Facts of the case

Mirsad Ramic is a Bosnian refugee who became a naturalized US citizen living in Kentucky. During his naturalization ceremony, he refused to recite the oath of allegiance to the United States and instead "proclaimed an Islamic oath and cursed all nonbelievers".

After his naturalization, he attempted to travel abroad to join jihadist groups, eventually traveling to Syria to join ISIS. There, he completed military training, fought in the siege of Kobane, and praised beheadings / threats against Americans online. Eventually, he felt ISIS was too moderate and fled to Turkey, where he was arrested and held in custody for five years for supporting terrorism and then turned him over to the US.

District court sentencing

A jury convicted him of providing material support to ISIS and receiving military training from a foreign terrorist organization. The advisory Guidelines range was 360–600 months.

However, the district court reasoned that Ramic had not committed terrorism in the "common sense" since he had not personally carried out bombings or mass shootings against civilians. The court instead characterized him as a "fighter" or "soldier" who joined an army seeking to create its own state. The court also relied on national sentencing statistics showing a median terrorism sentence of 168 months, then reduced that figure further to account for the time Ramic had already spent in Turkish custody.

Ramic and the US both appealed to the sixth circuit.

Argument #1: Assad's government wasn't recognized by the US (rejected)

Ramic argued that the terrorism enhancement should not apply because ISIS fought against the Assad regime, which the US hadn't recognized as the legitimate "government" of Syria. The Sixth Circuit rejected this, holding that the ordinary meaning of "government" in the statute is not limited to regimes formally recognized by the President. Even ignoring Syria, the enhancement would have applied anyway because Ramic intended to influence or affect the United States itself, as seen in his own statements.

Ramic's other argument that applying the enhancement would implicitly recognize Assad's government as the legitimate government of Syria also failed, but I gotta be honest I give him points for creativity for trying that one.

Argument #2: the court minimized Ramic / ISIS actions (accepted)

The Sixth Circuit held that the district court fundamentally understated the seriousness of both ISIS and Ramic’s conduct. The panel criticized the district court for repeatedly describing Ramic as a "fighter" and ignoring evidence showing Ramic enthusiastically embraced ISIS ideology (e.g. supporting beheadings and bragging about owning 'slave girls'). Beyond his beliefs, Ramic literally participated in the siege of Kobane, and even if he didn't gun down civilians himself his contributions caused death and suffering in support of ISIS mission. At sentencing, Ramic made it clear he felt this was a "sham prosecution" and demonstrated no remorse at all.

Argument #3: the court improperly relied on statistics (accepted)

The Sixth Circuit also held that the district court placed excessive weight on generalized national sentencing statistics. The district court relied on a median terrorism sentence derived from 9 defendants without meaningful analysis of whether they were comparable -- many defendants who engaged in less serious conduct (e.g. unsuccessfully attempting to join ISIS, sending money) received substantially longer sentences than Ramic had.

The panel's final thoughts

The panel remanded the case for resentencing, ending with an interesting note:

>These concerns about Ramic returning to terrorism upon his release aren’t merely hypothetical. Courts’ refusals to incapacitate terrorists for a long period of time have had deadly consequences. See, e.g., Vienna Reels From a Rare Terrorist Attack (describing a terrorist who was sentenced to just 22 months in prison for traveling to join ISIS, was released after one year, and then launched an attack in Vienna that killed four people and wounded another 23); Old Dominion Shooting Suspect Had ISIS Conviction, Was Subdued by Students (describing a terrorist who provided material support to ISIS, received a sentence far below the Guidelines range, was released, and then opened fire in a university classroom, killing the instructor and wounding two others). The district court here repeated that mistake and didn’t reckon with the very real possibility that Ramic could participate in future attacks after his release. When sentencing terrorists, protecting the public is of primary importance. The district court’s failure to properly weigh this factor when dealing with Ramic makes his sentence substantively unreasonable

From the introduction:

>This article addresses the transformation of the Supreme Court’s shadow docket – both in name and in substance. The Supreme Court’s non-merits orders have gone from being a subject of general obscurity to a highly salient one, coupled with a rise in the number of decisions (and applications) about whether to grant a time-sensitive stay or injunction. And the Court’s handling of these cases has raised many questions about both the law and the principles of discretion that should govern them.

>I first briefly explain the nomenclature controversy and explain why I believe “interim docket” is the best term to use now. I then describe two features that once governed such interim relief and may be at risk of being forgotten. One is the legal principle that interim relief is supposed to be ancillary to the Court’s ultimate jurisdiction over the merits. The other is the principle that the Court does not engage in routine error correction. 

See also the original "The Supreme Court's Shadow Docket" paper for context

Application, docket. From the application:

>Days before Virginia’s deadline to begin administering the 2026 election for members of the United States House of Representatives, the Supreme Court of Virginia invalidated an amendment to the Commonwealth’s Constitution that authorizes the General Assembly to adopt new congressional maps. The Court purported to find a procedural flaw in the amendment’s passage and ratification: that the General Assembly failed to pass the amendment prior to the “next general election” before passing it a second time and referring the amendment to the people for their approval. The basis for that holding was the Court’s view that, contrary to the Constitution’s own definition of the term “election” to refer to a single day in November, the term instead encompasses the entire period of early voting beginning in September. Based on that novel and manifestly atextual interpretation, the Court overrode the will of the people who ratified the amendment by ordering the Commonwealth to conduct its election with the congressional districts that the people rejected

>A stay is warranted because the decision by the Supreme Court of Virginia is deeply mistaken on two critical issues of federal law with profound practical importance to the Nation. The decision below violates federal law in two separate ways. First, it predicated its interpretation of the Virginia Constitution on a grave misreading of federal law, which expressly fixes a single day for the “election” of Representatives and Delegates to Congress. See 2 U.S.C. § 7. Where a state court’s decision on purportedly state-law grounds was “interwoven with the federal law,” this Court may intervene to ensure that the state court’s decision complies with federal law. Michigan v. Long, 463 U.S. 1032, 1040 (1983). See also Three Affiliated Tribes of Fort Berthold Rsrv. v. Wold Eng’g, P.C., 467 U.S. 138, 153 (1984) (vacating state supreme court decision whose interpretation of state statute “rest[ed] on a misconception of federal law”). Second, by rejecting the plain text of the Virginia Constitution’s definition of the term “election” to adopt its own contrary meaning, the Supreme Court of Virginia “transgressed the ordinary bounds of judicial review such that it arrogated to itself the power vested in the state legislature to regulate federal elections.” Moore v. Harper, 600 U.S. 1, 36 (2023) (cleaned up). Either violation is sufficient for this Court to reverse the decision below. Accordingly, there is a “reasonable probability that this Court will grant certiorari and will then reverse the decision below.” Maryland v. King, 567 U.S. 1301, 1302 (2012) (Roberts, C.J., in chambers) (cleaned up).