"Maritime Launch Services earned its first operating profit in the second quarter of 2026, as its launch-pad lease with the Department of National Defence (DND) delivered its first full quarter of revenue at Spaceport Nova Scotia, the Halifax-based company’s Aug. 14 filings show.

Revenue for the three months ended June 30 was $5.6 million, against nothing a year earlier, and net income was $3.2 million. After a decade of fits and starts mostly due to financial constraints, the launch site under-development near Canso, N.S., has begun paying its own way."

Jumia (JMIA): The Logistics Moat Is Finally Showing Up in the Margins

Jumia is the only real e-commerce and logistics platform at scale in Africa. It has never turned a profit, and management has guided to breakeven EBITDA in Q4 2026. Here is how I think about the business, why the market is anchored on GMV growth when margins are the real lever, and what it could be worth if the business succeeds.

Disclosure: I am personally long JMIA. These are my own personal thoughts and opinions, not investment advice and solely my own opinions. 

Overview

·       Jumia is a logistics company with an e-commerce front end — anyone can build a marketplace in the age of AI. Not anyone can deliver a package to rural Nigeria. That is the moat.

·       Margins beat GMV — Margins are a better lever to profitability than GMV growth that the market focuses on. Taking Q4 2026 GMV growth from 20% to 30% adds only ~$1.8MM of EBITDA. One point of gross margin adds ~$3.3MM.

·       The margin story is already happening — gross profit went from under 12% of GMV in Q4 2024 to 14.2% in Q2 2026 — while fixed costs shrank and GMV grew over 20%.

·       Fulfillment cost is the next lever — stuck at 5-6% of GMV since 2024, fulfillment expense is expected to decrease to ~4.5%; every point is worth ~$3.3MM of EBITDA.

·       The China risk is a price war, not displacement — Temu and Shein cannot replicate the local network, but they can make the market unprofitable for everyone. Q2 showed no sign of that yet.

·       Demographics are the structural tailwind — 582MM people across Jumia's markets today, 871MM by 2050, median age 20.5, and 4.7x as many annual births as the US.

·       The valuation is cheap — $772MM market cap. Haircutting SE and MELI purely for GDP per capita implies $16-20B. Even getting a fraction of the way there is a large number.

What Jumia Actually Is

Before the numbers, it is worth being clear about what this company actually does — because the label it usually gets is wrong.

Jumia is a logistics company, not the Amazon of Africa

JMIA has been unfairly labeled as the Amazon of Africa. Despite creating unrealistic expectations, this labeling misses a key part of JMIA's business. JMIA is a logistics business at heart. E-commerce fuels JMIA's logistics. Anyone can build an e-commerce website, especially a marketplace connecting 3rd party buyers and sellers (and I mean that literally in the age of AI). But not anyone can figure out how to deliver packages to rural Nigeria. That is the moat. I would rather see JMIA become the FedEx of Africa than the Amazon of Africa as ecommerce in Africa is incredibly challenging.

Are pick-up stations the Wal-Mart of Africa?

Are the pick up stations like the Wal-Mart of Africa? Pick up stations are a very smart strategy in environments where last mile localized delivery is difficult and customers are incredibly price sensitive. Pick Up Stations bring the breadth of products and cheap prices of a Wal-Mart Superstore available to rural cities with a small wait for delivery. 

Why e-commerce champions are homegrown

Why have ecommerce champions been homegrown throughout the world? Amazon in the US, Alibaba in China, SE in Southeast Asia, MELI in South America, Coupang in Korea. Home grown e commerce companies seem to perform best. It is possible that is because you need to have a deep understanding of your customer. There was a time JMIA probably did not. Now I would argue that changed and JMIA can be the home grown ecommerce champion of Africa.

The social dividend

JMIA has a positive effect on the society and communities it operates in. JMIA has thousands of J Force agents who are independent contractors and that JMIA pays, allowing them to essentially run their own small business. JMIA has thousands of sellers on their marketplace who can reach customers throughout Africa that they would not be able to reach through a storefront. JMIA enables people in relatively remote parts of the world to have access to cheap goods that they would have a hard time accessing otherwise. It connects people by allowing them to purchase phones and the internet through Starlink. JMIA is an enabler of social progress and inclusive growth through its ecommerce and logistics services.

The demographic tailwind

The massive and undeniably bullish structural tailwind behind this business is the phenomenal demographics of Africa. Africa is broadly the youngest and fastest growing region in the world. In a world where advanced economies are going to struggle to grow due to poor demographics and large debt burdens, Africa will look like an increasingly attractive place to invest. Nigeria in particular has excellent demographics (more children were born in Nigeria last year — 8.5MM — than in the US and the EU combined), positive government reforms under Bola Tinubu (removing fuel subsidy, focus on corruption), and strong support from large businesses like Dangote.

The Dangote refinery is particularly impressive. It shows how poorly run Nigeria was that they were a large oil exporter but had to import all of their refined fuels/gas. This created extreme pressure on their current account and currency as they needed USD to buy refined fuels from abroad. Now that they refine fuel themselves this pressure has abated. It is very notable that this year with an oil price shock caused by war the Nigerian Naira has appreciated 6% against the dollar. An oil shock like this would have hammered Nigeria a couple years ago, now their currency is rallying and you could argue it is a positive for them as customers worldwide look for alternative sources of oil and gas that don’t need to transit Hormuz.

Africa has some of the best demographic tailwinds in the world. Nigeria alone had 8.5MM births last year, more than the US and the EU combined (7.6MM). The median age in Nigeria is 18. The population of JMIA’s markets is expected to grow to 871MM by 2050. This growth will look even more attractive relative to the developed world where birth rates and population growth are much slower:

Metric	JMIA 8 markets	United States	EU-27	JMIA vs. US
Population, 2025E (m)	582.2	342.0	450.4	1.70x
Population, 2050P (m)	870.6	381.0	447.9	2.29x
Population CAGR, 2021-25	2.1%	0.7%	0.2%	—
Nominal GDP, 2025E ($bn)	1,207	30,507	20,300	0.04x
GDP per capita, 2025E ($)	$2,073	$89,202	$45,071	0.02x
Median age (yrs)	20.5	38.9	44.7	—
% of population under 18	45.2%	21.5%	18.0%	—
Births per year (000s)	17,582	3,728	3,828	4.72x
Internet penetration %	55.4%	93.1%	94.0%	—

Margins, not GMV, are the near-term profit lever

Increase in Gross Margin and scaling of costs is a more significant lever of near term profitability than GMV growth which the market mostly focuses on. I am modeling a contribution margin of 6.4% of GMV (14.2% gross profit margin less 5.3% fulfillment expense and 2.5% Sales and Advertising expense). At this level a 10% increase in GMV growth in Q4 2026 (i.e. from 20% to 30%) only increases EBITDA by 1.8M (10% of Q4 2025 GMV is 27.95MM x 6.4% contribution margin). However, a 1% increase in gross margin increases Q4 EBITDA by 3.3MM. A 1% decrease in fulfillment expense as a % of GMV would also increase EBITDA by 3.3MM. The business is more levered to margins than GMV growth at this stage.

Why management is right not to chase GMV

This justifies management’s decision to not chase GMV at all costs and instead focus on profitability. Gross profit as a % of GMV was 14.2% in Q2 26. This was below 12% in Q4 2024. An increase in take rate, Marketing and Advertising Revenue, and value added services has created a more profitable business that will scale better.

Fulfillment cost is the next big lever

The next step is to get fulfillment cost as a % of GMV down which should be doable as the business scales (you don’t need much extra cost to add more packages to trucks/delivery vehicles that are already making the trip). Fulfillment cost as a % of GMV has been stubbornly in the 5-6% range since the start of 2024. RBC is modeling fulfillment expense as a % of GMV ~4.5% for Q4 26 and FY 2027 which would be a large profit lever as explained above (this was 5.9% in Q2 26 although impacted by temporary fuel surcharges JMIA is paying its delivery partners due to oil price shock).

The execution has been excellent

The company has gone from a 12% gross margin (as % of GMV) business in 2025 to a 14% gross margin (and potentially going higher with more usage of Value Added Services and Marketing and Advertising by sellers) while slightly decreasing fixed costs (1H 2025 G&A/T&C expense was 50.9MM compared to 49.9MM in 1H 2026) and growing GMV by over 20%. JMIA has also increased its take rate (the amount they charge sellers to sell on their platform) which is a strong signal of a growing attractive marketplace that sellers find valuable. This is fantastic execution by management.

This execution occurred despite real headwinds created by exogenous shocks (AI, War, Cocoa prices). It shows both the power of the AI build out and the amazing interconnectedness of the global economy that an AI capex boom by hyperscalers in America leads to an evaporation of low priced phone supply in Africa.

On the capital raise

Management had said that they did not need to raise additional capital to reach profitability. They are standing by that and claiming the capital raise is more opportunistic than necessary. Having IFC as an investor can be bullish in the long term if it opens more opportunities for JMIA (more like a VC/PE partner than a traditional public equity investor). The dilution was minimal and the market reacted positively. The story is significantly de-risked now as the odds of another capital raise in the short to medium term are very low.

The path to breakeven

Management has guided to breakeven EBITDA in Q4 2026 and FY 2027. These would both be milestones for a company that has never turned a profit. In Q4 2026 the bar is relatively low. Assuming a 6.4% contribution margin on GMV the breakeven GMV growth is 21% in Q4, which should be achievable especially with a better cash position now to go after targeted opportunities. Using the midpoint of Q3 GMV guidance (17.5%) and the low end of FY 2026 guidance (20%) implies 323MM in GMV for Q4 2026, a YoY growth of 15.6%. In this scenario EBITDA is within 1MM of breakeven and therefore possible for JMIA to achieve with better performance on fulfillment or margins.

2027 FY EBITDA positive is more demanding unless JMIA is able to get fulfillment costs down. RBC is modeling fulfillment costs as a % of GMV at ~4.5% in both Q4 26 and FY 2027 which is a significant driver of profitability given the modest growth they are modeling (about 20%). Assuming fulfillment cost as a % of GMV at 5% in 2027 (and therefore a 6.5% contribution margin with 14% gross margins and 2.5% S&A), GMV growth would need to be 30% in 2027 to breakeven EBITDA. JMIA either needs to outperform on GMV growth or have lower costs than recent quarters in order to meet their target. I still believe they will and trust management who has executed well so far. But the bar is higher than for Q4 26.

Chinese competition: the risk is a price war, not displacement

The threat from Chinese entrants like Temu and Shein is real. China is incredibly good at manufacturing quality products cheaply. But they are ruthlessly competitive. One of my favorite macro strategists (ht Louis Gave) has a saying that “when China enters the room profits leave”. I am not concerned about Temu/Shein/Baba outcompeting JMIA because JMIA has a local logistics moat that cannot easily be replicated. But I am concerned that outside competitors flood the market with cheap goods and advertising dollars such that the competitive environment makes it difficult for anyone to make a profit, including JMIA. Q2 was reassuring on this with gross profit margins increasing and management stating on the call that they are not seeing any increased competitive pressures.

Third-party delivery: the underappreciated option

I was excited when JMIA rolled out their 3rd party delivery service in Q1 25 and I am disappointed that we have not heard anything about it since. Given my view that JMIA is a logistics company this is a perfect way to leverage their core competency. And it is almost pure profit since they are already running the logistic routes. Unfortunately this business has not yet seen any traction (it is included in “Other Revenue” which was down year over year to only 300k in Q1 26). Hopefully this business works, it would be a major positive to the story given its margin profile and how it leverages an already existing fixed cost base.

Ghana is the signal

When you see the outsized growth of certain markets it is a sign that something is working in the model. Ghana grew over 100% for a few quarters and is now a respectable 15% of GMV. That is a signal worth paying attention to.

Valuation: what if this actually works?

JMIA has a market cap of 772MM. If JMIA ends up being the ecommerce champion of Africa the way that MELI and SE are in their markets the returns can look like a VC investment.

RBC reaches its $13 price target by using 5x EV/2027 Sales. This is a very conservative multiple. From 2010 to 2020, MELI traded roughly around 10x sales and sometimes over 15x sales. SE traded around 10x sales for 2018-2019 as well.

If JMIA can compound revenues at 25% from the 2025 baseline of 189MM they will have about 575MM in revenues in 2030. And by then the model will be de-risked, proven, and they will have structural tailwind from positive African demographics and growth. In this scenario it could easily trade at 10x revenues which would be a 5.75B market cap and nearly 8x return from current levels.

One common critique of JMIA is that it operates in poor markets where their customers have low purchasing power. This is certainly correct. SE’s largest market Indonesia has a GDP per capita of 5k. MELI’s largest market of Brazil has GDP per capita of 10k. The markets that SE and MELI operate in have GDP per capita 4-6x higher than JMIA:

Metric	JMIA	SE	MELI
Population 2025E (m)	582.2	640.7	502.9
Nominal GDP 2025E ($bn)	1,207	4,885	6,038
GDP per capita 2025E ($)	$2,073	$7,624	$12,006

However, SE and MELI trade at much higher valuations than JMIA. If JMIA trades at 27% of SE’s market cap due to the GDP per capita differential implies a market cap of 20B for JMIA. Assuming JMIA trades at 17% of MELI’s market cap due to their GDP per capita differential implies a 16B market cap for JMIA. So if GDP per capita was the only difference between JMIA and SE/MELI it could still trade 20-25x higher than current valuation. This is not the case currently as SE and MELI are established national champion e-commerce companies that have been able to not only succeed in E-commerce but also grow into ancillary businesses. JMIA has a long road to being as successful as SE and MELI but if they get even close the upside to JMIA is substantial even given the lower GDP per capita of JMIA’s markets:

Metric	JMIA	SE	MELI
Current market cap ($)	$772 m	$74,686 m	$93,514 m
Current share / ADS price ($)	$6.23	$131.73	$1,844.58
Implied JMIA market cap — GDP per capita haircut ($)	—	$20,304 m	$16,144 m
Implied JMIA ADS price — GDP per capita basis ($)	—	$163.94	$130.35
Upside / (downside) vs. current — per capita basis	—	+2,531%	+1,992%

Bottom Line

Jumia has quietly turned itself into a different company: a higher-margin logistics and marketplace business that grows GMV while keeping a lid on fixed costs. The market is still grading it on GMV growth. I think the more important line items are gross margin and fulfillment cost, and both are moving the right way. Q4 2026 breakeven looks achievable; FY 2027 is a higher bar that depends on fulfillment costs coming down. If management keeps executing, the demographics of Africa do the rest of the work over the next decade — and the current $772MM market cap is not pricing that in.

Disclosure: I am long JMIA. These are my own personal thoughts and opinions, not investment advice and solely my own opinions. 

Most major ad channels have a public transparency layer: Meta has the Ad
Library. Google has its Ads Transparency Center. TikTok has the Creative
Center. ChatGPT, AI Mode, and AI Overview, however, have none of that – not
for competitors, and often not even for the advertiser's own team.

Adding AI Ads to Similarweb’s Ad Intelligence fills that gap with an Ads
Gallery that shows what ads are running and in what context.

For AI Mode & AI Overview, advertisers participating in Google’s broader
digital advertising programs are blind to ad placements in Google AI answers.
Most advertisers don't know whether their own ads are running in that context,
let alone how they stack up against competitors. Google’s visibility tools
don’t answer that question.

For ChatGPT, ads only show up when intent exists and is clarified from the
conversation, and the decision comes down to the combination of ad creative,
copy, and landing page. Rather than leaving advertisers to guess where their
ads are appearing, Similarweb’s AI Ads provides a direct look at what's
winning placement.

What makes Similarweb's approach unique is that these insights are drawn from
real user panel conversations, not synthetic prompts. We anticipate upcoming
releases of the AI Ads dataset will add advertisers' true share of voice, ad
categories, and conversational intent.

“When we started advertising on ChatGPT, we were flying blind, no visibility
into who else was in the auction or what was working,” says Jonathan Bar
Vardi, Head of Strategy at Natural Intelligence, a data-driven marketing
specialist that has become a top buyer of ChatGPT ads. “Similarweb changed
that. It shows what other advertisers don't know: who's spending, where
they're appearing, and what's driving performance.”

I’ve been trying to formalize how I think about GARP investing.

To me, long-term returns are driven by two turbines:

1. EPS growth
2. Multiple expansion/contraction

A company can compound EPS at 20%+ and still produce mediocre returns if you buy it at 35x earnings and it eventually trades at 15x. On the other hand, strong EPS growth combined with even modest multiple expansion can produce exceptional returns.

That’s pushed me toward looking for companies with:

- 20%+ expected EPS growth over the next 3–5 years

- Positive 1M / 3M / 6M estimate revisions. It doesn’t need to be perfect across every period, but positive revisions in aggregate over the past six months are a major bonus in my experience. At minimum, it suggests the earnings trajectory is improving and creates a higher probability we get multiple expansion.

- A strong history of beating quarterly estimates. If a company consistently beats and raises, it is often a sign the Street is still underestimating the business.

- 10%+ operating margins. I use this as a rough business-quality filter. Companies with healthy operating margins generally have a much better chance of becoming strong cash-generating machines.

- A clean balance sheet. Another quality filter, but also often a reflection of capable capital allocation and management discipline. I can write more about what I consider a “clean” balance sheet if there is interest.

- Minimal dilution. Some dilution is fine if it is being used to fund attractive investments or align management incentives, but persistent dilution can be an absolute killer of per-share returns.

- Non-cyclical businesses. I generally find it much harder to identify durable compounders in highly cyclical industries like oil, mining, and other commodity businesses.

- A reasonable starting valuation. Staying below roughly 40x forward earnings dramatically improves the odds that future EPS growth actually translates into strong shareholder returns. Hard to get multiple expansion in most cases when the multiple is already ~80x

The ideal setup is where earnings estimates are still moving higher while the market has not yet fully rewarded the business with a premium multiple.

If you can identify these characteristics probability of outsized returns are heavily skewed in your favor (but never guaranteed). The rerating catalyst is almost always is triggered by large new contract, earnings beat or guidance.

I tend to find these situations more often in small- and micro-cap names, (for example, stocks I’ve written about in the past, $DBOXF / $DBO.TO, or $LQDA) where the Street may simply not be paying close enough attention yet or overly pessimistic about some stormy cloud you have the conviction & foresight to see through.

For this exercise, though, I used a few larger-cap companies I like: $UBER, $RDDT and $ABNB - mostly because they have enough analyst coverage to give us reasonably robust forward estimates through 2031.

I then looked at what the five-year return profile could look like under different terminal P/E assumptions.

The results were pretty interesting.

$RDDT — 2031 EPS Scenario
15x P/E → $255 price → 7.5% 5Y CAGR
20x P/E → $341 price → 13.8% 5Y CAGR
22.5x P/E → $383 price → 16.6% 5Y CAGR
25x P/E → $426 price → 19.0% 5Y CAGR
30x P/E → $511 price → 23.5% 5Y CAGR

$UBER — 2031 EPS Scenario
15x P/E → $152 price → 14.9% 5Y CAGR
20x P/E → $203 price → 21.7% 5Y CAGR
22.5x P/E → $228 price → 24.6% 5Y CAGR
25x P/E → $254 price → 27.3% 5Y CAGR
30x P/E → $304 price → 32.0% 5Y CAGR

$ABNB — 2031 EPS Scenario
15x P/E → $211 price → 2.8% 5Y CAGR
20x P/E → $282 price → 8.9% 5Y CAGR
22.5x P/E → $317 price → 11.5% 5Y CAGR
25x P/E → $352 price → 13.8% 5Y CAGR
30x P/E → $422 price → 18.1% 5Y CAGR

Does anyone else use a similar framework?

Any companies are you seeing today that fit most of these criteria?

Any critiques on where this framework break down?

Follow me on X for more content like this. Trying to build a track record and share my ideas and process. I have nothing to sell you.

https://x.com/gz\_cap/status/2088686356012650652?s=46&t=ptp3dlurmR-41SfbNYXq6A

There’s been a lot to digest with Castellum ($CTM) over the last couple of days, so I wanted to put together the biggest takeaways from both the recent Navy development and two separate conversations that Mounwp and I had with CEO Glen Ives.
First — the Trump/Navy development.
President Trump has reportedly directed the Navy to move away from EMALS on future aircraft carriers and return to steam-powered catapults.
Naturally, this raised some concern because Castellum subsidiary Specialty Systems (SSI) has extensive experience supporting Aircraft Launch and Recovery Equipment (ALRE).
However, I think an important distinction is getting lost in some of the discussion:
ALRE is much broader than EMALS.
Aircraft still need to launch and recover regardless of whether the underlying catapult technology is electromagnetic or steam. Engineering, systems integration, software, testing and technical support don’t simply disappear because the technology changes.
After the news broke, Mounwp reached back out to Glen. According to Mounwp’s summary of that communication, Castellum had anticipated this issue, and Glen indicated that whether the technology is steam or electric, there should still be substantial engineering, systems-integration and software-engineering work.
That does not guarantee CTM wins that work, and I don’t think this development should somehow be spun as bullish.
But I also haven’t seen evidence that CTM’s ALRE business has suddenly been destroyed, existing ALRE work has been cancelled, or that some massive portion of backlog has disappeared.
For me, this is something to monitor, not something to panic over or dismiss.

My Call With Glen + Mounwp’s Separate Call
What I found particularly interesting is that Mounwp and I spoke with Glen completely separately, asked different questions, and still came away with a very similar understanding of Castellum’s broader strategy.
The simplest way I can describe it is:
Organic growth + acquisitions + business-development investment + new capabilities/contract access = an attempt to build a substantially larger defense contractor over time.
My conversation focused heavily on the financial side.
Castellum currently has roughly $17M in cash and zero debt.
I asked why they couldn’t simply use that cash to grow organically instead of pursuing acquisitions.
The answer, as I understood it, comes down to speed and capabilities.
$17M in cash gives CTM capital.
It doesn’t instantly give them new customers, contract vehicles, specialized employees, capabilities, agency relationships or access to adjacent markets.
Those things can be built organically, but that takes time.
An acquisition can potentially bring an established business that already possesses them.
And importantly, the strategy isn’t organic growth OR acquisitions.
It’s organic growth AND acquisitions.

Zero Debt Doesn’t Mean “Never Use Debt”
Another clarification from my conversation:
I did not come away believing Glen is philosophically opposed to debt.
He explained that Castellum previously had roughly $12M in debt with limited cash flow, which restricted the company’s flexibility.
Today CTM is in a completely different financial position.
My understanding of Glen’s philosophy was essentially:
Don’t take on debt just because you can. Preserve flexibility, but if a future deal requires debt and the opportunity justifies it, debt remains an option.

Why Hasn’t an Acquisition Happened Yet?
This was another area where our conversations overlapped.
CTM is evaluating potential companies, but acquisitions are two-sided transactions.
Castellum can identify a company it wants to acquire, but the seller may not be ready.
Some targets are founder-owned. Others may involve private equity. A seller might want another six months, another year, or simply not be ready at all.
One clarification from my call:
When a 6–12 month timeframe came up, Glen was NOT telling me CTM’s acquisition is 6–12 months away.
He was explaining the types of timelines certain potential sellers can operate on.

The Increased Spending / Profitability Debate
This was another area where Glen apparently gave both of us very similar explanations.
Could CTM make its near-term financials look better by reducing expenses?
Potentially, yes.
Cut business development.
Reduce acquisition-related spending.
Reduce certain growth investments.
Assuming everything else stayed equal, EBITDA/profitability would look better.
But management’s argument is that doing so could sacrifice future growth.
Glen does not appear interested in optimizing Castellum around remaining a ~$55M–$60M company that generates a little profit every year.
The ambition discussed with me was to use organic growth, acquisitions and expanded capabilities to eventually build something much larger — with roughly $100M–$150M discussed as part of that broader long-term ambition.
That is NOT guidance and not a guarantee.
It’s simply how I understood the scale management is ultimately trying to reach.

Mounwp Got Some Different Context
Our calls weren’t redundant.
Mounwp got additional context surrounding:
● Precise Systems as an example of an acquisition-led government contractor
● The acquisition “flywheel”
● PMA-290 and its expected ramp
● The Russell 2000 as a potential milestone
● How acquisitions can add capabilities, vehicles and access to new opportunities
My conversation went deeper into:
● The ~$17M cash position
● Zero debt and potential future debt usage
● Why cash alone doesn’t replace acquisitions
● Backlog conversion
● Contract ceilings vs. actual revenue
● Acquisition timing
● Near-term profitability vs. growth investment
Put together, I think the two conversations provide a much clearer picture of what Glen is trying to build.

But Management Doesn’t Get a Free Pass
Understanding the strategy doesn’t mean assuming it will work.
Eventually, execution has to prove the thesis.
I want to see:
Backlog → Revenue
BD spending → Contract wins
Acquisition strategy → An actual acquisition
Higher spending → Stronger future financial performance
PMA-290 → Meaningful contribution as it ramps
And now:
Navy policy changes → Evidence SSI can adapt and remain relevant
If backlog remains large but doesn’t convert over an extended period, that’s a problem.
If CTM keeps talking about acquisitions but never completes one, that’s a problem.
If expenses remain elevated without producing measurable growth, that’s a problem.
And if the Navy’s move away from EMALS eventually results in material cancellations/reductions to CTM work, then the thesis needs to be updated accordingly.

Where I Stand
The Navy development doesn’t make me more bullish on CTM, but based on the information currently available, I also don’t think the extreme reaction that CTM’s ALRE opportunity has been “destroyed” is justified.
The bigger takeaway from both conversations with Glen is that the strategy itself seems pretty clear now.
The question is no longer:
“What is management trying to do?”
The much more important question is:
“Can management actually execute it?”
That’s what I’m watching over the next several quarters.
I made a full video breaking down the Navy development, what Mounwp reported after reaching back out to Glen, and comparing both of our separate conversations with him.
Video: [INSERT YOUTUBE LINK]
For transparency: my conversation with Glen was not a formal interview, and my comments are based on my notes and recollection rather than a word-for-word transcript. Anything regarding Mounwp’s conversation or subsequent communication with Glen is based on the summary Mounwp provided. Nothing here is financial advice.
Curious what everyone else thinks: Does the Navy/steam development materially change your CTM thesis, and what do you most want to see Castellum execute on over the next few quarters?

Every month we pull the trailing 1-year total return for every stock in our universe, rank them by market-cap tier, and publish the top performers. No opinions, no "buy this now" — just what actually happened, sorted plainly.

Why we do this differently: Most "top stocks" lists mix timeframes, cherry-pick lookback windows, or bury the methodology. Ours is simple: trailing 1-year total return (price + dividends), split by cap size (large/mid/small), recalculated on the same day every month.

Friend sent me information about Terra cycle, and after looking through the numbers I’m perplexed. How can the company be valued at $465 million when revenue is $43 million. They have low profit margins, and are turning all of the profit into dividends. What math supports the multiple/valuation for what seems to be an unattractive business model (high capital intensity, low margins, questionable competitive advantage sustainability)

Every month we pull the trailing 1-year total return for every stock in our universe, rank them by market-cap tier, and publish the top performers. No opinions, no "buy this now" — just what actually happened, sorted plainly.

Why we do this differently: Most "top stocks" lists mix timeframes, cherry-pick lookback windows, or bury the methodology. Ours is simple: trailing 1-year total return (price + dividends), split by cap size (large/mid/small), recalculated on the same day every month. You can check our math.

Every month we pull the trailing 1-year total return for every stock in our universe, rank them by market-cap tier, and publish the top performers. No opinions, no "buy this now" — just what actually happened, sorted plainly.

Why we do this differently: Most "top stocks" lists mix timeframes, cherry-pick lookback windows, or bury the methodology. Ours is simple: trailing 1-year total return (price + dividends), split by cap size (large/mid/small), recalculated on the same day every month. You can check our math.

GRVY’s market cap is approximately $480 million from premarket trading. Its most recent cash balance is approximately $460 million at current KRW/USD exchange rate. The company also generated roughly $35 million of net profit in the first half of 2026!!!
So after adjusting for cash, the profitable operating business is being valued at almost nothing.

Why so cheap?
Because Gravity was a notorious cash hoarder. It accumulated cash for years without dividends, buybacks or a credible capital-deployment strategy. Investors reasonably applied a huge discount to cash they might never receive.

Today may be the inflection point.
Gravity announced:
Its first dividend since founding
KRW 4,400 per share
KRW 30.6 billion total distribution
$200 million allocated to growth and strategic investments

Shareholder returns as an explicit part of its capital-allocation framework
GungHo owns 59.3%, so governance remains a risk. But GungHo also became more shareholder-friendly this year, increasing its dividend, adopting a minimum 50% payout ratio and completing a JPY 5 billion buyback.
The discount existed because the cash looked permanently trapped. If management is now willing to return and deploy it, GRVY’s current valuation looks increasingly absurd.

Can anyone tell me more compelling stock to own?

Thats $CIFR . Pls read and get a bag on Mondays open

Cipher Digital (CIFR) — the setup is about to click into gear. Only 7bill mc with 11.4B contracted

Cipher isn't a bitcoin miner anymore — it's a hyperscale AI landlord with $11.4B in contracted lease revenue already locked in across 10–15 year terms with tenants like AWS and Fluidstack, plus a $5.5B Amazon deal at Black Pearl.

Contracts / clients

907 MW of operating + contracted capacity, three signed hyperscaler campus leases

Anchor tenants: Amazon, Fluidstack — long-duration, investment-grade counterparties

3.3 GW pipeline advancing (5.3 GW total portfolio), with Reveille and Ulysses already holding interconnection approvals and targeting 2027 energization

Balance sheet — funded to build

~$715M unrestricted cash on hand

~$3.5B restricted cash sitting at the project entities, earmarked for construction

Fresh $200M undrawn corporate revolver just closed

$2.0B project bond just closed for Black Pearl

Debt is almost entirely nonrecourse, tied to the contracted assets themselves — construction risk is isolated from the parent

The ramp to 2027

NOI is projected to go from roughly $97M in 2026 to nearly $700M in 2027 as Barber Lake, Black Pearl, and Stingray energize and the Amazon/Fluidstack leases start converting to cash flow. Average annualized NOI across the base lease terms is guided at $787M, climbing to $892M by 2035.

Why it's mispriced

The stock still trades like a leftover bitcoin miner — roughly 10x 2027 NOI targets — while only about 13% of the total pipeline is even under contract yet. Every incremental lease signed on the remaining 87% is pure optionality the market isn't pricing in. With hyperscalers scrambling for power-ready sites and Cipher sitting on approved interconnects at scale, the re-rating case writes itself.

TL;DR

Smoltek Nanotech Holding AB is a Swedish nanotechnology company developing technologies based on vertically grown carbon nanostructures.

The company currently has two main business areas:

• Smoltek Semi – ultra-thin CNF-MIM capacitors and related technologies for advanced semiconductor applications.
• Smoltek Hydrogen – nanostructured Porous Transport Electrodes (PTEs) designed to drastically reduce iridium usage in PEM water electrolysis.

Smoltek is still a pre-commercial/high-risk technology company. It has not yet demonstrated significant recurring commercial revenue from its core technologies.

The investment case therefore depends primarily on whether Smoltek can move from technical validation → industrial production → paying customers.

There have recently been developments on both sides of the company. In Semiconductor, Smoltek is working with ITRI in Taiwan on industrialization and production capabilities. In Hydrogen, the collaboration with Heraeus Precious Metals has now progressed to a planned 3,000-hour durability test.

This DD examines both the opportunity and what could go wrong.

1. What is Smoltek?

Smoltek Nanotech Holding AB is a Swedish nanotechnology company built around its ability to grow controlled carbon nanostructures on different substrates.

The basic idea is relatively simple:

Carbon nanostructures can create an extremely large functional surface area within a very small physical volume.

Smoltek has spent many years developing intellectual property around how these structures can be manufactured and used in different industrial applications.

The company should therefore not simply be viewed as a capacitor company or a hydrogen company.

The underlying asset is the nanotechnology platform and its associated IP portfolio, from which several applications can potentially be developed.

Today, however, most commercial activity is concentrated in two areas: Semiconductor and Hydrogen.

2. Smoltek Semi – CNF-MIM capacitors

One of Smoltek's most developed applications is the CNF-MIM capacitor.

CNF stands for Carbon Nanofiber and MIM for Metal-Insulator-Metal.

By growing vertical carbon nanofibers, Smoltek creates a three-dimensional surface inside an extremely small volume. MIM layers are then deposited onto this structure to create a capacitor.

The result is an ultra-thin capacitor with high capacitance density.

Why does this matter?

Modern processors are becoming increasingly power-hungry.

This is particularly relevant for:

• AI accelerators
• High Performance Computing
• advanced packaging
• chiplets
• RF applications
• 5G/6G

As processors become faster, supplying stable power directly to the chip becomes increasingly challenging.

One solution is to position capacitors extremely close to the processor.

This is one of the problems Smoltek is trying to solve.

3. Gen-One and the path from Lab to Fab

A good laboratory result does not automatically create a commercially viable semiconductor component.

The technology must also be manufactured:

reliably, repeatedly, at scale and at an acceptable cost.

This is why Smoltek's activities in Taiwan are important.

Smoltek is working with ITRI – Industrial Technology Research Institute – on establishing production capabilities for its CNF-MIM technology.

The objective is to move the technology from:

Lab → engineering samples → customer validation → industrial production

Smoltek's current generation, Gen-One, is an important part of this process.

The company has also been working on additional applications for its technology, including integration into interposers for AI/HPC and chiplet architectures.

However, one major question remains unanswered:

Will a major customer actually adopt and pay for the technology?

Until that happens, the commercial value of CNF-MIM remains unproven.

4. Smoltek Hydrogen – the iridium problem

The second major business area is Hydrogen.

Smoltek Hydrogen develops nanostructured Porous Transport Electrodes for PEM water electrolysers.

PEM electrolysis has several attractive characteristics for green hydrogen production, but it also has an important limitation:

Iridium.

Iridium is one of the rarest metals on Earth.

Scaling PEM electrolysis significantly could therefore create a supply constraint unless the amount of iridium required per electrolyser is reduced.

This is the problem Smoltek is attempting to address.

Instead of simply adding more catalyst material, Smoltek uses nanostructures designed to make a larger proportion of the iridium electrochemically active.

The objective can be simplified to:

Produce more hydrogen using substantially less iridium.

5. Heraeus Precious Metals – update 10 August 2026

This brings us to one of the most recent developments.

On 10 August 2026, Smoltek announced that its strategic collaboration with Heraeus Precious Metals is progressing to another validation phase.

The companies plan to begin a:

3,000-hour durability test

during autumn 2026.

This corresponds to approximately 125 days.

The test will specifically evaluate the long-term operational stability of Smoltek's nanostructured iridium catalyst layer under realistic operating conditions.

There are three details I consider particularly relevant.

1. Below 0.1 mg Ir/cm²

Smoltek reports that its catalyst architecture has reduced the required iridium loading to below 0.1 mg/cm² while maintaining high electrolyser efficiency.

Reducing iridium is, however, only useful if durability remains sufficient.

That is what now needs to be demonstrated.

2. Heraeus will lead the testing phase

This is not simply another internal Smoltek laboratory test.

According to the announcement, Heraeus Precious Metals will lead the upcoming testing phase and provide its material-analysis and testing capabilities.

That provides useful external validation of the development process.

It does not, however, mean that Heraeus has committed to purchasing or commercialising the technology.

3. Heraeus explicitly mentions industrialisation

Christian Gebauer, Head of Innovation in the Hydrogen Systems Division at Heraeus Precious Metals, stated that Heraeus intends to continue supporting the steps towards industrialisation of these ultra-low-iridium PTEs.

I think this wording is noteworthy.

But it needs to be interpreted carefully.

There is currently no announced commercial supply agreement between Heraeus and Smoltek.

The development can therefore currently be described as:

Collaboration → development → validation → 3,000h durability testing → ?

Potential industrialisation and commercialisation remain future steps that have not yet been demonstrated.

6. What does the 3,000-hour test actually need to prove?

This is perhaps the most important question regarding Smoltek Hydrogen.

Low iridium loading alone is not enough.

For the technology to have commercial value, Smoltek needs to demonstrate a combination of:

Low iridium loading + high efficiency + low degradation + manufacturability

The upcoming test primarily addresses the durability part of that equation.

If performance remains strong after 3,000 hours, it would remove one important technical uncertainty from the Hydrogen case.

If degradation is too high, further development could be required.

The test should therefore not be viewed as proof that commercialisation is coming.

It should be viewed as an important attempt to answer one of the remaining technical questions.

7. Industrialisation

Another important question is whether Smoltek's technology can eventually be produced at industrial scale.

Within Hydrogen, Smoltek has also collaborated with companies such as Impact Coatings regarding industrial production processes.

Within Semiconductor, ITRI plays a similar role in moving CNF-MIM toward scalable manufacturing.

This creates a common theme across Smoltek:

Several years ago the primary question was:

Does the technology work?

Increasingly, the question is becoming:

Can it be manufactured industrially and economically?

That is progress.

But industrial-scale manufacturing has not yet been fully proven.

8. Business model

Smoltek's commercial model varies between its technologies.

Historically, licensing and IP-based revenue have been an important part of the strategy, particularly within Semiconductor.

A possible model could include:

Upfront payment → milestones → licensing → royalties

Hydrogen has developed toward a more product-oriented business model, where Smoltek Hydrogen intends to manufacture and sell complete PTE products to customers.

The eventual economics of either business are therefore still difficult to estimate.

This is important when valuing the company.

Until actual commercial contracts exist, assumptions regarding future margins, royalties and volumes remain speculative.

9. Intellectual property

A significant part of Smoltek's potential value is its IP portfolio.

The company has developed patent families covering areas such as:

• carbon nanostructure manufacturing
• CNF-MIM capacitors
• interposer integration
• electrode structures
• manufacturing processes
• hydrogen applications

This potentially creates barriers to competitors.

However, patents should not automatically be assigned significant financial value.

Ultimately, IP becomes economically valuable when customers are willing to pay to use the protected technology.

Commercial adoption therefore remains the key validation.

10. Financing

Financing has historically been one of the largest risks in the Smoltek investment case.

Developing advanced nanotechnology before significant commercial revenue requires substantial capital.

During 2026, Smoltek completed a rights issue.

The offering was approximately 184% subscribed.

Including the over-allotment, Smoltek raised approximately SEK 82.1 million gross, before transaction costs and certain offsets.

This significantly improved the company's financial position and provides additional resources for commercialisation and industrialisation activities.

However, financing risk has not disappeared.

If commercialisation takes considerably longer than expected, additional capital could eventually be required.

Future capital raises could result in further dilution.

11. Trading in Germany – GY9

Smoltek's primary listing is on Spotlight Stock Market in Sweden under ticker:

SMOL

ISIN:

SE0010820381

The share has also become available for trading on German marketplaces under:

GY9

It is important to understand that GY9 is not a separate class of Smoltek shares.

It represents the same underlying security.

The German availability is interesting in the context of Hydrogen because Heraeus Precious Metals is a German industrial company.

However, availability on German exchanges should not itself be considered an investment catalyst.

Investor demand still needs to exist.

12. The Bull Case

For the investment thesis to work, several things need to go right.

Semiconductor

Smoltek needs to demonstrate reproducible manufacturing of CNF-MIM.

Engineering samples need to perform according to specifications.

Potential customers need to validate the technology.

At least one major customer eventually needs to adopt the technology commercially.

Hydrogen

Smoltek needs to demonstrate that ultra-low iridium loading can be combined with:

• high efficiency
• low degradation
• industrial manufacturing
• competitive economics

The 3,000-hour Heraeus test could answer part of this question.

But even a successful test would still need to be followed by industrialisation and commercial adoption.

13. Why could the investment thesis be wrong?

This is probably the most important section of the DD.

There are several substantial risks.

Commercialisation risk

Smoltek has spent many years developing its technologies without yet establishing significant recurring commercial revenue from them.

Technical success does not guarantee customer adoption.

Technology risk

Performance achieved in controlled environments may not translate perfectly to industrial production.

Durability risk

The Heraeus test could reveal higher degradation than expected.

Manufacturing risk

Producing nanostructures reliably at high volume could prove more difficult or expensive than anticipated.

Customer risk

Potential partners may test Smoltek's technology but ultimately choose another solution.

Timing risk

Semiconductor qualification and industrial adoption can take years.

Hydrogen projects can also experience long development cycles.

Financing and dilution risk

If commercialisation takes longer than expected, Smoltek may eventually require additional capital.

Historical execution risk

Smoltek has previously had commercial processes that took longer or developed differently than investors expected.

The history with YAGEO is relevant here.

Previous expectations regarding an exclusive licensing arrangement did not result in the commercial agreement many shareholders had hoped for.

This is an important reminder:

Collaboration ≠ commercial contract.

The same principle should currently be applied to Heraeus, ITRI and other partners.

14. Upcoming catalysts

Rather than focusing on the share price, I think the most useful way to follow Smoltek is to watch specific milestones.

Hydrogen

Start of 3,000h Heraeus test→Durability results→Potential industrialisation decision→Commercial customer/agreement

Semiconductor

Gen-One engineering samples→Customer validation→Reproducible production→Commercial agreement/licence

Other developments worth monitoring include new patents, additional industrial partnerships, cash burn and financing.

15. What would fundamentally change the investment case?

For me, the most important milestone is not another patent or another collaboration.

It is:

A significant commercial agreement.

Today, the main question surrounding Smoltek is:

Can the company commercialise its technology?

If Smoltek signs a meaningful agreement with a major industrial customer, the question changes to:

How much revenue can the technology generate?

That would represent a fundamental change in the investment case.

Until then, a significant part of Smoltek's valuation is based on future potential rather than demonstrated commercial economics.

16. Conclusion

Smoltek is not a low-risk investment.

It is a small nanotechnology company attempting to commercialise highly advanced technology in industries where qualification cycles can be long and technical requirements are extremely demanding.

The company still needs to demonstrate significant commercial revenue.

At the same time, there are signs that its technologies are moving further along the industrial validation process.

Within Semiconductor, Smoltek is working with ITRI in Taiwan on moving CNF-MIM from laboratory development toward reproducible production and customer samples.

Within Hydrogen, Heraeus Precious Metals is now preparing to lead a 3,000-hour durability test of Smoltek's ultra-low-iridium catalyst technology.

Neither guarantees commercial success.

But both provide concrete milestones against which investors can evaluate progress.

For me, the central question behind the entire Smoltek investment thesis is therefore:

Can Smoltek convert its nanotechnology and intellectual property into scalable industrial products that customers are willing to pay for?

If the answer is no, the downside is substantial.

If the answer is yes, the economics and valuation of the company could look very different from today.

The next stages of industrial validation and, ultimately, the first meaningful commercial agreements will therefore be critical.

Disclosure

I am a shareholder in Smoltek Nanotech.

This post represents my own research and interpretation of publicly available information. It is not financial advice.

I have attempted to include both the potential opportunities and the material risks.

Please do your own due diligence.