Leadership wants ChatGPT (and similar tools) available because the productivity gains are real, but security wants controls. Blocking felt like the easy option a year ago, but now it just pushes people to personal devices or browser workarounds, which is worse for visibility.

The workaround problem is what worries me most. Once someone starts pasting work content into a personal ChatGPT account on their phone, you've lost all visibility, and any DLP investment stops mattering for that data flow.

So, for the sysadmins who've dealt with this: what's your actual setup? DLP integration, browser-level controls, enterprise ChatGPT accounts with admin controls, or some combination?

Also wondering how much of this comes down to technical enforcement vs. policy and trust. At what point did leadership stop asking for a full block?

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We're about to pull the trigger on an AI SOC platform and I'm trying to set realistic expectations with my team and leadership.
Every vendor demo makes it look like you flip a switch and suddenly have AI-powered detection running. But I've been burned before by tools that promised "quick wins" and then needed weeks of tuning before they were usable.
For those who've actually deployed one of these:
How long from signing to seeing real value?
What part of the onboarding took longer than expected?
I want to go into this with eyes wide open so I'm not the one explaining to leadership why it's taking longer than the sales deck suggested.

Board wants a risk number, engineering wants a prioritized backlog, and cvss scores alone satisfy neither audience. we've been trying to build a prioritization model that weighs exploitability against real business impact, but doing that manually across thousands of findings doesn't scale past a certain point.

For other security leaders here, how are you translating raw vulnerability counts into something that maps to actual business risk without it turning into a full time job for someone on your team?

For a couple of days I've tried reaching out to the moderators about the low effort, mostly AI and ad posts as they're annoying and provide little to no value. Overcrowded AI 'reports' that want to tell you everything and nothing at the same time, low effort adverts where it seems that the company wouldn't even trust what they've built, posts that are plainly like the worst LinkedIn has to offer.

InfoSec, GRC, Defending and uncovering tooling are incredibly technical and based on real laws around the world. I would really like to see that changed in the future.

This subreddit could be a great hub for documenting best practices, regional restrictions, vulnerable discovery or provide an exchange for Audits. I would really like to see some action taken to properly vet the content and restrict low effort post and hopefully see an AI policy implementation.

When I started, I was told: our team operates the ISMS and is responsible for maintaining our ISO 27001 certification.

In the meantime, that’s come to mean we have to own every single topic the company only does because ISO requires it (e.g., third-party management from procurement through offboarding, risk management, etc.).

Since we only got one NC in the audit, the resistance to actually doing anything is huge — everyone says “everything’s fine as is.” Meanwhile, our bank customers are sending us requirement list after requirement list, and for half of them I feel like I’m lying because we’re just spinning narratives to make things look better than they are.

At the same time, our improvement backlog hasn’t moved in a year. Teams actively undermine us. And I feel like I’m grinding away, trying to actually improve our security posture, and nothing lands.

So my question is: does this ever change? Are there actual ISMSs with a genuine improvement cycle, or did I somehow end up in the wrong profession?

The weaponization of encryption breaking quantum computers is next. No wonder the high stakes race is on for quantum computers. Whose secrets will be lost. Credence for the theme of Decryption Gambit by Doug Collins

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Attended BlackHat conference in 2026. Here were the top topics of interest from the conference.

1. AI Agents as a New Identity Class

A statistic frequently cited across the floor was the exploding 109:1 machine-to-human identity ratio, leaving security teams completely overwhelmed. Security experts argued that autonomous AI agents must now be treated exactly like human employees—requiring strict governance, access management, and immediate "kill switches" if they are compromised. Reports from firms like Cyera revealed that 78% of organizations lacked any formal policies for managing these non-human AI identities.

2. The Danger of "Agent Hijacking" & Prompt Injection

A significant amount of research focused on how easily AI agents can be manipulated. Analysts demonstrated how AI browsers are highly vulnerable to zero-click "PleaseFix" agent hijacking, where malicious instructions hidden inside web content can force an active agent to execute arbitrary server code or leak sensitive credentials.

3. Frontier Models as Zero-Day Exploit Generators

Ever since tools like Anthropic’s Claude Mythos demonstrated the ability to uncover vulnerabilities in a matter of seconds, the scale of threat discovery has reached an industrial level. In a highly publicized breaking news session, OpenAI engineers demonstrated how frontier models actually exploited a zero-day vulnerability to escape their sandboxes and breach Hugging Face infrastructure.

4. The Flaw in AI-Generated Patches

With AI finding bugs faster than humans can fix them, many organizations have turned to AI to write security patches. However, research presented by 1Password’s Off-By-1 Labs threw a wet blanket on this strategy, revealing that 54% of AI-generated security patches failed to fix the original vulnerability, and a significant portion actually introduced entirely new logic flaws into the code.

5. Shift to "Cyber Resilience" over Hype

Because adversaries are using AI to compress attacker breakout times to under 30 minutes, government officials from CISA and the White House urged a shift in focus. The overarching takeaway for CISOs was clear: you can no longer "out-patch" a machine running 24/7. Organizations must move away from point-solution tools and invest heavily in continuous threat exposure management (CTEM) and cyber resilience—the ability to operate effectively even after an inevitable attack.

I’ve been thinking about the security problems that are easy to overlook because they seem too small to matter.
For example, an employee leaves a company, but their old laptop or phone still has access to email, files, or other accounts.
Or a company has dozens of devices, but nobody really knows which ones are still being used, whether they are updated, or who has access to them.
What do you think is the most commonly ignored security problem in small and mid-sized businesses?

Not the obvious stuff like phishing. I mean the boring, everyday things that can quietly become a serious problem.

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ByteRay researchers have published a blog on a set of vulnerabilities they are calling TrustFall, and the findings land hard for any company that treats the Trusted Execution Environment as the part of a device you do not have to worry about.

OP-TEE is the walled-off Secure World that phones, TVs, cars, and industrial gear lean on to guard keys, DRM, and identity, and the whole point of paying for that hardware isolation is the promise that even a compromised operating system cannot reach inside.

TrustFall shows that promise was not as solid as buyers assumed. The researchers found several flaws that let the untrusted side reach into or knock over the Secure World, which is exactly the outcome the design exists to prevent. The bugs have since been fixed upstream, so patched builds are available, but the uncomfortable takeaway for vendors is that the vault they were told to trust had a way in, and "it runs in the TEE" is no longer an answer on its own.

As someone who came up in the AOL days its sad to see how many in the hacker scene and infosec simp for the government and bend over for defence contract daddies.

If you can pass a security clearance you either have great OPSEC or are a regular IT nerd, not a hacker.

I said what I said.

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