*this argument uses free will as being “ the ability to truly and freely choose between several options independently”*

Ai uses algorithmic thinking.

An algorithm can be defined as a finite set of step-by-step instructions or rules designed to perform a specific task, solve a problem.

So how does this prevent free will?

Algorithms follow a set sequence, which always acts the same. Meaning if we give an algorithm an input, its output to that input will always be the same, despite the seemingly unlimited number of possibilities.

This means that for any particular situation, there is only one given “choice”/output that an algorithm can produce. This defies the “several options” part of the free will definition used.

There was never a choice, as there was only one option.

I am aware that some algorithms use the computer version of “random” meaning they will actuallt generate different outcomes to the same prompt. However if the variable that is being randomly assigned is allowed to change, that means the algorithm is not the same.

Similarly, some may argue that many algorithms do allow for several outcomes/answers. To which I reason this.

Should a given algorithm seem to output several answers, that is effectively one answer in itself. Rather than the answer being a string, it becomes a list, which are both just 1 thing.

Also, some algorithms will generate a pool of acceptable outcomes, and only choose one.

This seems to suggest options or “choices”. However this is not the case, as the sequence of steps used to determine which possible output to use will always return the same thing.

Meaning the only real possible output was the one given, and removing the “choices”. The only way to change this is to use “random” but that means the algorithm is not the same- as I previously mentioned.

*context-this is a part of the opening segment of a much larger article which also seems to provide “solutions” to the problem at hand, it will be linked below for this Interested*

Determinism relies on the idea of a preceding cause for every occurrence, but what caused the first occurrence?
Every cause is in itself an occurence. If we go to the beginning of time, we are able to find a first event. Since this is the first thing to exist, it seems reasonable to state that nothing came before it. If nothing came before the first event,then there could be no cause. Meaning that should there be a beginning of time, there is also at least one event that has occurred without a cause. This falls outside the rules of determinism and seems to challenge the idea that every occurence has followed determinism’s laws.

*full article linked below*

I’ve been thinking about the core contradiction of hard determinism and wanted to get your thoughts.

Neuroscience shows our brains make decisions milliseconds before we become consciously aware of them. Every choice is just the inevitable output of inputs we never controlled—genes, past experiences, and real-time brain chemistry. We are deterministic machines.

Yet, here is the ultimate paradox: We are biologically incapable of living as if free will doesn’t exist.

Even when you intellectually accept determinism, you still deliberate, plan, and feel regret. The brain evolved to model itself as an active agent. It’s like knowing how a magic trick works but still being fooled every time you watch it.

If we fully accept this, how we view morality has to change completely:

No more moral blame: People are trapped in their neural causality; judging them or yourself harshly makes no logical sense.

Pragmatic responsibility: Accountability becomes about prevention and protection, not moral retribution.

But here’s the irony: giving in to fatalism leads to worse practical outcomes. We are forced to act like we have choice, even though we don't.

*context-this is an extract from an article I wrote exploring the problem as a whole, the extract serves to show the argument for how determinism could survive the regression problem, the full article will be linked in the comments*

This existence has always existed
Relative to our own existence, this is obviously true. However using the timeframe of our own existence as the only timeframe within the grand -scheme of things is seemingly limited.

Think of a computer program made within our world, once launched,the only time that has ever existed for that program is what has passed during its existence. Relative to itself, it has always existed.
However in our world, it has not, there was a time before it existed.

Now think of our world in a similar way to the computer world, if our reality originates from a different existence-perhaps a more “true” or “real” one, then time has likely existed before us.

If this parent reality was to “create” ours, then that creation would be the original cause, with our realities “laws” assigned during the process.
Effectively removing the need for the original cause to stem from our reality,whilst still existing. Meaning the time regression problem would no longer exist.

For us to exist, that was always going to happen, so the predetermination of the first cause (creation) is valid, it just stems from an existence beyond our own.

This means that determinism would be possible, with the caveat of accepting that this reality we occupy stems from another which is responsible for creating ours, and assigning its laws.

The issue with this is that it seems to only serve to move the “first cause” problem back into the parent existence. However this “problem” relies on the parent existence following the same laws as our own, and is also irrelevant when discussing the laws of our own universe as a closed system.

I often see people here say that it “feels as if we have free will.” Usually this comes from either free will skeptics or libertarians, both of whom assume that free will requires our actions to be undetermined. So what they mean is that it feels as if our choices are undetermined rather than determined.

The skeptic then says this feeling is an illusion, because in reality our actions are determined.

But this comparison with ordinary illusions seems unclear to me. Usually an illusion involves mistaking one familiar kind of thing for another familiar kind of thing. Parallel lines can look as if they converge; the Earth can look flat even though it is spherical. In those cases, we understand both appearances well enough to compare them.

But with determinism and indeterminism, what exactly is the supposed difference in experience? What would an undetermined decision feel like, as opposed to a determined one? It is not obvious to me that either has a distinctive phenomenology at all.

So I am not sure what people mean when they say that determinism conflicts with how free will “feels.”

If randomness is a fundamental property of the universe and not a perceptive effect due to lack of knowledge, would you find that prefferable?

Would you find it favorable to know, whatever will happen is not completely determined, and scripted?

I want to write a character in a script that has what appears to be a luck based power; however I want the power to actually be the universe having a pre-determined outcome for the character.

My current concept contains terminology such as;

- Attractors : Things with determined outcomes

- DOA : Determined Outcome of Attractors

- Trajectory : The paths that the attractor takes before reaching the DOA

- Elasticity : How wild the trajectory can be

- Interference : Something that stops the Attractor from reaching the DOA

- Correction Event : A forced variable that subverts that initial interference, realigning the attractor to its DOA.

For example, if a marble is an attractor and landing in a certain spot of the room is the DOA, no matter how I throw the marble, it'll always land in that set spot someway or another, even if I were to take the marble into another room.

It's kind've like the opposite to every action has a reaction; I'm wondering if someone would be able to help me write a scientific law stating that sometimes a reaction is already set, whilst the actions to get to said reaction aren't.

If someone were to be an attractor and their DOA were to pass away at 100, but they got an incurable disease that has a 100% fatality rate within a year of diagnosis, and they were diagnosed at 35; the intervention event would be a sudden cure developed as a byproduct of some other sort of testing.

If an attractors DOA involved the attractor needing a reinforced arm in some capacity, maybe the attractor would have their arm snapped in just the perfect way through some means, to where the bone heals back stronger than before; or the attractor develops a certain mutation that spikes regeneration in some capacity, ect ect.

Examples of characters I can think of when referencing this are gonna be (so far)
Pocoloco from the first episode of SBR
Domino from Marvel
Relatively any main character with a winners storyline

What other rules could be added?
How could this affect our understanding of other sciences?
What would any form of equation look like for this?
Where would this fall flat?

We have yet to disprove Einstein's Special Relativity. Consequently, we have yet to disprove the notion of The Block Universe - The future is as real as the past, and the only reason we don't have memory of the future is because of entropy. If we take this at face value, then everything that happens in the future, including every decision you will make, already exists (4th dimensionally speaking). Therefore, how can there be free will?

I’ve encountered some deniers of randomness, yet not alot of compelling arguments against it.

Do you believe fundamental randomness does not exist? why?

If it does exist, determinism would be false.

Liberty That Looks at Itself

The Simple Explanation

Imagine you're a robot programmed to walk straight ahead. The robot cannot choose anything else — it walks straight, full stop. Now imagine someone puts a screen in front of it showing exactly how it moves. Still no choice — but it sees. Now imagine the robot can also understand what it sees and can say: "Ah, I'm walking straight. But I don't want to walk straight." — and it stops.

That moment — when the system sees itself and decides differently — is free will.

It's not magic. It's not an escape from physics. It's simply that some systems are complex enough to observe themselves from the outside — and this act of observation creates a third option beyond "automatic forward motion" and "random motion."

The 3 Arguments

Argument 1 — Hunger and the Menu 🍽️

What is determined: You're hungry. Your body has burned energy, blood sugar has dropped, your stomach is sending signals. You didn't choose this — it happened purely mechanically, like a thermostat reading the temperature.

What would be random: You close your eyes and point randomly at a spot on the menu.

What you actually do: You look at the menu. But at the same time you look at yourself looking at the menu. You tell yourself: "I want pizza, but yesterday I ate something heavy and I feel bloated when I do that. I know I'm going to choose pizza — and that's exactly why I'm choosing the salad."

That sentence — "I know I'm going to choose X, and that's exactly why I'm choosing something else" — is impossible for a robot and impossible for a die. It's only possible for something that can observe itself in the act of choosing.

The choice isn't determined because you broke the trajectory your body had set in motion. It isn't random because you made it for a clear reason. It's the third option: deliberate.

Argument 2 — Anger and the 10 Seconds ⚡

What is determined: Someone insults you. Your brain automatically triggers adrenaline, tension rises, the impulse to respond aggressively appears immediately. This is pure determinism — stimulus, reaction.

What would be random: You say something completely out of place, unrelated to the situation.

What you actually do: You pause. Not because the impulse has disappeared — it's still there, you feel it. But a part of you looks at that anger and says: "I can see that I'm angry. I can see that I'm about to say something I'll regret. I know exactly how this ends." And you choose to stay silent or respond calmly.

The anger was determined. The calm was not random. It was the product of a system that saw itself mid-reaction and intervened. That's exactly why you feel bad when you don't do it — because you know you could have stopped. That knowledge of possibility is the proof of freedom.

Argument 3 — Habits and Identity 🔄

What is determined: You've been smoking for 10 years. Your brain has built solid neural circuits — after coffee, you automatically light a cigarette. It's almost as mechanical as a knee-jerk reflex.

What would be random: One day, out of nowhere, for no reason, you don't light the cigarette.

What you actually do — when you manage to quit: The craving doesn't disappear. The circuits are still there. But you do something physically strange: you look at yourself as if you were another person. You tell yourself: "The one who lights a cigarette after coffee — that's the usual me. But I can be someone else too." And you sit with the craving, observe it, and don't act on it.

This is not determinism — you broke a causal chain ten years in the making. It's not random — you did it with a purpose. It was only possible because you created a meta-self that looked at the everyday self and decided it didn't want to be that person.

Why It's Neither Determined Nor Random

Think of a river. The water flows downhill — determined, inevitable. Now you throw a stone randomly into the water — random, meaningless.

Free will is neither the water nor the stone. It's an engineer who observes the river, understands where it's going, and builds a dam — not to stop the water (physics remains physics), but to change the direction in which it flows.

The engineer hasn't stepped outside of nature. He has used nature. But he has used it by seeing it from above — and this bird's-eye view, this eye that turns back upon itself, is exactly what it means to be conscious. And exactly where freedom grows.

If I roll a six-sided die, I usually describe the outcome probabilistically. That's what I observe consistently. However, a classical counter argument is that the probability is epistemological (it arises from my lack of knowledge of all the variables and factors in place) rather than ontological.

To prove this, we recreate a die roll in a laboratory setting (carefully controlling all variables — floor inclination, absence of air currents, shape of the die, force applied to the throw etc.) to demonstrate that a die roll, performed under identical conditions, produces deterministic outcomes. Thus every roll of die you performed and will perform, will have a predetermined outcome.

Now, I notice 3 implicit problems that are never addressed. My question would be: how to deal with those problems?.

1-)

Who ever said that these low-entropy laboratory conditions are ontologically the same as a roll performed under high-entropy conditions? If I take a system and "close" it off from external variables and make it as ordered as possible, sure — it may tend toward determinism (which, after all, can be conceiced as just a special case of probability: a probability of 100%). But has it actually been demonstrated that this artificially lowered-entropy setup adequately reflects what ontologically occurs in a open highly variable context without such artificial reduction? That assumption is simply taken for granted. It is entirely conceivable that I am constructing a system with a radically different causal structure and thus rules. The assumption that the two systems are ontologically equivalent (except for “spurious” variables) is precisely what should be demonstrated, not presupposed.

2-)

A laboratory die roll will typically be performed by a machine specifically designed for that purpose. But no one has ever doubted that a die thrown by a precision machine can be deterministic or aproximately so. When I talk about a die roll, I'm not only talking about the die spinning through the air and landing. I'm talking about the entire macroscopic process of a human being throwing a die. Why is the silent substitution of the phenomenon under consideration — human throws die — with an allegedly equivalent phenomenon — machine throws die — simply assumed to be valid? That's far from obvious. No one doubts that a deterministic machine can produce deterministic outputs—that is an engineering tautology. The original question/doubt concerns the entire process, including the agent that generates the input. The silent substitution is not harmless: it is a theoretical choice that assumes the “human” part of the process is causally irrelevant or reducible/equivalent to a deterministic machines. And this, too, must be demonstrated, not simply assumed.

3-)

Let's grant that objections 1 and 2 are not decisive, and that demonstrating a die thrown repeatedly under identical conditions behaves deterministically indeed proves that probability is epistemic rather than ontological, closed-low entropy systems or not, humans/biological factors being involved or not.

However, if I perform the exact same experiment with quantum particles — that is, I repeat "throws" under identical conditions — no matter how well I know and control the conditions in which the experiment is performed, I never get the same result; probability reemerges, strongly. Why, at this point, should I not accept its intrinsic (non-epistemic) probabilistic nature — by applying the exact same reasoning and criterion I applied to the die to conclude its non-intrinsic probability? Why should I move the goalposts to some supposed "upstream" lack of knowledge and sufficient information , invoking hidden variables and so on?

This move is not without consequences: because if I do that, the same reasoning can be applied — in reverse — to the die roll. If I claim that (despite experimental evidence) a quantum particle appears to me with probability x for spin-up and y for spin-down not because its behavior is probabilistic, but because there are initial conditions (unknown and arguably unknowable to me, but which I assume to exist) that deterministically fix the resuly... what stops me from saying that the die in the laboratory always lands on 3 not because its behavior is deterministic, but because an extremely strange sequence of identical rolls just happens to be occurring (hihgly improbable, but surely not impossible)?

When I move beyond experimental observation and invoke hypothetical, underlying / external factors, I am justified in doing so both in terms of deterministic initial conditions (which are set up to produce a fixed and necessary outcome when I measure a particle) and in terms of improbable but possible sequences somehow conspiring to produce wildly improbable outcomes of die rolls. Am I not?

I see and agree that the fact that epistemic ignorance regarding the initial circumstances seems more appropriate and believable than improbable sequences, but this is merely a phenomenological intuition based on common sense,. As such, it is itself a non-logical, non-scientifical stance and, as such, cannot be taken in an absolutist unproblematic manner

Does it affect it?

When in reality, in any framework even if magic exists, reality can just easily be described by a simple 1+1 = result.

ill express my own view, and would love to read what you think about this.( and it relates to the sub, by talking about, what is it that we ground our ideas on)

first i want to prove that all logic systems are circular and regressive.

A = A

if A = B = C
then A = C
therefore C = B = A

any system which evaluates the world evaluates it on the basis of its-own presupposed axioms— before the system existed, there were no axioms it could use to prove itself by apart from another system, which itself was built in the same way.
hence, initial axioms are not proven, they are presupposed without evidence, and proven only after the fact, by using those same axioms on themselves and on the rest of the world— the axioms are entirely self contained and anything which is outside of them is by definition, outside of their criteria of evidence.

(if you want to skip the rest, there are 3 examples of this at the bottom, marked " EXAMPLES")

given that at best, all that we know, is known through feeling, which filters thought which itself is qualia, as is sight and hearing and so on— given that certainty is always built upon a mountain of
half-answered questions, wither looping or infinitely regressing— and given that, to be a thing, is not the same as to represent a thing— what is the advantage to overcommitting one's own thinking strictly to one singular philosophical position?

given all thease limits, how is it not a transcendental claim, to assert a perfect clockwork universe?

given the same limits, how is it not a transendental claim to say that the universe is definately probabilistic and approximate?

is all we see and know, all that there is?
and can we discover anything more without a leap of faith whareby we say " hey, idk if this is the case, and the evidence is lacking, but lets try anyway because I'm interested in seeing what happens.
— after all, this was the exact same way in which we were able to learn to speak at all.
a baby didn't have logic to justify its-own positions, all it has is esthetic preference, on itsown qualia, pleasure, pain, apathy, and calm— and on those pillars of feeling, we made a leap of faith as we got conditioned.

and then to go from there, and to lock ourselves out of our ability to make leaps of exploration, which are leaps of faith, (i mean, they cant be justified before the fact, right? )— i think there is a great danger in locking ourselves out of posibilities like this, because its simply a closure of sight.

if i can see a perspective from within, i can evaluate when i would like to use it, if ever— but if i close it as utterly impossible, then no matter if its true, if its useful, if its even necessary as something that would improve my life— i just wouldn't be able to go there, because i would have a priori decided that it is impossible— its not the thing which is impossible, its me who has deemed it impossible by virtue of my-own current understanding.
understanding is after all something we produce, not something which is out there in the world for us to passively consume.

and lets think then to what end did we close off possibility?
what is the benefit?
simply, its to give us a feeling of cirtainty— thats it, because reducing the possibility of something down to 0, is like ripping my eyes out because i think that the rest of the senses are enough.

and obviously none of this is to say that we should therefore reduce cirtainly to 0, or that we shouldnt have ourown preferences, or that we cant disagree.
Infact, its the very thing which allows us to have a genuine disagreement by pining philosophies against oneanother— by the ability of the person to be able to pin theirwon prefered philosophy, against the one they dont prefer but understand in and out, and to be able to see how the one they dont prefer, has an upper hand if they are both evaluated on the basis of the presumptions of the one we dont prefer, as well as according to the one which we do.

inversely, judging the one we dislike by the standards of what we like, is the full extent of our analysis when we operate in the absolutist regime of analysis— its like judging whether hard rock is done right by the standards of techno— obviously it wont hold up, and neither will techno hold up by the standards of hard rock.

is absence of evidence, evidence of absence?
if i ate an apple but no one knows it, did i not eat the apple?

what is the advantage to certainty when relative agnosticism is a perfectly feasible, and in-fact, id argue, is a more practical position for our ability to explore, be curious, create, and ultimately to discover new evidence.

its one thing to have a preference, but quite another to feel absolutely certain in its validity.

philosophy, dear philosophy enthusiasts, isnt a team sport — its meant to allow us to think, to allow us to understand, to allow us to take not only ourown presuposed axioms and see the world through it, but to take the axioms of the very thing we opose, and to evaluate the world and even ourown prefered axioms, according to itsown merits, in and of themselves.

determinism wasn't made to be scrutinized by libertarianism— it presupposes a different set of assumptions.
the same can be said of libertarianism, which itself wasnt made by the axioms of determinism— so why would we expect that they would conform to each-others standards of evidence?

start from either one, and you will reach yourown cirtainty— it makes no actual difference— each is the better one to itself, so how then do we evaluate which one is actually better?
is there such a thing as actually better, or is that dependent on the particular relationship it is applied within?
and i would claim that this is precisely what is the case— that, a philosophy, is always correct on itsown terms, always incorrect on the terms of its oposition, and so the mesure of which is better is seen practically in the world— which one actually produces better results for the life of the user.

philosophy is a tool, the truth is lived , and only indirectly perceived.

and so the point of philosophy, isnt to one day go " oh yeah, free will is correct and determinism is definately wrong"
its to have both of thease in a perpetual dialogue in which they refine eachother, by challenging eachother with, hopefully harder and harder questions.

we so often use philosophies as bumper stickers we apply to ourselves, in order to define what we are, but whatever we are, and whatever the world is, we are so much more then can be encapsulated with any outside representation we stick onto it.

the molds of philosophy aren't who we are— they are molds which restructure our awareness towards particular goals, actions, preferences, choices and qualia states of being.

would we want to live a world in which everyone only embraces one philosophy?
in which only determinists

this is why im a relativist
compatabilis, because it isn't just about blending both perspectives, its also about showing the necessity of both perspectives.
Since both are able to be coexistent, then they have their own local independence as phenomenon.

and frankly, in my view, it can very well also accommodate for hard determinism as well, albeit in as an occasional temporary structure, and can even accommodate for the possibility of what i call incoherentism– which is the idea that nothing is actually knowable but it only appears to be.

im a relativist compatabilist not because i think its the absolute truth, but because it gives me the means to genuinely explore the subject without
overattaching myself to only one position, thereby allowing me to temporerally comit to any position, which allows me to explore it as it was intended on its own terms.

but how can we have consistent beliefs this way?
we can, because at each situation im guided by the new evidence, but also by the posibility that the evidence is incomplete.

hell, i say, if you feel like it, try it out— and its not hard to actually do once you realise that every philosophy, every belief presuposes itsown axioms, and itsown conclusion, so to enter any belief, all thats needed is a leap of faith, and confidence that no matter what, you will try to use the best of whatever you'll learn.

EXAMPLES:

" ill eat the smaller fish so i become a big fish so that there are less biger fish to eat me— but by eathing the small fish, im doing the same thing to them, that im afraid will happen to me, thereby motivating the small fish i want to eat, to also want to become bigger, which would then increase my chance to be eaten too"

the fear of being eaten, is the same structure which produces the fear of being eaten.

the logic of determinism — everything is predetermined, therefore everything that appears indeterminate must have been accounted for by the prior causes, because if it weren't accounted for, it wouldn't be determined, therefore it cant be undetermined.

the same structure that makes things determined, makes them unable to be undetermined or freely willed.

there is no way to loop out, it closes in on itself.

there exists free will, this everything in the world is freely willed " but what about things that i didn't will " well if you didn't will them, how could they happen when everything is freely willed? so you must have willed them" and also, being able to will freely, means that you can freely willed your ability to be unable to freely will— which means that if you believed that there are things you couldn't will, then by your-own free will, thats what would have happened"

so by having free will, you have free wont, and the free wont makes you able to experience things without having freely caused them, by revoking your-own causal power and giving it to something else.
like signing a contract which says that all contracts from here on out will be signed by other people and not yourself.

circularity is not a bug of logic, its a feature of every logic.

which begs the question— is any one logic sufficient to understand and represent the world?
to which i would answer— is only algebra enough to represent the world?
or do we sometimes need also fractions, and calculus, and geometry and set theory.

is one house plus one house, the same as one bike plus one apple? or is it different?

well, its both— there isn't only one perspective we can see things with, as i hope ive proven throughout this post.

and if you want a practical methodology of how to utilize this perspective more fully, feel free to DM me( its simpler then this post might make it appear)

have a lovely day everyone

The past only had causal power when it was the past, i.e. when it existed as matter.

Causal power transfers from the present moment to the next present moment, it doesnt stay back, because causal power is in the very essence of matter.

To will is to cause in the present according to ones own inner nature.

An indirect causal relationship, is not the same thing as causation itself.

The past doesnt cause anything now, it is what the present has become.
It only caused when it was the present itself.

The outside of you and the inside of you cause eachother– its not only one or the other— it cant be– if whats outside of us causes us, then whats inside of us causes it.
Its a colaborative process of simultanious action and reaction.

There are no absolutely innert unmoving objects which are to be moved from the outside.
To be innert, isnt to be unmoving, its to be looping in a self contained locality.
A thing is innert only in relation to its abuility to move linearly(straigh), relative to another objects inability to move linearly, but abuility to move circularly.
Its not about " one thing not moving and the other moving it" its about direction of movement.
Everything moves at the same speed— the speed of the present moment— light is only talked about as the fastest in relation to its direction relative to the direction of other objects.

A humans bodys matter reverberates in roughly the same area, its not racing too move perpetually straight.

Any interaction, requires all parties in that interaction, to act themselves.

Thisnis the compatibilist argument.

All things that exist, that we know of, exist in the present moment.

The effect, is the very same matter which the cause was, when it used to have causal power.
Now, this effect is itself a cause and as such contains causal power.

The past doesnt create the present— the present creates the next present moment.

Things never arrive at " the future" — the future is the thing which is perpetually one step ahead, and the past, the thing that is perpetually one step behind.
Matter doesnt become the past, and it doesnt become the future— it allways stays the present moment.

Things are only " the future" when they are uncaused, and are only " the past" once they had cauaed and lost causal power.
Reality only appears to us in the present moment.

This is what phisics tells us about causality.

Have a good day