r/foreignpolicyanalysis

From May 13 to 15, U.S. President Trump visited China, where he received a warm welcome and held talks with Chinese President Xi Jinping. The visit was highly ceremonial and friendly. According to the latest reports, the two sides have already reached multiple important agreements, such as China expanding market access for American trade and commerce, increasing mutual imports of goods, and reaching consensus on keeping the Strait of Hormuz open and on the denuclearization of Iran.

In his banquet speech, Trump also mentioned Benjamin Franklin’s admiration for Confucius and Franklin Roosevelt’s praise for the courage of the Chinese people during World War II, in order to illustrate that China and the United States share “common values.” Xi Jinping, meanwhile, stated during the talks that the “great rejuvenation of the Chinese nation” and “Make America Great Again” are not contradictory, and proposed a new blueprint for a “constructive and strategically stable China–U.S. relationship.” The talks between the two sides were very cordial. Trump also invited Xi Jinping to visit the United States in late September this year.

During this visit to China, Trump also brought along a large delegation of political and business figures, including Secretary of State Rubio, who has been sanctioned by China since 2020, billionaire Elon Musk, who is deeply involved in American politics, and NVIDIA CEO Jensen Huang, who is ethnically Chinese.

Judging from the agenda and developments of this visit, China–U.S. relations have clearly warmed significantly. Regarding more sensitive issues such as Hong Kong, Taiwan, Xinjiang, and Tibet, as well as the issue of releasing Jimmy Lai in Hong Kong, Trump did raise them, but handled them in a low-key manner and even deliberately avoided publicly answering reporters’ questions on Taiwan.

Trump does not wish to make the Chinese side unhappy, and in reality does not care very much about these non-economic issues that have relatively weak connections to America’s concrete interests. The topics of this meeting were mainly concentrated in the commercial and trade sphere, while also involving certain technological cooperation and major international affairs, showing a distinctly pragmatic diplomatic character.

This means that during the remaining two and a half years of Trump’s second term, China–U.S. relations will likely be centered on friendly and mutually beneficial cooperation, while competition between the two sides will mainly focus on the economic and trade sphere. Ideological differences and confrontation will be shelved, and bilateral relations will enter a relatively stable and harmonious new period. If the Chinese leader’s visit to the United States this September continues the tone and atmosphere of Trump’s current visit to China, then the new normal in which pragmatic competition and cooperation between China and the United States override ideology will become even more firmly established.

Since the founding of the People’s Republic of China, China–U.S. relations have displayed different characteristics and patterns in different periods. From 1949 through the 1960s, because of ideological confrontation, interstate conflict, and the atmosphere of the global Cold War, the two sides were locked in a highly hostile antagonistic relationship, even erupting into direct military conflict at one point. China viewed the United States as an imperialist aggressor, the most reactionary fortress of the bourgeoisie, and the manipulator behind Chiang Kai-shek’s regime. The United States, meanwhile, regarded China as a detestable communist state, a terrifying red demon, and an aggressive provocateur.

However, by the early 1970s, because of the Sino-Soviet split and the intensification of U.S.–Soviet confrontation, both China and the United States faced the enormous threat posed by the Soviet Union, as well as crises within their own countries. The ruling authorities of both nations therefore chose to end confrontation, shelve disputes, and normalize China–U.S. relations. In 1972, Mao Zedong and Nixon achieved their historic handshake. This laid the foundation for China and the United States to put aside ideological struggles and pursue pragmatic cooperation.

After Mao Zedong’s death, CCP leaders such as Deng Xiaoping continued this path of developing China–U.S. relations, strengthened cooperation between the two countries, and formally established diplomatic relations in 1979. Through expanding economic, trade, technological, and cultural exchanges, as well as mutual personnel exchanges, China and the United States deepened and normalized bilateral relations.

After the June Fourth Incident in 1989, China–U.S. relations briefly cooled because of political turmoil within China and related issues. China also restarted anti-Western and anti-Westernization political campaigns and propaganda, causing a decline in mutual trust between the two countries. However, cooperation and exchanges between China and the United States were not fundamentally destroyed, and relations warmed again after only a short downturn.

China’s enormous economic potential, especially its vast supply of cheap labor and huge market size, made the United States and other Western countries see the benefits of cooperating with China. At the same time, the West also believed that China’s economic development would promote political democratization and social openness, and therefore increased investment in China while supporting China’s entry into the WTO and its integration into globalization.

As a result, China and the United States maintained pragmatic cooperation for more than thirty years afterward, without interrupting exchanges because of ideological issues. However, during different periods, under different leaders, and under differing specific circumstances, the state of China–U.S. relations and their priorities varied. During the presidencies of the two Bushes, Clinton, and Obama’s first term, bilateral relations were relatively cordial, with more cooperation and fewer conflicts.

By contrast, during Obama’s second term, the Biden administration, and the latter half of Trump’s first term, friction and conflict between China and the United States increased, and the trend toward confrontation became more apparent. In addition, when Democrats are in power, conflicts are more likely to arise over China’s human rights issues and matters involving Hong Kong, Taiwan, Xinjiang, and Tibet, while Republicans, being more pragmatic, tend to have fewer clashes with China on these matters.

The reason China–U.S. relations have experienced repeated fluctuations and transformations is that, on the one hand, China and the United States possess obvious differences in political systems and ideology, leading to frequent conflict and difficulties in building mutual trust. China’s rise has also challenged American hegemony and intensified competition between the two countries. On the other hand, China and the United States also need each other and are interdependent in many fields, making true “decoupling” difficult under globalization and massive economic and trade exchanges.

Because China is not a democratic system based on political pluralism and competitive politics, but instead possesses highly centralized power, it has an inherent contradiction with the United States, which emphasizes liberal democracy and separation of powers. China’s official claim to uphold communist ideology also causes dissatisfaction among conservative anti-communist forces in the United States.

China’s frequent human rights controversies, the long-standing issues involving Hong Kong, Taiwan, Xinjiang, and Tibet, and disputes such as those in the South China Sea also attract criticism and concern from the United States, which places importance on human rights and the international order, while China’s countermeasures further provoke friction between the two countries. The United States has also never fully trusted China because of its lack of transparency and its institutional differences from the West, and together with allies such as Britain, France, Germany, and Japan, has sought to balance China strategically and ideologically.

However, China’s rapid economic growth, its rise as the world’s second-largest economy, the “world’s factory,” and a key engine of the global economy, as well as its enormous international influence, have made it an important economic and trade partner for the United States. These realities make it difficult for the United States to “leave” China; on the contrary, America needs China in many areas. Therefore, the United States has been forced to partially abandon or soften political and ideological confrontation with China in order to maintain pragmatic cooperation.

China achieved economic rise and strategic and technological competition with the United States on the basis of a system different from that of the West. Facing China’s dual challenge in ideology and economic trade, the United States also attempted to “decouple” from China. But facts have proven that under deep globalization, China’s indispensable influence, and America’s serious economic dependence on China, genuine “decoupling” is impossible. Even limited “decoupling” imposed heavy self-inflicted costs on the United States and proved not worth the price.

Trump promoted “decoupling” and a trade war during his first term. The Biden administration later worked with allies to contain China, and at the beginning of Trump’s second term there was also a tariff war against China. Yet none of these efforts achieved ideal results, and several “decoupling” and containment policies toward China ultimately began with great momentum but faded away without resolution.

Therefore, the United States must reconsider its relationship with China and once again place pragmatic cooperation at the forefront. This also has much to do with Trump’s own stance and preferences. Trump’s style is highly pragmatic and profit-oriented. He shows disdain toward democracy and human rights, has strengthened authoritarian tendencies even domestically, and does not care much about issues outside the scope of “America First.”

Internationally, Trump has been at odds with America’s traditional allies and with the European establishment based on shared liberal democratic values. Trump also admires political strongmen and has repeatedly publicly praised the strength and decisiveness of the leaders of China, Russia, and North Korea, envying their unquestioned authority. This has also enabled Trump and Xi Jinping to establish a good personal relationship.

Trump’s supporters, especially the “MAGA” camp, also care primarily about America’s own interests and not the human rights conditions of other countries. From both the American and global perspectives, liberal democracy has likewise shown signs of retreat, while populism and authoritarianism have become increasingly prevalent. Under such a background, a Trump-led United States pursuing détente and expanded cooperation with China faces not only fewer ideological obstacles, but also several additional favorable factors.

Of course, there have always been divisions and fluctuations within Trump’s governing team and China policy between hardline and moderate approaches. Figures such as Secretary of State Rubio, former Secretary of State Pompeo, former adviser Bolton, and current adviser Miles Yu have all advocated a hardline approach toward China out of ideological and geopolitical considerations. Meanwhile, important Trump collaborators such as Elon Musk and Treasury Secretary Bessent focus more on economic and trade considerations and place greater emphasis on cooperation with China.

Trump himself once stood with the hardliners and initiated the process of “decoupling” from China, but now he has clearly shifted toward a more moderate approach. In fact, cooperating with China and making money from such cooperation aligns more closely with Trump’s preferences. Even before becoming president, Trump already had extensive commercial dealings with China.

As an anti-establishment populist politician without a fixed political creed, Trump is not constrained by the human rights positions valued by traditional politicians, is indifferent toward sensitive issues involving Hong Kong, Taiwan, Xinjiang, and Tibet, and is even less likely to pressure China over the Ukraine issue. As for competition in economics, trade, and strategy, although intense, it is not a zero-sum game, and Trump, as a businessman, is willing and skilled at competing and cooperating simultaneously.

This year is a U.S. midterm election year. Facing domestic opposition, economic slowdown, and employment problems, Trump needs to improve relations with China in order to stimulate the American economy, sell more agricultural and industrial products, increase income and employment, and win voter support. American conglomerates and the business class also tend to favor cooperation with China. Under these circumstances, Trump has strong motivation to enthusiastically visit China and improve China–U.S. relations.

China, meanwhile, is also facing economic slowdown and many domestic problems, and therefore hopes to improve the external environment and expand foreign trade. At the same time, China has value-based disagreements with the European Union and worsening relations with Japan. Improving relations with the United States benefits China’s domestic and foreign policy goals and can also weaken the U.S.–Europe–Japan alliance aimed at containing China. Trump’s pragmatic orientation and lack of emphasis on ideological issues also suit the preferences of the Chinese side. China likewise has no intention of exporting ideology or changing the American system, and has also avoided direct confrontation with the United States on issues such as Iran and Venezuela, which has further increased Trump’s favorable impression of China.

During this meeting, Xi Jinping stated that China and the United States should avoid falling into the “Thucydides Trap” of great-power zero-sum rivalry. This also reflects China’s desire to avoid uncontrolled conflict with the United States and to maintain long-term stable cooperation. Both China and the United States recognize that cooperation is better than confrontation, and that a strong G2 partnership is preferable to mutual losses that would allow third parties to benefit. Therefore, Trump’s visit to China and the summit between the Chinese and American leaders proceeded naturally and encountered almost no obstacles. Compared with Xi Jinping’s 2024 visit to the United States and his meeting with Biden, where both sides had considerable disagreements and each harbored their own concerns and calculations, this Xi–Trump meeting was far more harmonious.

Although Trump’s visit to China can be described as friendly, smooth, and productive, it also has its limitations. Sensitive issues including Taiwan, as well as economic and trade competition and friction between the two countries, were handled in a low-key manner and shelved by both sides, which also means that they were not actually resolved, and contradictions and hidden dangers still remain.

The hardliners toward China within Trump’s governing team, such as Rubio, may accept compromises and visits to China, but this does not mean that they agree with a pro-China friendly approach. In the future, they will still advocate hardline policies toward China and continue to play important roles in decision-making within the Trump administration. In addition, although the atmosphere of this meeting was very friendly, the achievements reached were not truly groundbreaking and still remained within the scope of conventional cooperation.

Trump himself frequently changes positions and abruptly shifts policies, while circumstances constantly evolve. Whether the achievements of this visit to China can truly be realized, and how long the atmosphere of China–U.S. friendliness can last, remain uncertain. If Democrats regain control of Congress in this year’s midterm elections, or if the presidency changes hands again in 2028, China–U.S. relations may once again undergo major transformations. Therefore, Trump’s visit to China and its outcomes should not be overly glorified, and only cautious optimism is warranted regarding China–U.S. relations.

From a longer-term perspective, China–U.S. relations will continue to be characterized by the intertwining of pragmatic competition and cooperation with ideological confrontation. At times, friendly cooperation will outweigh confrontation and conflict, while at other times contradictions between the two sides will cause cooperation to stagnate and lead to mutual sanctions. The specific situation will depend on the domestic and international circumstances of the time, the decisions of the leaders of both countries, and the influence of unexpected events. Competition between China and the United States on the global level, as well as the risk of unintended escalation, will always exist, yet the two sides are also mutually dependent and unable to truly “decouple and sever supply chains.”

The author, of course, hopes that China and the United States can engage in more cooperation and as little conflict as possible, while balancing economic livelihood concerns with democracy and human rights, and promoting the well-being of China, the United States, and the world in a constructive manner.

(The author of this article is Wang Qingmin(王庆民), a Chinese writer living in Europe and an international politics researcher.)

On May 7, 2026, the United Kingdom held local elections, with more than 5,000 local council seats up for re-election, accounting for about one quarter of all seats. According to the official results released on May 10, the right-wing populist party Reform UK achieved a major victory, ranking first with 26% of the vote, winning 1,453 seats, and securing absolute majorities in 14 local councils.

Meanwhile, the currently governing Labour Party saw its number of seats fall by more than 50%, while the other major party, the Conservatives, also suffered major losses in both votes and seats. The radical left-wing Green Party saw a huge increase in seats, with a larger growth rate than Reform UK, though its share of the vote and total number of seats remained below that of Reform UK. Another important liberal party, the Liberal Democrats, saw slight increases in both votes and seats.

This marks a clear shift in the political direction of Britain and a dramatic transformation of its political landscape. It also means that populism has gained further momentum in the UK, while the traditional establishment has significantly declined. The rise of Reform UK is the most notable manifestation and result of this trend.

Reform UK was formerly known as the Brexit Party, whose main platform at the time was advocating Britain’s “decoupling” from the European Union. The party later gradually evolved into a right-wing populist “big tent” party based on white nationalism, populism, xenophobia, anti-establishment sentiment, and opposition to multiculturalism, bringing together various anti-establishment populists and groups.

The party is broadly similar in its core ideology and political orientation to other right-wing populist parties in Europe and the United States, such as the National Rally, Alternative for Germany, and Fidesz, though it also possesses certain “British characteristics.”

Compared with right-wing populist parties in other countries, Reform UK places greater emphasis on the uniqueness of the “Anglo-Saxon” people, separation from continental Europe, and opposition to the European Union. Its anti-immigration and exclusionary positions are also relatively stronger. Asian immigrants such as Indians and Chinese, as well as Muslims, who form sizable communities in Britain, are among the main targets of Reform UK. The opportunity for its rise came from the Brexit wave roughly a decade ago, echoing the rise of America’s “MAGA” movement and France’s “Yellow Vest Movement.”

The rise of British populism is, in fact, somewhat surprising. Traditionally, unlike the prevalence of radicalism in continental Europe, Britain has long been the major Western country with the weakest soil for populism and the strongest tradition of moderate democratic forces.

Whether in ideology or political tradition, Britain has long leaned toward “moderate conservatism.” In confronting social problems, reformist approaches such as “Fabianism” and the “Third Way” have been prevalent. British conservatism was also long dominated by the establishment-oriented Conservative Party, and Britain’s electoral system favored traditional major parties, leaving almost no room for populism.

From the early 20th century to the early 21st century, for more than a hundred years, British politics was essentially characterized by alternating rule between the Labour Party and the Conservative Party, each serving as the other’s opposition, with the Liberal Democrats functioning as an important third party. Regional parties in Scotland, Northern Ireland, and Wales also held a place in politics. The rise of Reform UK, especially its major victory in this local election, has strongly impacted this tradition, ushering in what could be described as “changes unseen in a century” in Britain’s political landscape.

In previous years, Reform UK had already gained considerable public support, second only to Labour and the Conservatives. However, Britain’s electoral system elects all members of Parliament and local councils through single-member constituencies with plurality voting. This benefits the leading party in elections and parties with deep local roots, while disadvantaging parties with relatively high nationwide support but whose supporters are evenly dispersed across constituencies and whose organizational foundations are weaker.

As a result, although Reform UK had a fairly high support rate in previous elections, it struggled to gain seats. For example, in the 2024 British House of Commons election, Reform UK won 14.3% of the vote but secured only 5 out of 650 seats. Labour and the Conservatives still monopolized the House of Commons and most parliamentary and local council positions.

However, as Reform UK’s support rate continued to rise and surpassed Labour and the Conservatives in many constituencies, climbing into first place, its support and votes began to convert efficiently into parliamentary seats.

In the 2025 British local elections, Reform UK already achieved a remarkable victory, ranking first in vote share and surging from its previous 2% to 30%, winning 677 out of 1,641 contested seats, five times its previous number of local council seats. In this year’s elections, although Reform UK’s vote share slightly declined compared with 2025, it won even more seats and further expanded its advantage.

Although Labour and the Conservatives still hold more total local council seats than Reform UK because Britain only re-elects part of local councilors each year, based on election results and seat changes over the past two years, if Reform UK maintains its current momentum and support rate, it is highly likely to gain even more local council seats over the next two years and become the largest party in local government. If its public support remains stable, it could also secure more seats in the next parliamentary election and may even become the ruling party.

After the conclusion of the 2026 local elections, Reform UK newly gained control of 14 local councils. Combined with those it had already won previously, it is now able to exercise local governing power in more than 20 counties and districts.

This means Reform UK is no longer merely an opposition populist party that voices protests without the ability to determine policy. It is now a genuine ruling force capable of implementing policies such as anti-immigration, opposition to multiculturalism, and anti-environmental measures. If Reform UK wins control of more municipalities and eventually gains a parliamentary majority, it could implement its policies nationwide, fundamentally reshaping Britain’s political ecology as well as its domestic and foreign affairs.

The reason Reform UK has risen so powerfully, step by step evolving from a fringe party into a major political force and climbing to first place in support ratings, is due to a combination of internal and external factors. Among them, immigration issues and conflicts between different ethnic groups and cultures are the most direct and critical causes.

Traditionally, Britain has been a country dominated by white Anglo-Saxon ethnic groups, with Christianity as the primary religion of its people. During Britain’s colonial expansion from the 17th to the 20th century, which established the “Empire on Which the Sun Never Sets,” many people from colonized nations came to Britain to study and work, but relatively few settled permanently, and they often could not enjoy the same rights and status as native British whites.

Only after the development of globalization following World War II and the influence of anti-racist movements did Britain grant more non-white and non-Christian people British citizenship. In the 21st century, the promotion of multiculturalism and humanitarianism, combined with the practical demand for cheap labor, led Britain to accept more immigrants and refugees.

The new immigrants and refugees made Britain more diverse, increased its labor force, and promoted economic development, but they also brought many problems such as public security concerns, cultural conflicts, and disputes over interests. For example, Muslim communities practicing forms of “self-governance” based on Islamic law and customs, South Asian gang crime, and Chinese communities occupying educational resources and white-collar positions in Britain have all triggered dissatisfaction among native British whites, especially lower- and middle-class conservative whites.

In recent years, scandals involving Pakistani-origin criminals in Muslim communities grooming underage British girls into sexual exploitation, with more than 1,400 underage white girls reportedly victimized, and the government and police allegedly failing to intervene aggressively due to fears of ethnic tensions, have provoked especially strong anger among many whites.

In addition, Britain’s economic stagnation in recent years and the impact of the COVID-19 pandemic on people’s livelihoods have further intensified public dissatisfaction and anxiety, making immigrants and minorities even more likely targets of hostility. At the same time, anti-immigration sentiment has surged across the United States and continental Europe. Billionaire Elon Musk has openly supported Reform UK, criticized the establishment, and attacked Britain’s immigration policies and perceived tolerance of crimes committed by non-whites. This has further boosted the momentum of Britain’s conservative populist forces, whose support rates have steadily risen.

Of course, immigration is not the only issue. Many longstanding social problems and structural illnesses in Britain — such as persistent wealth and class inequality, corruption and inefficiency in bureaucracy, and dissatisfaction caused by pension and healthcare reforms under fiscal pressure — have also caused people to lose faith in the traditional establishment and turn toward populist forces such as Reform UK that promise to break the status quo. Compared with the “politically correct” rhetoric of traditional establishment politicians, the unconventional and provocative statements of populist politicians such as Nigel Farage are indeed more attractive.

In addition, many conservative voters are dissatisfied with the “multiculturalism,” feminism, environmentalism, and related agendas promoted by Labour and the left, while believing that the traditional establishment right represented by the Conservatives has been ineffective in opposing them. As a result, they have chosen to support more right-wing and radical anti-multicultural, anti-feminist, and anti-environmentalist forces such as Reform UK. This resembles the situation in the United States, where some voters, frustrated by the Democratic Party’s progressive policies, support the Republican Party, while the Republican establishment has gradually yielded ground to populist forces.

The British right-wing populist forces represented by Reform UK are, in essence, rooted in extreme nationalism and racial superiority. Their policies also include tax cuts and welfare reductions, opposition to environmental protection, and measures harmful to vulnerable groups. These are detrimental to fairness and harmony in British society and damaging to Britain’s long-term interests.

Although some of the populists’ criticisms of the establishment are valid, the remedies they offer carry severe side effects, and most problems ultimately remain unresolved. Issues such as wealth inequality and bureaucracy often continue to exist after populists take power and may even worsen.

Farage and other British populist leaders are similar to Donald Trump in that they rely on sensational rhetoric and attacks on the establishment to attract support. However, both their moral character and governing abilities are questionable, and if they govern, they are unlikely overall to bring beneficial changes to Britain.

Nevertheless, judging from the results of recent British elections, more and more Britons are choosing to vote for populist forces such as Reform UK. Not only did right-wing populists achieve sweeping victories, but the Green Party, representing the radical left and also possessing some populist characteristics, achieved results several times greater than its previous vote share and seat count in this election.

This means that left-wing voters are becoming more left-wing and right-wing voters more right-wing, with both sides moving toward extremism and populism, while the traditional establishment and centrist forces are shrinking dramatically. British politics is becoming increasingly polarized, and society will become more divided as well.

In this election, Britain’s two traditional major parties — the center-left Labour Party and the center-right Conservative Party — both saw dramatic declines in votes and seats, symbolizing the decline of the traditional establishment. In particular, the Labour Party, which represents center-left social democracy and long enjoyed support from the working class, suffered the largest seat losses, reflecting the decline of center-left social democracy and the shift of the working class.

Most of these workers chose to switch their support to Reform UK, reflecting how many British workers, like their American counterparts, have shifted from left to right, from supporting traditional establishment parties to embracing populism. The Conservative Party also faces the danger that conservative voters will abandon it for Reform UK, replacing the Conservatives as the political representative of the right-wing electorate. In short, both the center-left and center-right establishment camps are facing severe crises.

However, Britain’s future political trajectory is still not settled. Although populist forces represented by Reform UK are advancing aggressively and rapidly expanding their influence in politics, their advantage may not last long, nor are they guaranteed to become a national ruling party. Labour and the Conservatives possess deep roots and strong resilience. Although they have suffered setbacks for now, they still have a strong possibility of regaining support in various constituencies.

As Reform UK rises forcefully, Labour and the Conservatives may also, like the center-left and center-right forces in France confronting the far right, reach compromises and alliances in elections to jointly suppress Reform UK. In that case, Reform UK would face extremely difficult challenges. Likewise, whether the radical left-wing Green Party can continue breaking through in the future or will fade after a brief surge remains uncertain.

Britain’s long tradition of moderate conservatism may also restrain the further rise of far-left and far-right populism. During the several centuries since the birth of modern political systems and ideologies, continental Europe, Asia, Africa, and Latin America have all experienced many violent revolutions, upheavals, and populist waves, whereas Britain has remained comparatively stable. Before World War II, fascism rose across many countries, with fascist groups becoming active and even seizing power, yet British fascism failed to gain dominance.

Meanwhile, “Fabianism,” advocated by famous thinkers such as George Bernard Shaw and Bertrand Russell and promoted by certain politicians as a reformist social democratic path, enabled Britain to achieve social progress without revolution and with relatively little bloodshed, including the establishment of the globally respected National Health Service (NHS), with remarkable results. A Britain possessing such resilience may still be capable of containing populism.

Regarding the results of this election and the rise of populist forces such as Reform UK, if this had happened many years ago, the author would certainly have adopted a wholly negative critical stance. However, after experiencing more events and engaging in deeper reflection, the author now has more “sympathetic understanding” toward the rise of populist forces and a greater awareness and criticism of the flaws of the establishment and the current order. Simply labeling populist supporters as “ignorant” is an oversimplification, an evasion of the problem, and irresponsible.

Although the author still does not support populist forces and does not believe Reform UK or populist parties around the world can bring beneficial changes to their countries, the author does recognize and respect the public’s use of voting to express dissatisfaction with the establishment, their strong desire for change, and the voices of those who feel ignored. The public possesses its own consciousness and emotions, and populism is also a way of expressing emotions and achieving goals. Even if this may not be wise, from their perspective, supporting the establishment is not necessarily a good choice either.

Compared with ordinary people who, burdened by difficult livelihoods, troubles, and lack of prospects, desperately turn to populism as a “last resort,” Britain’s establishment and social elites bear greater responsibility and possess greater capacity to reflect upon themselves and the structural problems of British society, to better understand the hardships of ordinary people, to confront both longstanding illnesses and new problems of the current era, and to seek solutions beneficial to all sides while favoring the vulnerable. Only in this way can Britain hope to ease social divisions and prevent the country from sliding down a more dangerous path under populist rule.

(The author of this article is Qingmin Wang(王庆民), a Chinese writer based in Europe and a researcher of international politics.)

연합뉴스 등 여러 매체의 보도에 따르면, 북한은 올해 3월 대폭 수정된 헌법을 통과시켰고, 5월에 이를 공개하였다. 새 헌법은 “조국통일”과 관련된 모든 표현을 삭제하고, 북한과 한국이 두 개의 국가라는 논리를 확립하였다. 또한 새 헌법은 김일성과 김정일 및 그들의 혁명사에 관한 내용을 대폭 축소한 반면, 김정은의 권위를 부각시키고 김정은이 맡고 있는 국무위원장의 권한을 강화하였다.

이번 북한 개헌은 1948년 건국 이후 가장 큰 규모의 헌법 개정이다. 이는 한반도 통일과 남북관계에 대한 태도의 급격한 변화에 나타날 뿐만 아니라, 헌법과 국가체제의 “탈혁명화” 및 독재체제의 정상화를 시도한다는 점에서도 드러난다.

그러나 이번 헌법 개정 내용은 그다지 뜻밖의 것은 아니다. 왜냐하면 이번 개헌의 내용은 최근 몇 년 동안 이미 북한에서 점진적으로 시행되어 왔으며, 이번 개헌은 단지 그러한 조치들을 헌법에 명문화하고 공식화한 것에 불과하기 때문이다.

2023년부터 북한은 국가통일에 대한 태도를 점차 바꾸기 시작하였다. 수십 년 동안 유지해 온 “한반도 남북은 하나의 국가이며 하나의 민족이고, 조선민주주의인민공화국의 영토는 한반도 전체와 부속 도서를 포함하며, 한반도는 반드시 통일되어야 한다”는 원칙을 포기하고, 대신 대한민국을 조선민주주의인민공화국과 다른 독립국가로 인정하는 동시에 한국을 “영원한 적국”이라 부르며 더 이상 통일을 추구하지 않게 되었다.

최고지도자 김정은과 실질적 2인자인 그의 여동생 김여정은 모두 여러 차례 공개적으로 “남북은 두 국가”라고 발언하였다. “통일문” 등 통일 염원을 상징하던 건축물은 철거되었고, “조국평화통일위원회” 등 대남 통일 관련 조직도 해산되었다. 또한 선전과 교육에서도 “삼천리 금수강산” 등 통일과 관련된 표현들이 신속히 삭제되었다.

이러한 변화가 발생한 이유는 복합적이다. 필자는 2025년에 작성한 「교활한 잔혹함과 제멋대로의 유치함: 북한의 예상 밖 내정·외교 정책 분석」이라는 글에서 이미 관련 분석을 하였기에, 여기서 자세히 반복하지는 않겠다. 간단히 말하자면, 김정은은 한반도 및 국제정세의 변화에 따라 자신의 “돌발적인 발상”식 사고를 결합하여, 절대권력을 바탕으로 북한의 장기적 국책을 제멋대로 바꾸었다. 또한 남북 민족의 이익, 동포 감정, 다수 사람들이 품고 있던 통일에 대한 기대를 고려하지 않은 채 남북 동포 간의 유대와 한국의 대북 영향력을 끊어버림으로써, 자신과 자신의 가문이 한반도 북부를 영구히 통치하려 한 것이다.

필자는 그 이전 글에서 김정은이 통일 정책을 폐기한 데 있어 제멋대로이고 유치한 측면을 더 강조하였다. 그러나 지금은 여전히 그것이 김정은의 제멋대로인 행동이라고 생각하면서도, 그 배후에 있는 “현실적 자기보존”의 동기에 더욱 주목하게 되었다.

이번 개헌 및 최근 몇 년간의 여러 관련 조치들을 보면, 김정은의 통일 포기는 단순한 충동 때문만은 아니며 일정한 체계적 관점과 특정한 의도를 갖고 있다. 즉 “탈통일”을 통해 한국의 대북 영향력을 제거하고, 남북이 서로의 내정에 간섭하지 않으며, 한미 등 외국 세력의 대북 침투와 개입을 줄이는 대신, 김씨 정권의 북한 영구통치를 확보하려는 것이다.

한국과 국제사회의 여러 정치·군사적 변화는 김정은의 이러한 생각과 결심을 더욱 강화시켰다. 2024년 당시 한국 대통령 윤석열은 한국군 무인기에 북한 침투를 명령하여 김정은 및 측근들의 부패 정보를 살포하게 하였고, 나아가 북한이 한국군과 미군을 살해한 것처럼 보이게 하는 “거짓 깃발 작전”까지 시도하였다. 이는 김정은으로 하여금 군사 침공, 정권 전복, 그리고 자신의 생명 종결이라는 직접적 위협을 느끼게 만들었다. 또한 시리아 바샤르 정권의 붕괴, 베네수엘라 대통령 마두로의 미군 체포, 이란이 미국과 이스라엘의 반복적 공격을 받고 하메네이 등 지도자와 핵심 인사들이 “참수”된 사건들 역시 김정은으로 하여금 자신도 비슷한 결과를 맞을 수 있다는 두려움을 가지게 만들었다.

이러한 상황들은 김정은으로 하여금 한국과 “디커플링”하고, “적대적이지만 상호 불간섭”이라는 태도를 통해 한미가 자신의 북한 통치를 묵인하도록 만들려는 생각을 더욱 굳히게 하였다. 물론 현실적으로 보면, 한미가 북한에 개입하는지 여부는 북한이 명목상 통일을 추구하는지와 큰 관련이 없으며, 한미는 오히려 북한 핵문제와 그로 인한 군사개입 가능성에 더 관심이 있을 것이다. 그러나 적어도 김정은 개인의 생각 속에서는 한국과 미국에 피해를 주지 않고 간섭하지 않는 대신, 한미가 김씨 가문의 북한 통치를 인정해 주기를 바라는 것이다.

그리고 몇 년 전 “남북 두 국가론”을 인정하면서도 동시에 “한국은 영원한 주적”이라고 강조했던 것과 달리, 이번 개헌에서는 한국에 대한 명확한 적대 표현이 언급되지 않았다. 이는 김정은이 한국과 “상호 불간섭” 및 “공존”을 시도하려는 태도를 더욱 보여준다.

이번 개헌의 또 다른 핵심은 “탈혁명화”와 “탈사회주의화”이다. 새 헌법은 북한 건국 지도자 김일성과 2대 지도자 김정일에 관한 내용을 대폭 줄였으며, 좌익 혁명에 대한 선전도 감소시켰다. 동시에 관료체제의 집권화와 국무위원장 김정은에 대한 충성을 강화하였고, 명목상 최고권력기관인 “최고인민회의” 및 그 의장의 지위와 권한은 약화시켰다. 또한 새 헌법은 헌법 명칭에서 “사회주의”라는 네 글자를 삭제하였다.

북한 내부 소식을 장기간 보도해 온 DailyNK 등의 매체에 따르면, 김정은은 그 이전에도 여러 기관 명칭 변경과 체제 개혁을 추진하였다. 예를 들어 북한의 “국가보위성”을 “국가정보국”으로 바꾸고, “인민보안원” 또는 “사회안전원”을 “경찰”로 개칭하였다. 다시 말해, 과거 “부르주아 계급이 인민을 탄압하는 도구”라고 선전되던 기관과 인원의 명칭으로, 좌익 혁명 색채와 “인민민주독재”의 특징을 지닌 명칭을 대체한 것이다.

비록 이것이 북한 민간에서 반발을 불러일으켰고, 주민들이 북한 공식 선전에서 오랫동안 악마화해 온 “부르주아 국가” 폭력기관의 명칭을 혐오하였음에도, 김정은은 여전히 강력하게 개명과 개혁을 추진하였다.

이는 김정은이 한때 신성시되었던, 좌익 혁명을 기반으로 한 북한의 법통과 체제를 부분적으로 포기하고 제거하려 한다는 것을 의미한다. 대신 보다 명확한 현대적 독재체제를 구축하고 국제 주류 행정체제와 접목시키려는 것이다. 또한 김정은은 일부 형식적 민주주의를 약화시키고, 당·정·군 최고지도자로서 자신의 권력을 강화하였다.

최근 몇 년 동안 김정은이 이끄는 조선로동당 정권은 “국가안전”, “정치안정”, “사회관리”를 더욱 강조하고 자주 언급하고 있다. 이는 북한 정권이 보다 명확하게 “혁명과 결별”하고, 정권 수호와 안정 유지에 최우선 가치를 두고 있음을 의미한다.

실제로는 이미 1950년대 김일성이 독재체제를 구축하고 개인독재를 실현하여 이를 후대에 세습하였으며, 1990년대에는 헌법에서 “마르크스-레닌주의”와 “공산주의” 표현도 삭제하였다. 또한 김일성 집권 후반기부터는 좌익 이념의 광열을 포기하고 실질적으로 보수화되었다. 그러나 오랫동안 북한은 명목상 여전히 일부 “인민민주혁명”의 제도 형식과 사회주의 선언을 유지하며, 자신들이 “부르주아 국가”와 다르다고 표방해 왔다.

그러나 이제 김정은은 더 이상 이러한 형식을 유지하려 하지 않으며, 북한 체제의 일부 독특성도 버리고 보다 현실적이고 “노골적”으로 “정상국가”와 유사한 체제를 구축하고 있다. 김정은이 이러한 변화를 추진하는 이유는, 무한한 권력을 가진 독재자로서 더 이상 명실상부하지 않은 “인민민주” 체제와 사회주의 선언을 유지하고 싶지 않으며, 보다 본질적으로 현대 국가제도와 관료기구를 독재에 활용하려 하기 때문일 것이다.

이는 아마 김정은 개인의 태도와 감정에서 비롯된 것이며, 특별히 깊은 이해득실 계산이나 치밀한 고려에 따른 것은 아닐 수도 있다. 그리고 김정은의 절대적 권위는 누구도 감히 이를 막지 못하게 만들었다. 설령 부하가 설득하려 해도 김정은이 이를 기각하면 더 이상 의견을 제시하지 못한다.

김정은이 추진하는 “탈통일화”와 “탈혁명화”는 북한 국가 이데올로기의 중대한 변화이며, 여러 구체적 정책 조치에도 반영되고 있다. 그러나 그 상징적 의미는 실제적 의미보다 훨씬 크다. 현실에서 남북한은 이미 오랫동안 분단된 두 국가였으며, 북한도 오래전부터 좌익 인민혁명 국가가 아니라 세습 독재국가였기 때문이다. 하지만 김정은이 개헌 등을 통해 그동안 수면 아래 존재하던 현실을 공식화·제도화한 것은 여전히 북한의 내정과 외교에 큰 충격을 줄 것이며, 북한의 미래 정책 방향과 국가 운명에도 영향을 미칠 것이다.

북한 개헌 이후 한국·미국·중국·일본·러시아 등 여러 국가들은 다양한 논의를 내놓았지만, 아직 명확한 대응은 하지 않았다. 필자가 보기에 한국을 제외한 다른 국가들의 대북정책도 이로 인해 크게 변하지는 않을 것이다. 각국이 북한에 개입하거나 압박하는지는 북한의 명목상 입장과 큰 관련이 없으며, 북한의 실제 행동·위협성·가치에 달려 있다.

반면 한반도의 평화통일을 희망하고 북한과의 강한 접촉 및 협력 의지를 가진 한국 진보진영 정부는, 북한의 “통일 거부”와 “두 국가론” 태도를 어떻게 처리할지에 대해 분명 고민하게 될 것이다. 특히 북한에 우호적이며 남북 협력과 평화통일을 열렬히 바라는 한국인들은 매우 난처하고 실망할 것이다. 현재로서는 앞으로 몇 년 동안 남북관계는 지금과 같은 냉랭하지만 충돌은 없는 상태가 지속될 것으로 보인다. 장기적인 미래의 남북관계는 아직 알 수 없으며, 앞으로 양측의 실제 상호작용을 더 지켜봐야 한다.

또한 북한 주민들과 조선로동당 내부가 이번 개헌과 김정은의 여러 대내외 정책 변화에 대해 어떤 태도를 보일지도 더욱 예측하기 어렵고 불확실하다. 김정은은 북한에서 절대적인 지위와 권력을 가지고 있기 때문에, 관료와 주민 누구도 공개적으로 반대하지 못한다. 그러나 이처럼 북한 건국 이념의 기반을 크게 바꾸면서도 당내 의견과 민의를 광범위하게 수렴하지 않았다는 점은 여전히 불안과 사적인 불만, 이해할 수 없다는 반응을 낳을 수 있다. 이러한 변화는 반드시 누군가에게 김정은의 행동이 혁명과 민족에 대한 배신이며, 그의 조부 김일성의 주장에도 어긋난다고 여겨지게 만들 것이다.

북한은 극도로 폐쇄된 국가이기 때문에 내부 불만의 정도와 그것이 어떤 반응을 유발할지는 정확히 예측하기 어렵다. 그러나 앞서 언급한 DailyNK 등의 매체를 통해 흘러나온 북한 내부 소식은, 이러한 정책 변화가 실제로 상당한 부정적 반향을 일으켰음을 보여준다.

필자의 견해로는, 김정은이 한반도 통일 노선을 폐기하고 혁명 서사를 약화시키며 사회주의 잔재를 제거하는 것은 국내외 지지를 얻는 데 불리하며, 중요한 이데올로기와 역사적 축적 자원을 “스스로 팔을 잘라내듯” 포기하는 행위이다. 동시에 이러한 정책은 외부 세력이 북한과 상호 불간섭 및 공존을 할지 여부에도 실질적 영향을 거의 미치지 못한다. 행정체제 개혁이 집권 강화에는 도움이 될 수 있으나, 이미 막강한 권력을 쥔 김정은에게는 큰 추가 이익이 되지 않는다.

총체적으로 볼 때, 필자는 이러한 여러 변화가 김정은 자신과 북한의 이익에 득보다 실이 더 많다고 생각한다. 설령 개혁이 필요했다 하더라도 이렇게 극단적일 필요는 없었으며, 보다 이성적이고 안정적으로 추진할 수도 있었을 것이다. 또한 필자는 조선로동당 내부에도 이러한 개혁에 동의하지 않는 사람들, 특히 “남북 두 국가론”과 “탈사회주의화”에 반대하는 사람들이 적지 않다고 본다. 그러나 북한에서는 김정은의 권력과 위신이 압도적이기 때문에, 그가 일단 결정을 내리면 누구도 막을 수 없다. 이의를 제기하는 사람은 가벼우면 실직과 해임, 심하면 투옥과 죽음을 맞게 된다.

김정은이 조부 세대의 “혁명과 통일” 기치를 “현실주의와 자기보존” 노선으로 바꾸려는 시도는 결코 순탄하게 진행되지 않을 것이며, 앞으로도 많은 불확실성이 남아 있다. 북한의 미래가 어떻게 될지, 이러한 정책들이 오늘날의 180도 전환처럼 훗날 다시 뒤집힐지 여부 역시 아직 단정할 수 없으며, 앞으로의 상황을 더 관찰한 뒤에야 판단할 수 있을 것이다.