r/biotech_stocks

MRNA after the 177% move — what happens next?

$MRNA had a massive session after Moderna and Merck reported positive Phase 3 results for their personalized mRNA cancer treatment.

The stock closed at $174.38, up 177%, on roughly 187M shares of volume compared with a 50-day average of only about 7M.

What caught my attention is that the move continued after hours, reaching $194.88 before pulling back.

Obviously, after a move this large the stock is extremely extended, so I'm more interested in how it handles the important levels from here rather than trying to chase it.

I put together a short Stock Spotlight covering the catalyst, why the Phase 3 results matter, and the levels I'm watching next:

Full analysis:
Dagger Trading — MRNA Stock Spotlight

Curious to see how MRNA handles tomorrow after a move like this.

Curious if there are others out there like me who have a positive long term view of IBRX and if so, how they view and think about the company's long term prospects. Admittedly I do not have any medical background that equips me to assess the viability of their (or any biotech company's) technology/drug therapies (Anktiva for example), but the initial and limited FDA approval seems promising and I also think there is high potential to scale internationally (Saudi Arabia approving them for both bladder and now lung cancer treatment for example) despite what is likely to be a very slow regulatory approval path in the US. I also believe in the founder, Dr. Patrick Soon-Shiong. I find the cancer-curing potential fascinating (enhancing T-cells in the body to specifically identify and kill cancer, and only cancer, cells while leaving healthy tissue alone). I own shares of IBRX but am just interested in discussion and in hearing other perspectives /viewpoints (good or bad) that can better inform how I think about the stock.

Disclaimer: newb here. I bought 1,000 shares in a stock named ACRV at $1.47. It’s now $2.28. Anyone heard of this stock? They’re projected anywhere from $6/share to upwards of $19/share. Any advice appreciated!

https://haematologica.org/article/view/11956

Figure 1B. CR2 non transplant survival curve with Ven+HMA. 9 months mOS, 1 year survival at 31%.

Jackpot everyone :)

The low risk group is composed of at least 31 CR2 patients (probably 33) because only 5 patients had TP53 mutation.

There was 36 CR/CRi patients, so in order for a CR patients to shift from low risk to intermediate risk, they would need both mutation conditions, which is possible only for 5 patients (piegonhole argument in mathematics).

Also the ELN mix is 70/30 (fav+int/adv).

Median time to response was 1 month.
It is not a perfect 1 to 1 with REGAL, but the filtering criteria for the population is correct: only consider CR2 with and without transplant.

I believe this is an extremely bullish datapoint.

Edit:

I wonder if someone could clear this: I don’t think line of treatment number is equal to CR number. You can have more than 2 line of treatments to reach CR2.

Brayer et al.

If you’re not on X, consider yourself lucky or intelligent. To be fair, I can say the same thing about StockTwits.

I’m here and on both and I’m seeing things that are starting to freak me out.

Every biotech stock with a great deal of potential begins to generate some fanboys. The binary plays, the catalysts, the FDA approvals, the M&A, etc. is all adrenaline pumping stuff and, if you’re truly lucky, your wallet pumps as well.

What you’re missing by not being on X is what appears to be a “negative astroturfing” campaign against SLS.

Without so much as a logical argument, multiple accounts, some who have otherwise been very rational in their daily approach to biotech, are trashing SLS and the REGAL trial.

Their arguments are inane. The fact that the 80th event hasn’t occurred is viewed as a scam. If the CEO mentions the 80th event hasn’t occurred in the last quarterly update but only says “…we await the 80th event…” in the most recent quarterly call, they seize on it as some shred of evidence that there is a scam going on. (Which I know makes zero sense but that was the entire argument.)

The “best” argument they have is the one that I’ll turn against them: the pro-SLS noise is the proof that it’s a rug pull.

Sad when hype is their best argument…

So, allow me to turn it around.

The fact that they are downright ugly and negative about the potential of GPS is, in itself, a Buy signal.

Huh?

Think of it from a higher level:

1. They don’t care that GPS may work and save lives.
2. They aren’t white knights trying to save naive biotech investors from taking on too much risk.

They are putting their names - which in many instances have built a reputation in biotech - online where things are permanent as trashing the company, the drug and the investors.

Even if they wind up deleting everything, they will be remembered as having been obnoxious and crass about a drug trial.

And what’s their upside if it’s not altruistic?

Maybe chest thumping bragging rights if the trial fails. But they have no idea whether it will fail or not and it’s a biotech binary so who cares that they were right about a phase III trial failure? I could predict that every time and claim an 88% success rate.

Nope. I don’t think that’s it.

Which leaves two scenarios.

1. They’re paid
2. They’re angry that they’re not paid

Why would anyone pay five or six of the biggest biotech influencers on X to trash SLS and GPS and those hopeful hypers on a daily basis?

I’m interested in your answer and if you want to say some shorting entity is working overtime to drive SLS down, fine but it’s very tin foil hat without more details.

If they’re angry that they’re not getting paid, it tells you something very sinister about the industry as a whole. If I’m the CEO of a clinical pharma co and I’m desperate to avoid trashing the stock with another dilution round, is it possible I might slide some cash to an influencer to pump my ticker?

Well, that would be illegal. But imagine if that were the norm and the X biotech bros are bitter that they can’t wet their beak in the SLS pond.

They just might get ugly.

I’m going to take a position on SLS here before the 80th event because something stinks. If you think I’m exaggerating, do the following:

Hold your nose, go on X and type $SLS into the search bar and choose Latest.

You won’t believe the amount of endless negative hype pouring out when all these influencers had to do was ignore the hype or block the term REGAL from their X feed.

I’m not suggesting you invest in SLS.

I am asking you to tell me why the bio-bros are working so hard to counter the SLS hype and the pending end of the REGAL trial.

It doesn’t make sense unless there’s something nasty going on that isn’t obvious.

DA PDUFA Target Action Date (Deramiocel BLA)

• Original Deadline: August 22, 2026
• Current Status: In flux / expected to be extended.

Key Details

• Context: The original Prescription Drug User Fee Act (PDUFA) action date for Capricor's Biologics License Application (BLA) for deramiocel in Duchenne muscular dystrophy (DMD) was set for August 22, 2026.
• Pending Extension: During the Q2 2026 earnings call, CEO Linda Marbán announced that Capricor is submitting a major BLA amendment containing 24-month open-label extension data from the HOPE-3 study and refined data analyses.
• FDA Position: The FDA indicated it is willing to review the incoming amendment, which will automatically trigger an official extension of the PDUFA action date beyond August 22. The updated target date will be formally established once the FDA officially receives and files the amendment.

Other Deadlines to Note

• Class Action Securities Litigation: Shareholders wishing to apply for Lead Plaintiff status in the active class action lawsuit against Capricor have until September 28, 2026.

No idea, except that the stock is down to 600k+ shares total after 3 reverse stock splits in 2026. The cash runway is small, the expenses are high, and the products have potential, but its a race to see if they can get sales up and running after an approval to keep from another major dilution? Injectible oxygen and glucose sensors that stay in place for days/months? Good potential.

I own some of this company, due your own due diligence before investing in it.

https://preview.redd.it/g2hakzfr4yjh1.png?width=936&format=png&auto=webp&s=287b69b25239d59ed83f15bc75fa4d3f2907dec8

SOURCE:

StockTwits

1. If Sterg is so confident the trial is a slam dunk why does he keep making those LinkedIn posts? Why not just wait until we get the results
2. There is a big cult like following, how many hyped up stocks have succeeded?
3. Why is everyone invested in SLS emotional!?

I hold a small position.

The LUGANO trial results appears to be a miss on a technicality due to the expected 3–5% of patients having unrelated ≥15-letter loss not being replicated in the control arm, difficult to interpret these results now without the follow up LUCIA trial results

9 out of 211 patients experienced ≥15-letter loss not related to wet AMD or the DURAVYU treatment which is within the expected historical pattern seen in comparable aflibercept trials however the aflibercept control arm experienced a highly unusual zero patients experiencing ≥15-letter loss which mean the trial missed its endpoint on what looks like a technicality, awaiting the EyePoint management discussion of the results in the conference call in the next 30 mins, if it is just an anomaly the LUCIA trial results will confirm that so it shouldn't be a total wipeout for the stock until those results are available

Update following the conference call the 9 patients who lost vision were not caused by wet AMD 6 were geographic atrophy (dry AMD), 2 were caused by glaucoma & the last by a detached retina & Cataract

In the original Phase 3 VIEW 1 and VIEW 2 trials of aflibercept (Eylea) in wet AMD, the proportion of patients who lost ≥15 letters by Week 52 was approximately 5% so highly unusual that the control arm had zero patients

$SLS may (probably will) fail. Yet, the moment the $SLS fanboys hear any negative opinions they get palpably assblasted. Biotech is the shitcoin of stocks and even if a trial is successful the stock can go down. My position is $5 puts (Jan 2028 exp) because I simply do not believe in the hype. When everyone around you is running towards the edge of a cliff sometimes it's wiser to stop and go in the opposite direction. Screenshot this post.

Ass Man Simple Simon, signing off.

A lot of the discussion around ARM today centers on its ~18% China revenue exposure (mostly royalty revenue through licensees like Samsung and SK Hynix). Ran the EPS sensitivity instead of just looking at the headline percentage: a 10% cut to that China revenue only moves EPS by about $0.01. The royalty/licensing model has enough operating leverage that revenue shocks don't translate 1:1 into earnings hits.

HPE was up almost identically (+10.0%) the same session, which points more toward broad tech/infra rotation than an ARM-specific catalyst. The AI infrastructure and custom silicon design-win narrative ("physical AI buildout" robotics, edge, data centers) is getting cited as the underlying driver.

Full writeup: https://metricshour.com/briefs/2026-07-10/

Curious if others are seeing the same EPS math or reading the exposure risk differently.

* I wrote this observation based on a trend that’s been plaguing our market and eroding the fabric of complex therapeutics. I am a 25 year pharmaceutical veteran, with the last ten years in radiopharmaceutical commercial strategy and leadership.

There is a particular kind of meeting that happens inside nearly every large company, usually in a room with windows that look down on a campus built on the back of past success. A number goes up on a screen. The number didn’t come from the market. It came from a consulting deck, built by people who’d spent perhaps three weeks with the business, and from what Wall Street already expected after last quarter’s promise. The number is not technically a description of anything. It’s a guess about what would be well received, dressed in the language of benchmarks and analysis, and everyone in the room nods at it as though it were a fact about the world.

Somewhere else in the building, usually several floors and several org chart boxes away from that room, are people who could have told them the number was fiction before it ever reached a slide. They are the ones who spend their days closest to the actual market, who know its adoption curve, its seasonality, the specific and unglamorous ways it refuses to behave like the company’s core business. Ask any one of them to react to the projection honestly, and the number wouldn’t survive the conversation. Not because these people lack ambition, and not because they’d want to talk anyone out of an aggressive target. It would fail because the reality of the market, plainly described, makes the fiction impossible to keep believing.

So, that conversation never happens. Not because it’s impossible to arrange, a meeting can always be arranged, but because having it would require someone senior to admit, before a single dollar has changed hands, that the number they’re about to promise to public markets might be wrong. Arrogance closes that door as often as ignorance, and it’s rarely obvious which one is operating at any given time. The guess goes to the board un-stress-tested, the board takes it to Wall Street, and the moment it becomes a public commitment, the company stops being in the business of understanding its market and starts being in the business of defending a sentence it said out loud.

This is the part of corporate life that gets the least attention and does the most damage: not the fictional number itself, and not even the refusal to check it, but what happens next, once the number is public and wrong. From that point forward, every decision the organization makes is graded against a single, unstated question that has nothing to do with the market: how do we make it look like we knew what we were talking about? What follows is not one bad call. It’s a cascade of them, each one designed to protect the last, until the thing being protected is no longer the target but the illusion that the target was ever reasonable.

Consider a company that has just acquired, or built internally, a specialized business unit: a niche product, an emerging technology, a market segment that behaves nothing like the company’s core business. The people running this unit are the ones who could have corrected the number before it went public. They weren’t asked in a formal sense. The projection reaches them only after the fact, as a target already promised to people outside the building, and their job is no longer to describe the market honestly. It’s to close a gap between what was said and what’s true, using whatever means the org chart allows them.

The quarter comes in. It’s positive. It’s real growth, real revenue, a real product finding real customers. It’s also, inevitably, short of the number on the screen in the room. A company with an honest relationship to its own forecasting would treat the miss as information: the model was wrong, the market is different than we assumed, let’s learn something. Almost no company does this. Admitting the forecast was wrong means admitting that the people who made it, who are often the most senior people in the building, misjudged something basic. So the organization reaches for the cheaper alternative. It decides the forecast was right and the execution was wrong.

This is the hinge the entire story turns on: a market problem gets reclassified as a leadership problem, because a leadership problem is fixable in a way that doesn’t require anyone upstairs to have been mistaken.

Once the miss becomes a leadership story, the response is fast and familiar. The niche unit’s leader, who has spent months absorbing pressure for a number he never should have been held to, starts to feel the walls close in. He does the natural thing. He tries to conform to what the parent company wants, tries to speak its language, adopt its cadence. What comes out of that effort is never quite right. It can’t be. He is translating a business that doesn’t map cleanly onto the company’s usual vocabulary, and the translation reads, to the people evaluating him, as weakness: a leader losing command of his own room.

So they replace him. They don’t promote a stranger. They reach for someone familiar, usually from a more conventional part of the business, someone whose success was built in a market that behaves the way the company’s models assume all markets behave. This person is, by every metric the company knows how to measure, a safe choice. What nobody in that boardroom seems to register is that the track record was earned in a different country, under different weather, and doesn’t necessarily travel.

The new leader arrives with real credibility and no relevant expertise, and this combination produces a specific, almost clinical form of vulnerability. He is surrounded by people who understand his new business better than he does, and everyone in the room knows it, including him. He has two paths available: spend his political capital admitting what he doesn’t know, or protect the version of himself that got him the job in the first place. Almost nobody, placed in that position, chooses the humbling path. Most choose protection. And protection, in a business unit staffed with people who can see through you, means getting rid of the people who can see through you.

This is where the story arrives at what I’ve called Hostile Nepotism, though by this point the name almost undersells what’s happening. It isn’t simple favoritism, a friend given a soft landing. It’s a defense mechanism with a body count. The specialists who could expose the new leader’s gaps get reframed as difficult, as lacking perspective, as not quite fitting the culture. The people who replace them are chosen for a single, unstated qualification: they know less than the leader does. The unit’s actual expertise walks out the door in stages, and nobody files a report that says so, because there is no line item for institutional memory.

None of it works, not really, though it can take years to become undeniable. Growth stalls. The people who might have fixed it are gone or have stopped offering opinions that go unheard. Eventually the numbers force another reckoning, and the organization does the only thing it has ever learned how to do when a forecast fails: it looks for a new leader. Someone familiar. Someone safe. The cycle does not end because nobody in the building has ever been forced to ask the one question that would end it, which is not “who should run this unit” but “why did we promise Wall Street something we didn’t understand well enough to promise.”

That question never gets asked, because asking it means someone very senior has to say, out loud, that the mistake was made before anyone was ever hired or fired. Everything after that, the squeeze, the ouster, the new leader’s fear, the purge of the experts who could have saved him, is just the bill for that first, invisible decision, arriving in installments, to people who had no idea they were the ones who’d be paying it.

And the debt doesn’t clear when one leader falls. Each turn of the cycle spends down something the company can’t easily rebuild: the trust of the people who still remember how the unit was supposed to work, the culture that made the work good in the first place, the difference between a promising business and a cautionary one told at other companies as a warning. None of it was destroyed by a single bad actor. It was spent, in small installments, by an organization that never once went back to ask whether the original number had ever been true.

Dear MAIA Biotechnology Investor Relations Team,

I am a shareholder following the company's progress closely, particularly the THIO-101 and THIO-104 programs. I appreciate the frequency of your recent updates, and I have a number of follow-up questions I was hoping you could help clarify, either directly or by pointing me to the relevant disclosures.

1. Full ORR / CR-PR breakdown (THIO-101 Part C)
   The July 8, 2026 release reported a 90.5% disease control rate (19/21 evaluable patients). Could you clarify when a complete objective response rate, including the breakdown between complete responses, partial responses, and stable disease, will be made available? Is this data already locked internally, and if so, what is driving the timing of its release?

2. Control arm / comparator methodology
   Since Part C is a single-arm cohort, how is the company addressing comparability to a contemporary, checkpoint-inhibitor-era control population, given that the historical 5.8-month OS benchmark (Girard et al., 2009) predates immunotherapy? Is there a plan to present efficacy against a more contemporary comparator (e.g., Freeman et al., 2020) alongside future data releases?

3. 2L vs. 3L survival data
   Earlier THIO-101 data (Parts A/B) showed lower median OS in second-line patients (~10.8 months) than in third-line patients (~17.8 months). Could you help explain the biological or methodological basis for this inversion, and whether it affects how the company is designing THIO-104's patient selection criteria?

4. Accelerated Approval timeline
   Given that the original 2026 filing guidance was issued in the January 2025 shareholder letter, is a 2026 Accelerated Approval submission still considered achievable? What specific milestones (e.g., FDA Type B/C meeting, locked dataset) remain outstanding before a filing decision can be made?

5. Capital position and financing plan
   The Q2 2026 10-Q disclosed cash of approximately $27.6 million as of June 30, 2026, alongside termination of the ATM facility effective May 21, 2026, and references to subsequent equity issuances around July 1 and August 10, 2026. Could you provide an updated, consolidated view of current cash runway, outstanding warrant overhang (13,086,220 warrants noted in the filing), and the company's plan for funding both THIO-104 completion and any potential NDA-related costs?

6. Business development / partnership status
   Given the existing clinical collaboration with Regeneron (cemiplimab) and prior reference to a master agreement with Roche, are there active business development discussions regarding a licensing or co-development partnership for ateganosine? If so, can you share what data package or milestones a partner would typically require before such a deal could be finalized?

7. THIO-104 enrollment pace
   Could you confirm current enrollment status against the stated goal of 100 patients dosed by year-end 2026, and whether the pace to date supports an interim analysis in H2 2027 as previously guided?

I would appreciate any clarification you can provide on the above, whether through direct response, a future corporate update, or reference to existing public disclosures I may have missed. Thank you for your time.

Been digging through penny stocks with upcoming catalysts. EVGN caught my attention, but I’m surprised by how discussion is almost non existent on this stock.

Really curious what people think here. Anyone been following Evogene closely? Is there any major dilution/cash-burn issues or other red flags I’m missing?

If anyone’s done DD on $EVGN please let me know what you think.

I’ve been digging into AI drug discovery lately, and 2026 feels like an important inflection point.

For years, it was mostly funding, partnerships, AI models and big promises.
Now we’re finally getting clinical data.

A generative AI-designed molecule has reached Phase III, and we’re starting to see whether AI can actually translate into medicines that work.

So, What’s your favorite AI drug discovery stock right now, and what’s your thesis?