Date: 08/18/2026
Welcome to the r/SupremeCourt 'In Chambers' discussion thread!
This thread will be pinned at the top of the subreddit and refreshed every Monday @ 6AM Eastern.
This replaces and combines the 'Ask Anything Monday' and 'Lower Court Development Wednesday' threads. As such, this weekly thread is intended to provide a space for:
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Open-ended discussion starters requiring minimal input from OP: (e.g. "Predictions?", "What do people think about [X]?", "What's your favorite [X]?")
U.S. District and State Court rulings involving a federal question that may be of future relevance to the Supreme Court.
TL;DR: This is a catch-all thread for legal discussion that may not warrant its own thread.
Our other rules apply as always. Incivility and polarized rhetoric are never permitted. This thread is not intended for political or off-topic discussion.
Date: 08/17/2026
Majority opinion by Clay (Clinton), joined by Moore (Clinton).
>Against this factual backdrop and construing the facts in the light most favorable to Plaintiff, any reasonable officer in Defendant Josephs’ position would have realized that allowing Plaintiff to use his restroom while supervised would not have jeopardized the search at all. The unlawfulness of the denial thus should have been obvious to Defendant Josephs. Accordingly, we conclude that Plaintiff pleaded a violation of his Fourth Amendment right against unreasonable seizures that was sufficiently obvious as a constitutional rights violation—insofar as such a violation pertains to the rights of privacy and human decency. The district court therefore erred when it concluded that Plaintiff did not allege a violation of a clearly established right.
Concur / dissent by Nalbandian (Trump)
>When you’ve got to go, you’ve got to go. And here, Antol had to go. But it wasn’t a great time because the cops were searching his house at the time and say it wouldn’t have been safe to let him back into the house to pee. So Antol peed in his front yard. And he’s understandably upset about it, especially because the cops’ excuse seems at least a little contrived. But the question is whether what happened amounts to a constitutional violation. Because I answer that question no, I dissent from that part of the majority opinion.
In a way it's a classic methodological split. The majority focuses on general reasonableness and notions of "privacy and human decency". The dissent focuses on original public meaning and spends several pages discussing laws and attitudes towards public urination at the time of the founding.
Briefly, Baylis v Valve is at the Ninth Circuit and the issue is the misapplication of discretionary (precatory) comity rather than the "Mandatory Standard" under the Berne Convention Implementation Act 1988 ("BCIA").
In GEMA v Suno a U.S. AI firm's "fair use" argument was analyzed and rejected. Also Germany doesn't have any fair use law. Under Berne Convention Rules (Article 5(2)) this German ruling shouldn't affect U.S. cases involving § 107 because under the same Berne Convention framework U.S. Law applies in the U.S.
But under the Valve standard (DC level) A German ruling would be afforded comity and Suno would be bound by German Law, thus negating their ability to advance a fair use defense in the US.
To put it another way, a U.S. district court would blind itself to the Berne Convention, afford comity to the German ruling, and treat the parties as bound by the foreign adjudication. Therefore, completely negating a U.S. fair use defense in the U.S.! Thus, effectively letting foreign decrees on fair use nullify a domestic federal statute § 107!
Docket link here. The admin's argument on standing:
>Article III requires more than a car and a fill-in-the-object declaration. Otherwise, someone could object to the “statement” made by the Thomas Jefferson Memorial; that Teddy Roosevelt “overshadow[s]” the scenery at Mount Rushmore; or that Andrew Jackson’s visage ruins the $20 bill. App., infra, 75a. That is not how Article III works. The separation of powers forbids the federal courts from being “continuing monitors of the wisdom and soundness” of daily life, id. at 372a (Rao, J., dissenting), and Article III’s standing requirement ensures courts do not “operate as an open forum for citizens to press general complaints about the way in which government goes about its business,” Alliance, 602 U.S. at 379 (quotation marks omitted).
The admin's argument on ultra vires:
>Even if the Trust had standing, it raises only an ultra vires challenge—“a Hail Mary Pass” that “rarely succeeds.” NRC, 605 U.S. at 681. The Trust must show an act is “entirely in excess of [an entity’s] delegated powers and contrary to a specific prohibition in a statute”—so “typical statutory-authority argument[s]” cannot suffice. Id. at 681-682. But garden-variety statutory-interpretation disputes are all the Trust has; besides, Congress doubly authorized the Project. Section 105(d) authorizes the President to make “alteration[s]” or “improvement[s]” to the White House “as the President may determine,” and the NPS Organic Act grants the Executive broad power to construct buildings on national parkland, as it has done thousands of times over a century. 3 U.S.C. 105(d); 54 U.S.C. 100101(a). The panel’s contrary reading of these statutes effectively declared countless federal construction projects unlawful.
A substack article and audio narration from Chief Justice John Roberts, created in collaboration with the In Pursuit podcast from More Perfect
>William Howard Taft holds the distinction of being the only person in the history of our Nation to have served as the head of two branches of the federal government: he was the 27th President and the 10th Chief Justice. Taft also held several other key positions in the executive and judicial branches. Yet he remains to this day the only incumbent President to have finished third in a failed bid for a second term. Indeed, the election of 1912 dealt Taft a peculiarly devastating personal blow, as the third-party candidate whose presence on the ballot ensured Taft’s defeat was his erstwhile friend and patron, former President Theodore Roosevelt.
Date: 08/12/2026
Home distilling any amount of spirits has been a Federal felony for over 150 years according to 26 USC § 5601. The law had originally also included making beer and wine at home, although that part of the ban was lifted in 1978.
Back in April, the 5th Circuit overturned the ban in McNutt v. Dept. of Justice, arguing that this law bans distilling spirits at home with no option to pay the spirit tax in order to distill legally. The panel argued that this amounted to a tax law designed to produce no revenue and decided that such a law exceeds Congress' authority to levy taxes.
Later that same month, the 6th Circuit held in Ream v. Dept. of the Treasury that the law was within Congress' authority under the "Necessary and Proper" clause, which the 5th Circuit had found unconvincing. This created a circuit split.
The Buckeye Institute, which represented the plaintiffs in both cases, has announced that they intend to appeal the 6th Circuit decision to SCOTUS. Based on the above, it seems likely that SCOTUS will grant cert to resolve the split. What would you say the likely outcome would be and why?
The article summarizes the court's upcoming OT26 case Kian v. Florida and the prior precedent Williams v. Florida (1970). From the article:
>The court’s recent treatment of the right to a jury trial is mixed. Although the court chose to reinstate the unanimity requirement in Ramos, Justice Samuel Alito, joined by Chief Justice John Roberts and Justice Elena Kagan, dissented, accusing the majority of giving stare decisis “rough treatment.” Similar concerns will return in Kian, attached to decades of state practice and thousands of judgments.
>Perhaps six people can deliberate carefully. And perhaps many six-person verdicts are perfectly sound. The question in Kian is whether the judgment about that number’s adequacy belongs to social scientists, legislators, or judges – or whether the people who adopted the Sixth Amendment settled it when they guaranteed a “jury.”
The article also highlight's Gorsuch's championing of the issue, including his dissent from the denial of cert in Khorrami v. Arizona in 2022
Welcome to the r/SupremeCourt 'In Chambers' discussion thread!
This thread will be pinned at the top of the subreddit and refreshed every Monday @ 6AM Eastern.
This replaces and combines the 'Ask Anything Monday' and 'Lower Court Development Wednesday' threads. As such, this weekly thread is intended to provide a space for:
General questions: (e.g. "Where can I find Supreme Court briefs?", "What does [X] mean?").
Open-ended discussion starters requiring minimal input from OP: (e.g. "Predictions?", "What do people think about [X]?", "What's your favorite [X]?")
U.S. District and State Court rulings involving a federal question that may be of future relevance to the Supreme Court.
TL;DR: This is a catch-all thread for legal discussion that may not warrant its own thread.
Our other rules apply as always. Incivility and polarized rhetoric are never permitted. This thread is not intended for political or off-topic discussion.
2-1. Millet and Garcia in the majority, Rao dissents.
From: Wesley (Bush II), Carney (Obama), and Park (Trump):
>We hold that the Customer Data Law violates the First Amendment as applied to the Platforms’ Marketplace products. Zauderer’s deferential review does not apply to the Law because the Law compels the disclosure of information about third parties who use Marketplace, not information about Marketplace itself. The Law must therefore satisfy at least intermediate scrutiny under Central Hudson. It fails that standard because the City has not carried its burden to establish a reasonable fit between its asserted interests and the means the Law employs to advance those interests.
>The City has not carried its burden. Two features of the Law’s design, taken together, extend its reach beyond what the City has established its interests require. First, the Law “presume[s]” that every customer consents to having their personal information shared. § 20-563.7(b). Second, the Law requires customers who want to opt out of data sharing to do so on an order-by-order basis. Id. The result is a marketing list that no customer asked to join and that none can be confident they have permanently left. The City has offered no evidence that this design serves its interests better than obvious, substantially less burdensome alternatives would.
Park joined the majority, but wrote a separate concurring opinion, saying:
>The Law compels speech for nothing more than economic favoritism. The City’s stated goal is to “support the restaurant industry” by requiring delivery platforms to disclose valuable customer data to restaurants. The Law’s sponsor explained that the objective was to “strike the right balance and equity between” platforms and restaurants and to “give” restaurants “a better opportunity to compete.”
>A vague desire to support an industry comprised of tens of thousands of stores is not the type of interest that can justify abridging the freedom of speech of disfavored competitors. Under Central Hudson, we “ask whether the asserted governmental interest is substantial.” 447 U.S. at 566. To determine which interests qualify as substantial in the compelled commercial disclosure context, “history and tradition are reliable guides.” Am. Meat Inst. v. U.S. Dep’t of Agric., 760 F.3d 18, 31 (D.C. Cir. 2014) (en banc) (Kavanaugh, J., concurring in the judgment). For example, the “Government has long required commercial disclosures to prevent consumer deception or to ensure consumer health or safety,” and “[t]hose interests explain and justify” compelled disclosures like “nutrition labels and health warnings.” Id. But here, the City does not even offer consumer protection as a pretext (nor could it because the Law would actually harm consumers by disclosing their personally identifiable information without consent, see ante at 21–25).