405). Yea read that again, that's what THE CEO is making. That is extremely low compared to peers, he likes the equity. He's not here for the salary. He came in through Pale Fire as an activist, took the seat himself, and has been buying shares in the open market personally on top of the fund's 10.18M and on top of the PSUs. His net worth is substantially this stock. Every buyback dollar, every note that converts, every short that covers, he feels it three ways simultaneously.

The last time this stock looked remotely like this setup it went from $10 to $43. That move happened when the float was less constrained, when the note structure was messier, and before Senkypl had restructured the debt and extended the runway.

$50 is not the ceiling. It's where the mechanism starts to get interesting.
The math is the math.

TLDR: The $244M in convertible debt doesn't become a conversation until the stock sustains above $70, at which point it converts itself off the balance sheet while the $223M buyback has the potential to absorb the dilution. Bears want bulls to fear this dilution, I welcome it.

Price target: $55 base case if squeeze mechanics alone do the work. If my loanable supply math holds, the real short interest has to cover into a float that doesn't exist. That's not a $55 outcome. That's $100+. Not a gradual jump to $100 either a very, very violent one. This stock can move in 25 cent ticks on low volume.

Long GRPN. Game on.

Not advice.

Continental General filed a 13G/A today disclosing they now hold 3,620,590 shares (9.24%) — up from 2,929,832 in their prior filing. Another ~691K shares moved into long-term lockup.

Ortex live shows shorts added 631K to the position today. 727K borrowed, only 96K returned. Net new shorting, no covering.

Live short interest is now 13.87M shares per Ortex. That's 57.25% of free float.

I rebuilt the entire ownership stack from Ortex's holder list (120+ filers) cross-referenced with the latest 13D, 13G, 13F, and Form 4 filings. Here's what I found.

Ownership by Category

Shares Outstanding: 39,186,503 (38.84M per Q1 10-Q + Senkypl's 345K PSU exercise on 5/1)
Treasury: 12,238,736 (separate, not in S/O)

CATEGORY SHARES % S/O LOANABLE
LOCKED (insiders + 17,718,594 45.2% 0
activists + Continental)
LOCKED? (Linmar) 1,650,000 4.2% 0
INDEX & ETF 7,815,040 19.9% 5,616,088
PRIME BROKER
(custody, see notes) 4,306,650 11.0% 2,735,813 raw
1,094,325 adjusted
MARKET MAKERS 434,960 1.1% 304,472
HEDGE FUNDS (pod
shops, won't lend) 4,811,950 12.3% 572,417
HEDGE FUNDS (
concentrated long) 3,060,040 7.8% 268,736
MUTUAL FUNDS 833,810 2.1% 541,029
ASSET MANAGERS 1,515,480 3.9% 672,028
PENSIONS 208,300 0.5% 134,207
CENTRAL BANK 51,900 0.1% 0

TOTAL IDENTIFIED 42,406,724 108.2%
PB DOUBLE-COUNT ADJ (2,583,990)

ADJUSTED IDENTIFIED 39,822,734
SHARES OUTSTANDING 39,186,503

IMPLIED RETAIL ~0 (institutional ownership is total)

The locked column in detail

These are people who structurally do not lend their shares. CEO's own fund, activist longs with public price targets, the chairman, insider officers, and an insurance company general account holding under regulatory restrictions on securities lending.

Pale Fire Capital SICAV/SE 10,180,970
Continental General (Gorzynski) 3,620,590 (filed today 5/14)
Windward Management LP 1,940,000 (per Ortex Q1 13F, was 2.77M in 13D)
Senkypl direct (CEO) 1,135,264 (post-PSU exercise 5/1)
Jiri Ponrt (insider) 264,220
Theodore Leonsis (Chairman) 218,600
Rana Kashyap (officer) 173,000
Robert Bass (director) 101,680
Jason Harinstein (officer) 55,660
Kyle Netzly (officer) 28,610
──────────
LOCKED TOTAL 17,718,594 (45.2% of S/O)

Plus Linmar Capital Fund GP at 1.65M which I can't classify cleanly. Name pattern suggests it's a Pale Fire-adjacent fund or another Czech connected entity. If it is, locked goes to 49.4%. If not, it's just a concentrated holder that probably still doesn't lend.

Pod shop hedge funds

These are the multi-manager platforms (Millennium, Citadel, Point72, D.E. Shaw, Two Sigma, ExodusPoint, Balyasny, Schonfeld) running market-neutral pods. They have GRPN long positions paired against shorts inside their own books. They don't lend out longs that are already hedging shorts — that defeats the trade. ~10% loanability max.

Millennium Management 791,500
D.E. Shaw & Co 748,300
Citadel Advisors 674,880
Two Sigma Investments 511,250
Squarepoint OPS 459,250
ExodusPoint Capital 340,300
Point72 Asset Management 294,030
Verition Fund Management 200,930
Balyasny Asset Management 194,260
Quantbot Technologies 114,140
Renaissance Technologies 109,810
Two Sigma Advisers 75,000
Capital Fund Management 45,330
Schonfeld Strategic Advisors 43,590
Brevan Howard 42,490
Campbell & Company 35,750
Walleye Capital 31,750
AXQ Capital 30,570
Blueshift Asset Management 28,110
AQR Capital 20,380
Centiva Capital 15,330
Marshall Wace 5,000
──────────
HF subtotal 4,811,950

These are huge red flags for the squeeze setup. When pod shops are short, they're short for alpha not for size — they cover quickly when the trade breaks because PMs get capital pulled fast on drawdowns. This is the layer that breaks first.

Concentrated long hedge funds (won't lend)

Garnet Equity Capital 958,660
Prentice Capital Management 497,500
Centerbook Partners 468,420 (new Q1 2026)
Divisadero Street Capital 444,960
Leap Investments 258,800
Potomac Capital Management 149,500
Gotham Asset (Greenblatt) 58,920
Shay Capital 50,000
Manatuck Hill 38,500
Pleasant Lake Partners 35,000
Diametric Capital 34,770
Freestone Grove 17,820
Crestline Investors 15,280
Prelude Capital 10,780
Numeric Investors 10,680
Bridgefront Capital 10,450
──────────
HF long subtotal 3,060,040

Index and ETF holders (the actual lenders)

This is where most of the lendable supply lives.

BlackRock 2,940,000 (~90% lent typically)
Vanguard Group 2,100,000 (~50% lent — more conservative)
State Street SPDR 881,420 (~80% lent)
Geode Capital 653,700 (~70% lent — Vanguard sub-adviser)
Dimensional Fund Advisors 452,780
Charles Schwab Investment 229,700
Northern Trust Global 213,470
Pacer Advisors 203,020
First Trust Advisors 110,160
Rhumbline 30,790
──────────
Index subtotal 7,815,040
Loanable from this group ~5.6M

Loanable Math

Index/ETF 5.6M loanable
Prime broker 1.1M (after 60% double-count haircut)
Hedge funds (all) 0.8M (10-15% lend rates)
Mutual funds 0.5M
Asset managers 0.7M
Pensions 0.1M
Market makers 0.3M
Retail residual ~0
─────────────────────────
TOTAL EST. LOANABLE ~8.9M

Ortex live SI: 13.87M
Excess over loanable: +5.0M
Utilization: 156%

So what's the real short interest?

Reported (FINRA biweekly): ~10.9M (stale by 10 days)
Ortex live: 13.87M
My estimated loanable supply: ~8.9M

If short interest is 13.87M and loanable supply is only 8.9M, something has to give. Either:

1. Real SI is actually lower than Ortex shows and shorts have already started covering quietly (possible but contradicted by today's +631K borrowed)
2. Real SI is HIGHER than 13.87M and 5M+ of it is hidden in swaps, total return swaps, married puts, or ETF basket exposure that doesn't show up in standard FINRA reporting (the Archegos / GME 2021 playbook)
3. My loanable supply estimate is too conservative

My best guess: real economic short exposure is somewhere between 14M and 19M shares when you include the synthetic/swap layer. Against a true tradeable float (S/O minus locked) of ~19.8M shares, that's 70-95% short of true float.

Tell me what I got wrong

I built this from Ortex's holder list plus filings. The model has assumptions baked in.

- Is the PB double-count haircut right? I used 60% based on industry experience but it could be 40% or 80%. Anyone with sec lending desk experience know better?
- Am I overcounting locked holders? Specifically would Continental/Gorzynski lend out insurance general account holdings? My read is no based on Texas DOI regs, but happy to be wrong.
- Linmar Capital Fund GP at 1.65M — does anyone know who this is? Name pattern suggests Pale Fire-adjacent but I can't verify.
- Are the pod shop lending percentages too low? I have them at 10% but if they're at 30% that's an extra 1M of loanable supply.
- Is anyone holding GRPN through swaps in a way Ortex doesn't see?

TLDR

GRPN's tradeable float is a lie. 45% is straight locked — Pale Fire, Continental, Windward, the CEO, the chairman, the officers. None of it lends. The pod shops (Citadel, Millennium, Point72, D.E. Shaw, Two Sigma) hold another 3M in paired books they can't lend either without blowing up their own trade structure. Index funds and pensions are the only real lenders and they max out around 9M shares of capacity.

Short interest is 13.87M per Ortex. The math doesn't work. Short interest exceeds estimated lendable supply by ~5M shares (given my napkin math). That gap is either hiding in swaps and total return baskets (Archegos-style) or the borrow desks are about to find out the hard way. Continental locked up another 691K shares and shorts ADDED 631K to the pile on the same day. Both sides are pressing.

I think this is one of the tightest setups since pre-squeeze CAR. But I'm one guy with a spreadsheet and Ortex screenshots, so I'm probably missing something. Tell me what.

Is the PB double-count haircut wrong? Are pod shops actually lending more than 10%? Is Continental allowed to lend insurance general account holdings under Texas DOI regs? Is there a holder I'm not seeing?

I love to pick things apart so any flaws please let me know.

Not advice.

Long Groupon. Game on.