u/Slow-Property5895

r/foreignpolicyanalysis r/GeopoliticsIndia r/leftistveterans r/PoetryWritingClub r/Lima_Peru r/WorkersStrikeBack r/WW2info r/berlin r/trump r/WritersSanctuary r/WorkersRights r/PolitikBRD r/ShadowBan r/BookDiscussions r/koeln r/LOOK_CHINA r/esHistoria r/IndependentFilmsIndia r/geopolitics2 r/depression_help r/problems r/cinemmon r/creativewriting r/Original_Poetry r/TrueLit r/animalwelfare r/POETRYPrompts r/poemsandchill r/Americaphile r/IndiaChronicle r/Enhancement r/latinoamerica r/VeganActivism r/NorthernIndia r/PoliticalDebate r/alltheleft r/HistoryUncovered r/northkorea r/singaporespeaks r/leftist r/Ethicalpetownership r/Chinese r/WW2Porn r/films r/USHistory r/DemocraticSocialism r/uspolitics r/Cinephiles r/vegancirclejerk r/criterion r/PERU r/NewToReddit r/ROC_Taiwan r/Northeastindians r/armenia r/anime_titties r/usaf r/IndianHistoryThread r/Political_Revolution r/assam r/KoreaNewsfeed r/FragrantHarbour r/ModernSocialist r/MayDayStrike r/shittyaskhistory r/labor r/AssamSpeaks r/KeepWriting r/movieideas r/WorIdPoIitics r/Filme r/espanol r/conspiracy r/Historians r/RareHistoricalPhotos r/SocialistEconomics r/politik r/PoliticalOpinions r/Left_News r/NewPatriotism r/China r/eastasianculture r/CinemaRetrospective r/AllThatsHistory r/socialscience r/fivethirtyeight r/union r/IranWarReport r/sglgbt r/AmITheJerk r/justpoetry r/protest r/MilitaryAviation r/AirForce r/IndianCinema r/Histoire r/Uniteagainsttheright r/PoliticalLatinos r/techsupport r/International r/democracy r/MilitaryHistory r/demsocialists r/foreignpolicy r/asian r/WorkplaceOrganizing r/MovieTVArticles r/FilmTheorists r/Asean r/culture r/unitedkingdom r/IndiaSpeaks r/worldpolitics2 r/living_in_korea_now r/filmtheory r/EndlessWar r/WayOfTheBern r/Social_Democracy r/Kommunismus r/fuckHPprinters r/Filmmakers r/ThisDayInHistory r/AmericanPolitics r/Freiheitsfront r/Cinema r/indianFilmmakers r/Peru_Republic r/TheIndianRepublic r/guwahati r/Moviesinthemaking r/dsa r/literature r/AsianCinema r/worldevents r/moderatepolitics r/EAAnimalAdvocacy r/duesseldorf r/internationalpolitics r/Culturestream r/CURRENTEVENTS r/myanmar r/AskAKorean r/IndiaUnfilter r/centerleftpolitics r/IndianHistory r/asianamerican r/ChunghwaMinkuo r/Geschichte r/TrueFilm r/PoliticalScience r/unitedstatesofindia r/USNewsHub r/poetry_critics r/FilmFestivals r/Mogong r/FranceDigeste r/UnfilteredChina r/InsightBridge r/flicks r/AnimalShelterStories r/ArtHistory r/HongKong r/DemSocialistAlliance r/EastAsianPride r/OCPoetryFree r/LeftWithoutEdge r/Documentaries r/AnimalRights r/ForeignMovies r/immigration r/duisburg r/poetasters r/francophonie r/ich_politik r/InternationalDev r/seoul r/AnimalRightsActivism r/theredleft r/Historydom r/WW2Photographs r/CineSeries r/Northeastindia r/NonCredibleDiplomacy r/culturalstudies r/reddithelp r/Pride_and_Positivity r/Colonialism r/Poems r/tankiejerk r/korea r/WorldHistory r/AnimalLoversGroup r/AnimalLiberationFront r/Critics r/expat r/discussingfilm r/printers r/IndianModerate r/LiberalGooseGroup r/LibertarianLeft r/WorldWar2

朱镕基改革争议:国企下岗工人的悲剧与工农差别下农民更沉重的苦难

  8月12日,中国前总理朱镕基去世,也引发了对其执政期间一系列改革措施的争论。其中最具争议和负面后果的,是推动国企改制,导致数千万工人“下岗”,失去了“铁饭碗”。这些失业者普遍处境悲惨,许多家庭陷入绝境。对此,有人认为是经济转轨的“必要牺牲”,有人觉得过于残酷而侵害了工人权利。不过争议者都承认改革导致了一部分前国企工人的苦难。

在讨论下岗工人苦难时,也有人注意到和提及,相对于长期有“铁饭碗”的工人,同时期的农民处于更加贫困、权利和保障更少的状态。从1950年代中期开始,中国就形成了壁垒森严的工农差别和城乡差别,并影响之后几十年中国不同阶层人的命运。当时中国全面实行公有制经济,几乎所有工业企业都是国有企业,所有工人都是吃国家财政饭的国企职工。在“统购统销”等计划经济政策下,抬高工业品价格而贬低农产品价格,形成“工农业剪刀差”,以积累资金促进工业化及养育工人,农民则成为付出代价的牺牲者。

在1950-1980年代那相对贫困的几十年,从事制造业、居住在城市的工人阶级及其家庭,享受到相对较好的医疗、住房、教育、养老等保障,终身端“铁饭碗”、“吃公粮”,工人退休或病亡后还可以让子女接班。国企也没有绩效考核要求(或流于形式),计划经济与封闭状态下不需要与其他企业竞争。除非“反革命”等政治问题,无论工人是否怠工或者打架斗殴,国企一般也不会开除工人。这导致工人普遍的效率低下、人浮于事、“跑冒滴漏”、产量低而质量更差、生产成本高而产量低。而一切成本与损耗,都由国家财政“兜底”,不影响工人收入和福利待遇。

而同时,占当时中国人口约80%、居住在乡村的农民阶级,则几乎没有任何工资和社会保障(或者说只有名义上的和非常稀薄的支持),还要承担繁重的农业劳动义务,以及“交公粮”(即实物税)。农村还时常发生饥荒,一些人活活饿死,或因营养不良及其他疾病死去。而当时工人和农民之间几乎没有流动,身份世代传承。少数农民可以以临时工身份参与工业活动,只能得到少量报酬而不享受正式工人的薪酬和保障。还有户籍体制从制度上固定了人们的身份和归属,限制了人们的流动。著名学者和社会活动家梁漱溟曾形容说“(建国后)工人在九天之上,农民在九地之下”。

改革开放初期,中国社会管制松动,农民可以分田单干保留余粮,还能通过副业、经商等致富,还可以通过高考改变命运,但摆脱贫困、阶层跃升的是少数,诸多限制和负担仍然压在农民身上。而工人也一度仍然捧着“铁饭碗”,但效率低下,产品质量差而缺乏竞争力,工人及其家庭享受的福利也成为巨大的财政负担。中国在改革开放初期经济发展有限,人均GDP甚至一度有所下降,一是与人口迅速增长有关,二就是低效而消耗严重的国企拖累了发展。对外开放、参与市场经济和国际竞争的中国大陆,不仅工业品质量差,成本还更高,根本无法与港台及外国竞争,亏损严重,并由国家财政埋单。而1980年代末至1990年代初,内外交困下的中国财政几乎崩溃、物价飞涨,经济危机严重。

   正是这样的背景下,朱镕基推动了国企改制,淘汰低效的企业,对工人也“优胜劣汰”,导致了下岗潮。下岗潮确实让许多本来有着稳定生活、衣食无忧的工人如坠入深渊,全家陷入困境,有的穷困潦倒,甚至从事性工作糊口,还有的自杀身亡。而下岗安置过程中的腐败、本就有限的安置费用被贪污等,也加剧了下岗工人的苦难。另外国企改革及下岗也存在许多不公平,如许多尸位素餐的国企管理干部反而未被裁撤,无权无势的一线工人下岗比例更高。这些问题即便过去很久,也仍然应当被记住、正视、批判。

   但同时,笔者也很想强调,占中国人口大多数、相对工人更苦难的农民阶层,更需要加以关注和同情,他们的境遇更需改善。而且在之前几十年里,工人的较好待遇的代价,正是由农民所承担的。国家通过工农业“剪刀差”,人为压低农民劳动价值供养工业生产与工人福利,让农民长期处于贫困、缺乏基本保障、权利受侵害、负担沉重的状态。1970年代末担任安徽省委第一书记的万里考察农村,发现农民竟然衣不蔽体、没有裤子穿,全家男女老少挤在昏暗狭窄的一间破房里居住。1978年王震等中共元老考察贵州等地,发现农民生活还不如1936年红军经过时的民国时期,许多农民吃不饱饭、吃不起盐。

中国农民的穷苦和遭受压迫,在改革开放已进行20年后仍然存在,如分别在1999年和2003年出版的陈桂棣所著《淮河的警告》和陈桂棣吴春桃合著的《中国农民调查》,就详细而深刻揭露了中国农民的苦况。2000年,湖北一乡党委书记李昌平告诉朱镕基,“农民真苦、农村真穷、农业真危险”。当时央视“焦点访谈”也常报道农村干部腐败、乱收费、侵吞农民补贴,以及农民的冤屈。基层官吏与黑恶势力勾结,以各种名目压榨农民、欺凌农户,官民矛盾十分尖锐,一些地区如江西丰城还发生了暴力抗税事件。而农民的负担之一就是需要缴纳税赋,不仅要交农业税这个“正税”,还要缴纳“三提五统”等苛捐杂税。农民付出多而获得少,国家财政更多用于补贴低效亏损的国企、负担大量工人及其家人的工资和福利。

   这样的情形显然是畸形而不可持续的,也是朱镕基决心改革的原因之一。裁撤低效国企和遣散部分工人,不仅是刺激竞争和经济发展,也是减轻财政负担也即减少农民负担,以及有更多资金和力量解决三农问题、改善农民处境。在许多低效国企破产或人员缩水同时,大批民营企业建立,许多农民进城打工。虽然农民工保障远不及国企工人,却仍比纯粹务农收入更多、生活更丰富。扶贫开发、农业补贴、农村的基础设施建设也逐渐铺开。

在这些措施下,农民终于从极端贫困中摆脱,逐渐实现温饱甚至走向小康。胡锦涛温家宝时期废除了农业税及附着的其他杂税,并发放更多补贴,农民负担大大减轻,也与朱镕基时期改革的方向和基础有关。而且国企改革也增加了国企效益,经济发展也反哺了国企及职工,许多工人比改制之前收入更高、保障更丰厚,一些下岗工人也得到再就业、获得更多收入和新的人生。

值得注意的是,当时发生剧变的苏联和东欧各国也进行了一系列改革,也经历了计划经济转向市场经济、国企私有化,也有许多工人“下岗”与贫困化。其中有些国家如捷克、波兰等国在改革中较好保障了工人权利,而俄罗斯等国工人损失更严重。但无论哪种情况,这些国家工人阶级(包括其家庭成员)长期占人口多数,农民是少数,起码二战后没有对农民的持续剥削。所以对这些国家而言,给予工人保障和补偿是应当的。但中国直到1990年代,工人阶级仍然只占人口不到五分之一,农民仍然是多数,对工人优厚无疑会导致农民得到更少(甚至失去更多),工农存在明显的利益冲突。

朱镕基及其后继者的改革和社会形势变化,导致的部分国企凋敝和下岗潮,对下岗工人确是悲剧,但国企改制和裁汰低效企业和人员,无论从全局利益还是占人口多数的农民利益都是必要的,也缩小了工农之间、城乡之间的差距。下岗工人从幸福坠入苦难确实不幸,但农民在之前几十年里都在极端贫困中挣扎。即便经过朱镕基改革,工人尤其国企工人的待遇仍然远好于农民及农民工,下岗工人也比农民有更厚的家底、更好的受教育水平,农民中贫穷者数量和比例都更高。

到了今天,中国农民平均每月也仅有120人民币养老金,远低于平均2000人民币的国有企事业单位退休职工,更低于月退休金数千至数万人民币的干部和公务员。农村老人因贫困、疾病、家庭矛盾(家庭矛盾往往也是贫穷等引发)等原因自杀现象至今也相当普遍,如学者以湖北京山和辽宁庄河两地为例,系统性记录了农村老人自杀的悲惨境况及其普遍性。农村妇女自杀比例长期以来也显著高于城市女性,也高于城乡男性,这也是多重压迫和贫困所致。农民的苦况显然不亚于下岗工人,且苦难更普遍和持久。只是人们更容易关注到曾经既得利益者阶层坠落的动态变化,而容易忽视长期处于下层和困境中“静态”的弱者。

近三十多年来,反映下岗工人境遇的影视剧、文学作品已有不少,包括《钢的琴》、《漫长的季节》等艺术水准很高且颇有知名度的影视剧。但反映人口更多、苦难更重、受苦更久的农民的影视与文学却很少,尤其高质量又为大众熟悉的影视剧作更是几乎没有。这一定程度源于反映工人苦难的作品审查尺度更宽松、对农民苦难题材审查更严,也在于工人及其亲友有更多文化艺术资源,而农民相关资源贫乏、缺乏发声机会。这也反映了话语权的不对等、农民相对下岗工人更加边缘和“失语”的现实。当一部分人苦难被关注、另一部分人苦难被忽视,也会影响社会对不同群体的评价、关怀、帮助。

有所欣慰的是,近年在讨论下岗潮及工农城乡关系时,越来越多的人注意并提及了农民长期遭受的不公平对待,以更全面的视角看待下岗潮的背景和当时中国各身份各阶层的处境。只是这些为农民打抱不平的议论,主要集中在网络平台的评论中,以及少数严肃枯燥的社科研究著作,而缺乏文学作品和影视剧等更加“正规”的演绎和具大众吸引力的表达。或许未来会有这样的作品产生,但在严格的审查制度、农民自身发声能力弱的情况下,中短期内看不到这样作品出现的可能性。

笔者无意否定一部分工人遭受下岗和面对的苦难,也认为国企改革应当更加人道、妥善安置和补偿受损的工人,不能直接抛弃,对安置费用被贪污等犯罪更应打击。最好的改革结果是各方都受益、尽可能没有人受害。但现实里改革往往难免一部分人遭受损失。而改革是否必要和值得,就要看情理上是否应当改革、对更多人利益是好是坏,综合考量和判断。就朱镕基的改革,虽有粗糙和激进之处,整体而言仍是必要和有益的。

人们看待各种改革的利弊、人群的得失,不能局限于一隅和少数人,而应更加全面、平衡、公允,兼顾不同群体的利益和关切。若人们仅仅看到一面而忽视另一面、关注一部分人而遗忘另一部分人,只看到改革对某些人的好处或坏处,忽视它同时对于另外群体的利弊益害,就未免偏颇和不公正。中国农民从古至今都是中国劳动最辛苦、受难最严重、话语权最微弱的群体,他们的生命与尊严与下岗工人等其他身份与阶层的人一样宝贵,他们的苦难也应被看到、声音也该被倾听、利益也需被考量。

  

reddit.com
u/Slow-Property5895 — 17 hours ago
▲ 35 r/China

Controversies Over Zhu Rongji’s Reforms: The Tragedy of Laid-Off SOE Workers and the Greater Suffering of Chinese Farmers Under Worker–Farmer Inequality

On August 12, 2026, former Chinese Premier Zhu Rongji (朱镕基) passed away, sparking renewed debate over a series of reforms carried out during his tenure. The most controversial of these, and the one with the most severe negative consequences, was his push to restructure state-owned enterprises (SOEs), which caused tens of millions workers to be “laid off” (下岗) and lose their “iron rice bowls.” These unemployed workers generally found themselves in dire circumstances, and many families were driven to desperation. Some regard this as a “necessary sacrifice” in the transition to a market economy, while others believe it was excessively harsh and violated workers’ rights. Yet both sides of the debate acknowledge that the reforms caused suffering for some former SOE workers.

In discussions of the suffering of laid-off workers, some have also noted that, compared with workers who had long enjoyed an “iron rice bowl,” farmers during the same period were even poorer and had fewer rights and protections. Beginning in the mid-1950s, China developed rigid divisions between workers and farmers and between urban and rural areas, divisions that shaped the destinies of people from different social strata for decades thereafter.

At the time, China comprehensively implemented a publicly owned economy. Almost all industrial enterprises were state-owned, and virtually all workers were SOE employees whose livelihoods were supported by state finances. Under planned-economy policies such as “unified purchasing and marketing” (统购统销), the prices of industrial goods were raised while those of agricultural products were suppressed, creating an industrial-agricultural “scissors gap” (工农业剪刀差). This was used to accumulate capital to promote industrialization and support the livelihoods of industrial workers, while farmers became the ones who paid the price.

During the relatively impoverished decades from the 1950s through the 1980s, the industrial working class, who worked in manufacturing and lived in cities, and their families enjoyed relatively good provisions for healthcare, housing, education, pensions, and other forms of social welfare. They held lifelong “iron rice bowls,” were supported by the state, and when a worker retired or died from illness, their children could even inherit their jobs. SOEs also had no meaningful performance-assessment requirements, or such assessments existed only as a formality. Under a planned and closed economy, they did not need to compete with other enterprises. Unless a worker was implicated in a political issue such as being labeled a “counterrevolutionary,” SOEs generally would not dismiss workers regardless of whether they shirked their duties or became involved in fights and other disturbances.

This resulted in widespread inefficiency among workers, redundant staffing, waste, losses, leakage, and other inefficiencies, low output and even poorer quality, and high production costs coupled with low output. All costs and losses were ultimately covered by state finances and did not affect workers’ incomes or welfare benefits.
Meanwhile, the peasant class, which accounted for about 80 percent of China’s population at the time and lived in rural areas, received virtually no wages or social security—or, more precisely, only nominal and extremely meager support. Farmers also had to shoulder heavy agricultural labor obligations and “deliver public grain,” effectively paying taxes in kind. Famines still occurred from time to time in rural areas, and some people literally starved to death or died from malnutrition and other illnesses.

At the time, there was virtually no mobility between workers and farmers, and these identities were inherited across generations. A small number of farmers could participate in industrial production as temporary workers, but they received only meager compensation and did not enjoy the wages or protections afforded to formal workers. The household registration system (户籍制度) also institutionally fixed people’s identities and social affiliations while restricting their mobility. The renowned scholar and social activist Liang Shuming (梁漱溟) once described the situation by saying that “after the founding of the People’s Republic, workers were in the ninth heaven, while farmers were beneath the ninth earth”(工人在九天之上,农民在九地之下).

In the early years of Reform and Opening Up (改革开放), social controls in China loosened. Farmers were allowed to farm allocated plots independently and retain surplus grain; they could also become wealthier through sideline businesses, commerce, and other activities, and could change their destinies through the National College Entrance Examination (高考). Yet only a minority escaped poverty or moved upward socially, while numerous restrictions and burdens continued to weigh on farmers. Workers, meanwhile, continued for a time to hold on to their “iron rice bowls,” but productivity remained low, product quality was poor and uncompetitive, and the welfare benefits enjoyed by workers and their families became an enormous fiscal burden.

China’s economic development remained limited during the early years of Reform and Opening Up, and per capita GDP even declined for a period. One reason was rapid population growth; another was the drag imposed by inefficient and highly wasteful SOEs. As mainland China opened to the outside world and entered the market economy and international competition, its industrial products were not only poor in quality but also more expensive to produce. They simply could not compete with products from Hong Kong, Taiwan, and foreign countries. SOEs suffered severe losses, which were ultimately covered by state finances. From the late 1980s to the early 1990s, amid mounting domestic and external difficulties, China’s public finances nearly collapsed, prices soared, and the country faced a severe economic crisis.

It was against this backdrop that Zhu Rongji pushed forward the restructuring of SOEs, eliminating inefficient enterprises and applying a process of “survival of the fittest” to workers as well, thereby triggering a massive wave of layoffs (下岗潮). This wave of layoffs did indeed plunge many workers who had previously enjoyed stable, worry-free lives into an abyss. Entire families fell into hardship; some workers were reduced to destitution, some even turned to sex work to survive, and others died by suicide.

Corruption during the process of resettling laid-off workers, including the embezzlement of already limited resettlement funds, further compounded their suffering. There were also many injustices in SOE reform and the layoffs. For example, many SOE managers who held sinecures and drew salaries without doing meaningful work were not dismissed, while rank-and-file workers with neither power nor connections were laid off at higher rates. Even though much time has passed, these problems should still be remembered, confronted, and criticized.

At the same time, I would also like to emphasize that the peasant class, which constituted the majority of China’s population and suffered even greater hardship than industrial workers, deserves still more attention and sympathy, and its circumstances were even more urgently in need of improvement. Moreover, during the preceding decades, the relatively favorable treatment enjoyed by workers had been paid for precisely by farmers. Through the industrial-agricultural “scissors gap,” the state artificially depressed the value of farmers’ labor in order to subsidize industrial production and workers’ welfare, leaving farmers for decades in poverty, without basic protections, with their rights infringed upon, and under heavy burdens.

In the late 1970s, Wan Li (万里), then First Secretary of the Anhui Provincial Committee of the Chinese Communist Party, inspected rural areas and discovered that farmers were so impoverished that they lacked adequate clothing and did not even have trousers to wear, while entire families—men and women, young and old—were crowded together in a single dark, cramped, dilapidated room. In 1978, Wang Zhen (王震) and other senior Chinese Communist Party leaders inspected Guizhou and other regions and found that farmers’ living conditions were even worse than they had been in 1936, during the Republican era, when the Red Army (红军) passed through the region. Many farmers did not have enough to eat and could not even afford salt.

The poverty and oppression suffered by Chinese farmers persisted even after Reform and Opening Up had been underway for twenty years. The Warning of the Huai River (《淮河的警告》), written by Chen Guidi (陈桂棣) and published in 1999, and An Investigation of Chinese Peasants (《中国农民调查》), co-authored by Chen Guidi and Wu Chuntao (吴春桃) and published in 2003, offered detailed and profound exposés of the hardships endured by Chinese farmers. In 2000, Li Changping (李昌平), a township Party secretary in Hubei, told Zhu Rongji: “The farmers are truly suffering, the countryside is truly poor, and agriculture is truly in danger.” At the time, CCTV’s Focus Report (《焦点访谈》) also frequently reported on corruption among rural cadres, arbitrary fees, the embezzlement of subsidies intended for farmers, and the injustices suffered by farmers.

During that period, grassroots officials colluded with criminal and other malign forces to exploit farmers and bully rural households under a variety of pretexts. Tensions between officials and the public were extremely acute, and violent tax-resistance incidents even occurred in some areas, such as Fengcheng, Jiangxi (江西丰城). One of the burdens farmers faced was taxation: they had to pay not only the agricultural tax, the “regular tax,” but also a host of onerous levies and miscellaneous charges such as the “three deductions and five unified levies” (三提五统). Farmers contributed much but received little in return, while state finances were devoted far more heavily to subsidizing inefficient and loss-making SOEs and covering the wages and welfare benefits of large numbers of workers and their families.

Such a situation was clearly distorted and unsustainable, and it was one of the reasons Zhu Rongji was determined to pursue reform. Closing inefficient SOEs and dismissing some workers was intended not only to stimulate competition and economic development, but also to reduce the fiscal burden—which in turn meant reducing the burden on farmers—and to free up more funds and resources to address the “three rural issues” of agriculture, rural areas, and farmers (三农问题) and improve farmers’ circumstances. As many inefficient SOEs went bankrupt or downsized, large numbers of private enterprises were established, and many farmers migrated to cities for work. Although migrant workers enjoyed far fewer protections than SOE workers, they could still earn more than they could through farming alone and enjoy materially richer and more varied lives. Poverty-alleviation and development programs, agricultural subsidies, and rural infrastructure construction also gradually expanded.

Under these measures, farmers finally began to emerge from extreme poverty, gradually achieving basic food and clothing security and even moving toward a moderately prosperous standard of living. During the Hu Jintao (胡锦涛) and Wen Jiabao (温家宝) era, the agricultural tax and various associated levies were abolished, while more subsidies were provided. This greatly reduced the burden on farmers and was also related to the direction and foundations established by the reforms of the Zhu Rongji era. SOE reform also improved the efficiency and profitability of state-owned enterprises, while economic development in turn benefited SOEs and their employees. Many workers came to earn higher incomes and enjoy more generous protections than before the restructuring, and some laid-off workers also found higher incomes and new paths in life.

It is worth noting that the Soviet Union and the countries of Eastern Europe, which were undergoing dramatic transformations at the time, also carried out a series of reforms. They likewise experienced transitions from planned to market economies and the privatization of state-owned enterprises, with many workers also becoming “laid off” and falling into poverty. Some countries, such as the Czech Republic and Poland, did a relatively good job of protecting workers’ rights during these reforms, while workers in countries such as Russia suffered more severe losses.

Whatever the circumstances, in these countries the working class, including workers’ family members, had long constituted the majority of the population, while farmers were a minority; at the very least, there had been no sustained exploitation of farmers after World War II. Therefore, it was appropriate for these countries to provide workers with protections and compensation. In China, however, even into the 1990s, the working class still accounted for less than one-fifth of the population, while farmers remained the majority. Providing generous benefits to workers would inevitably mean that farmers received less—or even lost more—and there was a clear conflict of interests between workers and farmers.

The reforms of Zhu Rongji and his successors, together with changes in social conditions, led to the decline of some SOEs and a wave of layoffs. This was indeed a tragedy for the workers who lost their jobs. However, restructuring SOEs and eliminating inefficient enterprises and personnel were necessary both from the perspective of the overall public interest and from that of farmers, who constituted the majority of the population. These reforms also narrowed the gaps between workers and farmers and between urban and rural areas.

It was indeed unfortunate that laid-off workers fell from relatively comfortable lives into hardship, but farmers had been struggling in extreme poverty for decades before that. Even after Zhu Rongji’s reforms, workers—especially SOE workers—continued to enjoy far better treatment than farmers and migrant workers. Laid-off workers also generally had greater household assets and financial reserves and higher levels of education than farmers, while both the number and proportion of people living in poverty were higher among farmers.

Even today, Chinese farmers receive an average monthly pension of only RMB 120, far below the average RMB 2,000 received by retired employees of state-owned enterprises and public institutions, and even further below the monthly pensions of several thousand to tens of thousands of RMB received by cadres and civil servants. Suicide among elderly rural residents due to poverty, illness, family conflicts—which themselves are often caused by poverty and related problems—and other factors remains quite common. Scholars, taking Jingshan in Hubei (湖北京山) and Zhuanghe in Liaoning (辽宁庄河) as examples, have systematically documented the tragic circumstances and prevalence of suicide among elderly people in rural areas. For a long time, the suicide rate among rural women has also been significantly higher than that among urban women, as well as higher than the rates among both rural and urban men. This is also a result of multiple forms of oppression and poverty.

The suffering of farmers is clearly no less severe than that of laid-off workers, while being more widespread and enduring. Yet people are more likely to notice the dynamic change of a formerly privileged group falling into hardship, while easily overlooking the “static” plight of vulnerable people who have long remained at the bottom of society and in difficult circumstances.

Over the past three decades and more, there have been quite a few films, television dramas, and literary works depicting the experiences of laid-off workers, including highly acclaimed and well-known productions such as The Piano in a Factory (《钢的琴》) and The Long Season (《漫长的季节》). Yet there are far fewer films, television works, and literary works portraying farmers, who are more numerous, have suffered more severely, and have endured hardship for longer. High-quality film and television productions about them that are also widely familiar to the public are especially scarce, almost nonexistent.

To some extent, this stems from the fact that works depicting the suffering of workers are subject to more lenient censorship, while works dealing with the suffering of farmers face stricter censorship. It is also because workers and their relatives and friends have greater access to cultural and artistic resources, whereas farmers have far fewer such resources and lack opportunities to make their voices heard. This also reflects the unequal distribution of discursive power and the reality that farmers are even more marginalized and “voiceless” than laid-off workers. When the suffering of one group receives attention while that of another is ignored, it also affects how society evaluates, cares for, and assists different groups.

One encouraging development is that, in discussions in recent years about the wave of layoffs and worker-farmer and urban-rural relations, more and more people have noticed and mentioned the longstanding unfair treatment suffered by farmers, viewing the background of the layoffs and the circumstances of different identities and social strata in China at the time from a more comprehensive perspective. I have no intention of denying the suffering experienced by workers who were laid off. I also believe that SOE reform should have been carried out in a more humane manner, with proper arrangements and compensation for workers who suffered losses rather than simply abandoning them, and that crimes such as the embezzlement of resettlement funds should have been punished more severely.

The best outcome of reform is for all parties to benefit and, as far as possible, for no one to be harmed. In reality, however, reform often inevitably causes some people to suffer losses. Whether such reform is necessary and worthwhile must therefore be judged by whether the reform is justified and reasonable, whether it benefits or harms a greater number of people, and through comprehensive consideration and assessment. As for Zhu Rongji’s reforms, although some aspects were crude and radical, they were on the whole necessary and beneficial.

When assessing the advantages and disadvantages of various reforms, as well as the gains and losses experienced by different groups, people should not confine their perspective to one corner of society or to a small number of people. Instead, they should adopt a more comprehensive, balanced, and fair approach, taking into account the interests and concerns of different groups. If people see only one side while ignoring the other, pay attention to one group while forgetting another, or see only the benefits or harms that reform brings to certain people while overlooking the advantages and disadvantages it simultaneously brings to other groups, their judgment will inevitably be biased and unfair.

From ancient times to the present, Chinese farmers have been the group that has performed the hardest labor, endured the greatest suffering, and had the weakest voice in Chinese society. Their lives and dignity are just as precious as those of laid-off workers and people of every other identity and social stratum. Their suffering, too, deserves to be seen; their voices deserve to be heard; and their interests deserve to be taken into consideration.

(This article was written by Wang Qingmin(王庆民), a Chinese writer based in Europe and a researcher in international politics. The original version of this article was written in Chinese.)

reddit.com
u/Slow-Property5895 — 1 day ago

郭德纲改歌词被调查与近年中国言论尺度日益收紧

  近日,著名相声演员郭德纲在演出中将红色抗战歌曲《弹起我心爱的土琵琶》歌词加以修改,提及“紫禁城”等被认为涉及政治敏感的词语,并加以调侃。这引发一些人的不满并举报了郭德纲。事发地湖北的文旅机构宣布已立案调查此事。这一事件引发广泛讨论,有人认为郭德纲篡改红歌,涉嫌侮辱先烈,应当受罚;也有人认为这损害了言论自由,造成寒蝉效应。
 
一些中国名人因为类似争议言论遭受批评、调查与处罚,以及引发有关言论尺度收紧讨论的事件,最近十几年的中国常常发生,已不是什么新鲜事。如2015年前央视著名主持人毕福剑,因调侃毛泽东的言论,从公众活动中消失并从央视退休,迄今也极为低调。2020年在新冠疫情期间撰写《方方日记》记录一些负面事实和对政府提出批评的作家方方,也遭受攻击举报,之后多年很少进行公共活动。另外还有一些提及更加敏感和更高禁忌、批评当下时政的教授、普通公民等,如张展、杨绍政、蔡霞等人,遭工作单位开除甚至判刑入狱。许多名人、学者、媒体人,也都面对比十几年前更多的举报、更严格的言论审查、更大的发言风险。

而近年来中国言论自由日益收紧,人们感到言论空间被压缩,也是广泛的共识。人们不再像以前那样敢于就公共事务畅所欲言,也回避对党政机构及官员提出批评。尤其是公众人物、明星名人,更是格外注意言论,以免遭受攻击、举报、封杀,丢了饭碗。曾在公共议题上积极发言的明星名人如姚晨、李娜、王思聪等也转向沉默。在高校和各机关单位,人们都不敢再就公共时事及政治人物发表自己的看法,要么沉默不言、要么完全按照官方定调机械的重复。

这样的现象是非正常和令人担忧的。一个正常的社会,对于各种公共议题,自然存在多元的声音,对于历史问题也有不同的看法,对政府有批评也是常见的。比如新冠疫情期间,人们就“清零”还是“共存”的争议,就是基于各自经历、观念、诉求的合理争论。一些人更强调防病毒和避免传染,另一些人更在乎就业收入和人身自由,各自都有权利阐述观点和推动政府改进政策。对于封城隔离导致的就医、饮食等生活困难,当然也有权表达不满和要求政府改进。而强制禁止不同意见,打压诉说,就会导致问题无法解决甚至酿成悲剧,及引发更多不满和冲突。

对于历史人物和事情有不同看法,且有些道理依据,做出适度的调侃,也是人之常情和应被允许的。即便有不当言论,只要在人道底线之上,适当批评和要求其道歉即可,而不至于上纲上线和过度处罚。如毛泽东是有功有过的人物,一些人反感他并不奇怪。至于红歌、红色故事,若调侃过度明显侮辱烈士确实不该,但若只是略加改编、批评时弊,则应当被宽容。而且若把一切改动和调侃都上纲上线为“侮辱英烈”,反而淡化了真正侮辱英烈的言论,并不利于维护烈士名誉。

对于政府和社会的不良现象,做出批评乃至一些讽刺,也是合情合理的。民心民意也常常通过市井里的闲言碎语、戏台上的插科打诨表现出来,自古就有且多数时期会被容忍。允许社会上不同声音的存在、宽松的言论环境,也是和谐社会的表现。历史上贤明君主对于“直言敢谏”或“能谤讥于市朝”者还加以奖赏,以彰其匡正过失之功。

公民本就应拥有包括言论自由的各项自由。人们可以畅所欲言、不担心因言获罪,是一个文明社会的基本要求。当然,任何国家的言论自由确实都有前提和底线,如种族主义和煽动暴力的言论往往是不被容忍的,造谣诽谤也常被追究责任。但言论的尺度应当符合情、理、法,而不应该过度的限制、出于部分人狭隘利益的禁言和处罚。

   滥用举报机制打击不合心意的观点、报复立场不同或有仇怨的人,也是不良现象。文革期间人们相互举报,甚至亲人朋友之间举报,造成了很多恶果,破坏了人与人的信任与和睦。这样的情形不应该再卷土重来,官方也不应纵容。对于符合情理的举报可接受,对恶意的利用公权力打击他人不可放纵鼓励。

本次郭德纲所涉事件,根据具体修改的歌词内容,其并无侮辱英烈之意,只是稍有调侃体制之言。而相声、戏剧、脱口秀等本就以“抖包袱”吸引观众,这样表演也在行规允许之内。对其上纲上线者,并非真正尊重英烈,而是让本已在言论尺度收缩下三缄其口的艺人更束手束脚,从文艺舞台到市井生活更加死气沉沉。同时,中文互联网上时常可以看到的一些阴阳怪气的、极端的、反智的言论,也是言论禁制过度促成的反弹,反映了言论尺度窄化的副作用。

中国领导人和官方媒体曾推崇一句出自《史记》的名言“千人之诺诺,不如一士之谔谔”。这正是鼓励人们针砭时弊、敢于直言。而近年不断收紧的言论尺度、越发压抑的社会氛围、人们普遍的谨小慎微而避免批评官方,与这样的倡导相悖。只有放松言论限制、真诚的广开言路、避免“上纲上线”、容许多元和批评声音,人们情感得到抒发、诉求可以讲出和被倾听,真理在多方辩论中更明晰,社会才真正和谐稳定。

u/Slow-Property5895 — 1 day ago
▲ 2 r/China

Guo Degang Investigated for Altering Song Lyrics and the Boundaries of Speech in China

Recently, renowned xiangsheng (crosstalk) performer Guo Degang (郭德纲) altered the lyrics of the revolutionary Anti-Japanese War song “Playing My Beloved Pipa” (《弹起我心爱的土琵琶》) during a performance, mentioning the “Forbidden City” and other words regarded as politically sensitive and making jokes about them.

This provoked dissatisfaction among some people, who reported Guo Degang. The culture and tourism authorities in Hubei, where the incident occurred, announced that they had opened an investigation into the matter. The incident has sparked widespread discussion. Some believe that Guo Degang tampered with a revolutionary song and may have insulted fallen heroes, and therefore should be punished; others believe that this harms freedom of speech and creates a chilling effect.

In China over the past decade or so, it has become commonplace for prominent figures to face criticism, investigation, and punishment over similarly controversial remarks, with such incidents also prompting discussion about the tightening boundaries of permissible speech. For example, in 2015, Bi Fujian (毕福剑), formerly a well-known host on China Central Television, disappeared from public activities and retired from CCTV after making remarks mocking Mao Zedong (毛泽东). He has maintained an extremely low profile ever since. Fang Fang (方方), the writer who documented some negative realities and criticized the government in “Wuhan Diary” (《方方日记》) during the COVID-19 pandemic in 2020, was also attacked and reported, and rarely participated in public activities for many years afterward.

There have also been professors and ordinary citizens who touched upon even more sensitive subjects and greater taboos or criticized current political affairs, such as Zhang Zhan (张展), Yang Shaozheng (杨绍政), and Cai Xia (蔡霞), some of whom were dismissed by their employers or even sentenced to prison. Many celebrities, scholars, and media professionals now also face more denunciations, stricter censorship, and greater risks in speaking out than they did more than a decade ago.

In recent years, freedom of speech in China has become increasingly restricted, and there is a widespread consensus that the space for expression has been compressed. People no longer dare to speak as freely as they once did about public affairs, and they avoid criticizing Party and government institutions or officials. Public figures and celebrities in particular are exceptionally cautious about what they say, for fear of being attacked, reported, blacklisted, and losing their livelihoods. Celebrities who once actively spoke out on public issues, such as Yao Chen (姚晨), Li Na (李娜), and Wang Sicong (王思聪), have also fallen silent. At universities and within government agencies and other institutions, people no longer dare to express their own views on current public affairs or political figures; they either remain silent or mechanically repeat the official line.

Such a phenomenon is abnormal and worrying. In a normal society, there are naturally diverse voices on various public issues, different views on historical questions, and criticism of the government is also commonplace. During the COVID-19 pandemic, for example, the debate over “zero-COVID” (清零) versus “living with COVID” (共存) was a legitimate debate based on people’s differing experiences, values, and demands.

Some placed greater emphasis on preventing the virus and avoiding infection, while others cared more about employment, income, and personal freedom. Each side had the right to articulate its views and push the government to improve its policies. People of course also had the right to express dissatisfaction with difficulties in obtaining medical care, food, and other necessities of daily life caused by lockdowns and quarantine measures, and to demand improvements from the government. Forcibly suppressing dissent and silencing people who speak about their experiences, by contrast, can leave problems unresolved or even lead to tragedies, while generating still greater dissatisfaction and conflict.

It is only natural that people have different views of historical figures and events, particularly when those views have some reasonable basis, and moderate satire should also be permitted. Even when remarks are inappropriate, so long as they do not cross fundamental humanitarian boundaries, appropriate criticism and a request for an apology should suffice, rather than elevating the matter into an ideological or political offense and imposing excessive punishment.

Mao Zedong, for example, was a figure who had both achievements and faults, so it is hardly surprising that some people dislike him. As for revolutionary songs and revolutionary stories, excessively mocking them in a way that clearly insults fallen heroes is indeed inappropriate. But if they are merely adapted slightly or used to criticize contemporary problems, this should be tolerated. Moreover, if every alteration and joke is elevated into an accusation of “insulting heroes and martyrs” (侮辱英烈), this instead dilutes the seriousness of remarks that genuinely insult them and does nothing to help preserve the reputation of fallen heroes.

It is also perfectly reasonable to criticize or even satirize undesirable phenomena in government and society. Public sentiment and opinion have often found expression through casual remarks and gossip in the streets and through jokes and banter on the stage; this has existed since ancient times and has often been tolerated. Allowing different voices to exist in society and maintaining a relaxed environment for expression are themselves manifestations of a harmonious society. Historically, enlightened rulers even rewarded those who “dared to speak frankly and offer remonstrance” (直言敢谏) or who were able to “criticize and censure in the marketplace and at court” (能谤讥于市朝), recognizing their contribution to correcting errors.

Citizens should inherently enjoy various freedoms, including freedom of speech. Being able to speak freely without fearing punishment for one’s words is a basic requirement of a civilized society. Of course, freedom of speech in every country does have conditions and limits. Racist speech and incitement to violence, for example, are often not tolerated, while those who spread falsehoods or engage in defamation are also frequently held accountable. But the boundaries of speech should accord with human sentiment, reason, and law, rather than being excessively restrictive or used to silence and punish people in the narrow interests of particular groups.

Abusing reporting mechanisms to attack views one dislikes or to retaliate against people with different positions or personal grievances is also an unhealthy phenomenon. During the Cultural Revolution (文化大革命), people reported one another, even among relatives and friends, producing many disastrous consequences and destroying interpersonal trust and harmony. Such circumstances should not be allowed to return, nor should the authorities indulge them. Reports that are reasonable and justified may be accepted, but the malicious use of public power to attack others should neither be tolerated nor encouraged.

In the present incident involving Guo Degang, judging from the specific alterations he made to the lyrics, he had no intention of insulting fallen heroes; he merely made some mildly satirical remarks about the system. Xiangsheng, theater, stand-up comedy, and similar forms of performance inherently rely on punchlines and jokes to attract audiences, and this kind of performance also falls within accepted professional conventions.

Those who elevate the matter into a serious political or ideological offense are not genuinely respecting fallen heroes. Instead, they are further constraining performers who are already extremely cautious about speaking amid shrinking boundaries of permissible expression, making both the cultural stage and everyday public life even more lifeless. At the same time, the sarcastic, extreme, and anti-intellectual remarks that frequently appear on the Chinese-language internet are themselves partly a backlash produced by excessive restrictions on speech, reflecting the side effects of increasingly narrow boundaries of permissible expression.

Chinese leaders and official media have previously promoted a famous saying from the “Records of the Grand Historian” (《史记》): “A thousand men saying yes are not as valuable as one scholar speaking forthrightly” (千人之诺诺,不如一士之谔谔). This is precisely an exhortation for people to criticize contemporary problems and dare to speak frankly. Yet the continuously tightening boundaries of permissible speech in recent years, the increasingly repressive social atmosphere, and people’s widespread caution and reluctance to criticize the authorities run contrary to such advocacy.

Only by relaxing restrictions on speech, sincerely opening channels for a broad range of opinions, avoiding the practice of turning ordinary remarks into grave political or ideological offenses, and allowing diverse and critical voices can people express their feelings, articulate their demands and have them heard, allow truth to become clearer through debate among different sides, and enable society to achieve genuine harmony and stability.

(This article was written by Wang Qingmin(王庆民), a Chinese writer based in Europe and a researcher in international politics.)

reddit.com
u/Slow-Property5895 — 4 days ago

对从批判中共、获得名利、到如今又回国舔专制、国内外“两头吃”的“红二代”流氓艾未未的评论

我对艾未未早年关怀汶川地震受害学生、帮助杨佳母亲、怒骂中共各种无耻,还有支持巴勒斯坦人民、聚焦罗兴亚人等边缘者,都是佩服的。

但后来艾未未一些言论和行为我就不赞同,例如逐渐支持特朗普和一些右翼阴谋论观点。我也不喜欢他那种红二代才有的某种流氓化的气质和习气。再后来则对他反感、充满厌恶

艾未未如果只靠他爹,并不一定能做到现在这样,很多成就当然是他个人奋斗和创造;

但艾未未如果没有那样身份的爹,那就基本没有后来各种成就的可能性。他不生长在大院而是某村庄无权无势村民家里,再努力也没现在的成就。也不能各种洒脱跋扈。

人,不应该把凭着出身获得的东西,都当成自己努力的结果

––

艾未未这种人,就是我说的“满蒙价值观”实践者。虽然他老家是南方的,但他成长是在北京,习气都是大院里的,满嘴脏话屁话也都是从北京街头学会的。这跟他族群血统没关系,和所处环境很有关系

––

我曾经在德国见到过艾未未。现在看来,我当时跟艾未未寒暄两句也是不必要的,当时就应该起来就走,一句话不说。没必要表达善意,因为这种人不配

我本来就很反感这个艾未未,当时表达客气,一是礼节客套,二是我确实还报了一点幻想,例如他可以提供一些平台资源,利于我宣传民主人权之类。

现在想来,这种想法是幻想,艾未未对我来说并没有利用价值(反过来也一样)。所以一开始就应该不搭理。

我现在非常后悔,当时见到艾未未,不应该给他礼貌谦恭的打招呼,应该干脆不搭理,直接走。

艾未未还说我不敢当面骂他。如果周边都是他朋友的场合,我骂了也难记录,还可能被倒打一耙。以后中立场合遇到艾未未,我会当面斥责

––

十几年前中学时候,我很崇拜艾未未、刘晓波等人,觉得他们敢言、反抗强权。

这些年了解他们各种言行乃至亲身接触,终于明白了,他们算个p,都是垃圾玩意,呸

––

艾未未在德国也有不少跟班/爪牙/蹭饭吃的。前几个月遇到一个叫张强的(艺名张弱),就是艾未未一伙的。我偶然聊天到当年朝阳公园艾未未打人事件,此人就加以诡辩。大大方方承认还好,还否认打人事实。

后来此人还对我冷嘲热讽,我也骂回去了。此人还嘲笑我的人权宣传和政治抗争,他自己只知道享乐。这些垃圾玩意,呵呵

艾未未也有不少支持者、跟班。大都是张弱(张强)这种缺乏道德、没有责任心、会给他溜须拍马和辩护、品质低下的东西

––

把任志强、艾未未、沈志华之类的家产都送给我、把他们平台和资源也给我,那我干的肯定比他们好、成就比他们大。更不用说和同样有条件什么都没干、只花天酒地的其他红N代官N代们比了。

我没觉得自己有什么不配的,起码比他们配多了

––

艾未未打人不受处罚,不是靠的特权?包括他拍纪录片,没特权也不能拍。虽然客观上他利用特权做了些有益的事,但根本上还是特权阶层。现在他好像还是经常回国,两头吃。

把他资源都给我,我肯定比他干得好啊

––

有人告诉我,严歌苓和艾未未不算靠爹,他们年轻时也落魄,靠自己努力成功了。

他们自己是努力了,但能飞黄腾达,靠的还是家庭背景、权势者助力。像习近平,也在陕西扛麦子、掏大粪,但仍然受到一定保护。后来改革开放,他也迅速飞黄腾达,一路成了总书记。难道习近平是靠努力扛麦掏粪当上总书记的吗?

––

我也不是没对严歌苓和艾未未这些人示好过,他们显然没有帮上我的忙,没有帮我促进中国解放事业,还表现出歧视。上次在柏林饭馆遇见艾未未,我表现谦卑尊敬,他也没尊重我啊。那我还客气什么?

其实我不是不愿意忍辱负重,只是没效果,对方不值得尊敬

––

艾未未的爹,虽然死了快30年了,还上了今年中国高考卷子呢。如果中共很反感艾未未反贼身份,会避开他爹。

现在看,中共不在乎艾未未反贼身份,他爹的红色权贵身份再一次坐实

艾未未如果是真的完全反贼、对中共威胁极大,中共肯定舍弃宣传他父亲艾青,更不可能登上高考卷子,哪怕他爹很知名。

正是因为艾未未并没有真正彻底反中共,也并没有产生真正威胁中共的影响,搞了一些批中共的艺术也只是点到为止、沽名钓誉,还可以在中外来去自由,所以中共才把他爹写进高考作文命题里

虽然大多数写高考作文的考生现在不知道艾未未,但他们早晚会知道的。中共显然是不在乎,才把艾青出到题上

––

习明泽、艾未未、薄瓜瓜可以不劳而获、奢侈享受,我为什么不能?我为什么不能享受他们起码万分之一的待遇?每个人都有这样的权利

––

艾未未资源丰富,但华而不实。这人充满红二代的那种匪气。曾经搞得地震遇难儿童调查之类,确实还不错。

但最近十几年艾未未基本没有干几个正经事。虽然也去采访加沙、罗兴亚人、乌克兰,但都是高高在上,不接地气,也没实际作用。

而且艾不怎么批中共了,因为想在反对派和中共两边都吃好处,名利都要

––

艾未未没有艾青那个爹,只能在北京大街上当二流子,甚至人品不如二流子

中共红二代本质一个德性,流氓色彩浓厚。从习近平到艾未未,无论是中共最高领导人,还是半真半假的反贼,其实都一样。土匪崽子

——

艾未未最近(2025年底)公开回国了,啥事没有。我早就说了,艾未未这种人两头吃,根本不是正经反贼,还是特权红二代

——

据说艾未未和苏雨桐有不正当关系。这俩东西本来也不是正当人,所以有不正当关系反而很正常、很“正当”

——

其实文革也并不完全坏,艾青在内那些中共干部,49之后吃香喝辣,大饥荒下脑满肠肥。确实该被斗。而且即便被斗了,还是留下巨大遗产让子女挥霍。

艾未未这种红二代,也应该被斗

——

1月13日,艾未未回北京后首次公开接受采访(柏林日报),批评德国各种问题,对中国无一句批评。很显然,艾未未底色从没变,就是红二代权贵。而且缺乏道德。他干了一些有益社会的事,只是他某种爱好,而非真正的责任心。这货之所以能搞起风浪,也是靠了特权身份。

其实艾未未说的德国官僚主义什么的,我也深有体会。但就个人恩怨,我还是要骂他。这种人品德低下,不配有那些资源

——

艾未未这些人做的有益的事,其实也只能算作为其特权赎罪,且并不足够。他们享受那么多特权和优越条件,本来就应该为人民服务,没什么需要格外称赞的。

只是中共权贵精英都太烂了,巧取豪夺、精致利己的太多了,艾未未这种干了一点正经事的,就很突出、被吹捧到天上

——

艾未未说中共维护国家民族尊严什么的,有些可笑。

第一,中共并不真的维护国家民族尊严,只是假借这些名目维护统治、阻止外国的人权批判。

第二,艾未未这些年从没做过维护汉族(哪怕中华民族也算)尊严和对外利益的事。而且他好像是有些支黑倾向、不喜欢谈国家民族利益的人。现在突然强调这一点,他自己好意思吗?

当然我一直主张维护国家民族尊严,也做了相关的事、写不少相关文章。但中共和艾未未在这一点上,恰恰都没做到

看过艾未未言论的就知道,他其实是有些支黑倾向的,只是没苏雨桐那么强烈。不过很明显艾未未从没说过以汉族、中华民族、中国人自豪之类的话,以及弘扬民族精神之类的言行。

这样情况下,艾未未却说中共维护民族尊严国家利益值得称赞,非常离谱,完全谎言,也很讽刺

——

王志安引用索尔仁尼琴在苏联/俄罗斯批判苏与俄、到了西方又批判西方的经历,来对比艾未未。

拿艾未未和索尔仁尼琴比,属于是拿旱厕土渣子比天河的恒星。

索尔仁尼琴那么深邃的思想、高尚的道德、对国家民族的忧患,艾未未能比得上一根毛?就算上他为汶川地震儿童什么的做的事,也只是技术性的、一般层次的,根本和伟大的人无法比

——

我在德国其实也是遇到各种问题,艾未未说的一些是事实。

但我绝不会因此与他有什么共情。他作为权贵阶级,属于矫情,不值得任何同情。我的情况和他不一样,哪怕一些事感受一样。

艾未未自己的问题甚至罪恶,远比他遭遇的不公平要多和严重

——

我对艾未未主要不是看他政治立场是不是坚定,主要是这个人本身享受很多特权,但道德很差,对待他人缺乏尊重。最近十年也没干什么正经事。

他在德国其实仍然享受了不少优待,各方为他提供平台和发声机会,被拒的是少数。但他并没有真的用好这些,而是来吃喝嫖赌、骄奢淫逸了

——

艾未未说的德国人在内的外国人歧视、虚伪、冷漠、各种审查、双标,这个我倒确实都体会过。我自己也在推特以及各种评论中提到过。

只是我捏着鼻子也不愿意和艾未未站到一块。艾未未本身也是这种歧视、虚伪、冷漠、双标的人,对他帮助的人一样带有色眼镜审查

——

对艾未未的要求,本来就应该远比普通人严格。因为他是有钱有势的名人,当然需要格外的责任和自律。

如果是普通人,受不了镇压和流亡,服软自首、放弃反共,那倒是可以理解。

但艾未未不行。他作为权贵阶级本就有原罪和社会责任,又在早年通过批判中共赚了很多名利,现在放弃批判转而舔共,当然要被骂

——

艾未未回国舔中共之后,艾未未的朋友要么沉默,要么出来为其辩护。其中不乏很热情反共的。

所以说,私人情谊小圈子利益,还是大于普世价值、自由民主、人民疾苦的。圈子就是这么回事。

另外还有一些社达、支黑,一边骂中国老百姓、弱势抗争者,同时又因艾未未是红二代,不仅不批,还刻意去舔,对其各种辩护,更加无耻,都是垃圾

——

艾未未虽然是为汶川地震儿童、杨佳母亲、弱女邓玉娇等人发声过,但其实就是古代官员衙内、满清贝子那种,一方面自己享尽特权、骄横跋扈,一边看到社会上一些不平事冒出当侠客的想法,也想表现一下自己的能耐,所以出手相救,博得喝彩,抱得获救者和旁观者中的美人入怀,名利双收。

当然,客观上这确实是干了好事,但并不意味着是好人。干好事也未必是出于善良,而是作秀表演、耍弄特权、满足心欲

——

艾未未没艾青及其亲朋好友的关系、资源,确实只能大街上当二流子。也不敢随便给人耳光,没资格歧视别人,只有被歧视的份。

我骂人是不好听,但这些人及其朋友、同事、相关人,又是怎么对我的?

艾未未及其同党们,这些货色,占着资源浪费,靠着受精卵和运气得到的特权,人模狗样、耀武扬威。垃圾而已

我在德国经济拮据,很大程度是搞各种活动,开支非常大,印海报、奔波住宿、参与有付钱的讲座和影片放映,都需要花钱。这些花了好几万欧元了。而在住所吃饭穿衣,我节省到最少,相当于苦行僧。

艾未未则是拿着千倍资产,吃喝嫖赌、挥霍财富,且仍嫌不够,所以回国要让中共再拨下旗人俸禄,供其奢侈享乐

——

浦志强说,艾未未并不是想舔中共,是真心认为西方应该批评、中共治下的中国应该赞美。所以是真性情而非被收买。

艾未未确实不纯粹是被收买,而是他自己本来就有毛病,发言做事很随意,而不考虑给他人、社会重要事业、各种问题的负面影响。

换句话说,他真心赞美中共,那岂不是比被收买舔共更可怕?

——

艾未未这种人,属于是曾经靠拢过古代贵族、士人的德行,但只是皮毛,且半途而废。

古代中国士人、西方贵族,很多都是关心公共利益、已天下为己任,为大众献身。

艾未未做过一些公益,但本质上看不起老百姓,也缺乏真正责任心,做的各种事都是“玩一玩而已”。

而且逐渐他完全放弃了士人贵族该做的事,蜕变回普通红二代那种衙内式流氓

——

据我很偶然的了解,都发现多个与艾未未曾经合作的人,明确表达了对艾未未言行作风的反感,例如霸道、流氓气、不尊重别人。

他并没有把合作对象当成平等的人对待,他自己也没配得上别人给他的尊崇和特权待遇。

他到了外国得不到特权了,就不舒服了。就这么回事

u/Slow-Property5895 — 4 days ago

On the 100th Anniversary of Jiang Zemin’s Birth: Discussing His Ties to Hong Kong, His Impact on Hong Kong During His Time in Power, and a Comparison with Hong Kong Today

August 17, 2026 marks the 100th anniversary of Jiang Zemin’s birth. There have been official commemorations in China, as well as considerable discussion among the public. Jiang Zemin had a special connection with Hong Kong. He took part in the ceremony marking Hong Kong’s handover (transfer of sovereignty), visited Hong Kong, and was involved in the appointment of Chief Executive Tung Chee-hwa. His “criticism of a Hong Kong journalist” also became something of an iconic historical moment.

Compared with the Xi Jinping era, Jiang Zemin did relatively more to uphold “One Country, Two Systems” and respect Hong Kong people’s institutions and way of life. At that time, relations between mainland China and Hong Kong were still relatively good, and there was still hope for the future. Hong Kong today is no longer what it once was, and relations between mainland China and Hong Kong can no longer return to the way they were.

What views do Hong Kong people have of Jiang Zemin? Feel free to discuss them in the comments as well.

(The image is a collage of screenshots from multiple news reports and institutional websites.)

u/Slow-Property5895 — 4 days ago

Flying Tigers: Across Time and Borders—from Present-Day Assam to the WWII “Hump” Lifeline, China–India Conflicts Since 1962, and Distant Europe—Tracing History to Explore the Destinies and Connections of Different Peoples Today

In February 2026, at the 76th Berlin International Film Festival, the film Flying Tigers(飞虎队), produced by a filmmaking team composed of personnel from India, China, Germany, and several other countries, was screened. As someone who is relatively knowledgeable about and deeply interested in the history of China’s War of Resistance Against Japanese Aggression and the Flying Tigers, I watched the film and had brief conversations with members of the cast and crew. I therefore write this review, which I had intended to write immediately after viewing the film but postponed for several months due to various circumstances.

The “Flying Tigers” refers to the American Volunteer Group, active from 1941 to 1945 during the Second World War. Centered around American pilots but also including mixed Chinese-American crews, its primary mission was to cooperate with the armed forces of the Republic of China in combat against the Japanese Air Force and to transport strategic supplies to aid China. This unique and powerful force played a major and decisive role in helping China, whose air force was then extremely weak and urgently in need of foreign assistance, continue its resistance against aggression. In particular, it was crucial in contesting air superiority with Japan, defending against aerial bombardment, and supporting ground operations.

During the war, more than 2,000 American members of the Flying Tigers were killed in combat against Japanese forces. At the same time, even more Chinese people suffered brutal reprisals from the Japanese military because they had rescued Flying Tigers personnel and other American servicemen in Japanese-occupied areas. In Zhejiang (浙江) alone, approximately 200,000 Chinese civilians were brutally killed in 1942 as part of Japanese retaliation against Chinese citizens who had helped rescue American pilots involved in bombing missions against Japan. Rear-area wartime cities such as Chongqing (重庆), Kunming (昆明), and Chengdu (成都) also suffered large-scale bombardment and heavy casualties.

In addition, along the important and perilous Hump Route (驼峰航线), the Flying Tigers transported vast quantities of crucial military supplies across the Himalayas under extremely harsh natural conditions into southwestern China. During these operations, 594 aircraft crashed and more than 1,600 Chinese and American pilots and crew members lost their lives. The scale of this air transport operation was unprecedented, and the sacrifices it required remain unsurpassed to this day.

This magnificent and grand chapter of history fell into silence for more than twenty years after the Second World War due to Sino-American hostility and changes in China’s domestic political situation. Under the anti-American narrative of Mao-era China, the Flying Tigers were criticized as “accomplices of Chiang Kai-shek’s reactionary Kuomintang clique.” Not only were their achievements not praised, but they were actively stigmatized. Their commander, Claire Chennault (陈纳德), also became a target of attack. At the time, dictionaries and illustrated storybooks even referred to this hero with the derogatory nickname “Bandit Flyer Chennault.”

Chinese members of the Flying Tigers who remained in mainland China suffered severe persecution during that period. Zhou Xundian (周训典), a captain in the Air Force of the Republic of China who had served with the Flying Tigers, was abused during the Cultural Revolution (文化大革命) and ultimately took his own life. Another Chinese Flying Tigers officer, Wu Qiyao (吴其轺), was subjected to political struggle sessions and labor reform. Although he survived, he was later forced to make a living as a rickshaw driver operating a three-wheeled vehicle. Many other little-known Chinese members of the Flying Tigers endured hardship and died during those decades, while survivors often spent the rest of their lives in sorrow and obscurity. They had been elite aviators and military personnel who achieved great accomplishments, yet the latter halves of their lives were so tragic that it is deeply heartbreaking.

Only after the normalization of Sino-American relations and the beginning of Reform and Opening Up was the historical memory of the Flying Tigers revived. Memorial museums dedicated to their achievements were established in places such as Kunming and Chongqing, where the Flying Tigers had once been stationed and active. Figures associated with this history, including Anna Chennault (陈香梅), the widow of Claire Chennault, traveled frequently between China and the United States and devoted themselves to promoting and commemorating this history.

However, because of the earlier hostility and isolation between China and the United States, as well as the continuing instability of Sino-American relations since the 1970s, public remembrance and promotion of the Flying Tigers came too late and remained too limited. Even where commemorations existed, they were insufficient to match the Flying Tigers’ historical importance and their contributions to China’s resistance against Japan.

Many valuable historical artifacts and documents related to the Flying Tigers were destroyed during turbulent decades. Most participants and survivors have since passed away, and the loss of historical materials has left numerous gaps in the record. Because of China’s poverty and underdevelopment, surviving Flying Tigers members who had endured persecution during political movements did not receive the attention and treatment they deserved even after political oppression had ended. Only after China’s economic and social conditions improved significantly in the twenty-first century did they receive greater public attention and government assistance. But it was far too late.

In 2022, Chen Bingjing (陈炳靖), the last surviving Chinese member of the Flying Tigers, passed away in Hong Kong. In 2025, the 80th anniversary of China’s victory in the War of Resistance Against Japanese Aggression, very few people directly connected to the Flying Tigers or who had personally witnessed their deeds remained alive.

Against this backdrop, the film Flying Tigers, which premiered at the Berlin International Film Festival in 2026, carried special significance. Having heard stories about the Flying Tigers since childhood, I was especially interested in the film and watched it twice. Outside the screening venue, I also held signs and distributed Flying Tigers-related posters in the hope that more people would learn about their story and achievements, while also expressing support for the film.

Strictly speaking, the film does not focus exclusively on the historical deeds of the Flying Tigers more than eighty years ago. Rather, using both the Flying Tigers and the tiger as narrative threads, it connects the lives and destinies of people across China, India, Myanmar, the United States, Germany, and many other countries. Their experiences differ in many ways, yet they are united by complex memories and emotions that are both distinct and shared. Throughout the film, the images of the Flying Tigers and of tigers appear and disappear, sometimes prominent and sometimes subtle, weaving through the entire narrative.

The film begins with the Indian director Dutta, whose mother, suffering from Alzheimer’s disease, had spoken unusually often about tigers and expressed an unusual fear of them before her death. While exploring his mother’s unusual memories, Dutta learned that Assam, her homeland in northeastern India, had once been an important base for transporting American supplies to China during the Second World War.

Many Flying Tigers transport aircraft departed from there, carrying military supplies to southwestern China and supporting China’s war against Japanese aggression. The children who now dance freely and carefree in the forests of Assam know nothing of the wartime history once witnessed by the skies and land around them.

Northeastern India today is vastly different from what it was nearly eighty years ago at the time of Indian independence. With industrialization, the local environment and living conditions have changed. People’s lifestyles are different, and the habits and habitats of animals, including tigers, have changed as well. It was precisely because of these changes that a tiger—once an uncommon sight—entered the area around Dutta’s mother’s home and left a profound impression on her.

Although these changes are not as complete as the Chinese idiom “turning seas into mulberry fields” suggests, they have been faster and more intense. Moreover, they transcend administrative boundaries such as national and state borders. Mi You also witnessed similar environmental changes in Yunnan, China.

Like Dutta, Mi You learned through the memories of older family members about the story of the Flying Tigers and their connection to her homeland, and she continued to explore these links further. The Hump Route once passed directly over the skies of their home regions. Many Chinese and American pilots and crew members were involved in accidents there, and both their bodies and their aircraft were buried in forests and snowy mountains. Along with them, memories of this history were also buried and sealed away for many years.

As Mi You and Dutta gradually explored their families’ pasts, they also pieced together the memory puzzle of the Flying Tigers. In that world war more than eighty years ago, participants of different nationalities and countries affected by the conflict each retained only partial records and fragmented memories. Postwar historical developments further fragmented and confused those already scattered memories, causing people’s understanding of history in various countries to drift away from historical reality as circumstances changed.

During the Second World War, China, the United States, and India were anti-fascist allies fighting side by side. Yet after the war, both China–U.S. and China–India relations at times turned hostile, leading to armed confrontations and prolonged periods of tension. Those American soldiers who had fought alongside Chinese troops on the Asian battlefields of World War II could hardly have imagined that only five years later they would be locked in deadly combat with Chinese forces in Korea. The China–India border, which had once served as a vital lifeline and rear base for the Allied war effort, also became a frontline of confrontation between the world’s two most populous countries.

Under the shadow of the Cold War and behind the “Bamboo Curtain,” the story of the Flying Tigers gradually faded from public memory as national priorities shifted and historical recollections fragmented. Not only did young Chinese people who shouted slogans about “defeating American imperialism” know little about the Flying Tigers’ assistance to China, but most Americans born after the war were also unfamiliar with this history. Fortunately, decades later, some individuals—because of family ties, hometown connections to the Flying Tigers, national sentiment, or historical interest—set out in search of the Flying Tigers and related historical remains.

Mi You embarked on her own journey to trace the historical footprints of the Flying Tigers, traveling from Kunming toward the remains of the Burma Road (滇缅公路) near the border. During China’s War of Resistance Against Japanese Aggression, the Burma Road served as the “lifeline” of the rear areas and as a major artery of international aid. Precisely because of its importance, it was frequently subjected to Japanese air raids and ground attacks, and its long-term operation depended heavily on the protection of the Flying Tigers. Major towns along the Burma Road were also principal battlefields of the Chinese Expeditionary Force. More than 200,000 Chinese soldiers and civilians were killed or wounded there, while more than 100,000 Japanese troops were eliminated.

The once-glorious Burma Road has now become fragmented, with most traces of it disappearing. It was only after fellow travelers pointed it out that Mi You realized the National Highway 320 she was traveling on had once been part of the Burma Road. What had once been a route for transporting military supplies has now become a corridor for domestic passenger and freight traffic as well as international trade. People unfamiliar with the history neither know nor recognize the Burma Road when they encounter it. As for the Flying Tigers, who once fought enemy aircraft in the skies above, traces of their memory can now be found only in the streets and alleys of Kunming, the distant capital of Yunnan Province.

The revival of the narrative of the War of Resistance Against Japanese Aggression and the promotion of the Flying Tigers on mainland China only gradually expanded after the 1980s. It was not until the 2010s that substantial resources were truly invested in these efforts. By then, however, most of the people directly involved had already passed away and could no longer share their memories. Likewise, many artifacts and historical materials related to the Flying Tigers had been lost or damaged over time and through various political campaigns, leaving only a small number remaining.

The few Flying Tigers museums and the handful of businesses named after the Hump Route that exist today are undoubtedly precious. Yet they can no longer fully recreate that tragic and magnificent chapter of history, nor bring back the lives of the Chinese and American soldiers and civilians who have long since passed away. From the Chinese Civil War to the political upheavals that followed in China, countless lives and memories were cruelly erased. China today is wealthier and more open-minded than before, but the effort to remember this history has undeniably come too late.

When Mi You and her Chinese and international friends explore the history of the Flying Tigers, they find only cold documents rather than direct and emotionally rich testimonies from those who experienced the events firsthand. Only the artistic effect of bloodstain-like marks created by pressing against glass panels reminds viewers that those cold documents record precious lives sacrificed in the struggle against aggression and in defense of international justice.

On the other side of the border, in Assam in northeastern India, indigenous communities have likewise been affected by India’s political and social transformations and continue to struggle amid the currents of history. Northeastern India is not traditionally part of the historical core of India. Its ethnic groups, cultures, and interests differ significantly from those of the central, western, and southern regions that form the heartland of Indian civilization. The long-standing separatist movements and even armed insurgencies across the seven northeastern states, including Assam, reflect local dissatisfaction with India’s central authorities and dominant groups, as well as aspirations for greater autonomy or independence.

Many minority ethnic groups and indigenous peoples in northeastern India do not wish to see their ways of life forcibly altered, nor do they welcome large-scale migration from other parts of India. Yet they often find themselves powerless to resist. The powerful central government, influential bureaucrats, and wealthy commercial developers continue to transform the natural environment and social fabric of Assam and the broader northeastern region of India.

The film’s exploration of transnational connections extends far beyond the borderlands of China, India, and Myanmar. Using the China-Europe Railway Express as a narrative thread, it links China in Asia with Germany in Europe, and Chongqing in southwestern China with Duisburg in western Germany. Both Mi You, a Chinese woman, and Dutta, an Indian man, have settled in Germany for extended periods, and it is precisely this circumstance that brought them together.

Germany, too, possesses profound memories of the Second World War, ongoing reflections on war and human nature, and close ties with emerging powers such as China and India in the era of globalization. As an established industrial power and developed nation, Germany increasingly relies on economic and trade cooperation with China and India to revitalize its sluggish economy.

As Asians living in a predominantly white Germany, Dutta and Mi You possess unique perspectives as minorities and outsiders. They search for traces of their compatriots in Germany and build new connections between their adopted home and their countries of origin. Along the way, they also encounter and hear the distinctive stories of other people of Asian background living in Germany.

Historical legacies, circulating goods, and migrating people connect different countries and individuals, weaving scattered symbols into a complex symphony and assembling a diverse portrait of the global village. Yet this picture is not always harmonious. Conflict and peace intertwine, while turmoil and stability alternate. Extensive connections bring not only broad cooperation but also more numerous and larger-scale contradictions and conflicts.

Just as Mi You’s homeland China and Dutta’s homeland India were once friendly neighbors, they have also fought multiple wars and today maintain a relationship characterized by both competition and cooperation, though not always harmony. China and India have had border disputes since their founding and fought a border war in 1962. This was followed by the Doklam Standoff and the Galwan Valley Clash. History has not faded away; it continues through contemporary realities and extends into a future whose endpoint remains unseen.

The COVID-19 pandemic also affected China, India, and Germany. People were forced to change their daily lives, while work and trade were disrupted. Globalization accelerated the movement of people and goods, but it also enabled viruses to spread more rapidly and widely. In the film, people wear masks, undergo nucleic acid testing, and reduce their travel. As someone living in Eastern Europe at the time, I experienced the same reality. The interconnectedness and resonance of the world often reveal themselves most vividly and powerfully in times of disaster.

The wave of globalization once seemed to move humanity toward a truly borderless global village. In recent years, however, that wave has receded, while divisions and antagonisms have deepened. The increasingly strict border controls depicted in the film are a concrete manifestation of these barriers. Although China and Germany continue to expand trade, political and ideological differences, as well as strategic “decoupling,” are unfolding simultaneously. Relations between China and Germany, and between China and Europe more broadly, frequently remain tense. This condition of doing business together while simultaneously mistrusting and criticizing one another reflects the complexity and multidimensional nature of international relations and reminds us not to be overly optimistic about transnational cooperation.

Wars between nations, both historically and today, are the products of divisions and antagonisms pushed to extreme levels. Humanity has already endured two world wars with devastating consequences. In response, people after the Second World War reflected upon war and defended peace, ushering in an unprecedented era of peace and development. Yet today it appears that the realities of factionalism and exclusion have once again overshadowed the ideal of universal harmony.

The Russia–Ukraine War, the Israel–Palestine conflict, the Sudanese Civil War, and the humanitarian tragedies accompanying them reveal the darker side of human nature and the world. They also expose the limitations of modern civilization and the fragility of peace and prosperity. The global rise of populism and political extremism may lead to more local wars in more places and ultimately to another world war.

Yet amid the growing number of conflicts, many people continue to uphold communication and cooperation that transcend national and ethnic boundaries. Dutta and Mi You exemplify this spirit. During the filming of Flying Tigers , tensions between China and India flared repeatedly. Despite this, Dutta and Mi You continued working together to complete the film, sharing historical memories and friendship.

There is no fundamental antagonism or irreconcilable hatred between China and India. These two countries, each possessing a long and distinguished civilization, ought to coexist harmoniously. While border disputes, geopolitical rivalries, and competition as emerging great powers make lasting friendship difficult, it remains possible to manage conflicts and promote greater dialogue, understanding, and mutual respect. The collaboration between Dutta and Mi You serves as an example of grassroots friendship between Chinese and Indian people and contributes positively to relations between the two countries.

The cooperation between Dutta and Mi You also carries forward the spirit of transnational friendship and internationalism embodied by the wartime cooperation between China and the United States in building the Flying Tigers and resisting fascism together. Humanity’s pursuit of love and justice can transcend ethnic identities and national borders. People from different countries and communities can cooperate on the basis of shared positive values and work together for the well-being of all humanity.

More than eighty years ago, when the Chinese people fought desperately against brutal Japanese fascist aggression regardless of region, age, or background, and were exhausted by the struggle, many countries and international friends extended a helping hand. These included the Soviet Volunteer Air Group in China, the American Flying Tigers, the Canadian physician Norman Bethune, who represented international leftist solidarity, the Indian physician Dwarkanath Kotnis, and the Christian missionaries Minnie Vautrin and Frans Schraven. Foreign friends from around the world—whether acting officially or privately, as individuals or organizations—joined China’s resistance against Japan out of sympathy for the suffering of the Chinese people and hatred of Japanese fascist brutality. Many sacrificed their precious lives and remain buried in Chinese soil.

It was precisely the shared struggle and sacrifice of people from China and many other countries during the War of Resistance Against Japanese Aggression and the broader international anti-fascist war that made possible the most peaceful, prosperous, humane, and culturally flourishing era in human history after the Second World War. Billions of people have benefited from it, and countless more will continue to do so in the future. The Flying Tigers and many other cooperative teams and operations among the Allied powers also stand as examples of beneficial international cooperation and positive connections among diverse peoples.

For a very long time, the Flying Tigers’ great achievements, courage, and outstanding character did not receive the recognition and care they deserved. On the contrary, many Flying Tigers members in mainland China suffered various misfortunes. Chinese and American Flying Tigers members outside mainland China were likewise neglected and marginalized for decades. Their stories were not told and celebrated to the same extent as those of the American, Soviet, British, and French heroes who fought against Nazi Germany, and their achievements were not fully recognized.

Although Flying Tigers is not exclusively a film about the history and individuals of the Flying Tigers, their story remains the central thread running through the work, and roughly a quarter of the film focuses on their historical traces and surviving legacies. The film was created through collaboration among people from multiple countries and professional fields and was screened at the prestigious Berlin International Film Festival.

This helps make the history and story of the Flying Tigers known to a wider audience. It reminds people who have gradually forgotten the history of the Second World War and China’s War of Resistance Against Japanese Aggression to recall that difficult yet great era. It also encourages younger generations to explore history and learn about the courageous, admirable, and vividly human individuals who came before them. For many Chinese Flying Tigers veterans who suffered hardship after the war, the film serves as a belated but valuable tribute and consolation.

At the end of the film, animated images of parachute bundles, weapons, jeeps, and various supplies descending from the sky recreate the precious materials delivered to China via the Hump Route. The white parachutes scattered across the sky resemble blooming flowers, bringing hope for victory in China’s anti-aggression war. Many Chinese and American transport crew members likewise fell into the forests and snow-covered mountains along the China-India-Myanmar border during their dangerous missions, becoming one with the earth. If they could see the prosperity of China, the United States, and the world today, they would know that their blood was not shed in vain.

Eighty years have passed. Whether members of the Chinese and American Flying Tigers, the Chinese soldiers who fought alongside them, or the ordinary Chinese civilians who rescued and helped them, the overwhelming majority have passed away. Yet their spirit of sacrifice for justice and their contributions to peace and prosperity should not fade with time. People today continue to benefit from their legacy and draw inspiration from their example.

The glory of the Flying Tigers belongs not only to China and the United States. It is also international and universal, transcending the boundaries of nations and ethnic groups. It is not narrow or exclusive, but belongs to all humanity. The glorious history of the Flying Tigers and the careful remembrance maintained by later generations transcend the limits of time and space, remaining widely known and enduring into the future.

(The author of this article is Wang Qingmin(王庆民), a Chinese writer and international politics researcher living in Europe. The original text was written in Chinese.)

u/Slow-Property5895 — 4 days ago

Trump’s Impulsiveness and Israel’s Ambitions: The Intermittent, Long-Term War Against Iran — a “Bad Show That Drags On and On”

On August 1, U.S. President Donald Trump announced that he was canceling plans for a new round of military strikes against Iran. But this does not mark the arrival of peace. Rather, it is merely another pause—another temporary and superficial calm—in the pattern of the United States and Israel repeatedly attacking Iran and then stopping over the past two years.

Less than half a year ago, the United States and Israel launched intense airstrikes against Iran, killing a number of senior Iranian officials and military commanders, including Iran’s Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei. Yet after Iran retaliated, they halted the war, reached a peace agreement with Iran, and unfroze Iranian assets for use in Iran’s postwar reconstruction. Just when people thought that the United States and Iran were moving toward peace, the U.S. military once again attacked Iranian military facilities in July, and the peace agreement came to nothing. Looking further back to 2025, as well as to 2020 during Trump’s first term, the United States likewise bombed Iran and carried out “decapitation” strikes, but stopped short of launching a ground war. Yet these cessations of hostilities never brought lasting peace; they were merely truces before the next conflict.

Many people who know little about the Middle East and international affairs, or have only a superficial understanding of them, are deeply puzzled by this. Many do not understand why the United States and Israel bomb Iran one moment and suddenly stop the next; even after peace talks have taken place or agreements have been reached, fighting inexplicably breaks out again. People are also confused about the motives behind whether the United States and Israel choose to attack Iran or refrain from doing so, as there seems to be no reasonable explanation or discernible pattern.

In fact, the repeated starts and stops in U.S. and Israeli attacks on Iran can, in brief, be attributed to just two factors: Trump’s “do-as-he-pleases” political style, and Israel’s sinister intentions regarding Iran—intentions that it may be inconvenient to state openly but that are nonetheless plain to see.

As is well known, Trump has an extremely distinctive personality. His words and actions are often unexpected and unpredictable, and his major domestic and foreign policies are no exception. For example, in 2025 Trump imposed high tariffs on almost every country in the world, but the campaign began with great fanfare and then petered out without a clear conclusion. Trump was also once extremely tough on China, launching a major trade war and imposing sanctions on the country, but in 2026 he visited China with a rather friendly attitude, and U.S.-China relations substantially improved. On the Russia-Ukraine issue, Trump has likewise swung back and forth, at one point drawing closer to Putin and distancing himself from Zelenskyy, and at another sympathizing with Ukraine and criticizing Russia.

On Iran, Trump’s tendency to act according to his own whims has been even more apparent. At times, he has been extremely hostile toward Iran, bombing Iranian military and civilian facilities, killing Iranian leaders such as Khamenei and Soleimani, and even declaring that he would “destroy Iranian civilization.” Yet Trump has also been unwilling to become bogged down in a ground war or provoke a backlash from the military and the public. His attacks on Iran have therefore been limited to airstrikes, with no intention of deploying ground forces to overthrow the Iranian government and occupy the country in its entirety, while the airstrikes themselves have often ended abruptly.

After Iran blockaded the Strait of Hormuz and attacked Gulf countries and U.S. military bases, Trump even agreed to unfreeze seized Iranian funds and restore the Iran nuclear agreement that he himself had torn up. But after an agreement had already been reached, Trump once again attacked Iran, making the agreement seem like nothing more than a scrap of paper.

Trump’s repeated reversals do have some practical motivations. He often disregards international law and the international peace order and readily launches military strikes and sanctions, but when he encounters a “tough nut to crack,” he may choose to back down. Of course, Trump’s hard-line positions sometimes also serve utilitarian purposes, such as courting foreign-policy hawks and winning political support and votes. Yet the extent of his reversals and unconventional behavior often goes beyond calculations of interest. He simply acts as he pleases, determining his Iran policy according to his mood and subjective wishes, without caring about negotiations, agreements, humanitarian considerations, international law, or other such concerns. For the sake of a momentary impulse, even the interests and potential gains and losses of the United States, the Republican Party, and Trump himself may have to take a back seat.

Therefore, it is clearly impossible to predict or assess Trump’s attitudes and actions toward Iran using conventional methods and criteria, such as weighing the benefits and costs to the United States, considering whether treaties have been signed, or examining the prevailing direction of Middle Eastern and international affairs. Trump’s impulsiveness and unpredictability mean that the repeated starts and stops in attacks on Iran, the seemingly inexplicable outbreaks of fighting, and the sudden cessations of hostilities are all “normal.” This has been the case over the past several years, and Trump and the United States under his leadership will continue to pursue an equally uncertain policy toward Iran in the future, alternating between war and peace. Only when Trump is no longer president of the United States will it become possible once again to use conventional methods and criteria to assess U.S.-Iran relations.

Another important factor affecting the war with Iran is the role Israel plays in it and the objectives Israel seeks to achieve. Since the Iranian Revolution of 1979, when Islamic radicals came to power, Iran and Israel have become mortal enemies. Iran has repeatedly declared that it seeks to “destroy Israel” and has supported anti-Israel armed groups such as Hezbollah in Lebanon; Israel, meanwhile, has assassinated Iranian nuclear scientists, infiltrated and attacked Iran, and supported anti-Iranian forces. The two sides have engaged in constant overt and covert confrontation, with each seeking to completely destroy the other.

Although Israel possesses formidable military capabilities and a developed economy, Iran’s vast population and territory, as well as its considerable national strength, make it extremely difficult for Israel to destroy the Iranian government on its own. Dragging the United States “into the water”—getting the United States and Israel to jointly attack Iran and destroy Iran’s Islamic regime, or at least weaken Iran’s national strength to the greatest possible extent—has therefore become Israel’s preferred option and an objective it has sought by every possible means to achieve.
However, although Iran has been fiercely anti-American in its rhetoric, since the 1990s it has consistently exercised restraint in its actual diplomacy toward the West, including the United States, and the United States has not had sufficient grounds to launch military attacks against Iran or overthrow its government. After the Iranian nuclear issue emerged, the United States at one point considered attacking Iran, but the planned strikes were limited to nuclear facilities.

In 2015, the United States and Iran reached the Iran nuclear agreement, resolving the issue through peaceful means and sparing Iran from attack. Although Israel repeatedly urged the United States to launch a full-scale attack on Iran similar to the one against Iraq, the administrations of Clinton, Bush, and Obama all declined to follow Israel’s advice, maintaining a confrontational but peaceful relationship with Iran.

It was only when Trump came to power—strongly and one-sidedly inclined toward Israel on Middle Eastern affairs, hostile to and determined to dismantle Obama’s political legacy, and backed by Republican hawks who favored a hard line against Iran—that Israel finally found an American leader willing to attack Iran. Under persistent lobbying from Netanyahu and Israel’s diplomatic team in the United States, Trump and pro-Israel, anti-Iran hardliners within the upper ranks of the U.S. political and military establishment decided to launch military strikes against Iran, impose even harsher sanctions, and provide assistance and backing for Israeli attacks on Iran. It was precisely Israel’s urging that prompted Trump to strike Iran repeatedly, including attacks that killed such central Iranian figures as Khamenei and Soleimani.

For Israel, the principal objective of its strategy toward Iran is to overthrow Iran’s Islamic regime and replace it with people friendly toward Israel, such as the exiled Prince Pahlavi, who would then take control of Iran. If that objective proves difficult to achieve, the alternative is to inflict the greatest possible damage on the Iranian government and weaken Iran’s national strength as much as possible. Neither objective can be achieved without military strikes, particularly U.S. participation. Israel also opposes and actively seeks to undermine U.S.-Iran peace talks, preventing a U.S.-Iran reconciliation from frustrating Israel’s objectives. This is also one of the reasons why the United States and Iran have repeatedly held negotiations and reached understandings, only for fighting to unexpectedly erupt again.

Whether it is joint U.S.-Israeli bombing that killed Khamenei and numerous senior Iranian military and political officials, or the reduction of numerous Iranian military and civilian targets to ruins, combined with economic sanctions that have caused Iran’s economy to collapse and internal turmoil to intensify, leaving it unable to support Hezbollah, the Houthis, and other armed groups, all of these developments are welcomed by Israel. Israel hopes to join forces with the United States in carrying out long-term military strikes against Iran, plunging Iran into poverty and violence and leaving it beset by crises at home and abroad, so that it will no longer be capable of challenging or threatening Israel.

It is precisely the combination of Trump’s impulsive disposition, his enthusiasm for power politics, violence, and military adventurism, and his unwillingness to be constrained by international law and other norms, together with Israel’s intense hostility toward Iran and its efforts to exploit and urge on the United States, that has produced the irregular cycle in which the United States repeatedly bombs Iran, wars sometimes end abruptly, and peace is sometimes shattered just as suddenly.

And while such a state of affairs may help Israel achieve its goal of weakening Iran, it is detrimental to Iran and its people, to peace in the Middle East, and to the long-term interests of the United States. This intermittent yet ongoing U.S.-Israeli war against Iran, together with Iran’s retaliatory strikes, has already caused numerous casualties, including large numbers of Iranian civilians. Some U.S. troops have also been killed or wounded by Iranian missile strikes. U.S. and Israeli attacks have not brought freedom, democracy, or human rights to Iran. Instead, the Iranian people are suffering in hellish conditions under the combined blows of domestic authoritarianism and corruption, relentless external bombardment, and sanctions.

Meanwhile, countries across the Middle East are also living with the difficulty of achieving peace and stability and the fear of being engulfed by war. Repeated rounds of conflict and heightened tensions have also disrupted Middle Eastern oil routes, harming both oil-exporting and oil-importing countries and dragging down the global economy. Even for Israel, although these actions may achieve strategic objectives in the short and medium term, they are not a reliable way to achieve and safeguard Israel’s lasting peace and long-term interests.

Therefore, the intermittent and seemingly endless U.S. attacks on Iran over the past two years, and the repeated cycle of fighting and stopping between the United States and Israel on one side and Iran on the other, can aptly be described as “a bad show that drags on and on.” It benefits neither the United States nor Iran, nor any of the other countries involved. Nor is there any justification—in terms of human sentiment, reason, or law (international law)—for continuing the war, which merely causes more casualties and losses. What is most needed is to bring the war to a complete and irreversible end as soon as possible, conclude a reliable treaty that takes into account the interests of all parties, and achieve lasting peace.

In reality, however, neither Trump, who leads the United States, nor Netanyahu, who dominates Israeli politics, will choose the path of lasting peace. Trump not only disregards peace and agreements and launches foreign wars at his own whim, but also has motives for attacking Iran in order to divert attention from domestic conflicts, win support from hardliners, and strike at the Democratic Party. Over the next two years, Trump is not only unlikely to move toward peace, but may even open new fronts in places such as Cuba, using foreign wars to perpetuate his hold on power.

Netanyahu, meanwhile, also seeks to use war and attacks on Iran to further cultivate his “strongman” image and accumulate achievements in foreign conflicts, thereby winning public support and diverting attention while evading corruption allegations and accountability. The mortal-enemy relationship between Israel and Iran, the strength of Israeli hardliners, and Israel’s influence over the United States all contribute to the continuation of joint U.S.-Israeli military strikes and sanctions against Iran. Peace among the United States, Israel, and Iran—and throughout the Middle East as a whole—therefore remains a distant prospect.

(This article is written by Wang Qingmin(王庆民), a Chinese writer based in Europe and a researcher of international politics.)

reddit.com
u/Slow-Property5895 — 4 days ago
▲ 23 r/Mogong

중국인들이 한국의 광복절(光復節)을 축하합니다

저는 중국인입니다. 매년 8월 15일 한국의 광복절은 중국이 항일전쟁에서 승리한 날이기도 합니다. 중화민국 정부는 과거 한국의 독립운동을 적극적으로 지원했고, 한국광복군을 지원했으며, 이승만·김구 선생과 협력하여 한국의 독립운동가들이 중국의 상하이, 난징, 충칭에서 대한민국 임시정부를 수립하고 활동하는 것을 도왔습니다. 제2차 세계대전 당시 중국인들도 한국인들과 마찬가지로 수많은 노동자와 일본군 ‘위안부’ 피해자들이 일본에 의해 강제로 동원되어 노예와 같은 삶을 강요당하고 목숨을 잃었습니다.

이후 중국공산당이 중화인민공화국을 수립하고 북한과 협력하여 한국 및 미국과 대립하면서 많은 불행한 일들이 벌어졌습니다. 그러나 일본의 침략에 맞서 싸우고 일본 제국주의에 반대했다는 점에서 중국인과 한국인은 같은 입장이었습니다.

중국과 한국은 역사적으로 비슷한 경험을 적지 않게 가지고 있습니다. 두 나라 모두 외세의 침략을 겪었고, 참혹한 내전을 겪었으며, 냉전의 대립에도 휘말렸습니다. 명나라 시기의 왜구와 만주 세력에 맞선 항쟁에서부터 근현대의 민족독립운동에 이르기까지, 한족과 한민족은 영광과 고난의 역사를 함께해 왔습니다. 1980년 한국에서 광주민주화운동이 일어난 뒤, 중국에서도 1989년 베이징 민주화운동과 6·4 진압이 일어났습니다. 중국인들 역시 자유와 민주주의를 갈망하고 있습니다.

이 자리에서 한국의 광복절을 축하드립니다. 한국이 앞으로도 독립과 번영, 강한 국력을 지켜 나가기를 바라며, 미래에는 중국도 민주화를 이루어 두 나라가 함께 아시아의 번영과 세계 평화를 떠받치는 기둥이 되기를 바랍니다.

u/Slow-Property5895 — 5 days ago
▲ 272 r/ChunghwaMinkuo+1 crossposts

Chinese People Celebrate Korea’s Liberation Day/광복절(光復節)

I am Chinese. Every year, August 15, Korea’s Liberation Day, is also the day on which China achieved victory in the War of Resistance Against Japanese Aggression. The government of the Republic of China actively supported the Korean independence movement and the Korean Liberation Army, and cooperated with Syngman Rhee and Mr. Kim Gu, assisting Korean independence activists in establishing the Provisional Government of the Republic of Korea in Shanghai, Nanjing, and Chongqing, China. During World War II, like Koreans, large numbers of Chinese people were forcibly conscripted by Japan as laborers or “comfort women,” subjected to enslavement, and killed.

Although the Chinese Communist Party later established the People’s Republic of China and cooperated with North Korea in confronting South Korea and the United States, resulting in many unfortunate events, the Chinese and Korean peoples stood together in resisting Japanese aggression and opposing Japanese imperialism.

China and Korea share a number of historical similarities. Both suffered invasions by foreign powers, and both experienced brutal civil wars. The Chinese people also yearn for freedom and democracy.

I hereby extend my congratulations to Korea on its Liberation Day. I hope that Korea will remain independent, prosperous, and strong, and that China will also achieve democracy in the future, so that together our two countries can become pillars of prosperity in Asia and peace in the world.

u/AmericanBornWuhaner — 5 days ago
▲ 23 r/Mogong

한국의 1980년 광주민주화운동 45주년과 중국의 1989년 민주화운동 36주년: 역사와 기억이 비추는 거울

(원문은 중국어이며, GPT를 사용해 한국어로 번역했습니다. GPT에는 가능한 한 존댓말로 번역해 달라고 요청했습니다.)

2025월 18일은 한국의 광주민주화운동 45주년 기념일이었습니다. 광주를 비롯한 한국 여러 지역에서 기념행사가 열렸습니다. 연합뉴스 보도에 따르면, 올해 기념식의 주제는 “오월, 함께 쓰는 이야기”였으며, 5·18 민주화운동 유공자와 유가족 대표, 정부 관계자, 각계 대표와 학생 등 2,500여 명이 참석해 민주항쟁 과정에서 희생된 분들을 함께 추모했습니다. 올해 대통령선거에 출마한 더불어민주당 이재명 후보, 개혁신당 이준석 후보, 민주노동당 전영국 후보도 행사에 참석했습니다.

  한국 사회 각계가 광주사건을 공개적이고 공식적으로 기념해 온 것은 이미 30년이 넘었습니다. 특히 1997년 한국 정부가 매년 5월 18일을 법정기념일로 지정한 이후, 정부도 매년 성명을 발표해 희생자들을 추모하고 있으며 대통령도 자주 직접 기념행사에 참석해 연설합니다. 민간 차원의 다양한 추모행사는 헤아리기 어려울 정도로 많고, 해외에 거주하는 한국 교민들도 기념행사를 조직합니다. 필자 역시 2024년 독일에 거주하는 한국 교민들이 주최한 광주민주화운동 44주년 기념행사에 참가한 적이 있으며, 당시 한국 사회 각계가 중국의 민주화를 지지해 주기를 바라는 내용의 편지와 전단을 배포했습니다.

  ‘광주민주화운동’은 1980년 5월 광주시민들이 파업, 수업 거부, 시위와 행진 등의 방식으로 전두환을 중심으로 한 군인들의 쿠데타에 저항하고, 전두환 정권의 계엄과 시민의 권리·자유 박탈에 반대한 사건을 가리킵니다. 항의가 시작된 뒤 전두환 정권은 군대를 동원해 광주시민들을 진압했고, 그 과정에서 대규모 사상자가 발생했습니다.

  사건의 배경은 다음과 같습니다. 1979년, 18년 동안 집권해 온 독재 대통령 박정희가 중앙정보부장 김재규에게 연회 자리에서 피살되면서 한국에는 권력 공백이 생겼습니다. 이는 원래 권위주의 체제에서 민주주의 체제로 전환할 수 있는 기회였습니다. 당시 일반 국민과 박정희 정권의 일부 전직 각료, 일부 군인들까지 민주주의를 지향하고 있었습니다. 그러나 전두환을 중심으로 한 한국군 일부 고위 장교들은 민주주의를 열망하는 한국 국민의 감정과 요구를 무시한 채 ‘12·12 군사반란’을 일으켜 민주화를 지향하던 육군참모총장 정승화를 체포하고, 문민정부의 각료들을 사실상 연금했으며, 전두환을 비롯한 군인들이 정권을 장악해 박정희의 권위주의 정책을 이어갔습니다. 전두환 정권은 언론·출판의 자유와 결사·집회의 자유를 금지하고 노동운동과 학생운동을 탄압했습니다.

  이는 한국의 학생, 노동자, 지식인 등 많은 국민의 불만을 불러일으켰습니다. 그러나 전두환이 군경을 동원해 탄압하자 대부분의 사람들은 굴복을 선택했습니다. 그 가운데 근현대사 이래 개혁적 분위기를 선도하고 권력에 맞서기를 두려워하지 않았던 전라남도 지역의 광주에서만 대규모 저항이 폭발했습니다. 광주의 학생들, 그중에서도 많은 대학생과 일부 중학생, 그리고 노동자와 시민들은 자위조직을 구성하고 대학을 거점으로 삼아 광주 시내에 방어선을 구축하며 군경과 대치했습니다.

  1980년 5월 18일, 전두환 정권의 군대는 전남대학교 등 대학을 공격하고 곤봉과 최루탄으로 학생과 시민을 폭행하며 진압을 시작했습니다. 시민들이 저항하자 군인들은 총격을 가했고 장갑차까지 동원해 진격했습니다. 18일부터 28일까지 광주 시내와 외곽에서 군대와 저항하는 시민·학생·노동자 사이에 격렬한 충돌이 벌어졌고, 군경은 비무장 시민뿐 아니라 여성과 어린이에게도 총을 쐈습니다. 28일까지 진압이 완료되면서 수백 명이 사망하거나 실종되었습니다. 구체적인 사망자 수는 150명에서 400명 사이로 논란이 있으며, 3,000명 이상이 부상을 입고 수천 명이 체포되어 고문을 당했습니다.

  전두환이 집권한 1980년부터 1986년까지 광주사건은 은폐되었고, 관련 보도와 추모는 금지되었으며 피해자들은 억울함을 호소할 곳조차 없었습니다. 1987년, 대학생이자 학생운동 지도자였던 박종철이 정부 폭력기관의 고문으로 사망하자 한국 곳곳에서 대규모 항의시위가 일어났고 전두환의 퇴진을 요구했습니다. 전두환은 결국 권력을 내놓고 민주화를 수용해야 했으며 스스로 정계에서 물러났습니다.

  1987년 대선에서 대통령에 당선된 노태우는 민주적 선거를 통해 선출되었지만, 그 자신이 바로 ‘12·12 군사반란’에 가담했던 전두환의 동료였습니다. 반면 세 명의 민주화 인사들은 각각 출마해 표가 분산되는 바람에 선거에서 패배했습니다. 노태우는 여론의 압력 속에서 전두환을 연금하고 광주사건을 재조사하겠다고 발표했지만, 실제로는 조사와 개혁을 계속 지연시켰습니다. 당시 광주사건 추모는 주로 야당과 민간 인사들이 주도했고, 정부는 소극적으로 대응하면서 사건을 평가할 때에도 애매한 표현을 사용했습니다.

  1993년 민주화운동 출신 지도자 김영삼이 대통령에 취임한 뒤에야 광주사건에 대한 조사, 명예회복, 보상이 전면적으로 추진되기 시작했습니다. 김영삼은 전두환의 광주시민 항쟁 진압을 ‘내란’으로 규정했습니다. 그러나 이후에도 전두환과 노태우 등 과거 군사정권 세력이 여전히 강력했고, 이들이 속한 보수 진영은 광주사건의 명예회복과 책임 추궁을 여러 차례 방해했습니다. 광주사건 조사와 책임자 처벌 문제는 한때 사실상 보류되기도 했습니다. 이후 시민사회가 조직적으로 집회와 항의를 이어가면서 여론이 거세지자, 김영삼 정부는 민심을 바탕으로 사법 절차를 추진해 전두환과 노태우를 체포하고 두 사람에게 유죄와 징역형을 선고했습니다. 전두환은 처음에는 사형을 선고받았으나 이후 무기징역으로 감형되었고 1997년 사면되었습니다. 광주사건도 공식적으로 명예가 회복되었고, 법원은 시민들을 민주주의를 수호하기 위해 폭력적 권력에 맞선 저항자들로, 군사정권을 불법적인 진압 주체로 인정했습니다.

  1997년 김대중이 대통령에 당선된 뒤에는 광주사건 추모가 한국 정부와 민간 모두의 진정한 사회적 합의로 자리 잡았습니다. 그해 한국 정부는 매년 5월 18일을 ‘5·18 민주화운동 기념일’로 지정했고, 정부와 민간 모두 대규모 기념행사를 열어 민주주의와 인권의 소중함, 광주 시민들의 용감한 항쟁과 고난을 알렸습니다. 1999년에는 광주사건 피해자들이 ‘국가유공자’로 인정되었고, 점차 경제적 보상과 기타 지원도 받게 되었습니다. 5·18민주화운동 관련 기념관 등 추모시설도 잇따라 세워졌습니다.

  그 이후 전두환·노태우와 같은 보수 진영에 속했던 대통령들, 예를 들어 이명박·박근혜·윤석열 등도 기념일이나 다른 계기에 광주사건과 희생자들을 추모하며 자유민주주의의 소중함을 강조했습니다. 진압에 직접 가담했던 극소수 과거 군사정권 인사들이 추모를 거부하고 심지어 여전히 광주사건을 ‘폭동’이라고 부르는 경우를 제외하면, 당시 군사정권의 탄압과 독재를 비판하고, 이에 맞서 저항한 광주시민을 인정하고 평가하는 것은 이미 한국 주류사회와 좌·중·우 각 정치세력, 그리고 대다수 한국 국민의 공통된 인식이 되었습니다.
  광주사건이 발생한 이후 한국 국민은 이를 한 번도 잊지 않았습니다. 광주의 비극과 군사정권 시대 전체를 다루고 성찰하는 문학·예술 작품은 셀 수 없이 많습니다. 군사정권의 범죄자들에게 책임을 묻는 일도 한 번도 중단되지 않았습니다.

  특히 문화예술계는 광주를 기억하고 독재의 폭력을 비판하는 선봉 역할을 해 왔습니다. 《화려한 휴가》, 《박하사탕》, 《택시운전사》, 《포크레인》, 《26년》, 《거짓말》…… 모두 광주사건을 직접 묘사하거나 이를 둘러싼 이야기를 다룬 뛰어난 영화들입니다. 이러한 작품들은 한국 국민들로 하여금 그 비극적이면서도 장엄했던 역사를 반복해서 떠올리게 하고, 광주사건 당시 서로 다른 위치에 있던 집단들의 행동과 심리, 그 이후의 삶을 분석하고 보여줍니다. 이를 통해 영화를 보는 한국인들은 그 역사 속에 스스로를 놓아 보면서 옳고 그름, 선과 악을 생각하고, 깊은 성찰 속에서 정신적으로 새롭게 태어나게 됩니다.

  필자가 가장 깊이 있게 느낀 작품은 광주사건의 여러 당사자들을 모티프로 삼은 한국 영화 《포크레인》입니다. 이 영화는 광주 진압에 참여했던 군인 김강일이 제대한 뒤 굴착기 기사로 일하다 우연히 광주사건 희생자의 유골을 발견하고, 그때부터 역사적 진실을 찾아 나서는 이야기를 그립니다. 김강일은 옛 전우와 상관들을 찾아가고, 그들이 술에 빠져 살아가거나 폭력적인 업종에 종사하거나, 겉으로는 화목한 가정을 꾸린 듯 보이지만 내면에서는 억압과 소모에 시달리거나, 출가했으나 마음의 평안을 얻지 못한 모습을 보게 됩니다. 과거 광주시민을 진압하고 살해하는 데 참여했던 군인들 역시 고통에 시달리는 피해자였으며, 광주의 비극은 그들 자신은 물론 가족의 운명까지 바꾸어 놓았습니다.

  그러나 모든 당사자가 피해자이거나 참회한 것은 아닙니다. 진압에 참여했던 어떤 장교는 계속 승진해 출세하고 명예를 얻었으며, 책까지 출간해 광주 진압을 미화하면서 자신은 애국자였고 시민들은 폭도였다고 주장했습니다. 어떤 군인은 국회의원이 되어 국민 복지를 입에 달고 살면서도 광주의 비극을 갖가지 방식으로 미화했고, 자신이 살인에 가담한 것 역시 당시의 시대 상황 때문이었으므로 자신에게는 책임이 없다고 여겼습니다. 광주사건의 최고 책임자이자 당시 최고지도자였던 인물, 즉 전두환을 암시하는 인물은 각종 경호 속에서 사저에서 편안한 노년을 보내며 광주 희생자들에게 단 한 번도 사과하지 않았습니다. 이미 죽은 시민과 학생, 군인들은 영원히 잠들었습니다. 살아남은 사람들 역시 고통스럽고 뒤틀린 삶을 살아갑니다.

  또 다른 영화 《박하사탕》은 사랑에 빠져 있던 한 학생이 군에 징집되어 광주사건 진압에 참여하고, 우발적으로 한 여학생을 총으로 쏴 죽인 뒤 타락해 결국 자살에 이르는 이야기를 다룹니다. 순수하고 결백했던 하나의 영혼이 한 걸음씩 파괴되는 과정은 깊은 탄식을 자아냅니다. 한국 드라마 《제5공화국》은 전두환 시기 한국 정치의 내부를 파노라마처럼 묘사했고, 광주사건도 중요한 부분으로 다뤘습니다. 중국에서도 상당한 관심을 받고 널리 알려진 이 한국 드라마를 통해 더 많은 중국인들이 한국의 그 시기가 중국 역사와 상당히 유사하다는 사실을 알게 되었습니다. 《택시운전사》 등 다른 영화들도 각기 다른 관점과 특별한 감정을 통해 광주사건을 기록하고 있지만, 여기에서는 더 길게 다루지 않겠습니다.

  이러한 영화와 이야기들은 적어도 일부 한국인들에게 깊은 사고와 깨달음을 주고, 권위주의적 폭력의 잔혹함과 인권·인도주의의 소중함을 깨닫게 하며, 자유민주주의를 더욱 소중히 여기고 인권을 확대하기 위해 노력하도록 만듭니다.

  반면 한국의 광주사건과 매우 유사한 1989년 중국의 6·4 사건, 즉 톈안먼 학살에 대한 중국인들의 기억은 은폐되고 훼손되며 모호하게 만들어져 왔습니다. 우선 중국 정부는 오랫동안 1989년 민주화운동을 ‘반혁명 폭란’으로 규정해 왔습니다. 비교적 완곡하게 표현할 때조차 ‘정치적 풍파’라고 부르며 인민해방군의 진압 필요성을 긍정하고, 당시 중국의 학생·노동자·시민이 제기한 민주화 요구의 정당성을 부정했습니다.

  6·4 사건은 중국에서 줄곧 정치적 금기였습니다. 정부가 극히 드물게 언급하면서 진압을 정당화하고 항쟁 참가자들을 부정적으로 평가하는 경우를 제외하면, 대부분의 경우 어떤 방식으로든 이를 언급하는 것 자체가 허용되지 않습니다. 중국 인터넷에서 6·4 사건은 관련 게시물이 가장 쉽게, 그리고 가장 빠르게 삭제되고 심지어 해당 발언을 한 계정까지 차단될 수 있는 민감한 주제입니다. 현실 세계, 즉 오프라인의 중국 본토에서는 공개적인 추모가 전혀 이루어지지 않으며, 반체제 인사들은 이런 특별한 날이면 ‘안정 유지’ 조치를 받습니다.

  해외 여러 지역에서는 매년 일부 6·4 추모행사가 열리지만, 전체 참가자는 감소하는 추세입니다. 중국 교민이 수만 명에 이르는 나라에서도 추모행사에 참가하는 사람이 한 자릿수에 그치는 경우가 있으며, 이러한 추모활동은 중국 본토에 거의 영향을 미치지 못합니다. 한때 세계 최대 규모의 6·4 추모행사였던 홍콩 빅토리아공원의 6·4 촛불집회도 범죄인 인도법 반대운동과 홍콩 정부의 탄압 이후 2020년 마지막 행사를 끝으로 중단되었습니다. 현재 홍콩과 중국 본토의 상황을 고려하면, 중국이 민주화되기 전에는 홍콩 빅토리아공원에서 과거와 같은 대규모 추모행사가 다시 열릴 가능성은 없습니다.

  중국에서는 완전한 금기 속에서 6·4 사건을 공개적으로 논의하거나 성찰할 공간이 전혀 없습니다. 당시의 희생자들은 이미 세상을 떠났지만 아직도 명예를 회복하지 못했습니다. 생존자 가운데 일부는 해외로 망명해 평생 귀국하지 못하고, 일부는 사회의 밑바닥으로 밀려나 극심한 빈곤 속에 살고 있으며, 일부는 정신적으로 무너져 자신이나 타인을 해치는 일까지 겪었습니다. 반면 당시 진압에 가담했던 사람들의 심경을 모두 알 수는 없지만, 일부는 참회했을 수도 있으나 더 많은 사람들은 깊이 뉘우치지 않았고 오히려 승진과 부를 누리며 출세했습니다. 주요 책임자 가운데 한 사람이었던 리펑은 천수를 누렸고, 그의 자녀들은 더욱 막강한 권력과 지위를 누렸습니다.

  대중 역시 6·4 사건이 있었다는 사실 자체는 어느 정도 알고 있지만, 대체로 침묵하고 있으며 정권의 규정과 선택, 선전에 따라 6·4와 각 참여자들을 바라봅니다. 6·4 이후 중국 경제가 지속적으로 성장하면서 많은 중국인들은 6·4를 더 이상 비판하지 않을 뿐 아니라 오히려 ‘진압을 잘했다’고 생각하고, 중국공산당의 진압이 중국을 더욱 안정되고 조화롭게 만들었으며 경제발전과 민생 개선에 도움이 되었다고 여기기도 합니다.

  이와 대비해 박정희에서 전두환으로 이어지는 시기, 즉 1960년대부터 1980년대까지 한국 경제 역시 고속 성장했습니다. 박정희는 ‘한강의 기적’을 만들었고, 전두환은 박정희의 경제정책을 계승해 한국 경제의 고도성장을 이어갔으며 한국이 선진국 대열에 들어서는 것을 추진했습니다. 당시 한국의 경제성장률은 중국보다 높았고 국민도 더 부유했습니다. 그러나 한국 국민은 박정희와 전두환의 경제적 성과 때문에 이들의 독재와 권위주의를 인정하거나 크게 칭송하지 않았고, ‘사회가 혼란스러워질까 두렵다’는 이유로 민주주의를 포기하지도 않았습니다. 한국 국민은 자유민주주의가 인간에게 본래 주어진 권리이며, 국민이 민주적 권리를 갖는 것이 인권과 존엄의 기초이고, 경제성과와 물질적 이익으로 이를 대신할 수 없다는 점을 이해하고 있었기 때문입니다. 또한 민주주의가 있어야 분배의 공정성을 촉진하고 부패를 억제하며 발전의 성과를 국민 모두가 공유할 수 있습니다. 많은 중국인들이 이러한 점을 이해하지 못하는 것은 권위주의적 억압과 우민화 교육, 세뇌 속에서 기본적인 권리와 존엄에 대한 의식을 상실하고 돈과 물질만을 탐하는 살아 있는 시체처럼 변했기 때문이기도 합니다.

  6·4가 명예회복되지 않고, 심지어 1989년 민주화운동을 ‘반혁명 폭란’으로 부르는 상황에서는 중국인들도 정상적인 감정과 옳고 그름에 대한 판단을 갖기 어렵습니다. 자유민주주의에 대한 적대감이든, 인도주의에 대한 경멸이든 모두 ‘6·4 후유증’의 반영입니다. 반혁명분자 숙청, 반우파운동, 문화대혁명을 잊어버린 것과 마찬가지로, 반성하지 않는 민족은 반드시 같은 잘못을 반복하게 됩니다. 2022년부터 2024년까지 중국공산당이 코로나19 방역 과정에서 벌인 각종 반인권적·반과학적 비극, 특히 ‘백위병’, 즉 방호복을 입은 방역요원들의 거칠고 폭력적인 행동은 문화대혁명의 어떤 재현이라고 할 수 있습니다. ‘단결해서 앞만 보고 나아가자’며 과거의 비극을 비판하고 성찰하지 않는다면 새로운 재난이 발생하는 것은 거의 필연적입니다.

  한국이 광주사건의 명예를 회복하고 피해자들의 이름과 명예를 바로잡고 보상했으며, 책임을 추궁하고 수십 년 동안 성대하게 추모해 온 것과 비교하면 중국인들은 부끄러움을 느끼고 크게 각성해야 합니다. 물론 앞서 말했듯이 한국에서도 광주사건의 명예회복 과정은 순탄하지 않았고 많은 우여곡절이 있었습니다. 여러 저항과 방해가 진실이 드러나고 정의가 실현되는 것을 가로막았습니다. 특히 전두환의 권위주의 통치 시기에는 광주사건 역시 억압되고 망각되었습니다.

  그럼에도 결국 한국이 민주화를 이루고 광주의 진실이 밝혀질 수 있었던 것은 한국 사회 각계 인사들이 여러 위험을 무릅쓰면서까지 끊임없이 노력하고 저항했기 때문입니다. 저항이 없었다면 한국의 민주화도 없었을 것이고, 오늘날 광주시민들을 용감한 항거자로 기리는 현실도 없었을 것입니다. 45년이 지난 지금까지도 한국 국민은 광주민주화운동의 역사와 당사자들에 대한 기억을 시간의 흐름 속에서 잃지 않고, 여전히 엄숙하고 진지하게 기억하고 추모하고 있습니다.

  2024년 한국 대통령 윤석열이 쿠데타를 시도하며 계엄을 선포하고 군대를 보내 국회를 봉쇄하고 야당 인사들을 체포하려 했으며, 한 정당과 한 정치세력이 권력을 독점하고 자신의 개인독재까지 가능한 체제를 만들려 했지만, 한국 시민과 서울 시민, 야당 인사들이 함께 이를 막아 한국의 민주주의를 지켜냈습니다. 한국 국민이 이처럼 용감하게 민주주의를 수호할 수 있었던 데에는 광주사건에 대한 기억과 성찰, 그리고 광주에서 용감하게 싸웠던 선배 세대에 대한 존경이 중요한 배경으로 작용했습니다. 이러한 기억은 오늘날 한국인들에게 민주주의를 지켜야 한다는 의지와 결심, 용기를 다시 불러일으켰습니다.

  미래의 중국도 반드시 민주화를 이루고 6·4도 반드시 명예를 회복하며 희생자들 역시 위로받게 될 것입니다. 그러나 이러한 일들은 단순히 기다린다고 이루어지는 것이 아닙니다. 이는 모든 중국인의 책임이며, 중국인과 국제사회의 친구들이 함께 적극적으로 추진하고 실현해야 합니다. 이를 위해서는 중국인들이 적극적으로 노력해야 할 뿐 아니라 다른 나라 국민들도 더 큰 정의감과 행동력을 보여야 하며, 양측의 긴밀한 협력도 필요합니다.

  2023년 한국의 ‘5·18기념재단’은 6·4를 기억하는 활동에 힘써 온 홍콩의 ‘홍콩시민지원애국민주운동연합회(支聯會)’ 상무위원이자 현재 수감 중인 중국 민주화운동가 초우항퉁(鄒幸彤)에게 ‘광주인권상’을 수여했습니다. 이는 중국과 유사한 역사를 경험한 한국 국민이 중국 인권에 관심을 갖고 있다는 점, 그리고 중국인들과 세계 각국의 민주주의를 사랑하는 사람들이 협력해 중국의 민주화를 이루어 갈 수 있다는 희망을 보여주는 사례입니다.

  광주의 5·18 사건과 중국의 6·4 사건은 기념일이 불과 20일도 차이 나지 않습니다. 두 항쟁과 인권 비극의 기념일 사이에 이 글을 써 두 사건을 함께 기억하고, 다시 한 번 상기와 호소를 전하고자 합니다. 중국에 민주주의가 하루빨리 찾아오고, 희생된 영령들이 편히 잠들 수 있기를 바랍니다.

(이 글의 원문은 중국어이며, 저자 왕칭민(王庆民)은 유럽에 거주하는 중국인 작가입니다.)

u/Slow-Property5895 — 5 days ago
▲ 185 r/HongKong

A Memoir of a Marginalized Mainland Chinese Person’s Experiences in Hong Kong: Traveling Around, Visiting Various Individuals and Organizations, Participating in Commemorative Activities, Enduring Hardships, and Losing My Freedom

This is a memoir of the unforgettable month I spent in Hong Kong in 2018. In particular, I wrote in detail about my experiences visiting Hong Kong political parties and media organizations, participating in human rights activities including the June 4th commemoration, being detained at Western Police Station, and being confined in a locked psychiatric ward at Pamela Youde Nethersole Eastern Hospital.

I wrote in the greatest detail about my experiences in the locked psychiatric ward at Pamela Youde Nethersole Eastern Hospital. I hope to help people in Hong Kong, mainland China, and around the world understand the circumstances faced by certain marginalized people, as well as some of the hidden realities inside psychiatric hospitals.

Because the memoir is very long—460,000 Chinese characters—and translating it into English requires even more space, I can only post the table of contents here. The link is in the comments section.If you find the full text too long, you can still get a general idea of my experiences from the table of contents.

I believe that what I have written still has some social value and relevance to the public. For me, writing and sharing it is a way of expressing my emotions and making my voice heard; for the public, perhaps it can also offer a glimpse of people and experiences that are rarely seen or often overlooked in everyday life.

Of course, some people may disapprove of my actions or statements, or may even feel aversion or disgust toward them. I can understand that as well. I hope that we can respect one another and seek common ground while accepting our differences.Those who do not wish to read this can simply scroll past it or block me.

I also acknowledge that some of my ideas and actions back then, in 2018, were somewhat naive. There were also aspects of my thinking that were immature when I wrote the memoir in 2020. It is now 2026, and many of my views and ways of doing things have changed. This memoir mainly recounts what I said and did approximately six to eight years ago. If I could turn back time, there are many things I would not do, and I would also think differently about many people and events.

In addition, I am not sure whether this memoir and its table of contents fully comply with the rules of this sub. I believe the memoir is beneficial: what it conveys is critical and reflective in nature, rather than any message intended to incite evil or wrongdoing.
Thank you.

Wang Qingmin(王庆民)

2026.8.15

(I originally took many photos during that trip to Hong Kong, including photos of the June 4th vigil. But because I was worried about their political sensitivity when returning to mainland China, I deleted most of them, and only a few remain.)

Chapter One: Suffering and Resistance—The Troubled Life of a Victim of School Bullying and a Rights Defender
(I) The Devastation of School Bullying and the Shattering of Personal Ideals

(II) My General Experiences in Online Society, and an Interlude That Accelerated My Path Toward Rights Advocacy

(III) Don Quixote-Like Rights Advocacy and One-Man Social Activism

(IV) A Drop of Water Cannot Wear Through Stone; One Foolish Old Man Cannot Move a Mountain

(V) The Idea of Going to Hong Kong Reborn Amid Despair

Chapter Two: Excitement, Disappointment, Confusion, Despair—Ten Days of Rushing Around Hong Kong

(I) Arriving in Hong Kong Amid Blind Optimism

(II) My First Encounter with the Pan-Democrats: Smooth but Fruitless

(III) Too Burdened by Worries to Enjoy the Scenery; Rising Anxiety over High Prices

(IV) Visiting Amnesty International and the Association
for Democracy and People’s Livelihood; My Second Visit to the Hong Kong Alliance

(V) My First Conversation with Ms. Fung of the Hong Kong Alliance

(VI) My Second Visit to the Confederation of Trade Unions; Visiting the Legislative Council

(VII) An Unsuccessful Attempt to Meet Professor Chow Po-chung at the Chinese University of Hong Kong; Visiting CUHK’s Democracy Wall

(VIII) My First Visit to the Liaison Office; My Second Conversation with Ms. Fung; Seeing Hong Kong’s “Cage Homes”

(IX) Visiting HKU and Posting a Petition and Proposal on Preventing and Combating School Bullying on HKU’s Democracy Wall

(X) A Conversation with Mr. Lam Cho-ming of the Confederation of Trade Unions; Visiting the League of Social Democrats in an Unsuccessful Attempt to Meet Mr. Leung Kwok-hung

(XI) An Interlude and Reflections and Commentary on Women’s Rights in China and Cyberbullying; Visiting St. Teresa’s Hospital and Returning to HKU

(XII) Visiting the June 4th Museum

(XIII) Sending Out a Final Wave of Appeals for Help (Including “An Account of My Personal Circumstances”)
(XIV) June 4th at Victoria Park: Candlelight and Tear-Filled Eyes

(XV) Visiting the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees and the Ming Pao Editorial Office, and Recalling My Visit to Initium Media

(XVI) Submitting a Petition to the Liaison Office; Attending an Evening Gathering in Memory of Mr. Li Wangyang

Chapter Three: Blood Spilled at the Liaison Office, Handcuffs Put On

(I) Why Did I Have to Petition Through The way ?

(II) Preparing for

(III) Blood Spilled at the Liaison Office

(IV) Arriving at Queen Mary Hospital for Examinations and Wound Suturing

(V) Questioned by a Psychiatrist: A Disastrous Turn of Fate

Chapter Four: Anxiety, Submission, Numbness, and Torment—Twenty-Three Days Confined in a Psychiatric Ward

(I) Painful Struggles and Forced Adjustment—Entering the Psychiatric Ward

1.The Admission Process in a Daze

2.The Pain of Realizing I Had Lost My Freedom

3.My Cries Through Bloodshed Came to Nothing;

4.Regaining Freedom Seemed Far Away

5.A Critique of the Abysmal Mental Health Review System

6.Forcing Myself to Write Poetry and Essays in the Ward, Before Finally Giving Up

Calling for Help; Ms. Fung Visits Me; Contacting My Father

7.My First Conversation with My Attending Doctor Chan Lok Yan Tammy

(II) Passive and Forced “Adaptation”—Growing
Accustomed and Numb to Life in the Ward

1.Drastic Changes in My Eating Habits; A Critique of the Appalling Dietary Conditions of Psychiatric Patients in Mainland China

2.Gradually Becoming Acquainted and Communicating with Some Fellow Patients

3.Though the Tree Longs for Calm, the Wind Will Not Cease: A Dispute over Changing Rooms

4.Becoming Acquainted with Some of the Nursing Staff; Adapting and Becoming Numb to Other Aspects of Daily Life in the Ward

5.Reading Newspapers, Books, and Magazines and Watching Television to Obtain Information and News; My Thoughts and Associations Regarding This Information and News

① The Abuse of Underage Undocumented Migrants at the U.S. Border

② The Death of an Elderly Person Caused by a Nurse at Tuen Mun Hospital

③ A Male Suspect’s in an Interrogation Room and Its Subsequent Impact

④ A District Council By-Election

⑤ The Imprisonment of Edward Leung Tin-kei

⑥ The Meeting Between Donald Trump and Kim Jong Un in Singapore

⑦ The Zhenjiang Veterans’ Rights-Protest Incident, the Truck Drivers’ Strike, and a Case in Which Improper Medical Procedures at a Mainland Hospital Caused a Patient to Contract HIV

⑧ The MTR Sha Tin to Central Link Scandal

⑨ Guo Li’s Rights Advocacy as a Victim of the “Toxic Milk Powder Scandal”

⑩ The Qingyang Female Student Suicide Incident

⑪ My Views on Commentary Articles in Hong Kong Newspapers

⑫ Eastweek’s Report on School Bullying in Japan, the Church Sexual-Harassment Scandal, the Bullying of an Autistic “Bus Fan” Boy, Abuse at a Hong Kong Special School, and the Subtle Yet Cruel Connections Among These Four Incidents

⑬ Examples and Analysis of Cases of Patient Abuse in Psychiatric Wards

Had I Really “Adapted” Just Like That?

(III) Easy to Be “Hospitalized,” Hard to Be Discharged—Cruel Prolonged Confinement, Physical and Psychological Struggles, and Painful Reflections

1.Discussing with My Attending Doctor; My Personal Thoughts and Views

2.Troubles and Delays in Contacting My Family; Difficulties During My Father’s Attempt to Come to Hong Kong;

3.A Critique of Severe Bureaucracy and Cumbersome, Counterproductive Formalism in Hong Kong Hospitals
Phone Calls and Visits—Gaps in Isolation, Support in Moments of Vulnerability

4.Finally Meeting a Social Worker; Matters Concerning the Hospital’s Contact with My Family and My Application for a Waiver of Medical Fees

5.The Doctor Speaks with My Family; A Critique of the Irrationality and Dangers of Judging Whether a Patient Has a Mental Illness, or Its Severity, Based on Descriptions Given by the Patient’s Family

6.A Serious Error by a Doctor Nearly Caused Me to Be Confined in the Psychiatric Ward for Another One to Two Weeks

(IV) Experiences and Setbacks Before My Discharge
The Doctor Tries to Dissuade Me from Rights Advocacy; Examples and Analysis of the Use of Psychiatric

1.Hospitals to Persecute Rights Defenders in Mainland China, with References to Relevant Authoritative Articles and Investigative Reports

2.A Series of Conversations Before My Discharge
Threatened and Intimidated by Psychiatric ward nurse Ricky Lo Wai-kit, Nearly Jeopardizing My Discharge

3.Finally Seeing the Dawn of Freedom

4.Finally Leaving the Psychiatric Ward, and a Further Assessment of Mainland China’s Abysmal Mental Health System (I Had Already Criticized It Many Times Earlier, but Not Nearly Enough. Even the Critique in This Section Remains Far from Enough)

Chapter Five: Transported in Handcuffs, a Night in a Steamer-Like Detention Cell, and the First Signs of PTSD—After Enduring the “Last” Ordeal, There Was Still Another “Last” Ordeal

(I) Handcuffed Again and Put Through a Tangle of Complicated Procedures

(II) Suffering in a Detention Cell at Western Police Station

(III) The Steamer-Like Detention Cell and a Conversation with Young Police Officers

(IV) Escorted to Queen Mary Hospital Under Heavy Restraints

(V) An Unsurprising End to My Time in Hong Kong: The Final Hours Before Leaving

Chapter Six: “Cruelty in the Ordinary”—Unknown
Dangers, Known Crises, and Solitude Amid Struggles at Every Step

(I) A Brief Stay in Shenzhen and Anxiety Amid Uncertainty

My First Conversation with Mr. D; Renewing My Appeal to Prevent and Combat School Bullying; My Argument with My Father

Exhausting Delays While Forcing Myself to Carry On, and Suspicions Concerning the Domestic Security Police
Further Attempts to Seek Help Reach a Dead End; Appeals to Multiple Sources Fail; Deciding to Risk
Returning to Henan; My Second Conversation with Mr. D

(II) My Father Living with the Aftereffects of a Stroke, and Me After the Onset of PTSD; Wrong Choices Amid Crisis and Anxiety

1.Gradually Realizing on the High-Speed Train That Anxiety Had Become Part of Everyday Life; The Onset of Post-Traumatic Stress Disorder

2.Further Difficulties Outside Zhengzhou Railway Station Due to My Father’s Post-Stroke Condition
My First Brief Conversation with My Father After Returning to Mainland China

3.Difficulties While Looking for a Hotel; Thoughts About Tomorrow; Repaying My Ant Credit PayLater Loan
Further Discussion of Seeking Treatment for Depression and Recollections of My Previous Medical Consultations
Meeting and Briefly Talking with Mr. Y in Zhengzhou
Seeking Help from Former Classmates Out of Fear, and Once Again Encountering Human Indifference and Self-Preservation

4.Hastily Deciding, with No Other Choice, to Return to Shenzhen

(III) A Cruel and Humiliating Road in Search of Help
Returning to Shenzhen Through a Journey of Hardship, Appeals for Help, and Suffering

1.The Expected Outcome of Seeking Help, Followed, Predictably, by “Misfortunes Never Coming Singly”
Once Again Experiencing Both Warmth and Coldness in Human Relations While Crying Out for Help
Finding Another Organization and Seeing a Glimmer of Hope

2.Seeking Help from New and Old Acquaintances on Social Media

3.Deciding to Steel Myself and Ask People for Help in Person

4.Thinking I Had Finally Found an Organization That Would Help Me

5.Another Failed Attempt to Seek Help from a Former Classmate

6.Believing I Had Become Part of a Public-Interest Group as a Crisis of Survival Drew Near

7.A Mental Breakdown After Being Rejected Twice
After Yet More Exhausting Travel, Detouring to Huiyang; My Phone Worked Intermittently, Forcing Me to Buy Another One

8.A Brief Stay in Huiyang

(IV) The Half-Month I Spent Living at Mr. C’s Home
A Day-Long Journey in a Hard Seat on a Conventional Train

1.Arriving at Mr. C’s Home; Concealing the Circumstances of My Suicide Attempt

2.My Body Had Settled Down, but My Mind Had Not; Fear of China’s Mental Health System and Psychiatric Hospitals

3.Struggling with All My Strength and Running into Obstacles Everywhere

4.Reflection, Regret, Anxiety, and Fear

5.Online Lending Companies Gave Me Hope of Going Abroad

6.A Visit to the Emergency Department

7.What I Saw, Heard, Thought, and Felt While Staying at Mr. C’s Home

(V) My First Attempt to Leave the Country and Seek Refuge Ends in Failure

1.Leaving Mr. C’s Home for Timor-Leste

2.Arriving in Timor-Leste and Meeting Mr. C

3.Failed Attempts to Seek Help from the European Union and United Nations Missions in Timor-Leste;
Encountering Danger While Seeking Help from the U.S. Embassy

4.Cracks Emerge in My Relationship with Mr. C; Giving Up a Job Opportunity in Distress

5.My Relationship with Mr. C Continues to Deteriorate and Ultimately Approaches Collapse; Reflections on the Limitations of Individual Charity

6.Setting Out on the Journey Back to China

(VI) Leaving the Country Again, and Remaining Abroad to This Day

1.I Refuse to Resign Myself to Fate

2.Hesitation, Turning Back, and Setting Out on the Journey Again

Chapter Seven: Endless Words Left Unsaid

(I) The Power and Powerlessness of Words

(II) Individual Memory, Collective Memory, Shared Memory; The Limits of Self-Empathy

(III) The Country and the Era Behind an Individual Fate

(IV) What If I Had Joined the Ranks of the Vested Interests Instead of Becoming One of the Dispossessed?

(V) Despair on the Road to Redemption

(VI) Waiting for Dawn

(VII) Conclusion

u/Slow-Property5895 — 5 days ago

中共治下中国各地域的概况(北京、东北、上海、江浙、广东、陕鲁湘、冀豫、川渝、皖赣、其他省份)

北京:红色专制政权的中枢、保守力量的大本营、非汉族群精英的聚居地、充满等级制度的政治首府 2
天津:因军事和工业兴起的沿海城塞,政治等级低于北京而高于河北,并不必要的直辖市 3
东北(满洲):与中国本土文化和地理皆迥异的地域、与关内长久的历史冤仇、机缘巧合下的多次崛起、工业没落下特权仍被维持 3
上海:被规训的样板城市、长三角的“经济龙头”、享受中国最优公共服务和福利待遇的户籍居民、“优待”下更大潜力被破坏的隐性事实 6
江浙:中华文明的精华、发达的工商业与农业、历史上屡遭侵略和破坏、在北方专制势力压制下沉沦 8
广东:地域特色鲜明的区域、对外开放的桥头堡、被统治者利用的工具、从开放走向封闭 12
其余地区 13
陕西省、山东省、湖南省:具有重要战略价值、被中共特别重视、上层与平民贫富悬殊、地方政策为既得利益者服务 13
河北省、河南省:历史文化悠久、人口众多、遭受制度性不公正与剥削、平民百姓贫困且负担沉重、缺乏希望和日益沉沦 14
四川省及重庆市:独特的地理单元、具有鲜明地域特色、历史上曾辉煌且为国家民族贡献巨大、中下层民众贫穷 15
安徽省、江西省:历史上曾长期经济发达和人文繁盛,但经历多次外敌入侵和内战走向衰落,今日当地经济有所起色但民众贫困,缺乏自主性和遭受剥削利用 16
其他省份 17
总结 17
中国各地域的统一与分离问题(主要谈各汉族区域,少数民族地区另有文章表述) 18

**  **中共治下中国各地域的概况
中共治下中国的单一制国家结构,与元明清类似,都是以省(或类似规模和性质的行政区划)为单位将全国划分为若干一级行政区。虽然中央在一些重要领域和重大问题上,可以直接管到县级,但大多数事务都是通过省级机构进行管理与处置。而中国的地域及地域差异,也以省为单位划分和比较。

  不过,在山川地理形势、文化与价值观、历史变迁等因素影响下,往往也会出现一些并不以省级行政区划为界限的区域,如东北地区(东北三省加内蒙东部)、江南地区(一般特指江苏省和浙江省,一般不包括上海、安徽、江西)、岭南/两广地区(广东省和广西省)、西南地区(云贵川,一般不包括西藏)、西北地区(陕甘宁,一般不包括新疆),这些区域也会形成现实的利益共同体,中央也会按照区域来索取和分配利益。

  本文主要讨论中国各省份及汉族为主的区域,不包括新疆、西藏、内蒙古等非汉族的自治区。关于非汉的中国少数民族问题,另有其他文章论述。

 **   **北京:红色专制政权的中枢、保守力量的大本营、非汉族群精英的聚居地、充满等级制度的政治首府

建国至今,首都北京是现行体制和国家结构的最大受益者,得到了独尊的地位和极为丰厚的利益。由于北京是中共中国的首都,是决定全国命运的权力中枢所在,又集中了中共统治集团的各种权贵精英和基本盘,所以获得了最大程度的政策倾斜、资源供给、发展优先权。毛时代的北京,既是政治风暴的中心和政治风向标的所在,更是一切大政方针的策源地。而拥有北京户口的市民,则在那个物质极端匮乏的年代拥有令全国其他任何地区都艳羡的食品和消费品配给,以及免费和相对优质的教育和医疗服务。而这些供给,很多都来源于对其他省份的“抽血”,例如前述的在饥荒年代从农业大省强夺粮食供应北京。北京市民不仅在民生上相对优越,也更易参与和渗透国家政治,起码比其他任何地区都能得到更多更好的各种政策、资源、机遇。

而改革开放之后,北京的政治文化地位仍然在全国首屈一指。虽然经济相对南移,但北京仍然通过行政手段从全国各地获取巨量的资源和利益,全国各地仍然被迫任北京予取予求。无论是南方的税收,还是中原的人才,以及周边河北省的所有有价值资源,都被北京大量吸收。居住在北京的各种既得利益者也在不断增多壮大,并以“北京户口”作为身份认同和利益连结的纽带。

   拥有北京户口的市民,在教育、医疗、就业、住房、养老及各种公共服务方面,拥有着非常大的优势和特权。例如北京户籍居民高考得到清华北大等全国性名校录取的比例,平均是其他省份的二十多倍。而北京的医疗资源也是全国最顶尖,上海、广州、成都、南京等城市医疗资源相合也不及北京。
 
   当然,不同身份的北京户籍居民,其福利待遇也千差万别,如高级干部和普通市民的医疗保障就差距极大,但整体上所有北京户籍居民都是国家的特权者。而国家的内政外交军事民事人事等诸多方面,凡是涉及到北京和其他地区利益冲突时,都优先考虑北京及北京户籍居民的利益。

而这一切,都是北京利用政治地位、通过行政强制力获得和维护的,而非北京及北京户籍居民的贡献所应得。相对于西安、洛阳、南京、杭州、开封等位于汉文明精华区的历代都城,北京偏居北方一隅,经济文化本来都不发达,仅仅是依靠重北轻南、带有强烈军国色彩的政权和割据势力强制开发的城市。它缺乏自立式经济造血能力,文化底蕴也不深厚,政治上更是顽固保守。而行政手段虽然让北京发展壮大,但是以供给资源的其他区域的损失为代价的。

还有,北京虽然从全国得到了丰厚的资源,以及受到中央政策的优先照顾,但北京户籍居民内部也被分成三六九等甚至更多等,按照或明或暗的等级秩序领取所得,少数权贵得到了最优质和大多数的资源,越往下所得越少。而没有北京户籍的外来“北漂”,则更是只有义务没有权利的“人肉电池”(当然他们也能蹭得一些北京相对于其他地域的特权利益,但非常有限)。“北京折叠”不止是科幻小说才有的景象,更是现实北京的文学映射,且现实比科幻小说的描述更复杂更残忍。

另外,北京虽然得到了如此优越的条件,但却并未有效带动和辐射周边地区的经济社会发展。相反,周边地区被北京吸走各种资源,在各领域及政策上也首先要考虑和服从北京利益。河北省是北京虹吸效应的最大受害者,河北管辖的北京市外周边地区被戏称为“环北京贫困带”。与北京相连的另一个直辖市天津,既是北京虹吸的受害者,但同时也在吸取河北的资源。

北京和天津不仅在经济上没有带动周边地区发展,在文化、思想、教育等非物质领域,也没有给周边乃至中国带来正面的、文明的、进步的影响。

北京是北方保守主义文化的中心和封建皇权专制主义的顽固据点。历史上,凡是定都北京的政权,都相对专制保守,政策残忍冷酷。相对于华夏文明浸淫日久的中原和曾为文明边缘但长期归于“王化”的关中(陕西),以及经济发达社会开化的江南,北京的文化、社会风气、人的价值取向,都相对缺乏人道和公正,而有着明显的等级色彩和非人权倾向,且社会潜规则盛行,官本位严重,崇尚权力而蔑视契约,还在现实中表现出种种冷酷与暴力。

   北京虽同为汉文化的辐射区,当地居民中汉族也占绝大多数,但却有意吸收借用北方游牧民族的价值观念和言行方式,以及接纳全国各种少数民族人员和势力,来区隔其他地区尤其中原和江南的文化形态和公民组成。这看似是多元化,实则是利用各少数族群及其文化,对汉族及汉文明、中国汉地各地域势力和地域文化加以稀释和压制,是另一种“大一统”。

虽然近现代以来尤其改开以后,北京的思想文化及北京人的价值观念相对变得多元开放,但整体上、与其他区域尤其南方相比,以上这些特征仍然相对突出。而且,北京那些思想开明进步的人,更多是自我享受而非传道受业,也并不是北京文化的主流,并不能给他人他地乃至北京自身带来人文关怀和社会更新,其影响力局限在特定的范围内,还与中下层北京人及“北漂”颇有隔膜。相反,北京各种保守落后的糟粕,却在中央集权和“首崇北京”的政策下,会通过制度、政策、潜规则及人际往来等各种方式影响全国,包括影响国家的治国理念和大政方针。这对于中国显然不是什么好事。

**  **天津:因军事和工业兴起的沿海城塞,政治等级低于北京而高于河北,并不必要的直辖市
而邻近北京的另一个直辖市天津市,相对没什么需要详细叙述分析的内容。天津由于独特的地理位置(位于渤海湾沿岸、连接东北和华北的水路要塞)及特殊的历史沿革(清末北方军事重镇和租界区、袁世凯等人的苦心经营),以及中共出于发展北方、拱卫北京等经济政治目的,在天津设立了直辖市。天津的地位和获得的利益远远不如北京,但也远超环其周围的河北省,并同样从河北“吸血”。我个人认为,天津并无设置直辖市的必要,未来民主中国也应该废除这一直辖市,将其并入河北(可作为河北省会,也可作为类似于厦门在福建的地位那样的河北城市)。
  ** **东北(满洲):与中国本土文化和地理皆迥异的地域、与关内长久的历史冤仇、机缘巧合下的多次崛起、工业没落下特权仍被维持
而中共中国单一制国家结构下,受益仅次于北京的地区,是东北地区。第二次国共内战中,中共之所以能够击败国民党、夺取政权,很大程度就是依靠在东北对苏军和日军武器的接收,以及对伪满军队的大规模收编、对伪满公务人员的全面留用。中共在内战初期不确定能统一全国,甚至准备以哈尔滨为首都,只控制东北地区。而中共取得国共内战胜利后,因为东北籍党政军人员的突出贡献、东北居民对中共的好感与忠诚,以及东北背靠苏联的地理优势,将东北作为国家重点建设地区。在建国最初的十多年,东北以全国八分之一的国土面积、十分之一的人口,获得了约占全国三分之一至半数的工业投资和苏联援助。而日据东北时代(即“满洲国”时期),日本也对此地有很多工矿开发和基础设施建设,这为后来中共统治时期东北工业发展打下了基础。

在全国各地普遍被贫困和饥荒困扰时,东北居民不仅衣食无忧,还享受着质量不算太高但在当时中国已非常优厚的就业、教育、医疗、住房、养老保障。三年大饥荒期间,东北是京沪之外全国为数极少没有大规模饿死人的区域,这也有赖于种种政策和资源优势。而他们享有的这些资源,除一部分为苏联援助及自有自产外,大多数都是从其他地区调集和征收过来的。在这十多年中,东北得到了完全不成比例的资源供给与政策倾斜。

   直到1960年代中苏决裂、苏联威胁入侵中国并在边境陈兵百万,中共推动“三线建设”,才将在东北和京津等地的一部分工业和重要机构迁往内地,稍稍平衡了全国各地经济投入和工业生产严重不平衡的状况。但即便如此,东北的工业化、城市化及社会保障程度,仍然远远高于除京沪津之外全国所有省级行政区域。而文革期间,东北受到的冲击也相对最轻,其他地方大批打死人和摧毁文物古迹时,东北各种历史遗迹包括满清宫殿皇陵几乎完好无损或只受到轻微损害。当其他各地前国民党人士纷纷被批斗甚至杀害时,原伪满出身的人士则普遍得到保全(或只被象征性“下放”)。东北显然是“前三十年”最大的既得利益者。

当然,东北也创造了不少财富,如制造了大量工业品、收获了各种农产品,以及提供了各种矿产资源,几十年来为国家发展做出了很大贡献。但相比而言,其获得还是大于产出,其很多产出也是建立在获得他处支持的基础上。而东北的工业化文化,既颇有可圈可点的值得赞扬之处,也有颇多弊病(下面会谈到)。

改革开放之后,中国经济重心逐渐南移,优先对外开放和实行非计划经济(不完全是市场经济)的珠三角和长三角经济快速发展,社会民生也在改善。而东北虽然也进行了一系列改革,但因计划经济沉疴已久,积重难返,经济开始有所滑落。1990年代的国企改制和下岗潮,更是沉重打击了东北的经济民生。而对下岗工人安置的不到位及各种贪污腐败,也导致了各种本来可以避免的悲剧。再后来,南方经济进一步发展,东北经济越发没落。东北曾经的辉煌一去不返(起码暂时如此)。

但即便如此,东北获得的各种中央层面的政策倾斜、转移支付、高考录取比例优势、基础设施投资和建设、社会福利保障,仍然明显高于全国除京沪津外其他任何地区。虽然东北经济乏力,但大多数东北户籍居民的教育、医疗、住房、养老都不用发愁(这四方面也是民生的基本内容),这是其他地区大多数居民都梦寐以求而难以得到的。尤其在全国各地民众都陷入“内卷化”的恶性竞争时,东北人可以轻松“躺平”。而这些都有赖于中央集权下中央对东北的偏爱与支援。

   虽然东北户籍居民的各种相对特权不及北京和上海户籍居民,但北京和上海的人口加一起只有4000万左右,东北则有1.2亿人。所以从获取优先政策和利益的总量上,东北超越了京沪,成为中共中国单一制国家结构和中央集权政策倾斜的最大受益者。(即便东北最悲惨的大下岗时期,东北人整体和平均生活水平仍然高于全国大多数地区。下岗者也只是东北人的一部分。而全国其他地方大多数人尤其农民阶层在90年代也只能勉强温饱,教育医疗养老还是负担不起)

例如高考录取比例,北京和上海明显高于东北三省(东三省高考录取比例也远高于青海宁夏西藏等人口稀少省份外所有其他省份),但每年北京和上海参加高考者人数加一起也远低于东三省(例如2022年北京参加高考人数仅5万人,上海也是5万左右,京沪共计10万;而黑龙江有18万、吉林12万、辽宁20万,东三省共计50万)。

   同样,其他如各种教育、医疗、基建等投入,东三省所获的支持从总量上也超过京沪。因此反而是东三省而非京沪获取了利益总量最大的公共资源供给和政策倾斜。而且,相对于京沪许多“后来者”需要拼命打拼才能得到户籍特权、与其他精英残酷竞争,东三省即便平民也能共享各种政策资源红利,不需要多么激烈的与他人竞争(比如黑龙江鹤岗的重点中学很容易上,在北京想上同样高考成绩的学校却需要拼各种资源和关系,仅购买学区房就需花费数百万元)。

更重要的是,东北的政治地位一直都是极高的。在建国后,东北被称为“共和国长子”,在“前三十年”得到了仅次于北京的地位与话语权。而改革开放至今,虽然东北经济一直不佳,但政治地位和话语权仍旧得到了保持。在江浙、中原、岭南等区域被中央予取予夺的情况下,东北却一直可以保障既得利益(起码保障东北权贵集团的既得利益)。而各种全国性政策,也都优先考虑东北利益和关切。在中国的高度中央集权下,东北某种程度有很大的独立性,不被中央完全驾驭,反而有时可以要挟中央。虽然我对中共内部的政治派系与权力斗争缺乏了解,但我可以肯定,东北地域利益集团及其关联势力,在中共决策层必定有着其他各区域都难以拥有的份量和话语权。

而由于东北相对独立于关内的地理位置、相对特殊的历史变迁,形成了非常有地域特色的文化风气、价值体系、思维方式、行为模式。在历史上,东北长期是女真/满族、渤海、契丹等少数民族的聚居区,汉化程度低,缺乏文明的浸淫,因此很大一部分人崇尚弱肉强食、行为残忍暴虐。而且,相对于匈奴、蒙古、突厥等其他民族在征服战争中虽然残暴但也直爽坦诚的特征,女真等东北民族在侵袭内地和统治中国的过程中,不仅手段残忍,还阴险狡诈、流氓成性、背信弃义。这很大程度上也是因为其吸收了汉文化的“术”而缺了汉文明的“德”。

   而清末民初“闯关东”的大量汉人中的相当一部分人,也颇受这类价值观和行为方式影响。还有许多在东北的汉人,早年饱受异族屠杀奴役,但被征服和融合后,反而相对汉文化更加认同异族身份和文化,价值观和言行举止皆变得异化。虽然这很大程度也是恶劣的自然和人文生存环境催生,而非种族民族的基因和遗传,但客观上的确成为当地各民族共同的文化特征。所以虽然东北现在汉族血统者超过半数,但这些人身份认同并非汉族,或其汉族认同与关内汉族认同并不相同。虽然并不是每一个东北居民都有这些价值观和言行,但整体的社会风气和一部分占人口少数却非常突出的群体所作所为,的确就是如此。

清末至民国汉族人占了东北人口的大多数,但并没有促成东北真正汉化,相反这些汉人某种程度被“满化”了,或者说形成了独特的东北文化。无论汉满蒙回朝各族,都认同相似的逻辑与价值观。而日本在东北建立“满洲国”,更强化了类似的价值观念、思想文化认同。日本人虽然利用“满洲国”残酷对待当地民众、血腥镇压反满抗日人士,但血腥残酷程度明显轻于全面入侵中国后对关内各地的所作所为(尤其和华北、江南相比)。而且,日本人在“满洲国”也有许多建设,促进了当地的工业化与现代化,文化教育事业也颇有进展。“满洲国”的政治实体虽然在1945年灰飞烟灭,但是它遗留下来了很多东西,如经济基础和经济结构、价值观塑造、国族/地域主义认知与立场,至今都在影响着东北的方方面面。

而中共建政后,得益于中共的全力支持及苏联援助,再加之日满时期的基础,东北经济社会得到极大发展,文化教育事业也突飞猛进。东北以短暂的时间取得了文化教育的跨越式发展,社会文明程度起码在表层得到迅速提高。但历史文化的遗留与惯性仍然影响巨大。而东北是高度工业化的计划经济模式,这也形成了极具特色的社会文化和人际关系。东北高度工业化下高度的城市化,让东北各阶层民众都能够有很高的知识储备和素养,人与人之间的平等程度高于其他地区,部分家庭的男女平等程度似乎也较中国其他地区为优(虽然这个是存疑的,不同人有不同说法),作为平民一部分的产业工人也拥有了前所未有的权利与福利保障。东北地区是中共建国后中国最像真正的“社会主义社会”的地区。

但计划经济造就的丑恶相对更多。不同于市场经济中相对较多人员流动和人身自由,计划经济形成了工业化下的熟人社会,与乡土中国的熟人社会类似,人与人之间既有脉脉温情也有勾心斗角。一些东北人常为东北去除宗族的影响自豪,认为是进步的表现。但东北工人阶级和干部阶级(两个阶级共同构成计划经济下的城市居民社会)人际关系的紧密和复杂程度,不亚于南方的宗族社会(而且并非没有宗族,在农村,或者满族、锡伯族等非汉民族家庭,宗族影响力非常大,加上更加暴力化,其对家庭成员的控制力甚至超过许多南方省份的宗族)。相对于宗族以亲情为依托,东北的人际关系更多基于同事间的利益交换,少了温情多了算计、少了论理多了论力。

   同样,东北人骄傲于没有受儒家封建糟粕影响,这一定程度是事实,但其没有儒家糟粕同时也少了传统文明的礼仪教化和道德积淀。还有,计划经济的封闭性,也不利于形成自由开放的市民社会,反而导致托关系走后门和各种暗箱操作的盛行。改革开放后,东北国企也进行了改制和重组,但并未真正摆脱计划经济带来的各种人文社会影响。(另外,与北京一样,东北的计划经济、官僚主义、保守文化,也导致其经济活力严重不足,缺乏造血能力,其经济几乎都依靠政策扶植和各种输血,其创造的物质与精神财富不及所得)

在这样的历史变迁下,如今的东北有着怎样的社会风气,部分东北人有怎样的价值观念和行为模式,就不言而喻了。而且,部分东北人也通过各种方式在全国开枝散叶,并抱团行事,直接影响了全国各地的德行风气与社会民生。我不希望在本文发泄情绪,所以就点到为止。简而言之一句话,东北的地方文化和民风,以及部分东北人的价值观与言行方式,是非常不利于社会进步、文明和谐的,既伤害东北和东北人自身,也有害于整个中国及中国人民。

需要说明的是,我以上所说关于东北及东北人的问题,并不是说所有东北人都如此,为恶的当然只是一小部分,大多数东北人本质还是好的,有一部分东北人更是非常热情善良真诚的。但即便是一小部分,也足以造成很大破坏和影响。还有,无论在现在的专制中国还是未来的民主中国,东北和东北人当然有权得到其应得的尊严、地位、话语权、利益,但不应该超出必要限度、不能以损害其他区域其他地域居民利益方式获益。东北人如果还自认为是中华民族和中国的一部分,在享有权利同时也要承担义务、得到尊重同时也应遵守公序良俗。

还有,部分东北人的恶行伤害的最大的还是其他弱势东北人。我虽然痛恨那些作恶的东北人,但也非常同情例如东北下岗工人、因维权被虐待者等弱势者,我认为下岗措施虽必要,但起码应该保障他们下岗后吃饱饭、子女和老人得到合理照顾。对于如建三江、马三家劳教机构恶行中的受害人,我更是非常同情并为其略尽微声声援。部分东北人各种恶行,伤害最大的其实也是其他相对弱势的东北人,因为东北人更多的生活在一起,当然是接触越多者受恶人伤害越大。改变现状,最终也有利于东北的文明进步。

   就像如果八九民运胜利,中国民主化,虽然大抵仍然要推动国企改制,但90年代下岗潮中的失业工人及家庭就不会那么悲惨,可参考东欧各国(尤其波兰和捷克/斯洛伐克)的工人安置和补偿,是非常有利于劳工一方的。即便被国人嘲讽鄙夷的俄罗斯转型,俄罗斯失业工人所得的补偿和保障,也略好于中国下岗工人。而其他方面的人权改善,也是如此。北欧各国的地理位置与东北类似,历史上也曾多次南下劫掠,但20世纪以来逐渐成为发达民主国家,国民素质极高,还包容移民难民,被世界称道,也无必要去追索其历史上的丑恶了。中国东北如果能效仿北欧,那也会成为中国和世界有益的组成部分。

  ** **上海:被规训的样板城市、长三角的“经济龙头”、享受中国最优公共服务和福利待遇的户籍居民、“优待”下更大潜力被破坏的隐性事实

北京、天津、东北之外,上海是另外一个相对其他地区而言的受益者。但上海的受益程度和影响不同。上海早在中共建政前,就是中国乃至东亚的明珠,是与纽约、巴黎、东京相媲美(甚至超越了东京、未来发展可能胜过纽约和巴黎(因为背靠的人口庞大)的现代化都市。民国时上海即是与北京(北平)平行的特别市,政治经济地位仅次于首都南京和代表北方的北京。

中共建政后,虽将上海划为直辖市并给予特殊地位,但其闭关锁国的政策反而破坏了上海经济的发展、阻碍了上海民生的改善。而中共北方基色的文化和价值观,也在主观客观上都压制了曾经颇为出色的上海文化及其他南方文化、毁损了其文化独立性与历史传承。当然,上海也的确因此得到了各种特权和资源,但远不及北京。改革开放后尤其1992年上海全面开放和浦东新区设立后,上海才回归到正常的开放与发展状态。

   上海拥有直辖市特殊地位和政策倾斜后,改开以来成为长三角乃至东南沿海的革新进步的领军者,其经济社会的发展带动和辐射了周边地区的发展,和江浙皖赣等地实现了合作共赢。而北京、天津、东北,以及北方和西部其他一些被重点扶植的城市(如西安、成都、武汉、兰州),不仅通过行政手段吸收各种资源,还对周边和其他地区有破坏无建设、拉大区域差距和各地经济发展不平衡。

还有,上海户籍居民尤其“老上海人(上海土著居民)”的确比较排外,上海也有倾向于本土主义乃至自治和独立的思潮,但是一种精致利己的、自保型的排外,是希望与外地人互不干扰,而不像北京户籍居民尤其“老北京”那样,一边排外一边肆意从全国各地及“北漂”那里掠夺各种资源。

   在做人的修养和言行素质上,上海人整体上也好于北京人。北京的排外程度从表面上不如上海强烈,甚至有时对外人还有些开放包容,但那是在没有触及其利益和深度接触的情况下。如果触及北京市民利益或者长住在一起,以及和北京籍公务人员打交道,那各种矛盾冲突都会爆发,外人就能深刻体会到其排外和其他各种丑恶行径。虽然上海的排外也是错误的,其各种所得都有外地及外地人的贡献,但还算情有可原,冷漠但不过于使坏的排外言行也勉强可以忍受。

不过,相对于北京居民包括户籍居民内部受益严重不均的情况,拥有上海户籍的平民因户籍制度和其他本土主义政策而受益颇大。据说,上海户籍居民一生的福利折合人民币超过一百万元,如得到拆迁补偿款,则不下数百万乃至上千万元。上海平民享有的教育、医疗、住房、养老、家政等资源的平均数量和质量,皆居于全国之冠。

不过,如果从另一个角度而言,虽然上海与北京一样仍然拥有各种政策倾斜,上海户籍居民也享有种种特权,但起码一部分是上海及上海人靠区位优势和自身奋斗而非行政手段就可获得的。

甚至,如果没有中共统治,而是民国或其他相对民主开放的政权统治包括上海在内的中国大陆,即便那时的上海并不拥有现在这样的制度性地域特权,其人权保障程度和公民福利水平,也会远好于几十年来在中共治下的相关条件和所得(尤其改革开放以前的阶段)。

   上海虽然在中共治下得到了一些地域特权,但只是和相对被中共侵害更严重的地区的比较而言。如果没有中共,上海可能相对中国其他地区的相对优势弱化、优越性不那么强,但本身的权利和民生都要更好于现在。这也从侧面更加凸显了中共统治对中国其他地区更深更剧烈的伤害。

一种制度有相对受益者,就有相对受害者。而中共中国的单一制和中央集权下,只有北京、上海、天津、东北是明显的受益者,其余地区除个别城市和区域外,都不同程度受害。(不过,这四地的“受益”主要是指相对于其他区域,如果和1949年起步情况类似的国家地区相比,中国所有地区都是受害的。而且,这四地受益者主要是权贵精英,平民大众与其他地区一样受害,只是程度有所差别)

**   **江浙:中华文明的精华、发达的工商业与农业、历史上屡遭侵略和破坏、在北方专制势力压制下沉沦

在相对程度上,中共建政以来受害最大的是江南地区/江浙地区,尤其江苏省和南京市。历史上,江浙地区长期是南方政权的核心地带,南京则是作为首都次数最多的南方城市。江浙两省相比,江苏有更加深厚的政治和思想底蕴,浙江则是民间社会更为发达和活跃,共同构成了中华文明南方部分的菁华。

但由于北方在军事和政治上的相对强势,南方政权往往不敌北方而屡次受到入侵与压迫,南京更是遭遇多次屠戮与破坏。民国有十余年定都南京,并投入许多资源着力进行“首都建设”,曾让南京及江浙得到很大发展,政治文化地位也空前提高(经济地位长期都是全国最高)。

但1937年日军制造南京大屠杀,以及八年占领中对江浙各地的多次屠杀与长期奴役,让大量民国精英尤其出身江浙的精英遇害,南京及江浙许多城市都遭遇严重破坏,对南京及江浙的地位、声誉、经济、文化等各领域都造成沉重打击。1945年国府还都南京,本来可能重振南京和江浙,但随着国民党在内战中的失败、中共渡江战役的胜利,南京的首都地位再次失去。

中共建政后,南京的地位大大下降,各种资源被夺走、实力和影响力大为削弱。1951年,毛泽东在“镇反运动”中声称,“南京是一个50万人口的大城市,国民党的首都,南京(镇反)杀人太少,应在南京多杀”,可以说是中共政权对南京这个城市命运的残酷宣告(且毛泽东是在明知南京曾在十几年前发生惨绝人寰大屠杀的情况下如此发言,可见其心之恶)。

   而在1950年代初期的全国高校院系调整拆分中,包括原中央大学在内的南京诸多高校被拆解、迁移、削弱,极大打击了南京乃至江浙地区的教育、人才培养、思想文化发展。在政治地位上,北京拥有了独一无二的、至高无上的国都地位,南京则成了一个普通的省会城市,仅仅可以代表江苏省(甚至在江苏省内,南京的首位度也不高(不过这很大程度是因为江苏其他城市经济文化实力也很强))。中共还有意扶植缺乏政治野心、没有定都历史、文化底蕴不足的上海,以进一步削弱和制约南京。改革开放以后,南京的经济文化有所恢复,但仍然只是一个普通的省会城市,其地位和影响力不仅远不及北京和上海,连广州、西安、成都的区域影响力都不及。

而南京所在的整个江浙地区,从建国至今也都是被打压的对象。而建国后江浙的处境,也是江浙地区几千年来相对北方弱势的格局的延续,是中国大陆南北两个板块军事冲突、政治斗争、文化对立的缩影和例证。

早在华夏文明初兴之时,江浙所在地区就是文明发祥地之一,南方河姆渡文化即是与北方半坡文化并列的华夏文明的源头。而从吴越的崛起、夫差勾践的争霸,到秦末项羽刘邦的奋起抗暴、汉初吴楚七国之乱,再到汉末三国孙氏家族数代的文治武功,千年前的江浙曾是尚武之土、兴兵之地。

   但后来,一方面是经济重心南移下,江浙文教日益兴盛、民生越发富足;另一方面却是相对北方而言武力的衰弱、战略的守势。由于北方异族入侵、战乱频仍、暴政肆虐,原来繁荣的黄河流域的中原地区多次成为贫瘠的焦土。而地理环境得天独厚的江浙地区,逐渐成为中国经济的核心地区。“苏湖熟、天下足”、“国家根本,仰给东南”,都在反映着江浙经济的发达与对全国的重要性。

“仓廪实而知礼节,衣食足而知荣辱”,随着经济开发,以及“衣冠南渡”下北方士人阶层的南下、中原文化在江南的传播和与当地文化的融合发展,江南的人文也日益兴盛,并形成了相对独特的、与中原文化等北方文化有明显差异的文明形态与价值观。其文化婉约、含蓄、内敛,思想开明、包容、进取,让汉文明更加丰富与温和。

   到了明代中后期,伴随资本主义萌芽和商工文明的发展,江浙涌现了顾炎武、黄宗羲、王夫之等“新儒学”思想家,提出了“天下为主君为客”、“工商皆本”、“经世致用”、“有治法而后又治人”等主张,带有一定的民主和自由主义色彩,其进步性可与欧洲启蒙运动相比。这些思想也已经很大程度作用于现实,伸张了许多民权,打击了封建专制,促进了科学发展(如徐光启、宋应星的成就),让明王朝向开明专制乃至更大的革新迈进。如果江浙经济文化社会继续发展,还能推动中华文明的进步转型。

但随着满清的铁蹄入侵和文字狱的铺展,江浙的文明被摧毁、社会的进步被打断。在满清统治的二百多年中,江浙一直是被打压和吸血的对象。“扬州十日”、“嘉定三屠”、“江阴八十一日”,仍未让江南屈服。因此从顺治康熙时的“哭庙案”、“庄廷鑨明史案”、“南山集案”,到乾隆时的“叫魂案”,满清政权又对江南士人和民众进行了许多次清洗,“屠尽了汉人的骨气廉耻”,让江南沉寂了百年有余。

   满清期间江南经济仍然非常发达,但大多数收益被满清统治者和北方保守势力掠走,政治和文化上更是极为消沉。江南士人连本地重要官职都不能担任,满洲贵族的臣属乃至家仆成为了这里的主官(如曹雪芹父祖及整个家族),从官场到民间皆是腐烂,从官绅到黔首俱若奴隶。而到了太平天国时期,江浙地区成为起义军和清军交战的修罗场,再次受到残酷破坏。在这个过程中,江浙人只是被双方利用和屠杀的对象,自身几乎毫无作为。

直到清末民初,随着满洲政权的内外交困尤其对外战争中的一系列败绩,江浙才从压抑窒息统治下得到久违的部分自由。随着国门打开,江浙深厚的人文底蕴与西方及日本的现代思想碰撞,擦出了革命的火花,并逐渐燎原。

   在19世纪末至20世纪初的思想启蒙和革命浪潮中,江浙涌现了秋瑾、章太炎、鲁迅等革命家和思想家,让江浙的才华与勇气在沉沦许久后重新焕发耀眼之光。“拼将十万头颅血,须将乾坤力挽回”,江浙及江浙人民在民族民主革命洪流中涅槃重生,武昌起义后以光复会为主的江浙起义军在徐州与清军接战,后克复江宁(南京)与杭州,与两广、四川、湖北等地共同迎来光复,实现了夏完淳“毅魄归来日,灵旗空际看”的遗愿。

   而民国定都南京,发展江浙、经营宁沪杭,让江浙一度成为中国的政治经济文化核心地带。但日寇的入侵再次让多灾多难的江浙蒙难,从社会精英到平民大众都遭遇残酷虐杀。与南京的命运一样,中共对国民政府的取代,也让江浙失去了抗战后再次重生的可能。

击败国民党的中共政权,对江南的态度和作为,除了没有明显的民族压迫(但有“重北轻南”的政治经济歧视),其他方面与满清几乎没有二致。在“前三十年”,中共的闭关锁国和计划经济模式,对适应对外开放和市场经济的江南显然是噩耗。但由于江南工农业基础的优良(哪怕经历了抗日战争和国共内战的破坏),经济仍然优于全国大多数地区。在三年大饥荒期间,江苏和浙江饿死的人较少(但生活水平相较民国大幅下降,苏北和浙江山区也有饿死人现象)。而江南地区的相对富庶,也成了中共政权重点掠夺的对象。

而中共之所以可以肆无忌惮的掠夺,也在于江浙政治权力地位和话语权的失去。由于国民党的核心一大部分都来自于江浙(核心的另一部分来自于两广),国民政府的核心统治区也在江浙,所以作为国民党死敌的中共对江浙严防死守、百般打压。还有,江浙人崇尚自由、反对专制、主张民主民权、营建和参与公民社会、追求法治透明的社会风气和历史行为,都令高度专制、奉行等级制度和个人独裁、迫使民众仰其鼻息而活、习惯于潜规则和密室政治的中共恐惧。在中共专制极权尤其“镇反”、“反右”、“文革”的摧残下,江浙在清末民初复兴的人文风貌、士人风骨,都毁损殆尽。

在反右与文革被迫害致死的知识分子中,大多数都来自于江浙。例如有杂志列举文革中自杀的52位名人(主要是学者型知识分子,还有一些艺术界人士,也是广义的知识分子),一半以上都来自于江浙。其他各处关于文革的资料,也都能反映出中国受迫害的著名知识分子中,来自江浙的比例几乎超过全国其他所有地区的总和。

具体的例子有,祖籍浙江上虞、生于江苏南京的考古学家陈梦家,从建国后就经常被整,文革中又遭迫害,被吐口水和往头上浇剩饭菜,最终不堪受辱自杀;江苏江阴籍戏剧家上官云珠被迫献身于毛泽东,但文革中也未幸免被批斗,最终自杀身亡;浙江杭州的文学家吴兴华,被红卫兵不断批斗、强迫劳动,最终强行灌下污水将其杀害;江苏南汇(现上海浦东)籍翻译家傅雷被抄家和侮辱,和妻子双双自杀;浙江义乌籍历史学家吴晗,因发表《海瑞罢官》等作品被批斗和逮捕,最终死于狱中;江苏无锡籍的导弹和航空航天专家、研发“两弹一星”的元勋之一姚桐斌,在文革中被红卫兵暴打致死;江苏上海县(现上海市)籍、被称为“大师的大师”的物理学家叶企孙,在文革在被诬陷为“国民党中统特务”,被红卫兵百般羞辱折磨,精神失常,大小便失禁,文革结束后不久即去世(他的同籍贯的徒弟熊大缜,则早在1939年即被中共诬为“特务”杀害);另一位江苏无锡籍钢琴家顾圣婴,被批斗羞辱后开煤气和母亲弟弟一起自杀;同样是籍贯为江苏无锡的历史学家、南京大学教授钱海岳,因赞颂郑成功被指鼓吹蒋介石反攻大陆,被红卫兵杀害于明孝陵……连死去的秋瑾、章太炎的墓葬乃至骨殖都被破坏(可悲的是,这些罪恶既有外来者所为,也有江浙本地红卫兵所为,他们这时已经被洗脑的完全是非不分、将家乡的英雄当成罪人批判和污名)。

   而幸存的江浙知识分子,绝大多数也都沉默、沉沦、沉寂,在打击和压迫下默默的活着。江苏扬州籍的理论物理学家束星北,虽然历经多次政治运动冲击而幸存,还熬过了文革残酷岁月,但也无法正常进行学术研究,长期在贫苦和被批斗中生活。虽有生之年得到平反,可这难以弥补曾经的创伤。江苏扬州籍的翻译家巫宁坤,其幸存离国后写下的《一滴泪》,就反映着江浙知识分子的种种苦难,以及在暴政下无力改变丑恶现实、不得不忍耐和逃亡的无奈与悲辛。

   面对毛泽东和中共的淫威,毛时代的江浙人噤若寒蝉。毛时代中共对江浙的所作所为与满清对江南的屠杀压迫与文字狱何等相似?死于文革的江浙知识分子,与明末殉国的东林党人的悲剧又多么相通?而反右和文革至今江浙的沉默低调,又与满清两江/闽浙总督治下民众的长久沉寂惊人一致。万马齐喑中,只有苏州籍的林昭奋力呐喊,在那泯灭人性的黑暗时代发出痛斥暴君、反对专制、追求自由的伟大啼鸣。但这无法改变当时的专制暴政,江浙人民也只能战战兢兢、浑浑噩噩的生存与死亡。

改革开放后,江浙的经济迎来了久违的春天。相对于珠三角更多依靠对外开放和借助港澳台的资本与平台拉动经济,长三角的江浙更多凭借自身的经济社会底蕴恢复和发展。珠三角在经济发展的同时贫富分化严重、治安混乱、各种非法活动猖獗,充满着暴力与动荡。而长三角这几十年贫富差距相对较小,治安更是在全国相对最为优良,公然的过恶的非法活动也较少。

相对于珠三角的野蛮生长、东北经济的相对衰落、内陆其他地区的相对贫困落后,长三角是改革开放后中国经济发展最稳健、最扎实、最均衡、最惠民、最具可持续性的地区,域内各地差距和城乡差距都小于其他地区,尤其江浙农村富裕程度冠绝全国。江苏和浙江的GDP总量不仅常年位居全国前四,人均GDP更是居各省份(不包括直辖市)前三位。江浙上缴中央财政的总量与比例,也同样位居全国前四。江浙地区无疑是京沪之外中国经济最发达的地区。

但经济的发达无法改变政治的弱势和文化的不振。改革开放后,中共仍然实行重北轻南的政治方针,鼓励南方发展经济的同时遏制其政治影响力和话语权的增长。虽然中共两任最高领导人(江泽民、胡锦涛)皆出身于江苏省,但这并不能改变中共在地域问题上的原则和政策。北京仍然是中国政治和文化的中心,引领着中国的发展方向和决定着中国的政治特质。

  中共始终非常警惕南方出现能够挑战北京权力与地位的地域势力,江浙则是其最为提防和打压的地区。江浙只有在经济上埋头发展和为其他地区“供血”的义务,却没有与付出相匹配的政治权力与话语权利。相反,其地方文化入方言和地方传媒,遭受各种或明或暗的打压,已几乎没有了独特的地方思想价值体系,也没有独立的话语权。

历经满清屠杀和文字狱、日寇屠杀和奴役、中共的专制及历次政治运动(尤其是文化大革命),江浙的文风、民气屡遭摧残折辱,虽几度复兴,但起码如今已不再有曾经的盛况。现在的江浙虽仍是理工和人文学者最集中的产生地区(可以看当今中国科学院和中国工程院的院士籍贯,江浙籍的占四分之一,算上受江浙影响的上海、安徽、福建、江西(即华东地区),则占两院院士的一半),但却普遍远离政治或依附强权,不是自私自利耽于享乐,就是成为政权的走狗和喉舌,再也没有“天下兴亡匹夫有责”的家国观念和“国事、家事、天下事,事事关心”的公共意识。

   历史上的物理与心灵摧残和留下的阴影余悸,以及如今仍然专制和压制思想文化自由的环境、在地域博弈中的相对弱势地位,都让江浙人变得非常低调、世俗、保守,纷纷在物质享乐和靡靡之音中沉醉,无力也无心去效法先贤、秉笔直书、经世致用了。夏完淳、秋瑾、林昭,这些人的光芒太耀眼,江浙人更多是恐惧和远离,而非效仿和超越。江苏人面对相较很高生源质量而言很低的高考录取率(还包括将本省大学录取名额大量“让”给其他省份)、残酷的中考“五五分流”,选择唾面自干的忍受(虽然也有零星的反抗行动,如在江苏籍家长在省内各级政府机构、教育机构门前的和平抗议,都被镇压下去),也反映了他们已经丧失了抗争的意志,现实中也没有抗争的手段和能力。压抑之下,江浙社会风气也逐渐糜烂,当地的人们也被动或主动的沉沦。

在沉沦中,许多江浙人纷纷变成精致利己之徒,只顾个人私利而没有家国天下精神和公民意识,乃至为私利损人利己、狗苟蝇营。曾经注重清廉和操守的江浙籍官员,现在也普遍参与腐败,虽然执政绩效尚可,但也不再那么秉公无私,不仅贪腐,裙带之风也极为盛行;许多江浙中产在教育资源和中高考录取名额限制下,纷纷想方设法不择手段挤进名校,还排斥外来打工子女与其孩子同校同班;在医疗、养老等方面,江浙人也越来越为私利钻营……

而江浙一些知识分子包括一些有话语权的科技医工与人文社科学者,不仅早已没有民国时代“为天地立心,为生民立命,为万世开太平”的理想追求,反而视野狭隘且保守自利,只有知识没有品德,为前途名利巧言撒谎(有些学者甚至在关系到亿万国民生存和人权、国家发展乃至人类命运的一些问题上巧言令色、歪曲事实、误导大众,如在新冠议题上替官方封城隔离政策背书、推荐并不可靠的中医中药治疗新冠的医学界专家钟南山、李兰娟(李兰娟丈夫郑树森亦为浙江人,其在国际期刊发表论文,因无法提供论文中涉及的563例器官移植来源的伦理证明而被撤稿,可想而知其参与了多少丑恶);在气候危机问题上巧言撒谎、误导公众、造成极大恶果的地理学专家丁仲礼),勇于私斗而怯于公争,歧视弱者而默于强者。

这些科研领域的名人都不是真正的科学家,而是”高级技术员”。如同明清易代后,“国事家事天下事,事事关心”的东林党人消失,代之的是为官人军头做高级仆役的“绍兴师爷”那样,今日的江浙知识分子再次成为体制和权贵的附庸,为作恶者出谋划策和提供知识与技术。他们被丑恶伤害却又参与丑恶,既是历史和时代的受害者,又是相对更弱者的加害者,令人感到可悲可叹。(当然,另一方面看,江浙几经杀戮和长期压迫,仍然是中国经济最发达、公民素养最高、最文明和平的地区,也能反映江浙人文底蕴之深厚、江浙人民的坚韧顽强)

江浙的沉沦,亦是中共式中央集权的恶果。对南方地域势力的忧虑、对江南自由开放文化和市民社会的恐惧,都让代表北方顽固势力、崇尚北方保守文化的中共不遗余力的打压江浙,扭曲当地的文化民风,让这块人杰地灵的宝地,变成世俗市侩的戏园。这不仅是对江浙人民尤其知识分子的摧残,也是对汉文明的破坏,并让中国走入和困在丑恶的歧途。
**   **广东:地域特色鲜明的区域、对外开放的桥头堡、被统治者利用的工具、从开放走向封闭
广东和珠三角地区的发展沿革和地位,则是中共治下中国的又一种中央与地方关系形态。广东所在的岭南地区,一直都有着相对汉族其他地区强烈很多的独立性与独特性。这既是地理环境造就的,也是广东历代人民主动抗争与坚持的结果。

不同于汉族其他地区已大致“同音同文”,广东一直保持着独特的语言--粤语,以及基于独特语言的独特文化。独特的语言,是强化族群认同和凝聚力、拒斥外部同化的重要工具。正是凭借这一点,广东在历朝历代都比中原和江南乃至云贵川地区都有更多自主性。而广东与香港、南洋的特殊关系和连接,也让这里有着对外开放的条件与风气。

   相对于江浙相对温婉的文化特征,广东的民风粗犷甚至野蛮,既可为公作战前赴后继,也会因私械斗血流成河;既讲求贸易自由社会契约,也五毒皆兴治安混乱。而且,广东只有珠江(西江北江东江合流后那段)沿岸地带较为富有,其他地区贫穷程度不亚于中国中西部(迄今都是如此),这样的相对贫穷和很大的域内贫富差距,也让许多广东人有强烈的名利动机和冒险精神,并为之不惜性命。

正是在这样的特色条件下,广东成为清末民族民主革命的策源地,以及民国南北对峙时期南方革命政府的大本营。不过,不同于紧邻北方、与中原文化密切乃至融合、时而有问鼎中原之志的江浙,广东相对更加倾向于割据一方,保卫自身的文化特色与独特利益。而从广东出兵、志在统一中国的北伐战争,其实是相对例外的。而陈炯明、胡汉民、许崇智在广州的坐镇称雄,更能反映广东作为相对独立的政治区域的特征。

而中共依靠来自东北/满洲及晋冀鲁豫等地的北方军政人员(“南下军人/干部”),击败了南方为基本盘的国民党政权,进占包括广东在内的南方各地,被成为此地的统治阶层。相对于江浙,广东在中共治下有相对略多一些的自主权(虽然重大和决定性事务仍然要听命于中央)。而叶剑英、陶铸等中共元老的坐镇,一方面保证中共对广东的控制,另一方面也让广东有了更多话语权与自主性。大饥荒期间广东饿死人很少,也和其有一定自主、不用像皖豫川那样被大规模强征粮食有关。

   在“前三十年”,广东一方面与其他省份一样处于专制和闭关锁国之下,但另一方面却有当时全国绝无仅有的对外开放窗口,即“广交会”,以及与香港的特殊关系及联系通道。广交会的前身可追溯到满清乾隆时期的“广州十三行”,二者都是全国闭关锁国下唯一的对外经贸窗口(这又是一处中共与满清相似乃至相同之处)。除了公开的广交会,还有在广东和香港边界私下进行的各种交易。

   中共政权利用广东与香港、南洋、西方的特殊关系和历史渊源,在闭关锁国时留下缝隙,以为中共特权阶层谋取利益。例如当时毛泽东、林彪、江青等人都从广东和香港的联系通道获得各种西方新式产品(例如淋浴设备),包括他们看的西方影片也是这样进口的。正是出于中共特权阶层的私利,中共才给了广东一定的自主权,这实在是一件讽刺的事。

   改革开放之后,邓小平决定在广东和福建等地进行对外开放和市场经济试点,在广东设立了深圳珠海两个经济特区,广东得到了巨大的发展机遇,有了更大的自主权。随着经济的腾飞,以及广东与香港联系的日益紧密(尤其香港回归后),广东及整个岭南地区的特色文化也得以恢复和发展,其在舆论上的话语权也明显增强。

   以《南方周末》和《南方都市报》为代表的南方系媒体,成为中国舆论界放言百弊、监督政府、关怀民生的领军者。而广东的公民社会及街头运动也一度有声有色。这与同样人文深厚(乃至更加深厚)却在舆论方面沉闷低调、几乎毫无声色的江浙,形成鲜明对比,凸显了广东在文化和舆论上的相对独立和富于特色。

相对于经济上的相对自主和文化上的相对自由,广东在政治上却仍然高度受制于中央。虽然广东的政治自主性和相对独立性高于江浙,但这只是比较而言。另外需要特别提及的是,广东的富裕繁荣的红利,很大程度被中共自建国前夕以来“南下”的北方干部家族所得,南方本土居民获益有限,且处于被这些“南下干部”家族的统治控制之下。广东也为国家贡献了巨额的税收收入,但大多数并未转移支付给在广东务工的内地家庭和贫困区域的弱势群体,而是进了全国各级官吏和背景深厚的豪商腰包。

   随着2013年习近平的上台和中国政治的极速收紧,广东政治、经济、文化、舆论的有限自主自由也很快被剥夺的所剩无几。而2020年中共挫败香港反修例运动和颁布《国安法》,则让作为广东外部依托的香港也日益内地化,广东的特殊地位和作用也迅速下降。广东现在变得越来越像江浙,成为供给中共权贵集团和其他财政亏损地域的“肉鸡”。

广东的各领域自主权之所以长期受限乃至最终被剥夺,当然同样是由于中共中国的单一制国家结构和中央集权。在这种体制下,即便赋予地方一定的自主权,也必然是有限的,更是随时可以剥夺的。对中共中央来说,让广东保有一些自主性,只不过为了发展经济,以维护中共政权的存续和利益。当地方的发展变革威胁到政权安全,那当然就会改弦更张,收回下放的权力。而广东地方政府和人民的利益,当然是不需要顾及的。

北京、上海、东北、江浙、广东,是对中共来说最为重要的五个地区。首崇北京、拉拢上海、供养东北、打压江浙、利用广东,就是中共政权对这五个地区的基本政策方针。

  其余地区

* ***   **陕西省、山东省、湖南省:具有重要战略价值、被中共特别重视、上层与平民贫富悬殊、地方政策为既得利益者服务

而其余的地区,中共同样有不同的对待。以上五地之外的汉族聚居区,中共相对看重和扶植的,是陕西省、山东省、湖南省。

陕西省是中原和西部的交界省,一般被划为西北地区(有时也会被视为中部地区的一部分)。而同样属于西北的甘肃、宁夏、青海,体量远小于陕西,新疆则是稳定大于一切的特殊地区。

   于是,陕西就成了中共扶植的控制西北、连接西部与中部东部的命脉之省,政策上高度倾斜,在此投入的政治、经济、文教、科技等资源,无论总量还是人均,都远超其周边所有省份(包括人口分别为陕西省两倍以上的河南省和四川省)。此外,陕西管辖的延安是中共革命圣地,同样是陕西一部分的榆林则是能源和工业重镇。这两地的特色和价值也是中共扶植陕西的重要原因。但除西安和榆林外,陕西其他地区包括延安都非常贫穷,地理环境也十分恶劣。

所以,中共扶植陕西省的结果,是导致西安一城独大(榆林市只有工矿但不适合生活),经济和科教文卫资源高度集聚于西安一地。虽然这种集中也有一定必然性和价值,但即便西安市民,受惠也分三六九等,贫者极贫,富者愈富。而自然地理和人文环境恶劣的陕西其他地区,就越发凋敝败落。显然,这样的扶植并不利于陕西整体的民生发展,只是符合中共的统治需要、有利于西安权贵的利益。

山东省则是中共政权崛起地和高层官员的重要来源地之一,政治经济地位颇高。虽然山东省不是土地革命时代的“革命老区”,但在抗日战争和国共内战期间却成为中共的重要根据地,为中共发展壮大和夺取政权起到重要作用。山东重农的经济特点和保守的文化特色与中共的“农民党”特质合拍,部分山东民众不怕吃苦、坚韧、顺从、蒙昧的特性,也让中共便于对其收买和利用。无论建国之前还是建国后至现在,中共大量军政人员皆出身于山东,山东也是中共军队主要兵源地。

中共政权着力培养山东成为北方经济大省,并试图将之与经济实力强劲的江浙、广东抗衡,以提高北方的经济权重。但正是因为山东省位于北方,官僚主义与保守主义色彩极为浓厚,阻碍了经济的进一步发展,经济成果也难以普惠民众而是被官僚掠走。山东本来也有深厚的人文底蕴,孔孟儒学也颇有可取之处,但中共为巩固统治却故意“取其糟粕、去其精华”,利用传统文化灌输忠君和服从,却故意无视儒学思想中的人道理念与民本立场,从而让山东人文环境更加恶化。

湖南省是毛泽东的家乡,也是中共起家地之一。出于饮水思源等原因,中共对湖南也多有扶植。但与陕西和山东一样,中共的扶植主要是为了巩固统治,其各种建设发展缺乏人道和普惠性。而湖南有“南方的北方”之称,本来风气就相对保守、民众较为愚昧(当然也有许多聪颖刚直之士,但只是湖南人的少数),社会崇尚暴力、官本位思想不亚于山东,精英与平民、城市与乡村(尤其省会长沙与其他市县乡村)有着巨大鸿沟,中共的统治和各种措施更加剧了湖南保守落后、社会不公。

以上三省,中共都对其有大量政策倾斜和各种资源投入。但由于中共政权的性质和特征,其各种政策扶植和资源投入,都无法真正普惠和可持续性的改善民生,也不能促进当地文教的公平有益发展。三省一直都有非常多的贫困人口,很小比例的人集中了大多数财富和资源。而专制下这些省份更不可能发展民权和兴起公民社会了。所以,即便这些得到中共偏爱的省份,在中共治下也是受害多于获利。

而上述的五个地区及三个省份之外中国的其他汉族聚居区,则普遍是被忽视、利用、损害、抛弃的对象。

**    **河北省、河南省:历史文化悠久、人口众多、遭受制度性不公正与剥削、平民百姓贫困且负担沉重、缺乏希望和日益沉沦
河北省,如前所述,关于它的各种政策和制度,都围绕着为北京服务(有时还包括天津)的原则,是京津的奴仆。它没有享受到邻近首都的任何好处(或者说好处微乎其微),却受尽了北京的剥削压迫。河北人是最能感受到中国地域不平等和户籍制度之恶的,是制度性地域不公的最大受害者。

   当今的河北没有自身独特的文化(“燕赵慷慨悲歌”早已在残酷的历史变迁和中共令人窒息的专制下被磋磨净尽),也缺乏省籍认同和历史自豪感,全省人民都在浑浑噩噩的为北京当“人肉电池”。虽然有许多中央层面的高官出身河北,但是他们几乎从未为家乡带来发展和利益,甚至总是站在中央和北京的利益立场上要求河北做出牺牲。这更能反映河北籍的上层精英与河北人民大众的割裂乃至对立。

   同样,那些在衡水中学等高考工厂里“内卷”出来上了名校的“天之骄子”们,也很少会回乡生活,而是千方百计远离河北,不让自己孩子再遭受作为河北人的种种苦难。如果中共政权不倒台、畸形的京津冀地域关系结构不改变,河北就不可能振兴和发展。

河南省,是中华文明的发祥地,曾经有过辉煌灿烂的历史,从商周至唐宋的一千多年中,一直是中华文明与汉文明的核心和精华地带。但是经过无数战争摧残尤其金国/女真、蒙元的入侵和破坏,异族的烧杀抢掠和横征暴敛,以及起义军与统治者的持续交战,曾经的东京梦华(开封)和东都繁盛(洛阳),都化作过眼云烟。明代的河南,已经非常没落和被忽视。明末农民起义和满清入侵,再次重创了河南。

   这些残酷的外敌入侵和内部战乱,让中原文明的中心河南,成了被侮辱与被损害的令人厌弃之地。清末和民国的历史变局中,全国许多省份都有枭雄和旗手,只有河南没有可以保境安民、兴建工商文教的政治强人,自然也没有实力雄厚的地方组织和势力。

正是因此,河南在近现代继续被侮辱和践踏,人民成为没有主心骨和凝聚力的孤魂野鬼。1942年河南大饥荒中灾民们在蝗虫、日军、国军的夹击下死亡枕藉,就是典型的写照。八年抗战,河南并非主战区,也无发生特别激烈的战役,但死于战争有关的人数却是全国各省最多,也反映了一盘散沙、无人照管的河南人民的悲惨。

而中共建政后,河南仍然是“朝中无人”。在“前三十年”,河南除了“一拖(洛阳东方红拖拉机厂/中国第一拖拉机制造厂)”和几个依托矿产资源的企业,几乎没有什么像样的工业,是十足的农业省份。但由于集体经济的低效和强制征粮政策,种粮食收粮食的河南人却经常吃不上粮食,除占河南人口很小比例的干部、工人、军人得到定量粮食供应(高级干部还有充足的肉、蛋、奶供应)及衣布配给外,大多数民众吃不饱穿不暖是常态。“足蒸暑土气、背灼炎天光”的辛劳之后,换来的是“遍身罗绮者,不是养蚕人”的“回报”。而河南众多的人口和人均稀少的资源,更是加剧了贫穷落后。

当时的中国整体非常贫困,河南省则是贫穷中的贫穷。改革开放后,河南经济有了发展,无论本省二三产业,还是赴外打工群体,都创造了可观的财富,民生也得到改善。但由于中央政策仍然不利于河南,如政治地位低于大多数省份,教育上仅给了河南省一个重点院校名额,人均转移支付也低于其他省份,河南省大多数人民仍然在为基本的生存挣扎。

*  *四川省及重庆市:独特的地理单元、具有鲜明地域特色、历史上曾辉煌且为国家民族贡献巨大、中下层民众贫穷

四川省,是中国兼具庞大人口和广阔面积的超级大省,是西南地区的代表。四川有着独特的地理环境,域内土地肥沃风调雨顺,还和周边尤其中原腹地相对分隔,本来应是安逸和与世无争的天府之国。

   但实际的历史上,许多中原政权和势力都流亡至此,将蜀地作为休养生息后夺取天下的跳板,多少蜀地儿郎成为外来大人物争雄天下的工具而死于疆场。“终黄土”的不止“卧龙跃马”,更有亲眷们“春闺梦里”才能相思相见的百万千万兵丁。

不过,外来势力的不断涌入,也让四川高度汉化、成为汉民族强固的一部分。保路运动、辛亥革命、抗日战争,近现代的四川人前赴后继的为国家民族的救亡复兴做出了巨大努力和牺牲。民国的四川也有一些能干的地方枭雄,地方自治和经济社会发展也在进行中。

中共建政后,四川丧失了相对的自主,与河南等地一样成了政权的“奶牛”,大饥荒中饿死的人数为全国最多。虽然1960-1970年代的“三线建设”让其有所受益,但只是让占人口很小一部分的党政军及公营机构人员获利,整体贫困落后的情况基本没有改观。

改革开放后,其发展程度和瓶颈与河南类似。中央集权下,地方的发展饱受制约,中央不仅不给予四川和河南这两个历史上有过独特辉煌的地区更多自主,还有意避免其形成地方势力和自我壮大,以保证四川和河南被中央牢固的控制于股掌之中。四川虽被中共当做西南的领军省份予以重视,但大多数民众获益有限。各种政策扶植和转移支付,与陕鲁湘三省一样,都被省内权贵和依附者瓜分,人民并没有得到什么利益。因为四川人口极多、省土广袤,所以人均分得的转移支付相对以上各省更少。

   还有,与陕西省的资源高度集中于省会西安一样,四川省会成都在全省独大、市民相对富有,而川地其他县市均非常贫穷(排名第二的绵阳市GDP总量仅有成都的八分之一,人均也只是成都的二分之一),发展极不均衡。

从四川省被分出的重庆市,虽然有了直辖市之名,但很大程度上没有直辖市之实。相对于京沪津,重庆受到的政策扶植较少,也没有它们那样的地位和话语权,人民享有的政策红利和社会保障更是远低于前三者。不过,以市而非省看待的话,重庆的政治地位和经济规模,仍然与四川省会成都并驾齐驱,是西南的重镇,在全国也至少是第二梯队的中坚。
***    ***安徽省、江西省:历史上曾长期经济发达和人文繁盛,但经历多次外敌入侵和内战走向衰落,今日当地经济有所起色但民众贫困,缺乏自主性和遭受剥削利用

安徽省和江西省,自古以来都相对周边贫穷。两地部分区域的民风都相对保守野蛮(尤其和邻近的江浙相比),官僚主义和底层暴力都较严重。这很大程度在于其地理环境不佳,以及地理与经济和人文的恶性循环。虽然两地也人才辈出,如安徽合肥、江西吉安和临川,皆是“才子之乡”,但对皖赣整体人文风貌和社会发展影响有限,人才流失严重。而多次战乱和民变让这里的环境更加糟糕。

   中共这个单一制政权,没有努力去促进安徽和江西的发展以弥合区域差距,而是以严酷压迫让两地安于贫穷,为其他地区输送廉价劳动力、农产品和矿产资源。江西省还是中共的革命老区,但中共并不怎么照顾江西,曾经的革命老区仍然高度贫穷。甚至出于对蒋介石、蒋经国父子在江西苦心经营的报复,中共还一直强烈打压江西的文教工商各方面。相对于国民政府和土豪劣绅,中共对江西农民的强制征粮征税,也更加野蛮无忌。这也反映了中共政权对人民的叛卖。

   相对于中共和中央政府的野蛮无情,倒是地理相近的江浙沪对皖赣两省经济社会发展有所促进,两省许多民众也通过在江浙沪务工经商得以温饱乃至发家致富(当然江浙沪也利用和剥削了皖赣的廉价劳动力,也对其人才及其他资源有虹吸并造成一定负面影响。另外,中共在打压江浙同时也对江浙有一定安抚,安抚内容即包括抑制安徽和江西的权力地位,令其在与江浙博弈中处于相对弱势贫乏一方)。
*  ****  ***其他省份
山西省、湖北省、福建省、海南省,因为其特殊的地理位置、历史文化、战略价值,相对独立于周边地区,各自自成一体。中共对这四地的态度都是利用,利用山西的煤炭资源、湖北的地理优势和水文资源、福建的战略位置及与台海的连接、海南的独特地理环境与位置。在利用的同时也有建设,但建设少于索取。

云南省、贵州省、广西省(广西壮族自治区,但一般也视为汉地),则是被忽视和边缘化的。相对于中共在东北三省的巨大投入,地理位置相对的西南三省正是反面典型。这三省在中央也缺乏话语权,很难影响政权的决策和执行。

   虽然近年来三省也有很大发展,但自力更生所得远多于中央的赐予。中共的确在这些地区进行了扶贫开发,但人均每月实际得到的资源和补助,恐怕还不如京沪一般公务员下馆子的一顿普通餐费。相对于平民的贫苦,三省各地的本土家族、少数民族精英,则被中共扶植和“统战”,获得了各种制度和政策的红利,协助中共政权维持着西南的宁定。

甘肃和青海两省,虽然因为地理位置的重要(位于汉族和少数民族交界和混居区,甘肃连通中原、西南、西北,青海位于长江、黄河、澜沧江等河流的源头)、自然资源的相对丰富,得到了中央的一些扶植,又因为人口较少所以人均得到的资源较多,但有限的资源主要被权贵和体制内人士所得,平民大众还是生活在贫穷中,文化教育和社会风貌也长期落后。
   ** **总结
总之,在中共的单一制国家结构及中央地方关系模式下,整体普遍受益的地区只有北京、天津、上海、东北四地,陕西、山东、湖南也得到一些相对的好处,但以上各地也只有域内部分人受益,而其余地区整体上都不同程度的受害。而各地的受益和受害,取决于中央的政策导向及各地的话语权。还有,全国所有地区得到的一定程度的优惠政策和资源配给,其利益的大多数皆是被权贵精英及依附者瓜分,平民则都是被侮辱与被损害者(只不过不同地区、不同阶层、不同细化身份的平民,被侮辱与损害程度有所区别)。

中共有意采取“分而治之”的策略,将全国各地以省级行政单位分割,一切管理与政策皆分省而行。中共也在不同地域和行政区域故意实行差别待遇,以加剧地域冲突对立、避免各地方团结,以巩固专制极权。而户籍制度则是分化各地的最重要手段。

   中共建政后的许多年,不仅城乡之间的户口迁移非常困难,跨省的户口变动也被政权紧密控制。虽然现在跨省迁移户口的政策有所松动,但户籍制度仍然在阻碍跨地域的人口流动,尤其京沪津三地的户籍很难取得。虽然不迁移户籍也可以去外省旅行和工作,但往往难以享受在地的各种权利和社会保障,也会在办事过程中面临更多麻烦。

   正常的单一制国家,国民是完全自由流动的,在哪里就是哪里人。而中共中国则一方面通过单一制强化中央集权、号令全国,却又设置了比各联邦制国家还严格许多倍的区域壁垒,并将人民用户口绑在特定的省份乃至具体的市县乡村。中国这种畸形的单一制国家结构,世间除朝鲜外再无他例。

此外,中共政权虽然严格限制地方党政机构和官员的权力,对地方严密管控,打压地方及地方官民自主性,不过这种中央集权主要是用于维护中共政权统治及统治集团利益,对于地方党政机构及官员、公务员、地方强人、农村宗族势力、底层流氓恶霸,以及这些机构、群体、个人的依附者的各种恶行,包括中共中央和国务院在内的最高层却是默许、放任、鼓励的。

   例如中国自80年代起至今人口贩卖问题极为严重,电影《盲山》中的情节迄今还在发生,如2022年还曝出如“徐州八孩”事件这样的丑闻,但中央政府却对此睁一只眼闭一只眼,对购买妇女和儿童的买家往往根本不予处罚或量刑畸轻。这显然是出于稳住颇具暴力能力的农村男性和宗族势力考虑,而不惜牺牲女性和儿童的权利自由乃至起码做人的尊严。对于各地方其他同样普遍的恶行如贪污腐败、暴力执法、制假贩假、滥砍乱伐,中央也是放任或选择性执法。

对于中央统治者而言,放纵地方官员和黑恶势力作恶,对底层种种丑恶不闻不问或有意偏袒强势一方,虽然损害人民利益、影响政权形象、招致民众不满,但却能够变相收买和控制各地官员和强人,既可以通过包庇纵容官员和强人的违法犯罪、满足其各种欲望与利益需求,以拉拢其效忠,又可以借助对他们作恶违法的选择性执法来慑服他们,令其不得不依附与忠诚于中央和最高层的特权者。而各地弱势的民众,则成了中央权贵和地方既得利益者拉拢对方和利用对方的“礼物”和“棋子”。显然,这样的中央集权不仅没有发挥以集权打击地方邪恶腐朽势力的作用,还助长和加剧了各地强人恶人的为非作歹。

因此,中共治下中国的单一制国家结构,有着极大的弊害。它既剥夺了地方的自主权,又设置了区域壁垒“分而治之”,还在不同区域的发展和竞争中“拉偏架”、制造地域矛盾,抑制可以挑战中央权威的地区发展,并且通过户籍制度迫使国民依附于政权。而且中共的中央集权体制下,中央反而放任地方官员和恶霸胡作非为、鱼肉百姓,集权成为维护统治的工具,而非保护人民的后盾。这对于中国各区域尤其江浙和中原的发展、中国全境的革新进步、中国全体国民的自由与平等,都是极大的损害。

 **  **中国各地域的统一与分离问题(主要谈各汉族区域,少数民族地区另有文章表述)

虽然我设计的汉族聚居区是不同于少数民族及港澳台的单一制中央集权结构,但我也认为应该给各地方以分离独立的权利。“强扭的瓜不甜”,民主中国的统一、汉族聚居区的团结,应该是建立在对历史、文化、价值观的共同认同,相同的道德自律和言行方式,以及各地方共同利益的相对一致基础上的。如果某些区域的众多人士离心离德,制造种种事端,那不如一拍两散。

例如中共中国对首都北京市的独尊和赋予北京户籍市民的特权,在民主中国就不能再存在,这必然导致北京既得利益者们的反弹(即便不追溯此前的既得利益、仍然让他们保留更高起点)。北京在建国以来之所以一直保持繁荣、北京户籍居民得到远超其他任何地区的种种福利配给和特权,几乎完全依赖于中央政策的高度倾斜和其他区域的资源输入。反过来,北京却没有在经济政治文化等各方面对全国有反哺和助益。而未来民主中国,无论北京是否还是首都(我倾向于在其他城市建都,如武汉、南京、西安、杭州、郑州、洛阳、长沙,都可作为民主中国首都备选地,个人认为武汉最宜),都不再可能有如今这样的“输血”强度,北京市民尤其中共统治下有北京户籍的居民,也不可能再有如今的各种地域特权。即便还是首都居民,所享有的各种基本社会保障和公共服务,起码在制度层面也与全国各地相同。

而北京为代表的北方保守顽固、充满封建皇权等级色彩的思想文化,以及各种文化和制度影响下塑造的“潜规则”和人的言行习惯,也严重阻碍中国的发展进步与人民权利的伸张,民主后必须削弱乃至清除这类思想文化并摧毁其根基。而对于各种通过公然的或潜规则作恶获利的北京居民尤其权贵阶层,也需要进行揭露、批判、审判、改造、自新。如果不能从根本上摧毁旧的丑恶的思想、行为模式、社会结构,重塑各阶层价值观念和行为方式,即便废除不平等的制度和法律,各种丑恶亦会以各种相对隐蔽的形式存在,蛰伏待机、勾连内外反动势力,并会在民主法治不彰、正义力量虚弱时卷土重来。

   中共统治下中国重现明清尤其满清时期的专制体制、等级制度、闭关自守、潜规则、各种丑恶的思想和文化、对个人自由和社会舆论的钳制,尤其“红卫兵”和“白卫兵(防疫人员)”再现“义和团”的反智愚昧狂热,各种丑恶百年未变,都是民国时未深刻反思和批判旧人旧物,导致的血淋淋的前车之鉴、正在发生的历史悲剧再现。假如早几十年充分省思历史悲剧、挖掘历史根源,从结构与根底上改变传统,文革和今日防疫的悲剧与荒唐就不可能重演。

   如果未来民主中国仍然姑息敷衍,不审判旧日的既得利益者,不厘清是非曲直,不铲除根基,一时半会可能得到宁定和平,但作恶者实力犹在,也不会真心悔改。即便一时沉寂和边缘化,但其旧日积累的资源人脉仍在,内心也期盼复辟和重作恶行,早晚会趁民主进步势力虚弱时卷土重来(乃至在民主进步势力强盛时,他们也会或明或暗的制造事端,通过“耳语”和“潜规则”继续荼毒国家和人民。或者,直接渗入民主进步政权,让政权蜕变为和明清、中共一样的货色)。对于没有廉耻和自省精神的人,进步势力的宽容大度只会被当成软弱和容易欺骗。而这些素养低下、没有道德和同情心同理心的群体强大乃至掌权后,却不会同样程度的宽容进步势力和弱势群体,而是对前者批伤批残,乃至批斗致死;对后者则予取予求、拼命奴役,在“使用完毕”后冠以“低端人口”加以野蛮驱逐。

这样的情形不改变,会让未来的北京和全中国持久腐烂,乃至发生更大的祸乱,不断重演历史上的种种悲剧。这样的事情已经发生多次且现在还正在发生,难道未来还要不断重复循环吗?如果民主之后“算了”,那说不定过几十年又会重蹈覆辙,甚至这些势力就会成为颠覆民主、扼杀自由、破坏进步的关键力量。因此,“转型正义”必须进行,旧制度、旧势力、旧思想必须予以批判和清除,过程中也必然伴有许多惩罚与破坏。

   当然,不仅北京,全中国都要“转型正义”,但专制和丑恶的中心当然需要加倍重视和改造。不过,我并不是说要大肆杀戮,甚至一个都不杀,但要充分回溯历史、挖掘机密、扒开内幕,充分厘清各种人与事的真相并完全公开,然后加以反思和批判,就如纳粹德国的“去纳粹化”过程、南非/韩国/台湾地区/西班牙的转型过程、美国的“扒粪运动”和民权运动那样,从本质上瓦解丑恶存在的土壤和根基。

而且,如果不如此的批判和改造,而是轻轻放过,他们甚至都不知道自己种种行为是作恶,如户籍特权、无人道政策、暴力执法、官僚主义、形式主义、阶级/地域/性别歧视、欺压老弱、各种潜规则与私相授受……他们把当成理所当然,认知不到这些是错的、是损害他者利益的、违背现代文明的,甚至许多人还以拥有各种特权和“关系”为荣,以“根正苗红”自居。包括口口声声自由民主法治的许多北京籍中国自由派知识分子、异见人士,也并不在乎或者知道但有意回避户籍特权和阶级特权问题,拒绝谈论是否应废弃,更不谈自身愿不愿意放弃这些既得利益。因此,只有正视这些丑恶和不公,彻彻底底的揭露批判,才能让加害者、受害者、社会各界各方,都从心底抛弃丑恶,重新做人。

对北京的既得利益者们,对这些改变的感受必然如同“一落千丈”。但民主中国不可能继续让这些人寄生于其他地区及“北漂”人士的劳动成果之上,不可能让河北等地人民在民主之后还忍受被北京制度性剥削压迫的痛苦。民主中国也不能再容忍皇权专制、等级观念、阴损潜规则的大行其道。在这样的情况下,如果北京市民无法接受失去各种特权、北京变成一座地方城市(而非首都)的现实,他们也有权通过公投等方式离开民主中国。如果要留在民主中国,北京市民同样要放弃一切特权和不合情理法的利益,与他地他人平等相处。(天津市也同理,民主之后将并入河北省,不再享有任何地域特权)(其实,即便废除北京和天津的各种特权,原京津户籍居民仍然可以依靠旧有既得利益拥有远好于全国平均水平的生活、更多的资源和机遇)

还有,如前所述,虽然北京市民尤其户籍居民享有各种福利和优越性,但内部亦分成三六九等,除最高领导人外其他人同样在一些情形上是弱者和奴仆(最高领导人其实也难安枕),没有人是完全的受益者,所有人都一定程度受害。即便相对受益者,也在这样的环境中丧失了纯洁、扭曲了心灵,还因参与丑恶而承受各种压力与负担。如许多“做题家”辛辛苦苦拿到北京户口,甚至进入“体制内”,却仍然只是为权贵打下手的“工作机器”,看着各种丑恶只能沉默和屈从,自身也饱受压榨,甚至成为他人罪过的“背锅侠”。虽然相对大多数国人富足,但是也近距离感受到更多不公不义。这些人难道不希望换一种人人平等、社会自由、有起码尊严的生活吗?
而对于那些没有取得或暂时没有取得北京户口乃至居住证的“北漂”,身在北京并对北京发展建设有着巨大贡献(甚至远比那些尸位素餐的权贵更有贡献,付出的劳动和血汗则更是多了许多倍)却不能享有权利和福利,难道他们的利益、情感、尊严、人权,就不如北京户籍居民尤其权贵“金贵”吗?这样的人占到北京常住人口的一半,如加上其他经常在京的外地人,起码占到三分之二。难道这些人不配称为“北京人”、不能代表北京的利益与诉求吗?

北京从中国分离,其实也可以给那些中共统治时期的权贵精英、各种既得利益者乃至恶人一个退路。不仅北京,中共统治下全中国各地的权贵精英,尤其残酷对待民众、背有血债的中共高官和打手,非常担心被人民尤其各种受难者及家属清算、报复,他们也正是因此而恐惧和拒绝变革。

   因此,不如将北京作为民主后给他们的“自留地”,一个能保全自身安全和家人性命的退路,允许其独立建国。不仅北京当地特权阶层,从上海到南京,从广州到成都,从西藏到新疆,全国各地的类似人士及其家属都可以在民主化期间和之后迁到北京,去过他们自己的日子。他们分离出去,和民主中国隔离,人民不用忍受他们的剥削压迫,也能阻塞他们破坏民主转型的企图,而他们自己也可以不用日夜不安的担心,不用害怕人民像他们对待人民那样对待他们。这也是一种另类的“两全其美”了。我想不仅我个人,大多数人民也乐意甩出去这些丑恶的东西。倒是这些权贵精英,或许会为不能再继续骑在人民头上作威作福、享有各种特权,而懊恼和不甘,甚至希望留在民主中国,利用旧有资源人脉继续渗透政权、荼毒人民。(其实,不仅北京,全国其他地区若区域内大多数人认同中共统治模式、价值观、社会形态、人文风貌,也可以公投与中共控制的北京合并。这样,那些真诚认为中共统治好于自由民主开放社会的“自干五”们,也就得其所愿。而民主中国则抛掉了这些麻烦和障碍,免去许多不安定因素。两全其美,岂不快哉)

如果说北京既得利益者起码暂时还乐于留在中国,而中国东北则长期都有一定的离心倾向。如前所述,东北地区有着相对关内而言特殊的历史沿革、族群认同、文化风貌。不同于中国关内各地往往同呼吸共命运,东北的兴衰与关内不仅不同步,甚至往往是关内繁荣时东北凄苦、东北兴盛时关内凋敝,且并非偶合而是相关。东北地区的许多居民,虽然大多数是汉族,但其中一部分人的价值观、利益诉求、立场,与关内各地颇有差别乃至相互冲突。即便他们在中共建政这数十年得到了除北京之外全国最为偏爱的政策倾斜和资源输入,却反而认为自己吃了亏。其经常提及“支援全国”,可这本来就是建立在一开始资源配置就严重不公的基础上的。例如建国初期苏联援助中国的156个工业项目,三分之一以上都安置在了东三省,且重要性和质量更是高于全国其他区域所得。“前三十年”,全国其余地方得到的苏援和其他投入,还不如东北这一隅。这对全国其他地区显然是不公平的,但部分东北人从不考虑这点,甚至认为这种不公平分配天经地义。这就是只要权利和利益,却不考虑作为中国一部分、汉族大家庭成员应承担的责任与义务。

还有他们声称向全国供给了多少粮食和矿产资源,可这些并不是白送给其他地区的,其他地区是通过金钱购买或资源置换得到的,且往往是以高于国际市场价格收购的。而且,东北各种矿产资源如石油、煤炭,并非东北居民劳动创造所得,仅仅是其居住地区恰巧有相关资源罢了。就像沙特、阿联酋、科威特等国,凭借石油赚的盆满钵满,但根本上说是不劳而获,其拥有的石油资源和其自身劳动创造毫无关系(不仅与现在的住民无关,和其祖辈祖先也没有关系),无助于现代工业文明的铺展(甚至还助力了封建保守顽固、形成能源依赖(“荷兰病”)),有什么值得炫耀的呢(当然,东北还好一些,毕竟当地居民参与劳动了,沙特等国则是雇佣外国劳动力做苦工,本国人只当高管或者干脆躺平不工作拿高额福利)?当地居民真正有资格拿的,只包括自己作为开采者付出的劳动所应得的报酬、资源开采对土地的占用和造成环境污染的补偿,其他收益其实都是非合理所得。何况,其他地区包括南方同样向东北输送了各种有形资源和无形财富,如中部的农产品、南方和西北的有色金属矿产、上海江浙的高校师资。东北所获的“输血”,无论从量还是质,都超过了其“造血”的成果。

至于90年代的大下岗,的确是巨大的悲剧。但东北及全国各地低效和负担沉重的国企,是必须要改革的,否则国家经济就会崩溃,受害的是包括东北平民大众在内的全国大多数人民(国家经济崩溃,东北也会被波及)。东北在“前三十年”得到了极大的偏爱,那当然也应该要有所付出。下岗工人没有得到妥善安置、各种补偿款被侵吞,其实很多也是东北籍的官员和权贵造成的,歌手曲婉婷的母亲、前哈尔滨市发改委副主任张明杰,就是侵占下岗工人补偿款的贪官的典型。而且,大下岗中的国企下岗工人的确悲惨,但当时中国的农民和没有编制身份的城市居民更加悲惨。国企下岗工人是从天堂坠落地狱,而农民和无编制的城市居民则是一直都生活在地狱里,前者的悲惨从落差上看更大,而后者的悲惨在总量上更多。

面对这些显而易见的事实,许多东北人仍然视而不见。还有现实中一些东北人也与其他地区的汉族有矛盾冲突,相互都有怨恨。而且很多东北人也怀念当年“满洲国”的“辉煌”,觉得东北工业发达、自然资源禀赋优越,认为独立就能发展的更好。既然如此,那不如遂了他们心愿。如果他们希望与日本或俄国合并,或建立某种特殊关系,那也听凭其愿。中国的确难以管束他们,或许日俄反而能教化成功,历史好像也的确证明了这一点。如果他们想复制历史上对关内的入侵,那中国内地当然也可以复制二战中联合欧美各国对抗日本的“ABCD(美英中荷)包围圈”,以及如今乌克兰依靠北约和欧盟对抗俄罗斯的模式,捍卫国家利益和世界和平。

   而且东北的社会风气和部分人的价值观乃至言语思路,都与其他国人极不相同。具体差异很多,在此仅举一例。例如部分东北人一方面总是以自己几十年来在社会福利和生活水平方面的相对优势自豪,并通过嘲笑关内的贫穷和苦难炫耀优越性;另一方面在涉及关于转移支付、各种政策倾斜问题上,又不断提及自身的条件不足、贫穷落后,以及南方如何发达富裕、理应让利给东北。他们可以在不同场合同时使用这两种逻辑和话术,并且一点不觉得矛盾和愧疚,实在令人叹为观止。仅这一点,部分关内人和部分东北人就很难能正常沟通。其他类似的价值观和言行想必许多人也都有所领会。当然,这也并不是部分东北人天生如此,也是各种客观环境所致,且其在与中国其他地区民众打交道时,同样感觉不适,认为对方伤害了自身感情、触犯了自己尊严,我相信这种感觉是真实的,好像根据他们逻辑也有一定道理。也就是说并非完全一方对一方错。而是形成“文化冲突”,并导致各种现实冲突,冤冤相报何时了。既然如此,那何必都痛苦呢?(我并不是说关内其他地方的人都没有双重标准和虚伪撒谎,但是要论缺乏羞耻自省、以之为荣,那部分东北人的确令他者望尘莫及)

   如果大多数东北居民还是愿意留在民主中国,那也需要放弃各种不合情不合理的特权,遵守法纪和公序良俗,以及解决一些历史遗留问题,和其他地域同样实行“转型正义”且要更加深彻的思想文化改造,然后和其他地区居民平等的生活在中国领土。

如果北京、天津、东北一方面希望留在民主中国,一方面又不愿意放弃种种特权,还在民主中国内部使用各种手段专横跋扈、巧取豪夺,破坏国家团结与安宁,那民主中国其余地区应进行集体公投,将此三地从民主中国强行分离出去。另外,对于这三地尤其东北地区出身、在全国其他地区生活的成员,若其里通外国、不遵守法律和公序良俗,乃至成为渗透在汉族民主中国各地的“第五纵队”式的势力,那应将这些人驱逐出境、遣返属地。否则,对于全国其他多数地区,尤其河北、河南、江苏、浙江、山西、山东等地,等于是延续中共治下中国地域不平等的损害,是对数亿国人权利与利益的破坏,也是未来民主中国的巨大祸患。

清末革命家章太炎就曾对国土问题有过论述:“若满洲政府自知不直,退守旧封,以复靺鞨金源之迹,凡我汉族,当与满洲何怨?以神州之奥博,地邑民居,殷繁至矣,益之东方三省,愈泯棼不可理。若以汉人治汉,满人治满,地稍迫削,而政治易以精严”。而中华民国没有放弃周边而是贪图领土,于是造成了后来百年的各种民族和地域问题及连带的更大问题。假如民国干脆舍弃包括东北、内蒙、热河、北京等与汉族文明离心离德或异化中华的地区,与维藏等西部民族达成友好折中的分治共治协议,守住燕赵之南、陕甘以东的汉族中国本体,其余地区甚至可以作为和缓与俄日关系的手段附赠予之,或许就能让一个真正的汉民族主义国家屹立,然后再软硬兼施的文明渗化和武力防守反击,徐图故土,得到真正心悦诚服的旧地,也就可能避免了后来几十年的祸乱。

就像美国早年只据有东部十三州,主体人口是英裔移民(另有一定数量的法裔、德裔、爱尔兰裔、意大利裔移民,这些移民文化和价值观较接近,且英裔占压倒性多数),然后随着繁荣发展逐步开拓,反而愈发繁荣。如果一开始就包括西部南部相对落后之地、族群及文化颇为不同的人口,反而可能难以发达,甚至会有更多次类似于南北战争的内战或对峙。而美国发达、文明、强大之后,德克萨斯和夏威夷等地主动要求并入,波多黎各则想加入而不得,墨西哥许多人也都希望成为美国公民。这时强大自信的美国,也能相对从容包容不同族群(虽然仍然没有很好解决族群差异问题,拉美裔的族群问题虽不如非裔严重,但也很是棘手。可想而知早年加入美国会如何)。

而土耳其的凯末尔,果断放弃土耳其本土外原奥斯曼帝国所有非土耳其人为主体的领土和殖民地(包括近在咫尺的叙利亚),但对土耳其人为主的小亚细亚半岛及首都伊斯坦布尔寸步不让,成功斩断各种内外麻烦、实现土耳其的现代化和民族振兴。而在凯末尔去世后数十年的今天,与其意识形态大异但都热爱土耳其国家民族的埃尔多安,就在凯末尔保有的国力基础上试图复兴奥斯曼帝国荣光,向非土耳其裔地区扩充影响,并有所成就。如果不谈是非对错、只论利弊得失,美国和土耳其“舍外固内”、“先弃后取”的决定显然都是非常成功的。

   而如今的中国,国内民族/族群和地域问题并没有好于民国,几十年来不仅没有解决问题,还愈演愈烈,并成为阻碍国家民主转型和社会进步的巨大障碍。因此,面对价值观念和言行方式与其他区域有明显差异、所获远大于贡献的东北,以及代表保守糟粕思想文化、作为专制体制顽固据点、充满各种权贵既得利益者、向全国吸血却缺乏贡献的北京,人文差劣且价值很低的天津,其他汉族区域人民不仅未因这三地是中国一部分而得利,反而受害不浅,放弃未必是坏事,甚至利远大于弊。

其他地区也应该基于自愿决定留在中国还是分离独立。就例如四川,如前所述它是一个相对独特的地理区域,也有相对鲜明特色的地方文化。它历史上既被外来的汉族政治人物利用,导致“功成功败万骨枯”,但也得到汉族思想文化的浸润,实现了文明开化并融合于泱泱中华,在近现代更是与中国其他地区同抗争共患难。“天府之国”既在许多短暂时期受害于中州入侵,但长远而言更受益于中华文明。无论是武侯祠,还是杜甫草堂,都象征着汉民族脊梁在蜀地的伸展,让川渝闪耀着华夏英杰的辉光。对四川来说,究竟是留在民主中国且作为汉族聚居区一部分、继续作为中华文明一份子,在经济社会上与周边汉地连为一体,还是分离独立并构建特色的文明形态,哪个更利于四川及四川人民?

   地域特性突出的广东也是类似。广东的一些本土主义思潮可以理解,但细究起来颇有值得商榷之处。广东在改革开放以来迅速发展,成为中国经济第一大省,也是向中央财政上缴款项最多的省份。但广东的发达,一方面是凭借区位优势,另一方面更利用了中部和西部各省的廉价劳动力,以及背靠全国的资源和市场,并非广东一省的功劳。尤其是小珠三角之外的广东普遍贫穷,更反应了广东自身的乏力。广州和深圳的高度发达,其实和香港类似,都更多是借助天时地利,连通中外,才得以发达。仅靠广东自身,其恐怕并不会比其隔壁的广西和北邻的湖南发达多少。

   广东的粤文化的确独具特色,但粤文化更多是在汉文化的浸润下才更加文明和丰富。 例如香港作家金庸的“飞雪连天射白鹿,笑书神侠倚碧鸳”系列小说及改编的各种作品,成为粤文化和香港文艺的标杆,但这些故事从情节来源到道德价值,皆出自汉地与汉文化。这些作品最广为传诵的地方,也是中国大陆大江南北,因为只有同文同种的中国人才最能感知和明白金庸作品的内涵和意蕴。而其他广东和香港的艺术与人文作品,从武侠小说到言情剧,从纪实文学到政治研究,无不与中国、中华、汉民族和汉文化有关。如果比喻,在一盘菜中,粤文化就像香料与麻油,而汉文化则是菜本身,只有后者没有前者,就寡淡乏味,但前者如果没有后者,就等于釜底抽薪而直接无用。

   显然,广东和中国内地更多是互补互利,而非一方的施舍恩赐。那么,广东究竟是要独立成国以弘扬粤地本土文化和捍卫当地利益,还是作为中华文明一部分、捍卫汉民族的南部陆海之疆,和民主中国其余地区优势互补、一起发展壮大?这当然应由广东人民来决定,并同时考虑中国其他地区的利益与情感。

而中国最发达的城市上海市,在民主中国仍然会是直辖市,但不应再对外地人有各种歧视性政策壁垒,本地居民也丧失户籍特权(不过可以暂时保留部分教育、医疗、养老、住房的优惠,但会逐步取消,最终会完全废止制度和政策层面的特权和优先权。但原来所获的物质和非物质利益,都不再追溯褫夺。这样原上海户籍居民仍然在起点上优于后来者),上海居民愿不愿意接受?上海的繁荣发展,同样是全国人民共同付出的结果,而地理区位的得天独厚也起到了重要作用,上海土著和获上海户籍的“新上海人”的自我奋斗只是占到贡献的一小部分。上海以开放进取包容和国际化自居,那么在制度上难道应该和印度的种姓制度看齐吗(而且印度已废除了种姓制度,还反而给低种姓人士各种优惠政策以平权扶助)?与上海地位、性质、规模类似的城市,如纽约、伦敦、巴黎、东京、孟买、里约热内卢,皆无户籍制度和其他制度性地域特权,上海人民难道真的非要厚着脸皮保留这些专制与等级社会的残渣?如果那样,上海也可以选择公投独立。
关于中国大陆之外香港、澳门、台湾的离合,也应以民意为基础。在以前,我认为港澳台回归祖国,对中国大陆人民来说当然值得骄傲和自豪,而那些港独台独分子则罪该万死。但是经过多年的了解观察接触,越来越明白是非黑白并非这样简单。国家统一的根本目的,当然是为了整个国家和民族的利益、全体国民的幸福。而在中共治下,除了占人口少数的权贵阶层,全都生活中在巨大不幸之中(其实权贵也是缺乏安全感的,“一人之下万人之上”者也是受压迫者,最高领袖也是处于终身不安中)。这样的国家体制和社会状态,为什么非要更多人来受苦呢?

   而“一国两制”同样并非真正良好的制度设计。且不说反修例运动后香港的“一国两制”已打了巨大折扣(虽然仍然有不同制度和社会形态),即便真的履行“一国两制”,不谈对港台人的影响,仅看对大陆人,也不是好的和公平的事。
   许多国家和地区的民众赴港都是免签入境,而中国大陆居民却需要额外办理“港澳通行证”且往往停留限期很短(短期旅游仅允许停留7天(大陆人持中国护照过境香港,可免签停留7天,但仅限于过境中转),而与中国大陆人口接近、经济水平更差的印度的国民来港,则可以免签证停留14天)。而香港居民享有的各种权利与福利,即便在香港上学、工作、旅行的大陆人也不能享有或起码无法完全享有。而香港从官方制度到民间社会,也普遍对大陆人施以歧视。

显然,大陆人在香港只是“二等公民(甚至更低,如欧美日韩公民在香港都得到更多尊重)”。这样的“一国两制”,对大陆人无异于赤裸裸的歧视、剥削、伤害。回归后的香港,对大陆人俨然如外国殖民“租界”,香港人在制度和现实中公然凌驾于大陆人之上,大陆人值得骄傲吗?而具体到大陆人个体,只有权贵精英和一部分与香港关系紧密的民众得益,大多数中国大陆的平民百姓,除了因香港回归有了一些虚幻的自豪感,没有任何实际受益。如对山西某位挖煤工、江西“革命老区”某位农民、云南某位少数民族山民,香港的繁华和陆港的一统,与他/她们在实质上有一分钱的关系吗?(即便反修例运动和《国安法》颁布后日益“内地化”的香港,整体仍然如是)

   而如果台湾回归,同样如此甚至更甚。由于台湾相对香港更大的“统战价值”,大陆对台湾的优惠和许诺更丰厚,特权也更多。如台湾人可以直接申请北京户口并基本100%成功,这就是90%以上中国大陆人梦寐以求而不得的。而澳门居民也有类似于港台的特权,仅118平方公里的面积、65万人口的规模,其政治地位和话语权份量却超过全国大多数省份。
此外,根据“一国两制”的设计细则,无论香港、澳门、台湾,其都不需要上缴中央财政一分钱,也不需要承担任何经济社会方面的国家义务(仅需承担保持统一和政治稳定的义务,甚至这个义务都不需要完全承担),哪怕其财政收入和人均GDP都居全中国最前列(而人均GDP低于港澳台的上海、江浙、广东,均要拿出巨额财政收入转移给其他省份)。相反,大陆需要不断出台各种“惠港/惠台”政策,许多政策红利反而需要大陆居民付出代价、让渡权利和利益。统一祖国难道只是让大陆人头上多这么一些“大爷”吗?

   而这一切,即便在中国大陆实现民主化之后,也不会有迅速和根本的改变。香港和台湾已和大陆隔离太久,无论利益、文化和价值观、生活习惯,都与大陆相异乃至冲突,并不是制度一致就可以全面接轨的(何况民主制度也分许多种类)。澳门虽然亲近中国大陆,但也不愿意和大陆完全并轨。尤其如果在社会保障和财政收支方面与大陆合并同一,即便循序渐进,他们也很可能会激烈反对的。

   在这样的情况下,民主后三地与大陆的离合,最好还是遵从三地民众的意愿,而非强制统一。而且,如果统一,也必须像北京、上海那样,逐步废止各种“特权”。即便仍然作为自治区、异于汉族聚居区的另外联邦主体,可以拥有一些特别的权力、制度、政策,但是不能有凌驾于中央政府和大陆人民的特权(但旧有既得利益不再褫夺),并且承担与其他地方相同的义务。这样的统一才是真正让两岸四地皆平等的统一,而非为了名义的大一统和被虚化的民族尊严。这也是对大陆人民而言最好的统一方式。

总之,中国的统一与分离,要尊重全国各地人民的意愿。
但各地自决独立,需要满足一定的面积和人口规模,如需同时满足面积超过10万平方公里、域内人口超过3000万且连接成片的区域,才有权进行集体自决独立(如整个区域是完整的省级行政区划,或少数民族自治区中的汉族聚居区、汉族聚居区中的少数民族聚居地,则不满足这些条件亦可公投独立,或并入相同民族的自治区或国家)。否则,每个市县乃至乡镇村庄都进行“独立公投”,国家安定将不复存在、社会秩序也将陷入混乱。此外,与各联邦主体的“公投冷却期”相同,如汉族聚居区中一地独立公投未能通过,则20年内不能再进行独立公投,这同样是基于国家安定和维护社会秩序的考量。
只有基于真心诚意的国家公民与民族身份认同、同大于异的价值取向和利益诉求,民主中国各地尤其各汉族聚居区才能真正团结一心、共谋发展。前述的杨度对统一与分离的看法,不仅可以评价不同民族的离合,对同一民族不同地域、不同意识形态立场群体也适用,对统独问题应顺势而为而非强求统一。而且,对于只是吸血却乏建设、对经济政治文化社会皆无积极贡献甚至是“负贡献”、破坏国家团结和内部安宁的势力,与其强留导致鸠占鹊巢、内讧不断、如鲠在喉,不如去除以强固本体、摆脱掣肘。尤其对于汉文明的两大核心地带中原和江南而言(还有受压榨更残酷的华北(河北、山西),与压榨和束缚自身的地区分离,是有利无害的事。

(我内心深处,是非常希望实现全中国包括港澳台在内所有汉族聚居区的完全统一,实现制度和法律的同一、国民享有权利自由和社会福利保障的均一、身份认同和内政外交步调的一致、全境内经济社会的完全一体,整个民族和国家如一人,一元一体。但这不应该依靠强迫实现,起码不应该依靠完全强迫,而应该主要以思想文化的博大与价值观念的先进、制度法律政策的科学进步、经济繁荣和人民生活的殷实安定,产生难以阻遏的吸引力、真诚认同的向心力、强固不破的凝聚力,并完全同化异质族群,让以汉族为主体的民主中国达至真正的统一,并江山永固、长治久安。但是,中共政权的户籍制度、特区制度、两岸分治,以及其他各种或明或暗的基于地域和其他身份的歧视性制度和规则、对不同国人的分割与挑唆,加之各地域固有的隔阂与矛盾,已经在相当程度上撕裂了包括汉族聚居区在内的整个中国,让国民人心离散、相互仇视,想真正让两岸四地和全国数十个行政区的民众,舍弃既得利益和各种优越性,并发自内心的走向统一,已是难上加难。当然,无论现在还是未来,无论是否民主,我们都应该竭尽全力促成中国的统一与团结,但如果仍然无法阻止分离,那就“天要下雨,娘要嫁人”,随其自然吧)

总括而言,民主中国将实行联邦制,将全国划为9个联邦主体,包括“内地汉族统合区(汉族聚居区)”、5个少数民族聚居区、港澳台三个特殊地区。但具体而言,汉族聚居区将实行类似于单一制的中央地方关系结构,保障国家的统一、发展、进步,实现人民的自由、平等、幸福。

reddit.com
u/Slow-Property5895 — 5 days ago

Sanae Takaichi’s Visit to India: The Historical Trajectory of Japan–India Cooperation, and the Gap Between Vision and Reality

On July 1, Japanese Prime Minister Sanae Takaichi visited India and attended the annual Japan–India Summit, where she received a warm welcome from the Indian side. This marked the first visit to India by a Japanese prime minister in three years, following then–Prime Minister Fumio Kishida’s visit in 2023. Takaichi’s visit can also be regarded as a return visit following Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi’s trip to Japan in August 2025.

Japan and India are both among the world’s six largest economies and are also major powers in terms of population, culture, and military strength, wielding considerable international influence. Takaichi’s visit came at a time of significantly deteriorating Japan–China relations, the strategic retrenchment of the Trump administration in the United States, and increasing global conflicts and instability amid the rise of conservative populism and extreme nationalism. It is therefore especially noteworthy.

Japan and India share a relatively long history of connections and what is often described as a “traditional friendship.” When India was still a British colony, Japan, motivated by its desire to challenge British power and replace the Western colonial powers as the dominant force in Asia, actively sought to cultivate ties with India’s anti-British independence movement under slogans such as “resisting Western colonialism” and “Asia for Asians.”

Indian independence leaders such as Chandra Bose actively cooperated with Japan and received Japanese financial and military assistance. Although Japan’s motives for supporting India were complex and self-serving, its assistance did, in objective terms, contribute to India’s struggle against British colonial rule and its eventual independence.

This also led some Indians to develop favorable impressions of Japan. For example, Justice Radhabinod Pal, the Indian judge at the International Military Tribunal for the Far East (the Tokyo Trials), argued that all Japanese war criminals should be acquitted. Even prominent Indian leaders such as Mahatma Gandhi and Jawaharlal Nehru, who had sided with the Allied powers during World War II, did not harbor hostility toward Japan. Like many Japanese political leaders, they were advocates of Pan-Asianism and shared similar views on many international issues.

After India’s independence and Japan’s postwar reconstruction, the two countries found their interests to be complementary. Unlike the historical animosities that characterized China–Japan or South Korea–Japan relations, India and Japan had no such legacy of conflict. Both also tended to remain relatively independent of both the United States and the Soviet Union during the Cold War, leaning toward neutrality. As a result, they established diplomatic relations and developed friendly cooperative ties with relative ease.

However, because of India’s long-term economic stagnation and protectionist trade policies, the geographical distance between the two countries, and the constraints imposed by the Cold War, practical cooperation remained limited. From the establishment of diplomatic relations in 1952 until the end of the Cold War in 1991, Japan’s trade with India accounted for less than 1% of Japan’s total imports and exports. Although India’s trade with Japan represented around 8% of India’s total foreign trade, the overall volume remained modest. India’s exports to Japan consisted largely of mineral resources in exchange for high-value Japanese industrial products. While this relationship was economically complementary, it remained narrow in scope and lacked deeper cooperation.

Since the end of the Cold War, changes in the international environment and the global wave of democratization have shifted Japan–India relations from their traditional foundations of Pan-Asianism and anti-colonial solidarity toward a “values-based alliance” emphasizing their shared commitment to freedom and democracy. Especially after the deterioration of China–Japan relations in the 2000s and the intensification of China–U.S. strategic rivalry in the 2010s, Japan increasingly sought to draw India closer through its “values-oriented diplomacy,” viewing India—whose interests often compete or clash with China’s and which describes itself as “the world’s largest democracy”—as an important strategic partner.

At the same time, India, whose rapidly growing economy required external investment and advanced technology, which had experienced repeated border clashes with China, and which competed with China for influence among emerging powers and the developing world, increasingly needed the support of Japan as an influential extra-regional power. China’s close cooperation with Pakistan, India’s longstanding rival, further encouraged India to strengthen its relationship with Japan.

As Japan gradually relaxed its postwar military restrictions, the two countries expanded their security cooperation, including joint military exercises, defense equipment collaboration, and regular “2+2” meetings between their foreign and defense ministers. Although these initiatives are officially described as not targeting any specific country, they are clearly oriented in practice toward China as the principal strategic competitor.

Economically, Japan–India trade has expanded significantly alongside India’s economic rise, and cooperation has become broader and deeper. A notable milestone was the signing of the Japan–India Comprehensive Economic Partnership Agreement in 2011, through which both countries opened more sectors to each other. Japan also simplified visa procedures for Indian nationals and kept visa fees relatively low. Nevertheless, the scale of Japan–India trade and the intensity of people-to-people exchanges remain significantly lower than those between Japan and the United States, China, or South Korea.

Although both India and Japan have strong incentives to cooperate because of historical and contemporary factors, their relationship in practice has not become as close as originally envisioned. While each regards the other as an important international partner, both place the United States, Europe, China, and their own key neighboring countries ahead of one another in terms of strategic priority.

This is attributable not only to the considerable geographical distance and India’s relatively underdeveloped economy, but also to the substantial differences between the two countries in terms of ethnicity and culture. Although both Japan and India emphasize their identities as Asian countries, one belongs to the East Asian civilization while the other belongs to the South Asian civilization. Their religious beliefs, traditional values, ethnic backgrounds, and lifestyles differ greatly. There are also enormous disparities in per capita income and living standards. These differences make close cooperation across various sectors, as well as interaction between their peoples, less straightforward and create numerous visible and invisible barriers.

For example, proposals promoted by senior leaders in both countries to expand people-to-people exchanges and encourage more students and professionals to study and work in each other’s country have proven difficult to implement in practice. Because of India’s relatively poor economic conditions, infrastructure, and public security, most Japanese people are reluctant to travel, study, or work there.

Although many Indians are willing to move to Japan, and Japan also needs relatively low-cost labor, Japanese society remains strongly conservative and resistant to immigration. Compared with citizens of countries such as China and South Korea, people from India and other South Asian countries differ more substantially from the Japanese population in terms of religion, customs, and physical appearance, making social acceptance and integration more difficult. Moreover, most Indians also find it difficult to afford the high cost of living associated with residing in Japan.

However, as India’s economy continues to grow rapidly, its national strength and international influence expand significantly, and both Japan and India increasingly recognize their need for one another, cooperation between the two countries is likely to continue strengthening.

Takaichi’s visit to India comes at a time of seriously deteriorating China–Japan relations, Chinese sanctions against several Japanese companies related to the defense industry, and a sharp decline in exchanges between China and Japan. The visit therefore inevitably carries implications with regard to China. Faced with China’s hostility, pressure, and sanctions, Japan has a strong need for India—a developing country comparable to China in terms of population, national strength, development potential, and international influence.
At the recent G7 Summit, Japan had already secured support from its Western allies on issues such as disputes in the Indo-Pacific and rare earth exports, as well as their implicit criticism of China without explicitly naming it. Naturally, one objective of the Japan–India summit is to seek India’s support for Japan’s positions as well.

Although India has strategic competition and disputes with China and maintains friendlier relations with Japan than with China, it is unlikely to align itself entirely with Japan or openly criticize China to any significant extent. For Prime Minister Modi’s government, economic development and the enhancement of India’s international influence remain top priorities. To achieve these goals, India seeks both to strengthen cooperation with Japan and to avoid a renewed deterioration in China–India relations, thereby preserving a favorable international environment for its own development.

Although India experienced two border clashes with China in 2017 and 2020 during Modi’s tenure, resulting in casualties, neither side wished to allow the conflicts to escalate. Over the past two years, both India’s military and government institutions have noticeably toned down their criticism of China. India’s Ministry of Defence even pressured the producers of the film The Battle of Galwan Valley, which depicts the China–India border conflict, to remove content that might anger China or further intensify bilateral tensions.

China and India have also signed a number of agreements to expand economic cooperation and people-to-people exchanges, contributing to an improvement in bilateral relations. In fiscal year 2025–26, China overtook the United States once again to become India’s largest trading partner and its largest source of imports. Against this backdrop, although India is likely to support certain Japanese strategies and initiatives aimed at balancing China, it will not actively target China or pursue such efforts with excessive enthusiasm.

Sanae Takaichi, the Liberal Democratic Party prime minister who represents Japan’s conservative political forces, and Narendra Modi, the Bharatiya Janata Party prime minister who espouses India nationalism, share not only a professed commitment to the “common values of freedom and democracy,” but also certain common characteristics associated with conservative populism and right-wing nationalism. Against the backdrop of the global rise of populism, their meeting and the domestic and foreign policies they pursue deserve close attention. Nevertheless, despite their many ideological similarities, both leaders place their own countries first and take pride in their respective nations, making differences and conflicts over specific interests and policy positions inevitable.

Therefore, although Takaichi’s visit to India and the bilateral summit will further strengthen relations and cooperation between the two countries, the achievements are likely to be limited. There is no need to dismiss the visit pessimistically, but neither should its significance be overstated. For many years, there has been a considerable gap between the vision that Japan and India have held for their bilateral relationship and the actual level of cooperation they have achieved.

This gap reflects the reality that the practical scope and capacity for cooperation between the two countries fall short of their mutual expectations. If Japan and India make balancing China the principal foundation of their bilateral relationship, such a strategy may generate temporary cohesion but is unlikely to establish a more enduring and substantial partnership. Cooperation that is genuinely based on mutual benefit, rather than directed against a third party, is ultimately more sustainable and beneficial.

At the same time, as Japan–India relations continue to strengthen, China will indeed face greater strategic challenges and increased pressure along its periphery. China is unlikely to respond dramatically, but it will take countermeasures. For example, it may further strengthen its “all-weather strategic cooperative partnership” with Pakistan, deepen its relations with Russia and North Korea, and improve ties with Southeast Asian countries, building a quasi-alliance based on economic interests and the values promoted by Beijing in order to respond to the challenges and strategic containment efforts posed by Japan, India, and the West.

(The author of this article is Wang Qingmin, a Chinese writer based in Europe and a researcher of international politics.)

u/Slow-Property5895 — 5 days ago

Retrospectiva sobre Jiang Zemin en el centenario de su nacimiento: el timonel de China durante la transición del conservadurismo a la apertura, un líder del PCCh objeto tanto de elogios como de críticas y un dirigente autoritario con importantes logros y graves errores

El 17 de agosto de 2026 se conmemora el centenario del nacimiento de Jiang Zemin (江泽民), ya fallecido, ex secretario general del Partido Comunista de China (PCCh) y dirigente estatal de la tercera generación de la República Popular China. A mediados de agosto, las autoridades chinas pusieron en marcha una serie de actividades conmemorativas, como la emisión por la Televisión Central de China (CCTV) de un extenso documental titulado Jiang Zemin y la preparación de reuniones para recordar a Jiang Zemin y ensalzar sus logros. Entre la población también han resurgido los recuerdos y debates sobre Jiang Zemin y la época en que gobernó, con opiniones tanto favorables como desfavorables, aunque las valoraciones positivas son claramente más numerosas.

La trayectoria vital de Jiang Zemin fue, sin duda, rica en experiencias y estuvo marcada por numerosos giros. Procedía de una familia en la que hubo tanto mártires revolucionarios como colaboracionistas y traidores. Pasó sus años de estudiante en una de las zonas centrales bajo la ocupación japonesa y el régimen títere colaboracionista durante la invasión japonesa de China, y estudió en la Universidad Central de Nankín, entonces bajo la administración del régimen títere de Wang Jingwei (汪伪政权). Jiang Zemin vivió el breve retorno de la capital de la República de China a Nankín y su posterior derrota y retirada; después se convirtió en ingeniero de la China roja y, por una combinación de circunstancias, entró en política y ascendió rápidamente.

A finales de junio de 1989, poco después de la represión del Movimiento Democrático de 1989 (八九民运), en aquel momento crucial y decisivo de las transformaciones de China, Jiang Zemin sustituyó a Zhao Ziyang (赵紫阳) como secretario general del PCCh con el apoyo de Deng Xiaoping (邓小平) y otros dirigentes, y permaneció en el cargo hasta 2002. Para conocer con mayor detalle la vida de Jiang Zemin y sus diversos episodios, existen obras como la biografía de Jiang Zemin escrita por Robert Lawrence Kuhn; no es necesario extenderse aquí sobre ello. Este artículo se centra principalmente en comentar las políticas internas y exteriores durante el mandato de Jiang Zemin, así como sus ventajas, desventajas, aciertos y errores.

Cuando Jiang Zemin asumió el liderazgo de China, el país atravesaba graves dificultades tanto internas como externas, la población se encontraba desorientada y la sociedad vivía una situación de agitación e inestabilidad. En aquel momento, la mayoría de los chinos tampoco albergaba ninguna esperanza ni aversión especial hacia el nuevo secretario general del PCCh. Muchos incluso lo consideraban una figura de transición poco importante, una «marioneta política» situada en primer plano. Jiang Zemin tampoco era, como Mao Zedong (毛泽东), Deng Xiaoping y otros, un veterano revolucionario del PCCh, y su antigüedad y posición dentro del Partido no eran particularmente elevadas.

Sin embargo, gracias a su lealtad a Deng Xiaoping, al hecho de haberse mantenido al margen de las anteriores luchas entre conservadores y reformistas dentro del PCCh y a no haber participado directamente en la represión del 4 de Junio (六四镇压), evitando así quedar marcado directamente por ella, Jiang Zemin pasó finalmente de ser un dirigente con solo una parte del poder a convertirse en un líder con plenos poderes, en el sucesor oficial de Deng Xiaoping y en el núcleo de la tercera generación del liderazgo colectivo chino.
China acababa entonces de atravesar el Movimiento Democrático de 1989 y la represión del 4 de Junio, mientras que, en el ámbito internacional, se producían las grandes transformaciones de Europa Oriental y la desintegración de la Unión Soviética (东欧剧变苏联解体). El país se encontraba ante una encrucijada: continuar con la reforma y apertura (改革开放) o virar hacia el aislamiento y el conservadurismo. Las decisiones adoptadas en la cúspide del poder determinarían el destino de China durante las décadas siguientes. Como se sabría posteriormente, el grupo gobernante del PCCh optó por mantener la apertura en el ámbito económico, acelerando y ampliando su proceso; adoptar una orientación más conservadora y reforzar el autoritarismo en el terreno político; y permitir cierta relajación en el ámbito cultural, aunque manteniendo el control.

La figura principal que determinó esta orientación fue, efectivamente, Deng Xiaoping, quien por entonces aún no se había retirado por completo y gozaba de un enorme prestigio. Pero Jiang Zemin también desempeñó, sin duda, un papel importante al heredar y desarrollar la línea ya establecida por Deng Xiaoping: «tomar la construcción económica como tarea central, mantener los Cuatro Principios Fundamentales (四项基本原则) y perseverar en la reforma y apertura», así como «construir una economía socialista de mercado (社会主义市场经济)».

A juzgar por la actuación de Jiang Zemin entre 1989 y 1992, no parecía dispuesto a acelerar las reformas e incluso se preparaba para regresar parcialmente al modelo de economía planificada de la era de Mao anterior a la Revolución Cultural (文化大革命) y a un sistema político de tipo estalinista. Con ello pretendía ganarse el apoyo de los conservadores del PCCh, marcar distancias con reformistas como Zhao Ziyang, reforzar el dominio del PCCh y consolidar también su propio poder y posición como dirigente del Partido y del Estado. Quizá pensaba que Deng Xiaoping deseaba seguir una línea tan ampliamente conservadora y trataba así de complacer tanto a Deng como a otros conservadores opuestos a las «revoluciones de colores».

Sin embargo, Deng Xiaoping impulsó enérgicamente una línea dual consistente en profundizar las reformas económicas al tiempo que se mantenía el conservadurismo político, y afirmó que «quien no reforme tendrá que dejar el cargo». Jiang Zemin comprendió las intenciones de Deng Xiaoping, cambió rápidamente de rumbo y siguió su línea. Esto también demuestra que Jiang Zemin era pragmático, sabía adaptarse a las circunstancias y era hábil para seguir los vientos políticos, en lugar de aferrarse a principios y dogmas.

Si después de 1989 Deng Xiaoping siguió siendo el principal responsable de la decisión de mantener la línea de reforma y apertura, Jiang Zemin fue, sin duda, el principal responsable de la decisión de incorporar a China a la Organización Mundial del Comercio (OMC) e integrarla en la globalización. En aquel momento, la izquierda conservadora china se oponía al «ingreso en la OMC» alegando que «perjudicaría la independencia y autonomía nacionales» y que «destruiría la industria/agricultura nacional». También acusaba a quienes apoyaban el ingreso de «vender el país» y de querer «volver a la época anterior a la Liberación». Pero Jiang Zemin resistió la oleada de oposición, apoyó plenamente las negociaciones de adhesión y finalmente consiguió que China ingresara con éxito en la OMC y se convirtiera en una de sus economías y participantes más importantes.

Durante las más de dos décadas siguientes, la economía china despegó, China se convirtió en la segunda economía más grande del mundo y las condiciones de vida de la población mejoraron considerablemente. Esto se debió en gran medida al ingreso de China en la OMC y a su plena participación en la globalización y en la división internacional del trabajo, lo que permitió que China prosperara y se fortaleciera como la «fábrica del mundo», al tiempo que los chinos podían adquirir productos extranjeros con mayor facilidad y a precios más bajos. Esto, a su vez, demostró que el «ingreso en la OMC» había sido una decisión acertada. Su repercusión más profunda fue que China pasó de estar aislada del mundo a formar parte de la «aldea global». Independientemente de los conflictos que posteriormente pudieran surgir entre China y Occidente, ya no sería posible que ambas partes se «desacoplaran» realmente ni que llegaran a una confrontación absoluta, lo cual favorece la paz y la prosperidad tanto de China como del mundo entero.
Los méritos de Jiang Zemin en la apertura de China al exterior no se limitaron al ingreso en la OMC. La exitosa celebración en Pekín de la Conferencia Mundial sobre la Mujer de 1995 (1995年世界妇女大会), la apertura integral de la Nueva Área de Pudong (浦东新区), el éxito de las candidaturas para organizar los Juegos Olímpicos y la Exposición Universal, y el mantenimiento de unas relaciones amistosas y de cooperación entre China y Estados Unidos pese a sus numerosos altibajos fueron inseparables de los esfuerzos de Jiang Zemin.

Esto fue especialmente difícil en circunstancias como las de la década de 1990, cuando Estados Unidos y Occidente impusieron durante un tiempo duras sanciones a China y se produjeron acontecimientos como el incidente del Yinhe (银河号事件), el bombardeo de la Embajada de China en la República Federal de Yugoslavia (中国驻南联盟大使馆被炸事件) y el incidente aéreo entre China y Estados Unidos en el mar de China Meridional (中美南海撞机事件). Jiang Zemin no condujo a China hacia un antiamericanismo generalizado; por el contrario, contribuyó a aliviar las tensiones en las relaciones con Estados Unidos y reforzó la cooperación económica, comercial y cultural, algo nada fácil de conseguir.

En otros ámbitos de la política exterior, Jiang Zemin continuó, por una parte, la línea de Mao y Deng de mantener relaciones amistosas con Japón para obtener apoyo económico y tecnológico japonés. Al mismo tiempo, en las relaciones con Japón y en cuestiones como la historia de la invasión japonesa de China, manifestó una postura de recordar la historia y condenar la agresión, preservando así la dignidad nacional china. La Guerra de Resistencia contra la Agresión Japonesa (抗日战争) comenzó a ser conmemorada de una manera más oficial y solemne. Los veteranos de la resistencia contra Japón, incluidos los antiguos soldados del Ejército Nacionalista, así como grupos de víctimas como los trabajadores sometidos a trabajos forzados por Japón y las llamadas «mujeres de consuelo», también recibieron mayor atención durante el mandato de Jiang Zemin, especialmente en sus etapas media y final.

Sin embargo, la inacción de Jiang Zemin y del equipo
gobernante del PCCh ante las violaciones y masacres sufridas por los chinos étnicos y las comunidades chinas de ultramar durante las masacres antichinas de Indonesia de 1998 (1998年印尼排华屠杀), al tiempo que mejoraban las relaciones con Indonesia, constituyó otra mancha en su historial. El hecho de que las autoridades chinas no consideraran aquello un problema grave que requiriera intervención era, en sí mismo, un grave problema y un error. En un momento en que países como Estados Unidos, Canadá y Australia criticaban y sancionaban a Indonesia, el silencio de China resultó especialmente doloroso.

Jiang Zemin realizó frecuentes visitas al extranjero. Durante su mandato, las relaciones de China con Europa y con los países de Asia, África y América Latina experimentaron avances considerables. En particular, aumentó notablemente la cooperación económica y comercial, y los productos «Made in China» fueron exportados masivamente al extranjero.

En cuanto a la política interna, Jiang Zemin realizó importantes contribuciones a la modernización, sistematización y profesionalización de la economía, las fuerzas armadas, las instituciones, el sistema jurídico y otros ámbitos de China. Después de convulsiones como la Revolución Cultural, numerosos sectores del país —especialmente la industria, la ciencia y la tecnología, la educación y la construcción del Estado de derecho— habían permanecido durante mucho tiempo en una situación de caos, desorden e ineficiencia. Tampoco en los primeros años de la reforma y apertura existían suficiente capacidad y condiciones para corregir estos problemas. No fue hasta la época de Jiang Zemin cuando esta situación comenzó a mejorar. La reducción del fenómeno de que «los profanos dirigieran a los expertos» y de las interferencias políticas, así como la administración de las distintas regiones y sectores por tecnócratas, también fueron promovidas y tomaron forma durante la era de Jiang Zemin. Todo ello resultó muy beneficioso para el desarrollo y la construcción de China.

La limitación de los mandatos de los dirigentes del PCCh y del Estado chino, un sistema pacífico y estable de alternancia en el liderazgo y la jubilación oportuna de los altos funcionarios de edad avanzada también se convirtieron en prácticas habituales durante la época de Jiang Zemin (aunque, después de dejar los cargos de secretario general y presidente de la República, Jiang Zemin siguió ocupando durante dos años la presidencia de la Comisión Militar Central, en términos generales se normalizaron la jubilación oportuna y la rotación regular de los dirigentes). Durante la era de Jiang Zemin, la cúpula del PCCh también alcanzó cierto grado de liderazgo colectivo. El anterior modelo de gobierno personalista, en el que la posición jerárquica y el grado de poder se determinaban según el prestigio personal y la «antigüedad revolucionaria», evolucionó gradualmente hacia un sistema burocrático en el que los funcionarios desempeñaban sus respectivas funciones según el cargo que ocupaban, los ascensos se decidían de acuerdo con la capacidad y los logros políticos, y se establecieron cierta forma de «Estado de derecho» y cierta normalización institucional dentro de un régimen autoritario.

Durante la época de Jiang Zemin se obtuvieron algunos resultados positivos en materia de autonomía y elecciones democráticas en las estructuras de base de China, especialmente a nivel de las aldeas. La propaganda y los libros de texto del PCCh incluso las elogiaban como «la práctica más amplia y profunda de la democracia». En aquella época también se permitía y elogiaba que los ciudadanos se presentaran a título individual como candidatos a representantes de las asambleas populares (人大代表). Durante la era de Jiang Zemin, funcionarios del PCCh, incluido el propio Jiang, realizaron declaraciones favorables a impulsar reformas políticas, hacer que China fuera más democrática en el futuro e implantar elecciones por sufragio universal en niveles superiores, en lugar de limitarlas al nivel de las aldeas. Aunque finalmente no llegaron a materializarse la democracia política, la elección por sufragio universal de los responsables por encima del nivel de las aldeas ni la libre competencia electoral para convertirse en representante de una asamblea popular, esto demuestra al menos que en aquella época el PCCh no negaba ni rechazaba explícitamente la democracia y que ofrecía a la población la esperanza de un futuro más democrático y libre.

Además, la formulación de la estrategia de «revitalizar el país mediante la ciencia y la educación» (科教兴国) permitió que los ámbitos de la educación, la ciencia y la tecnología en China recibieran más apoyo político y mayores recursos financieros, convirtiéndose en un factor clave del ascenso del país. Muchos hijos de familias pobres obtuvieron acceso a la educación y pudieron cambiar el rumbo de sus vidas. La inversión en investigación científica, la promoción de la divulgación científica, la difusión del espíritu científico y la lucha contra la superstición tuvieron una gran importancia para la modernización de China y la ilustración cívica de sus ciudadanos. La calidad y la eficiencia del desarrollo económico y social del país también mejoraron gracias a ello.

La anomalía surgida tras la reforma y apertura, consistente en que las fuerzas armadas participaran en actividades comerciales y utilizaran su poder para competir con la población civil por intereses económicos, fue contenida gracias a los esfuerzos de Jiang Zemin y terminó por desaparecer. La teoría de las «Tres Representaciones» (三个代表) proporcionó al PCCh una base teórica para mantener su legitimidad en una era de paz y desarrollo. Durante las devastadoras inundaciones del Yangtsé y otras regiones en 1998 (1998年长江等地特大洪灾), Jiang Zemin acudió personalmente a la primera línea para dirigir las labores de control de las inundaciones y de socorro, tratando de preservar el principio de que el PCCh debía mantenerse estrechamente unido al pueblo y la imagen de «servir al pueblo». Considerado en sí mismo, esto también merece reconocimiento.

También merece una mención especial el hecho de que Jiang Zemin fuera un dirigente con una personalidad muy marcada. En sus encuentros con invitados extranjeros, sus visitas al exterior y sus inspecciones por distintas regiones de China, solía expresarse con gran elocuencia espontánea, hablaba con fluidez varios idiomas, entre ellos inglés, francés, Español, ruso y japonés, y recurría con facilidad a poemas, textos clásicos y alusiones históricas. Su entrevista con el periodista estadounidense Mike Wallace, así como la famosa escena en la que «reprendió a un periodista de Hong Kong» (斥责香港(某位)记者), también circularon ampliamente y fueron comentadas y valoradas una y otra vez. Todo ello refleja que Jiang Zemin era efectivamente muy talentoso y relativamente abierto de pensamiento. Un dirigente chino de este tipo resultaba más cercano que alguien rígidamente apegado a las convenciones y podía ganarse con mayor facilidad la simpatía tanto dentro como fuera del país. Esta es también una de las razones por las que Jiang Zemin contó con no pocos «fans» entre la población.

Por supuesto, el período de Jiang Zemin en el poder también tuvo un lado oscuro y generó o agravó diversos problemas. La pobreza de los campesinos y las múltiples cargas y exacciones que sufrían no fueron resueltas eficazmente; no fue hasta la época de Hu Jintao (胡锦涛) cuando se abolió el impuesto agrícola y otras cargas abusivas asociadas. Las oleadas de despidos de trabajadores también provocaron numerosas tragedias y sufrimientos. Mientras la economía crecía rápidamente, aumentaba también la brecha entre ricos y pobres, y la corrupción se agravaba cada vez más. Los problemas de contaminación ambiental también se hicieron más severos. La tendencia histórica de China a privilegiar las ciencias y la ingeniería en detrimento de las humanidades, así como el desequilibrio entre el aumento del poder duro y la insuficiencia del poder blando, se consolidaron aún más durante la era de Jiang.

Jiang Zemin defendía la idea de «hacerse rico en silencio» (闷声发大财), mientras que las autoridades orientaban, insinuaban y alentaban a la población a recurrir a cualquier medio con tal de enriquecerse. Esto condujo al retroceso del idealismo y del sentido de responsabilidad pública entre los chinos —en comparación con el período anterior al Incidente del 4 de Junio (六四事件)— y al deterioro de la moral social, especialmente entre las élites, que fueron degenerando en «egoístas sofisticados» (精致利己主义者). Fue también en este período cuando surgió con fuerza el capitalismo de compadrazgo y de élites: las familias de la élite roja y de los funcionarios se apropiaban de riquezas y beneficios mediante maniobras y depredación, vivían a costa de la población, formaban una comunidad de intereses, se convertían en los verdaderos «dueños» de China y pasaban a ser los defensores más poderosos del régimen autoritario de partido único del PCCh.

Más grave aún, y más fundamental, fue el estancamiento de la reforma política en China durante la era de Jiang Zemin. El país no tuvo tanta libertad como en la década de 1980 ni avanzó hacia la democracia. Por el contrario, se reforzaron el dominio autoritario del PCCh sobre China y su monopolio del poder, sin que ningún otro partido ni individuo pudiera compartir el poder con el PCCh ni competir políticamente con él. Al mismo tiempo que las «Tres Representaciones» subrayaban la responsabilidad del Partido hacia el Estado y el pueblo, también implicaban que el PCCh monopolizaba la posición de representante de los intereses del Estado chino y del pueblo chino, y que los «representaba» de manera impuesta sin haber recibido una autorización voluntaria de la ciudadanía.

Aunque durante la era de Jiang se llevaron a cabo algunas reformas institucionales y judiciales limitadas y se lograron ciertos avances, esto no puede ocultar la situación general de consolidación del autoritarismo y rechazo de la democratización. Al mismo tiempo que la normalización y el perfeccionamiento de diversas instituciones y políticas impulsaban el desarrollo y el progreso, también se fue estableciendo gradualmente un sistema organizado de represión política y control social, que luego fue reforzado y perfeccionado por sus sucesores Hu Jintao y Xi Jinping (习近平). Paralelamente a la modernización económica y tecnológica, el propio gobierno autoritario también alcanzó su propia «modernización».

Los métodos de represión excesivamente brutales empleados contra grupos específicos como Falun Gong (法轮功), la detención de numerosos presos políticos, la tolerancia hacia la persecución por parte de los gobiernos locales de ciudadanos que defendían sus derechos, y la postura dura respecto a la cuestión del Tíbet (西藏问题) también causaron mucho sufrimiento y provocaron amplias críticas en materia de derechos humanos y otras consecuencias negativas. Todo ello perjudicó tanto los derechos civiles y la cohesión interna como la imagen y la influencia internacionales de China.

Fue precisamente la línea de desarrollo establecida y exitosa durante la era de Jiang Zemin —apertura económica combinada con conservadurismo político— la que hizo que China perdiera una ventana y una oportunidad cruciales para la democratización tras el Movimiento Democrático de 1989, la represión del 4 de Junio y las transformaciones en la Unión Soviética y Europa Oriental (苏东剧变). El desarrollo económico, ciertos avances sociales y en materia de derechos civiles, la participación en la globalización, la mejora de las relaciones exteriores y el fortalecimiento del poder nacional, lejos de debilitar el autoritarismo, consolidaron el dominio del PCCh y reforzaron al grupo gobernante, lo que a largo plazo resultó perjudicial para la democratización de China. Para quienes se preocupan por los derechos humanos y desean una mayor pluralidad política, libertad y democracia en China, esto fue naturalmente algo desafortunado.

La época de Jiang Zemin fue también el período en que tomó forma el «modelo chino» (中国模式). Este «modelo chino» consiste en la coexistencia del autoritarismo político y la apertura económica: mantener la estabilidad mediante un gobierno de alta presión y reprimir a quienes se resisten; utilizar mano de obra barata basada en la «ventaja de bajos niveles de derechos humanos» (低人权优势) para desarrollar la producción y obtener una ventaja relativa en la competencia internacional. Los logros económicos pueden aumentar los ingresos fiscales, mejorar el nivel de vida y fortalecer el poder nacional, que a su vez contribuye a consolidar el régimen autoritario y a proteger los intereses de los estratos privilegiados del PCCh. En las eras de Hu Jintao y Xi Jinping, el «modelo chino» fue perfeccionándose y consolidándose cada vez más, y comenzó también a exportarse internacionalmente. Este «modelo chino» tiene ventajas y desventajas y efectos complejos. He analizado el tema con más detalle en otro artículo, por lo que no me extenderé aquí.

Las valoraciones sobre los méritos y errores de Jiang Zemin y sobre lo correcto o incorrecto de aquella época varían inevitablemente según la posición de cada persona, el ángulo desde el que la observe y los episodios o aspectos que seleccione. Si se deja de lado la cuestión política de democracia frente a autoritarismo y se adopta más bien una perspectiva pragmática centrada en los resultados y en el desarrollo de China, no pueden borrarse ni los logros ni los esfuerzos de Jiang Zemin. Como líder de China en la década de 1990, cuando el país se encontraba presionado por graves dificultades internas y externas y su futuro era incierto, impulsó la apertura económica y las relaciones pacíficas y amistosas con el exterior, insistió en desarrollar la economía y mejorar el nivel de vida, y condujo a una China pobre, caótica, relativamente aislada y marcada por años de inestabilidad hacia una nueva época de creciente prosperidad, estabilidad y previsibilidad, integración internacional y modernización.

Jiang Zemin heredó la reforma y apertura de la era de Deng Xiaoping y, al mismo tiempo, sentó las bases para el desarrollo y la prosperidad sostenidos de la posterior era de Hu Jintao, así como para la entrada de China en una etapa de gran fortaleza nacional integral durante la era de Xi Jinping. Desde una perspectiva pragmática, puede considerarse un timonel competente de la etapa de transición de China. Pero Jiang Zemin fue también el jefe de un régimen dictatorial que consolidó el dominio autoritario del PCCh tras la represión del 4 de Junio, hizo que China perdiera la oportunidad de democratizarse, toleró y agravó la corrupción y el sufrimiento de los trabajadores y campesinos de las capas más bajas de la sociedad, y reprimió a los disidentes. Jiang Zemin también debe asumir una parte de responsabilidad por el autoritarismo y los problemas de derechos humanos que China ha padecido desde su salida del poder hasta hoy. Tuvo méritos y errores; fue abierto de pensamiento y muy capaz, pero también estuvo fuertemente apegado al poder y al mantenimiento del autoritarismo. Objetivamente, su balance puede considerarse dividido entre logros y fracasos.

Precisamente cuando se acerca el centenario del nacimiento de Jiang Zemin, Zhu Rongji (朱镕基), ex primer ministro chino y compañero de Jiang durante el período en que este ocupó los cargos de secretario general y presidente de la República, falleció el 12 de agosto. Mientras Jiang Zemin se centraba principalmente en los ámbitos de la diplomacia, los asuntos militares y la ideología, Zhu Rongji fue el principal ejecutor concreto de la política interna china. Era conocido por sus reformas de mano dura: reestructuró numerosas empresas estatales ineficientes, logró finalmente estabilizar las finanzas públicas y los precios tras un período de alta inflación, impulsó la construcción de zonas económicas especiales como Shenzhen (深圳), promovió en todo el país la atracción de inversiones, favoreció el desarrollo de la economía de mercado china, golpeó a algunos funcionarios corruptos y ayudó a China a superar un período de grandes dificultades económicas después del inicio de la reforma y apertura.

Sin embargo, las reformas de Zhu Rongji también tuvieron importantes limitaciones y produjeron diversos efectos negativos, como el agravamiento de las oleadas de despidos, la ampliación de la brecha entre ricos y pobres y la creciente intensificación de los conflictos entre autoridades y población y de las tensiones sociales. Su lucha anticorrupción de mano dura tampoco logró erradicar la corrupción; tanto el número de personas implicadas como las cantidades involucradas siguieron aumentando. Las reformas de Zhu Rongji también estuvieron marcadas de forma muy clara por la primacía del gobierno de los hombres sobre el Estado de derecho y no podían aportar a China una estabilidad duradera. La dificultad para contener la corrupción se debía precisamente a la ausencia de democracia y Estado de derecho. Por muy decidido que Zhu Rongji estuviera a combatir la corrupción, no podía tener éxito bajo un régimen autoritario. Al igual que Jiang Zemin, Zhu Rongji fue una figura de transición importante de la China posterior a la reforma y apertura y al 4 de Junio; ambos participaron conjuntamente en numerosos asuntos internos y externos, y Zhu compartió por ello también una parte de los méritos y errores de Jiang Zemin.

Jiang Zemin nació en una República de China convulsa, creció bajo la ocupación japonesa y alcanzó la cúspide del poder en la China roja gracias a una combinación de capacidad, astucia y suerte. Murió a la avanzada edad de 96 años, después de haber participado en casi un siglo de transformaciones de China y haber sido testigo de ellas. Aunque la era de Jiang fue políticamente conservadora y careció de libertad y democracia, tuvo, no obstante, más libertad, apertura y cierto ambiente democrático que la China más cerrada y conservadora de la era de Xi Jinping.

Algunas personas elogian a Jiang Zemin no porque lo consideren un dirigente extraordinariamente grande, sino porque la China actual presenta más problemas y causa más decepción. Por ello sienten nostalgia por una época pasada que parecía estar llena de esperanza y seguir una trayectoria ascendente, y utilizan esa nostalgia para expresar su descontento con la realidad presente. Las valoraciones actuales de Jiang Zemin en distintos sectores de la sociedad china, especialmente entre la población, son diversas pero en su mayoría positivas. Esto refleja precisamente el dicho de que «la gente común lleva una balanza en el corazón» (老百姓心里一杆秤), y también pone de manifiesto el deseo sincero de los chinos de hoy de mantener la reforma y apertura y oponerse al aislamiento y al retroceso.

(Este artículo fue escrito por Wang Qingmin (王庆民), escritor chino residente en Europa e investigador de política internacional. El texto original de este artículo fue escrito en chino.)

u/Slow-Property5895 — 5 days ago

Looking Back at Jiang Zemin on the 100th Anniversary of His Birth: The Helmsman of China’s Transition from Conservatism to Openness, a CCP Chief Who Drew Both Praise and Criticism, and an Authoritarian Leader with Both Significant Achievements and Serious Failings

August 17, 2026 marks the centenary of the birth of the late Jiang Zemin (江泽民), former General Secretary of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) and the core leader of the third generation of the People’s Republic of China’s leadership. In mid-August, Chinese authorities launched a series of commemorative activities, including CCTV’s broadcast of the lengthy documentary Jiang Zemin and preparations for meetings to commemorate Jiang and extol his achievements. Among the public, memories and discussions of Jiang and the era of his rule have also been rekindled. Assessments vary, but positive evaluations are clearly more numerous.
Jiang Zemin’s life was rich in experiences and marked by many twists and turns. He came from a family that included both revolutionary martyrs and collaborators and traitors. His student years were spent in the heartland of the Japanese occupation and its collaborationist regime during Japan’s invasion of China, and he studied at National Central University in Nanjing under the Wang Jingwei puppet regime (汪伪政权). Jiang witnessed the Republic of China’s brief return of its capital to Nanjing and subsequent retreat, became an engineer in Red China, and then, through a combination of circumstances, entered politics and rose rapidly through the ranks.

In late June 1989, shortly after the 1989 Democracy Movement (八九民运) was suppressed, at a critical turning point in China’s transformation, Jiang Zemin replaced Zhao Ziyang (赵紫阳) as General Secretary of the CCP with the support of Deng Xiaoping (邓小平) and others, remaining in that position until he stepped down in 2002. More detailed accounts of Jiang’s life and its particulars can be found in works such as Robert Lawrence Kuhn’s The Man Who Changed China: The Life and Legacy of Jiang Zemin. There is no need to repeat them here. This article focuses primarily on the domestic and foreign policies pursued under Jiang’s leadership, as well as their benefits, drawbacks, successes, and failures.

When Jiang Zemin became China’s leader, the country was beset by internal and external difficulties, widespread uncertainty, and social unrest. At the time, most Chinese people neither placed any particular hopes in the new CCP general secretary nor harbored any particular dislike of him. Many regarded him as an inconsequential transitional figure, a “political puppet” on the public stage. Nor was Jiang a veteran of the CCP revolution like Mao Zedong (毛泽东) or Deng Xiaoping; his seniority and standing within the Party were not especially high.

Nevertheless, by demonstrating loyalty to Deng Xiaoping, avoiding direct involvement in the previous struggles between conservatives and reformists within the CCP, and escaping the stigma of direct participation in the June Fourth Crackdown (六四镇压), Jiang ultimately transformed himself from a leader with only partial authority into a paramount leader with full power, Deng Xiaoping’s formal successor, and the core of China’s third-generation leadership.

China had just experienced the 1989 Democracy Movement and the June Fourth Crackdown, while internationally the dramatic upheavals in Eastern Europe and the dissolution of the Soviet Union were unfolding. The country stood at a crossroads between continuing reform and opening up and turning toward isolation and conservatism. Decisions made at the highest level would determine China’s fate for decades to come. As people later came to know, the CCP ruling group chose a course of maintaining economic openness while accelerating and expanding the process of opening up, becoming more conservative politically and strengthening authoritarian rule, and loosening cultural restrictions while still retaining control.

The foremost figure in determining this course was indeed Deng Xiaoping, who at the time had not yet fully retired and still enjoyed enormous prestige. But Jiang Zemin undoubtedly also played an important role, inheriting and further advancing Deng’s established line of “taking economic development as the central task, upholding the Four Cardinal Principles (四项基本原则), and adhering to reform and opening up (改革开放),” as well as “building a socialist market economy (社会主义市场经济).”

Judging from Jiang Zemin’s conduct between 1989 and 1992, he did not appear willing to accelerate reform and was even preparing to partially revert to the planned-economy model and Stalinist political system of the Mao era before the Cultural Revolution (文化大革命). He sought in this way to win the support of CCP conservatives, draw a clear line between himself and reformists such as Zhao Ziyang, strengthen CCP rule, and consolidate his own power and position as leader of the Party and state. He may have believed that Deng Xiaoping wanted to pursue such a comprehensively conservative course and sought thereby to please Deng and other conservatives opposed to “color revolutions.”
But Deng Xiaoping vigorously promoted a dual-track course of intensifying economic reform while remaining politically conservative, declaring that “whoever does not reform must step down.” Jiang grasped Deng’s intentions and quickly changed course, following Deng’s line. This also reflected Jiang’s pragmatism and adaptability, and his skill at following the prevailing political winds rather than adhering rigidly to principles and dogma.

If Deng Xiaoping remained the principal decision-maker behind the choice to continue reform and opening up after 1989, then Jiang Zemin was undoubtedly the foremost decision-maker behind China’s accession to the World Trade Organization (WTO) and its integration into globalization. At the time, China’s conservative left opposed WTO accession on grounds such as that it would “undermine national independence and self-reliance” and “destroy domestic industry/agriculture.” They also accused supporters of WTO accession of “selling out the country” and “returning China to the pre-Liberation era.” But Jiang withstood the opposition, gave his full support to the WTO accession negotiations, and ultimately enabled China to join the WTO successfully and become one of its most important economies and participants.

Over the following two decades and more, China’s economy took off, the country became the world’s second-largest economy, and people’s living standards improved significantly. A major reason was China’s accession to the WTO and its full participation in globalization and the international division of labor, which enabled China to prosper and grow strong as the “world’s factory,” while Chinese consumers gained access to foreign products more cheaply and conveniently. This, in turn, demonstrated the correctness of joining the WTO. An even more far-reaching impact was that China went from being isolated from the world to becoming part of the “global village.” No matter how China and the West might subsequently come into conflict, it would no longer be possible for the two sides to truly “decouple” or become completely antagonistic. This has benefited peace and prosperity in both China and the world.

Jiang Zemin’s contributions to China’s opening to the outside world went beyond WTO accession. The successful hosting of the World Conference on Women in Beijing in 1995, the comprehensive opening of the Pudong New Area (浦东新区), China’s successful bids to host the Olympic Games and the World Expo, and the maintenance of friendly and cooperative relations between China and the United States despite repeated twists and turns were all inseparable from Jiang’s efforts.

This was particularly difficult given that, during the 1990s, the United States and the West at one point imposed tough sanctions on China, while incidents such as the Yinhe Incident (银河号事件), the bombing of the Chinese Embassy in Yugoslavia (中国驻南联盟大使馆被炸事件), and the China–U.S. aircraft collision over the South China Sea (中美南海撞机事件) occurred. Yet Jiang did not lead China toward comprehensive anti-Americanism. Instead, he eased relations with the United States and strengthened economic, trade, and cultural cooperation.

In other areas of foreign policy, Jiang continued the Mao-Deng policy of maintaining friendly relations with Japan and seeking Japanese economic and technological support. At the same time, on issues in China–Japan relations such as the history of Japan’s invasion of China, he also expressed a position of remembering history and condemning aggression, thereby safeguarding China’s national dignity. The War of Resistance Against Japanese Aggression (抗日战争) began to receive more formal and solemn commemoration, while veterans of the war—including former Nationalist soldiers—as well as victims such as laborers forcibly conscripted by Japan and “comfort women” received greater attention, particularly during the middle and later years of Jiang’s rule.

However, Jiang Zemin and the CCP leadership’s inaction in the face of the rape and massacre of ethnic Chinese during the 1998 anti-Chinese violence in Indonesia (1998年印尼排华屠杀), followed by improved relations with Indonesia, was another stain on their record. The Chinese government’s failure to regard this as a major issue requiring intervention was itself a serious problem and mistake. At a time when countries including the United States, Canada, and Australia were criticizing and sanctioning Indonesia, China’s silence was especially painful.

Jiang frequently traveled abroad. During his tenure, China’s relations with Europe and with countries across Asia, Africa, and Latin America made considerable progress, with commercial and trade cooperation increasing particularly markedly and “Made in China” products being exported overseas on a massive scale.
In domestic policy, Jiang Zemin made important contributions to the modernization, systematization, and professionalization of China’s economy, military, institutions, legal system, and other fields. After upheavals such as the Cultural Revolution, many areas in China—especially industry, science and technology, education, and the development of the rule of law—had long remained chaotic, disorderly, and inefficient. Even in the early years of reform and opening up, there was insufficient capacity and favorable conditions to rectify these problems. It was during the Jiang era that these conditions began to improve. Reducing the phenomenon of “laymen leading experts” and political interference, while placing localities and various sectors under the administration of technocrats, was also promoted and institutionalized during the Jiang era. This greatly benefited China’s development and modernization.

Term limits for CCP and Chinese state leaders, peaceful and stable leadership succession, and the timely retirement of elderly officials also became established conventions during the Jiang era. Although Jiang continued to serve as Chairman of the Central Military Commission for two years after stepping down as General Secretary and State President, overall, the timely retirement of leaders and regularized leadership succession were achieved. The CCP’s top leadership under Jiang also practiced collective leadership to a certain extent. The earlier personalized system in which rank and power were determined by individual prestige and “veteran revolutionary credentials” gradually evolved into a bureaucratic system in which officials performed duties according to their positions, promotion was determined by competence and political achievements, and a certain form of “rule of law” and institutional regularization operated under authoritarian rule.

During the Jiang Zemin era, there were some positive achievements in grassroots autonomy and democratic elections at the village level in China. CCP propaganda and textbooks even praised these as “the broadest and most profound practice of democracy.” At the time, citizens running independently as candidates for People’s Congress deputy (人大代表) were also permitted and praised. During the Jiang era, CCP officials, including Jiang himself, made statements advocating political reform and suggesting that China would become more democratic in the future and introduce direct elections at higher levels rather than limiting them to villages. Although democratic politics, direct elections of officials above the village level, and free competition in elections for People’s Congress deputies were ultimately never implemented, this at least indicated that the CCP at the time did not explicitly reject or repudiate democracy, and it gave people hope for a freer and more democratic future.

Also, the introduction of the strategy of “revitalizing the country through science and education” (科教兴国) brought more policy support and funding to China’s education, science, and technology sectors and became a key factor in China’s rise. Many children from poor families gained access to education and were able to change the course of their lives. Investment in scientific research, promotion of science popularization, advocacy of science, and efforts to combat superstition were of great significance to China’s modernization and civic enlightenment. The quality and efficiency of China’s economic and social development also improved as a result.

The disorder that had emerged after reform and opening up, in which the military engaged in business and used its power to compete with civilians for economic interests, was curbed through Jiang Zemin’s efforts and eventually disappeared. The Theory of the Three Represents (三个代表) provided a theoretical basis for the CCP to maintain its legitimacy in an era of peace and development. During the catastrophic floods along the Yangtze River and elsewhere in 1998 (1998年长江等地特大洪灾), Jiang personally went to the front lines to direct flood-control and disaster-relief efforts, striving to uphold the principle that the CCP and the people should remain closely connected and to maintain the image of “serving the people.” Judged on its own merits, this is also worthy of praise.

Another point particularly worth mentioning is that Jiang Zemin was a leader with a distinctive personality. When meeting foreign guests, traveling abroad, or making inspection tours around China, he frequently spoke eloquently and extemporaneously, displayed fluency in several languages including English, French, Russian, and Japanese, and readily drew upon poetry, classical prose, and historical allusions. His interview with American journalist Mike Wallace, as well as the famous scene in which he “scolded Hong Kong journalist” (斥责香港记者), were also widely circulated and repeatedly discussed and evaluated. These episodes reflected Jiang’s genuine talent and relatively open-minded outlook. A Chinese leader of this kind had greater personal appeal than one who rigidly followed conventions and was more likely to win favorable impressions both at home and abroad. This is also one reason Jiang had quite a few “fans” among the public.

Of course, the Jiang Zemin era also had a dark side, creating and exacerbating a number of serious problems. Rural poverty and the multiple layers of exactions imposed on peasants were not effectively resolved; it was not until the Hu Jintao (胡锦涛) era that the agricultural tax and the various onerous levies attached to it were abolished. The layoffs of workers also resulted in many tragedies and hardships. While the economy grew rapidly, the gap between rich and poor widened and corruption became increasingly rampant. Environmental pollution also grew increasingly severe.
China’s longstanding emphasis on science and engineering at the expense of the humanities, and its imbalance between growing hard power and inadequate soft power, became further entrenched during the Jiang era.

Jiang Zemin advocated “making a fortune quietly” (闷声发大财), while the authorities guided, implicitly encouraged, and incentivized people to pursue wealth by whatever means necessary. This led to the decline of idealism and public responsibility among Chinese people compared with the period before the June Fourth Incident (六四事件), as well as a deterioration in social morality. The elite in particular increasingly degenerated into “sophisticated egoists” (精致利己主义者).

Crony capitalism also rose during this period. Red elite families and the families of officials amassed wealth through manipulation and predation, enriching themselves at the expense of ordinary people and forming a community of shared interests. They became the true “masters” of China and the most powerful defenders of the CCP’s one-party authoritarian rule.

More seriously and fundamentally, political reform in China stagnated during the Jiang Zemin era. China did not enjoy as much freedom as it had in the 1980s, nor did it move toward democracy. Instead, the CCP’s authoritarian rule and monopoly on political power were strengthened, with no other parties or individuals permitted to share power or compete politically with the CCP. While the Three Represents emphasized the Party’s responsibilities toward the country and the people, it also meant that the CCP monopolized the position of representing the interests of the Chinese state and people—and forcibly claimed to “represent” them without having been voluntarily authorized by the people to do so.

Although there were some limited institutional and judicial reforms during the Jiang era that achieved a certain degree of progress, they cannot obscure the broader reality that authoritarian rule became institutionalized and democratization was rejected. While the regularization and improvement of various institutions and policies brought development and progress, a systematic apparatus of political repression and social control was also gradually established, and was subsequently strengthened and refined by Jiang’s successors, Hu Jintao and Xi Jinping (习近平). Alongside economic and technological modernization, authoritarian rule also underwent its own “modernization.”

Excessively brutal methods of repression against specific groups such as Falun Gong (法轮功), the arrest of numerous political prisoners, tolerance of local governments’ persecution of citizens defending their rights, and a hardline approach to the Tibet issue (西藏问题) also caused great suffering and prompted widespread human-rights criticism and negative repercussions. These policies were detrimental to civil rights and social cohesion within China, while also damaging the country’s international image and influence.

It was precisely the development path established during the Jiang Zemin era—economic openness combined with political conservatism—and its success that caused China to miss a crucial window and opportunity for democratization following the 1989 Democracy Movement and June Fourth Crackdown and the upheavals in the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe (苏东剧变). Economic development, certain advances in society and civil rights, participation in globalization, and the enhancement of national strength instead consolidated the CCP’s authoritarian rule and nourished the ruling establishment, which in the long run was detrimental to China’s democratization. For those concerned about human rights and hoping for political pluralism and liberal democracy in China, these developments were of course unfortunate.

The Jiang Zemin era was also the formative period of the “China Model” (中国模式). The “China Model” refers to the coexistence of political authoritarianism and economic openness: maintaining stability through high-pressure rule and suppressing those who resist; exploiting the cheap labor made possible by the “advantage of low human rights standards” (低人权优势) to develop production and gain a relative competitive advantage internationally; and using the resulting economic achievements to increase fiscal revenue, improve living standards, and strengthen national power, which in turn reinforces authoritarian rule and the interests of the CCP’s privileged class. By the Hu Jintao and Xi Jinping eras, the “China Model” had become increasingly refined and entrenched and was being exported internationally. Such a “China Model” has both advantages and disadvantages, and its impact is complex. I have discussed it in detail in another article and will not elaborate on it here.

Assessments of Jiang Zemin’s achievements and failures, and judgments about the rights and wrongs of that era, inevitably differ depending on people’s political positions, the perspectives from which they view the period, and the particular episodes and aspects they choose to focus on. If we set aside the political question of democracy versus authoritarianism and look more from a utilitarian perspective and from the standpoint of China’s development, Jiang Zemin, who assumed leadership of China in the 1990s amid internal and external difficulties and an uncertain path ahead, promoted China’s economic opening and peaceful, friendly relations with the outside world, persisted in developing the economy and improving people’s livelihoods, and led a China that had been poor, disorderly, relatively isolated, and turbulent for many years toward a new era of gradually increasing prosperity, stability and predictability, international integration, and modernization. Neither his achievements nor his efforts in this regard can be erased.

Jiang Zemin inherited the reform and opening-up policies of the Deng Xiaoping era and laid the foundations for the continued development and prosperity of the later Hu Jintao era and for China’s emergence as a country with formidable comprehensive national strength in the Xi Jinping era. From a pragmatic perspective, he can be regarded as a competent helmsman during China’s transitional era. Yet Jiang was also the head of an authoritarian regime that consolidated CCP rule after the June Fourth Crackdown, caused China to miss the opportunity for democratization, tolerated and exacerbated corruption and the suffering of workers and peasants at the bottom of society, and suppressed dissidents. Jiang also bears a certain degree of responsibility for China’s authoritarianism and human-rights problems from the period after he left office through the present day. He had both achievements and failures; he was open-minded and highly capable, yet also deeply attached to power and committed to maintaining authoritarian rule. Objectively speaking, his legacy was a mixture of accomplishments and wrongdoing.

Just as the centenary of Jiang Zemin’s birth approaches, Zhu Rongji (朱镕基), the former Chinese premier who served alongside him when Jiang was General Secretary and President, died on August 12. Compared with Jiang Zemin, whose principal activities focused on diplomacy, the military, and ideology, Zhu Rongji was the hands-on operator of China’s domestic affairs.

Zhu Rongji was known for his iron-fisted reforms. He restructured large numbers of inefficient state-owned enterprises, ultimately stabilized China’s public finances and prices after a period of high inflation, promoted the development of special economic zones such as Shenzhen (深圳), encouraged investment nationwide, advanced the development of China’s market economy, cracked down on some corrupt officials, and helped China through a period of considerable economic difficulty following reform and opening up.

However, Zhu Rongji’s reforms also had significant limitations and produced various negative consequences, including exacerbating the wave of layoffs and intensifying conflicts between officials and citizens as well as broader social tensions. His iron-fisted anti-corruption campaign also failed to eradicate corruption, as both the number of people involved in corruption and the sums involved continued to rise. Zhu Rongji’s reforms were also a clear example of rule by individuals prevailing over the rule of law and could not bring China lasting peace and stability. Corruption was so difficult to curb precisely because of the absence of democracy and the rule of law. No matter how determined Zhu Rongji was to fight corruption, such efforts could not succeed under authoritarian rule.Like Jiang Zemin, Zhu was an important transitional figure in China after reform and opening up and June Fourth. Together they participated in a wide range of domestic and foreign affairs, and Zhu therefore also shared in both Jiang’s achievements and failures.

Jiang Zemin was born into the turbulent Republic of China era, grew up under the iron heel of Japanese occupation, and rose all the way to the top in Red China through a combination of ability, shrewdness, and luck. He died at the age of 96, having participated in and witnessed nearly a century of China’s transformation. Although the Jiang era was politically conservative and lacked liberal democracy, it nevertheless had somewhat more freedom, openness, and democratic spirit than China has had under the more closed and conservative Xi Jinping era.

Some Chinese people praise Jiang Zemin not because they regard him as extraordinarily great, but because China today has more problems and causes greater disappointment, leading them to look back nostalgically on an earlier era marked by hope and an upward trajectory, while using that nostalgia to express dissatisfaction with present-day realities. The mixed but predominantly positive assessments of Jiang among various sectors of Chinese society, especially among ordinary people, embody the saying that “the people have a scale in their hearts” (老百姓心里一杆秤). They also reflect the sincere desire of Chinese people today to uphold reform and opening up and oppose isolation and regression.

(This article is written by Wang Qingmin (王庆民), a Chinese writer based in Europe and a researcher of international politics. The original version of this article was written in Chinese.)

reddit.com
u/Slow-Property5895 — 5 days ago

Retrospectiva sobre Jiang Zemin en el centenario de su nacimiento: el timonel de China durante la transición del conservadurismo a la apertura, un líder del PCCh objeto tanto de elogios como de críticas y un dirigente autoritario con importantes logros y graves errores

El 17 de agosto de 2026 se conmemora el centenario del nacimiento de Jiang Zemin (江泽民), ya fallecido, ex secretario general del Partido Comunista de China (PCCh) y dirigente estatal de la tercera generación de la República Popular China. A mediados de agosto, las autoridades chinas pusieron en marcha una serie de actividades conmemorativas, como la emisión por la Televisión Central de China (CCTV) de un extenso documental titulado Jiang Zemin y la preparación de reuniones para recordar a Jiang Zemin y ensalzar sus logros. Entre la población también han resurgido los recuerdos y debates sobre Jiang Zemin y la época en que gobernó, con opiniones tanto favorables como desfavorables, aunque las valoraciones positivas son claramente más numerosas.

La trayectoria vital de Jiang Zemin fue, sin duda, rica en experiencias y estuvo marcada por numerosos giros. Procedía de una familia en la que hubo tanto mártires revolucionarios como colaboracionistas y traidores. Pasó sus años de estudiante en una de las zonas centrales bajo la ocupación japonesa y el régimen títere colaboracionista durante la invasión japonesa de China, y estudió en la Universidad Central de Nankín, entonces bajo la administración del régimen títere de Wang Jingwei (汪伪政权). Jiang Zemin vivió el breve retorno de la capital de la República de China a Nankín y su posterior derrota y retirada; después se convirtió en ingeniero de la China roja y, por una combinación de circunstancias, entró en política y ascendió rápidamente.

A finales de junio de 1989, poco después de la represión del Movimiento Democrático de 1989 (八九民运), en aquel momento crucial y decisivo de las transformaciones de China, Jiang Zemin sustituyó a Zhao Ziyang (赵紫阳) como secretario general del PCCh con el apoyo de Deng Xiaoping (邓小平) y otros dirigentes, y permaneció en el cargo hasta 2002. Para conocer con mayor detalle la vida de Jiang Zemin y sus diversos episodios, existen obras como la biografía de Jiang Zemin escrita por Robert Lawrence Kuhn; no es necesario extenderse aquí sobre ello. Este artículo se centra principalmente en comentar las políticas internas y exteriores durante el mandato de Jiang Zemin, así como sus ventajas, desventajas, aciertos y errores.

Cuando Jiang Zemin asumió el liderazgo de China, el país atravesaba graves dificultades tanto internas como externas, la población se encontraba desorientada y la sociedad vivía una situación de agitación e inestabilidad. En aquel momento, la mayoría de los chinos tampoco albergaba ninguna esperanza ni aversión especial hacia el nuevo secretario general del PCCh. Muchos incluso lo consideraban una figura de transición poco importante, una «marioneta política» situada en primer plano. Jiang Zemin tampoco era, como Mao Zedong (毛泽东), Deng Xiaoping y otros, un veterano revolucionario del PCCh, y su antigüedad y posición dentro del Partido no eran particularmente elevadas.

Sin embargo, gracias a su lealtad a Deng Xiaoping, al hecho de haberse mantenido al margen de las anteriores luchas entre conservadores y reformistas dentro del PCCh y a no haber participado directamente en la represión del 4 de Junio (六四镇压), evitando así quedar marcado directamente por ella, Jiang Zemin pasó finalmente de ser un dirigente con solo una parte del poder a convertirse en un líder con plenos poderes, en el sucesor oficial de Deng Xiaoping y en el núcleo de la tercera generación del liderazgo colectivo chino.
China acababa entonces de atravesar el Movimiento Democrático de 1989 y la represión del 4 de Junio, mientras que, en el ámbito internacional, se producían las grandes transformaciones de Europa Oriental y la desintegración de la Unión Soviética (东欧剧变苏联解体). El país se encontraba ante una encrucijada: continuar con la reforma y apertura (改革开放) o virar hacia el aislamiento y el conservadurismo. Las decisiones adoptadas en la cúspide del poder determinarían el destino de China durante las décadas siguientes. Como se sabría posteriormente, el grupo gobernante del PCCh optó por mantener la apertura en el ámbito económico, acelerando y ampliando su proceso; adoptar una orientación más conservadora y reforzar el autoritarismo en el terreno político; y permitir cierta relajación en el ámbito cultural, aunque manteniendo el control.

La figura principal que determinó esta orientación fue, efectivamente, Deng Xiaoping, quien por entonces aún no se había retirado por completo y gozaba de un enorme prestigio. Pero Jiang Zemin también desempeñó, sin duda, un papel importante al heredar y desarrollar la línea ya establecida por Deng Xiaoping: «tomar la construcción económica como tarea central, mantener los Cuatro Principios Fundamentales (四项基本原则) y perseverar en la reforma y apertura», así como «construir una economía socialista de mercado (社会主义市场经济)».

A juzgar por la actuación de Jiang Zemin entre 1989 y 1992, no parecía dispuesto a acelerar las reformas e incluso se preparaba para regresar parcialmente al modelo de economía planificada de la era de Mao anterior a la Revolución Cultural (文化大革命) y a un sistema político de tipo estalinista. Con ello pretendía ganarse el apoyo de los conservadores del PCCh, marcar distancias con reformistas como Zhao Ziyang, reforzar el dominio del PCCh y consolidar también su propio poder y posición como dirigente del Partido y del Estado. Quizá pensaba que Deng Xiaoping deseaba seguir una línea tan ampliamente conservadora y trataba así de complacer tanto a Deng como a otros conservadores opuestos a las «revoluciones de colores».

Sin embargo, Deng Xiaoping impulsó enérgicamente una línea dual consistente en profundizar las reformas económicas al tiempo que se mantenía el conservadurismo político, y afirmó que «quien no reforme tendrá que dejar el cargo». Jiang Zemin comprendió las intenciones de Deng Xiaoping, cambió rápidamente de rumbo y siguió su línea. Esto también demuestra que Jiang Zemin era pragmático, sabía adaptarse a las circunstancias y era hábil para seguir los vientos políticos, en lugar de aferrarse a principios y dogmas.

Si después de 1989 Deng Xiaoping siguió siendo el principal responsable de la decisión de mantener la línea de reforma y apertura, Jiang Zemin fue, sin duda, el principal responsable de la decisión de incorporar a China a la Organización Mundial del Comercio (OMC) e integrarla en la globalización. En aquel momento, la izquierda conservadora china se oponía al «ingreso en la OMC» alegando que «perjudicaría la independencia y autonomía nacionales» y que «destruiría la industria/agricultura nacional». También acusaba a quienes apoyaban el ingreso de «vender el país» y de querer «volver a la época anterior a la Liberación». Pero Jiang Zemin resistió la oleada de oposición, apoyó plenamente las negociaciones de adhesión y finalmente consiguió que China ingresara con éxito en la OMC y se convirtiera en una de sus economías y participantes más importantes.

Durante las más de dos décadas siguientes, la economía china despegó, China se convirtió en la segunda economía más grande del mundo y las condiciones de vida de la población mejoraron considerablemente. Esto se debió en gran medida al ingreso de China en la OMC y a su plena participación en la globalización y en la división internacional del trabajo, lo que permitió que China prosperara y se fortaleciera como la «fábrica del mundo», al tiempo que los chinos podían adquirir productos extranjeros con mayor facilidad y a precios más bajos. Esto, a su vez, demostró que el «ingreso en la OMC» había sido una decisión acertada. Su repercusión más profunda fue que China pasó de estar aislada del mundo a formar parte de la «aldea global». Independientemente de los conflictos que posteriormente pudieran surgir entre China y Occidente, ya no sería posible que ambas partes se «desacoplaran» realmente ni que llegaran a una confrontación absoluta, lo cual favorece la paz y la prosperidad tanto de China como del mundo entero.
Los méritos de Jiang Zemin en la apertura de China al exterior no se limitaron al ingreso en la OMC. La exitosa celebración en Pekín de la Conferencia Mundial sobre la Mujer de 1995 (1995年世界妇女大会), la apertura integral de la Nueva Área de Pudong (浦东新区), el éxito de las candidaturas para organizar los Juegos Olímpicos y la Exposición Universal, y el mantenimiento de unas relaciones amistosas y de cooperación entre China y Estados Unidos pese a sus numerosos altibajos fueron inseparables de los esfuerzos de Jiang Zemin.

Esto fue especialmente difícil en circunstancias como las de la década de 1990, cuando Estados Unidos y Occidente impusieron durante un tiempo duras sanciones a China y se produjeron acontecimientos como el incidente del Yinhe (银河号事件), el bombardeo de la Embajada de China en la República Federal de Yugoslavia (中国驻南联盟大使馆被炸事件) y el incidente aéreo entre China y Estados Unidos en el mar de China Meridional (中美南海撞机事件). Jiang Zemin no condujo a China hacia un antiamericanismo generalizado; por el contrario, contribuyó a aliviar las tensiones en las relaciones con Estados Unidos y reforzó la cooperación económica, comercial y cultural, algo nada fácil de conseguir.

En otros ámbitos de la política exterior, Jiang Zemin continuó, por una parte, la línea de Mao y Deng de mantener relaciones amistosas con Japón para obtener apoyo económico y tecnológico japonés. Al mismo tiempo, en las relaciones con Japón y en cuestiones como la historia de la invasión japonesa de China, manifestó una postura de recordar la historia y condenar la agresión, preservando así la dignidad nacional china. La Guerra de Resistencia contra la Agresión Japonesa (抗日战争) comenzó a ser conmemorada de una manera más oficial y solemne. Los veteranos de la resistencia contra Japón, incluidos los antiguos soldados del Ejército Nacionalista, así como grupos de víctimas como los trabajadores sometidos a trabajos forzados por Japón y las llamadas «mujeres de consuelo», también recibieron mayor atención durante el mandato de Jiang Zemin, especialmente en sus etapas media y final.

Sin embargo, la inacción de Jiang Zemin y del equipo
gobernante del PCCh ante las violaciones y masacres sufridas por los chinos étnicos y las comunidades chinas de ultramar durante las masacres antichinas de Indonesia de 1998 (1998年印尼排华屠杀), al tiempo que mejoraban las relaciones con Indonesia, constituyó otra mancha en su historial. El hecho de que las autoridades chinas no consideraran aquello un problema grave que requiriera intervención era, en sí mismo, un grave problema y un error. En un momento en que países como Estados Unidos, Canadá y Australia criticaban y sancionaban a Indonesia, el silencio de China resultó especialmente doloroso.

Jiang Zemin realizó frecuentes visitas al extranjero. Durante su mandato, las relaciones de China con Europa y con los países de Asia, África y América Latina experimentaron avances considerables. En particular, aumentó notablemente la cooperación económica y comercial, y los productos «Made in China» fueron exportados masivamente al extranjero.

En cuanto a la política interna, Jiang Zemin realizó importantes contribuciones a la modernización, sistematización y profesionalización de la economía, las fuerzas armadas, las instituciones, el sistema jurídico y otros ámbitos de China. Después de convulsiones como la Revolución Cultural, numerosos sectores del país —especialmente la industria, la ciencia y la tecnología, la educación y la construcción del Estado de derecho— habían permanecido durante mucho tiempo en una situación de caos, desorden e ineficiencia. Tampoco en los primeros años de la reforma y apertura existían suficiente capacidad y condiciones para corregir estos problemas. No fue hasta la época de Jiang Zemin cuando esta situación comenzó a mejorar. La reducción del fenómeno de que «los profanos dirigieran a los expertos» y de las interferencias políticas, así como la administración de las distintas regiones y sectores por tecnócratas, también fueron promovidas y tomaron forma durante la era de Jiang Zemin. Todo ello resultó muy beneficioso para el desarrollo y la construcción de China.

La limitación de los mandatos de los dirigentes del PCCh y del Estado chino, un sistema pacífico y estable de alternancia en el liderazgo y la jubilación oportuna de los altos funcionarios de edad avanzada también se convirtieron en prácticas habituales durante la época de Jiang Zemin (aunque, después de dejar los cargos de secretario general y presidente de la República, Jiang Zemin siguió ocupando durante dos años la presidencia de la Comisión Militar Central, en términos generales se normalizaron la jubilación oportuna y la rotación regular de los dirigentes). Durante la era de Jiang Zemin, la cúpula del PCCh también alcanzó cierto grado de liderazgo colectivo. El anterior modelo de gobierno personalista, en el que la posición jerárquica y el grado de poder se determinaban según el prestigio personal y la «antigüedad revolucionaria», evolucionó gradualmente hacia un sistema burocrático en el que los funcionarios desempeñaban sus respectivas funciones según el cargo que ocupaban, los ascensos se decidían de acuerdo con la capacidad y los logros políticos, y se establecieron cierta forma de «Estado de derecho» y cierta normalización institucional dentro de un régimen autoritario.

Durante la época de Jiang Zemin se obtuvieron algunos resultados positivos en materia de autonomía y elecciones democráticas en las estructuras de base de China, especialmente a nivel de las aldeas. La propaganda y los libros de texto del PCCh incluso las elogiaban como «la práctica más amplia y profunda de la democracia». En aquella época también se permitía y elogiaba que los ciudadanos se presentaran a título individual como candidatos a representantes de las asambleas populares (人大代表). Durante la era de Jiang Zemin, funcionarios del PCCh, incluido el propio Jiang, realizaron declaraciones favorables a impulsar reformas políticas, hacer que China fuera más democrática en el futuro e implantar elecciones por sufragio universal en niveles superiores, en lugar de limitarlas al nivel de las aldeas. Aunque finalmente no llegaron a materializarse la democracia política, la elección por sufragio universal de los responsables por encima del nivel de las aldeas ni la libre competencia electoral para convertirse en representante de una asamblea popular, esto demuestra al menos que en aquella época el PCCh no negaba ni rechazaba explícitamente la democracia y que ofrecía a la población la esperanza de un futuro más democrático y libre.

Además, la formulación de la estrategia de «revitalizar el país mediante la ciencia y la educación» (科教兴国) permitió que los ámbitos de la educación, la ciencia y la tecnología en China recibieran más apoyo político y mayores recursos financieros, convirtiéndose en un factor clave del ascenso del país. Muchos hijos de familias pobres obtuvieron acceso a la educación y pudieron cambiar el rumbo de sus vidas. La inversión en investigación científica, la promoción de la divulgación científica, la difusión del espíritu científico y la lucha contra la superstición tuvieron una gran importancia para la modernización de China y la ilustración cívica de sus ciudadanos. La calidad y la eficiencia del desarrollo económico y social del país también mejoraron gracias a ello.

La anomalía surgida tras la reforma y apertura, consistente en que las fuerzas armadas participaran en actividades comerciales y utilizaran su poder para competir con la población civil por intereses económicos, fue contenida gracias a los esfuerzos de Jiang Zemin y terminó por desaparecer. La teoría de las «Tres Representaciones» (三个代表) proporcionó al PCCh una base teórica para mantener su legitimidad en una era de paz y desarrollo. Durante las devastadoras inundaciones del Yangtsé y otras regiones en 1998 (1998年长江等地特大洪灾), Jiang Zemin acudió personalmente a la primera línea para dirigir las labores de control de las inundaciones y de socorro, tratando de preservar el principio de que el PCCh debía mantenerse estrechamente unido al pueblo y la imagen de «servir al pueblo». Considerado en sí mismo, esto también merece reconocimiento.

También merece una mención especial el hecho de que Jiang Zemin fuera un dirigente con una personalidad muy marcada. En sus encuentros con invitados extranjeros, sus visitas al exterior y sus inspecciones por distintas regiones de China, solía expresarse con gran elocuencia espontánea, hablaba con fluidez varios idiomas, entre ellos inglés, francés, Español, ruso y japonés, y recurría con facilidad a poemas, textos clásicos y alusiones históricas. Su entrevista con el periodista estadounidense Mike Wallace, así como la famosa escena en la que «reprendió a un periodista de Hong Kong» (斥责香港(某位)记者), también circularon ampliamente y fueron comentadas y valoradas una y otra vez. Todo ello refleja que Jiang Zemin era efectivamente muy talentoso y relativamente abierto de pensamiento. Un dirigente chino de este tipo resultaba más cercano que alguien rígidamente apegado a las convenciones y podía ganarse con mayor facilidad la simpatía tanto dentro como fuera del país. Esta es también una de las razones por las que Jiang Zemin contó con no pocos «fans» entre la población.

Por supuesto, el período de Jiang Zemin en el poder también tuvo un lado oscuro y generó o agravó diversos problemas. La pobreza de los campesinos y las múltiples cargas y exacciones que sufrían no fueron resueltas eficazmente; no fue hasta la época de Hu Jintao (胡锦涛) cuando se abolió el impuesto agrícola y otras cargas abusivas asociadas. Las oleadas de despidos de trabajadores también provocaron numerosas tragedias y sufrimientos. Mientras la economía crecía rápidamente, aumentaba también la brecha entre ricos y pobres, y la corrupción se agravaba cada vez más. Los problemas de contaminación ambiental también se hicieron más severos. La tendencia histórica de China a privilegiar las ciencias y la ingeniería en detrimento de las humanidades, así como el desequilibrio entre el aumento del poder duro y la insuficiencia del poder blando, se consolidaron aún más durante la era de Jiang.

Jiang Zemin defendía la idea de «hacerse rico en silencio» (闷声发大财), mientras que las autoridades orientaban, insinuaban y alentaban a la población a recurrir a cualquier medio con tal de enriquecerse. Esto condujo al retroceso del idealismo y del sentido de responsabilidad pública entre los chinos —en comparación con el período anterior al Incidente del 4 de Junio (六四事件)— y al deterioro de la moral social, especialmente entre las élites, que fueron degenerando en «egoístas sofisticados» (精致利己主义者). Fue también en este período cuando surgió con fuerza el capitalismo de compadrazgo y de élites: las familias de la élite roja y de los funcionarios se apropiaban de riquezas y beneficios mediante maniobras y depredación, vivían a costa de la población, formaban una comunidad de intereses, se convertían en los verdaderos «dueños» de China y pasaban a ser los defensores más poderosos del régimen autoritario de partido único del PCCh.

Más grave aún, y más fundamental, fue el estancamiento de la reforma política en China durante la era de Jiang Zemin. El país no tuvo tanta libertad como en la década de 1980 ni avanzó hacia la democracia. Por el contrario, se reforzaron el dominio autoritario del PCCh sobre China y su monopolio del poder, sin que ningún otro partido ni individuo pudiera compartir el poder con el PCCh ni competir políticamente con él. Al mismo tiempo que las «Tres Representaciones» subrayaban la responsabilidad del Partido hacia el Estado y el pueblo, también implicaban que el PCCh monopolizaba la posición de representante de los intereses del Estado chino y del pueblo chino, y que los «representaba» de manera impuesta sin haber recibido una autorización voluntaria de la ciudadanía.

Aunque durante la era de Jiang se llevaron a cabo algunas reformas institucionales y judiciales limitadas y se lograron ciertos avances, esto no puede ocultar la situación general de consolidación del autoritarismo y rechazo de la democratización. Al mismo tiempo que la normalización y el perfeccionamiento de diversas instituciones y políticas impulsaban el desarrollo y el progreso, también se fue estableciendo gradualmente un sistema organizado de represión política y control social, que luego fue reforzado y perfeccionado por sus sucesores Hu Jintao y Xi Jinping (习近平). Paralelamente a la modernización económica y tecnológica, el propio gobierno autoritario también alcanzó su propia «modernización».

Los métodos de represión excesivamente brutales empleados contra grupos específicos como Falun Gong (法轮功), la detención de numerosos presos políticos, la tolerancia hacia la persecución por parte de los gobiernos locales de ciudadanos que defendían sus derechos, y la postura dura respecto a la cuestión del Tíbet (西藏问题) también causaron mucho sufrimiento y provocaron amplias críticas en materia de derechos humanos y otras consecuencias negativas. Todo ello perjudicó tanto los derechos civiles y la cohesión interna como la imagen y la influencia internacionales de China.

Fue precisamente la línea de desarrollo establecida y exitosa durante la era de Jiang Zemin —apertura económica combinada con conservadurismo político— la que hizo que China perdiera una ventana y una oportunidad cruciales para la democratización tras el Movimiento Democrático de 1989, la represión del 4 de Junio y las transformaciones en la Unión Soviética y Europa Oriental (苏东剧变). El desarrollo económico, ciertos avances sociales y en materia de derechos civiles, la participación en la globalización, la mejora de las relaciones exteriores y el fortalecimiento del poder nacional, lejos de debilitar el autoritarismo, consolidaron el dominio del PCCh y reforzaron al grupo gobernante, lo que a largo plazo resultó perjudicial para la democratización de China. Para quienes se preocupan por los derechos humanos y desean una mayor pluralidad política, libertad y democracia en China, esto fue naturalmente algo desafortunado.

La época de Jiang Zemin fue también el período en que tomó forma el «modelo chino» (中国模式). Este «modelo chino» consiste en la coexistencia del autoritarismo político y la apertura económica: mantener la estabilidad mediante un gobierno de alta presión y reprimir a quienes se resisten; utilizar mano de obra barata basada en la «ventaja de bajos niveles de derechos humanos» (低人权优势) para desarrollar la producción y obtener una ventaja relativa en la competencia internacional. Los logros económicos pueden aumentar los ingresos fiscales, mejorar el nivel de vida y fortalecer el poder nacional, que a su vez contribuye a consolidar el régimen autoritario y a proteger los intereses de los estratos privilegiados del PCCh. En las eras de Hu Jintao y Xi Jinping, el «modelo chino» fue perfeccionándose y consolidándose cada vez más, y comenzó también a exportarse internacionalmente. Este «modelo chino» tiene ventajas y desventajas y efectos complejos. He analizado el tema con más detalle en otro artículo, por lo que no me extenderé aquí.

Las valoraciones sobre los méritos y errores de Jiang Zemin y sobre lo correcto o incorrecto de aquella época varían inevitablemente según la posición de cada persona, el ángulo desde el que la observe y los episodios o aspectos que seleccione. Si se deja de lado la cuestión política de democracia frente a autoritarismo y se adopta más bien una perspectiva pragmática centrada en los resultados y en el desarrollo de China, no pueden borrarse ni los logros ni los esfuerzos de Jiang Zemin. Como líder de China en la década de 1990, cuando el país se encontraba presionado por graves dificultades internas y externas y su futuro era incierto, impulsó la apertura económica y las relaciones pacíficas y amistosas con el exterior, insistió en desarrollar la economía y mejorar el nivel de vida, y condujo a una China pobre, caótica, relativamente aislada y marcada por años de inestabilidad hacia una nueva época de creciente prosperidad, estabilidad y previsibilidad, integración internacional y modernización.

Jiang Zemin heredó la reforma y apertura de la era de Deng Xiaoping y, al mismo tiempo, sentó las bases para el desarrollo y la prosperidad sostenidos de la posterior era de Hu Jintao, así como para la entrada de China en una etapa de gran fortaleza nacional integral durante la era de Xi Jinping. Desde una perspectiva pragmática, puede considerarse un timonel competente de la etapa de transición de China. Pero Jiang Zemin fue también el jefe de un régimen dictatorial que consolidó el dominio autoritario del PCCh tras la represión del 4 de Junio, hizo que China perdiera la oportunidad de democratizarse, toleró y agravó la corrupción y el sufrimiento de los trabajadores y campesinos de las capas más bajas de la sociedad, y reprimió a los disidentes. Jiang Zemin también debe asumir una parte de responsabilidad por el autoritarismo y los problemas de derechos humanos que China ha padecido desde su salida del poder hasta hoy. Tuvo méritos y errores; fue abierto de pensamiento y muy capaz, pero también estuvo fuertemente apegado al poder y al mantenimiento del autoritarismo. Objetivamente, su balance puede considerarse dividido entre logros y fracasos.

Precisamente cuando se acerca el centenario del nacimiento de Jiang Zemin, Zhu Rongji (朱镕基), ex primer ministro chino y compañero de Jiang durante el período en que este ocupó los cargos de secretario general y presidente de la República, falleció el 12 de agosto. Mientras Jiang Zemin se centraba principalmente en los ámbitos de la diplomacia, los asuntos militares y la ideología, Zhu Rongji fue el principal ejecutor concreto de la política interna china. Era conocido por sus reformas de mano dura: reestructuró numerosas empresas estatales ineficientes, logró finalmente estabilizar las finanzas públicas y los precios tras un período de alta inflación, impulsó la construcción de zonas económicas especiales como Shenzhen (深圳), promovió en todo el país la atracción de inversiones, favoreció el desarrollo de la economía de mercado china, golpeó a algunos funcionarios corruptos y ayudó a China a superar un período de grandes dificultades económicas después del inicio de la reforma y apertura.

Sin embargo, las reformas de Zhu Rongji también tuvieron importantes limitaciones y produjeron diversos efectos negativos, como el agravamiento de las oleadas de despidos, la ampliación de la brecha entre ricos y pobres y la creciente intensificación de los conflictos entre autoridades y población y de las tensiones sociales. Su lucha anticorrupción de mano dura tampoco logró erradicar la corrupción; tanto el número de personas implicadas como las cantidades involucradas siguieron aumentando. Las reformas de Zhu Rongji también estuvieron marcadas de forma muy clara por la primacía del gobierno de los hombres sobre el Estado de derecho y no podían aportar a China una estabilidad duradera. La dificultad para contener la corrupción se debía precisamente a la ausencia de democracia y Estado de derecho. Por muy decidido que Zhu Rongji estuviera a combatir la corrupción, no podía tener éxito bajo un régimen autoritario. Al igual que Jiang Zemin, Zhu Rongji fue una figura de transición importante de la China posterior a la reforma y apertura y al 4 de Junio; ambos participaron conjuntamente en numerosos asuntos internos y externos, y Zhu compartió por ello también una parte de los méritos y errores de Jiang Zemin.

Jiang Zemin nació en una República de China convulsa, creció bajo la ocupación japonesa y alcanzó la cúspide del poder en la China roja gracias a una combinación de capacidad, astucia y suerte. Murió a la avanzada edad de 96 años, después de haber participado en casi un siglo de transformaciones de China y haber sido testigo de ellas. Aunque la era de Jiang fue políticamente conservadora y careció de libertad y democracia, tuvo, no obstante, más libertad, apertura y cierto ambiente democrático que la China más cerrada y conservadora de la era de Xi Jinping.

Algunas personas elogian a Jiang Zemin no porque lo consideren un dirigente extraordinariamente grande, sino porque la China actual presenta más problemas y causa más decepción. Por ello sienten nostalgia por una época pasada que parecía estar llena de esperanza y seguir una trayectoria ascendente, y utilizan esa nostalgia para expresar su descontento con la realidad presente. Las valoraciones actuales de Jiang Zemin en distintos sectores de la sociedad china, especialmente entre la población, son diversas pero en su mayoría positivas. Esto refleja precisamente el dicho de que «la gente común lleva una balanza en el corazón» (老百姓心里一杆秤), y también pone de manifiesto el deseo sincero de los chinos de hoy de mantener la reforma y apertura y oponerse al aislamiento y al retroceso.

(Este artículo fue escrito por Wang Qingmin (王庆民), escritor chino residente en Europa e investigador de política internacional. El texto original de este artículo fue escrito en chino.)

u/Slow-Property5895 — 5 days ago

2025–2026 Chinese Left-Wing Activist Participates in Berlin’s “LLL” Left-Wing Mass March, Commemorating Rosa Luxemburg and Other Revolutionary Pioneers, and Promoting the History of Chinese Socialism While Calling on the Global Left to Understand the Contributions and Suffering of the Chinese People

On January 12, 2025, from 9:40 to 14:30, I (Chinese writer Wang Qingmin(王庆民)) participated in the left-wing mass march in Berlin, Germany, commemorating Rosa Luxemburg and Karl Liebknecht and other pioneers and martyrs of the German socialist revolution. The march procession went from Frankfurt Tor to the Zentralfriedhof Friedrichsfelde cemetery. Because the march commemorates Lenin, Rosa Luxemburg, and Karl Liebknecht, it is also called the “LLL” march.

For nearly five hours, I displayed posters on the German and Russian left-wing revolutions, the 1968 movement, China’s May Fourth Movement, Chinese youth participating in the War of Resistance against Japan, the 1989 Tiananmen democracy movement, and the 2018 Shenzhen Jasic labor movement, in solidarity with German and global leftists.

I also laid flowers at the cemetery where Rosa Luxemburg and others are buried.

During the five-hour march, I stood on the side of the procession, displaying posters to participants and passersby. When the procession passed, I quickly ran to the front of each group (there were seven or eight groups, stretching for one kilometer), and then again displayed from the side, trying to let as many people as possible see.

In addition to that left-wing poster, I also displayed posters commemorating Chinese laborers in World War II, condemning the remnants of Japanese fascism (and comparing the huge differences between Germany and Japan in how they treat history), opposing the removal of the “comfort women” statue, and calling for the release of Xu Zhiyong and other Chinese political prisoners.

Today, at least thousands of people saw my posters. I also distributed hundreds of related leaflets and letters. I did not print enough; two categories ran out very quickly.

I also displayed posters of outstanding Chinese women, including Qiu Jin, Lin Zhao, Wu Jianxiong, and other female heroes who made outstanding contributions to China, as well as Chinese female workers, female farmers, and female victims such as the “chained woman.”

They should be seen and understood by the whole world, and of course the Chinese people should know and remember them even more.

During the march, I spoke with many participants, expressing my views and demands. Some of them were Marxist-Leninists, some were Maoists, and some supported Stalin. I told them that I consider myself a social democrat–democratic socialist, and also partly inclined toward Trotsky.

But I also respect their views. Even Maoists—Maoism and Mao himself are not the same thing. Mao Zedong himself betrayed Maoism. Of course, I myself am not a Maoist.

In fact, more Chinese people should actively participate in activities and express themselves. Regardless of political stance (of course, those that cross the bottom line, such as Nazis and extreme anti-Chinese racists, are not within the scope of discussion), the Chinese people should actively speak out based on their values and positions, so that the world can hear China’s voice and see the presence of the Chinese people.

I also, during the march and when paying respects at the cemetery, displayed a commemorative poster for the Chinese laborers who were forcibly conscripted, suffered, and died under Japanese aggression in World War II.

The suffering of Chinese laborers is also the shared suffering of the working class of the whole world. These forgotten Chinese laborers should be known and remembered by more people.

On January 13, 2026, I again participated in the LLL march in Berlin, displaying posters and distributing leaflets. The general process was the same as in 2025.

The posters I mainly displayed, at the very top, featured photos of the German socialist/feminists Rosa Luxemburg, Karl Liebknecht, and Clara Zetkin; the Russian and global revolutionary leader Trotsky; as well as the Chinese Trotskyist leader Chen Duxiu, the feminist pioneer Xiang Jingyu, the Marxist Li Dazhao, and early CCP leader Qu Qiubai.

The second row showed the German November Revolution of 1918, the Russian February Revolution (not October), and Korea’s March 1st Movement of 1919, for democracy, peace, and socialism;

The third row of the poster showed in 1919 China’s May Fourth Movement—patriotism and the pursuit of democracy and science; and in 1925-1926 the Canton–Hong Kong General Strike—resisting colonialism and capitalist exploitation, and defending labor rights as well as national sovereignty and dignity.

The fourth row showed Chinese youth resisting Japan, “every inch of land is stained with blood, a hundred thousand youths, a hundred thousand soldiers,” opposing fascism, and defending national independence and the well-being of the people;

The fifth row showed the global left-wing civil rights/student movements of the 1960s–1970s, namely the “1968 movement,” for equality, justice, and decolonization;

The sixth row showed the 1989 Chinese 8–9 democracy movement, for democracy, freedom, and civil rights;

The seventh row showed the 2018 Shenzhen Jasic labor movement, workers and students uniting to fight for labor rights.

On the other side of the posters I distributed, I provided a general introduction to the history and development of the Chinese socialist movement, and also issued a call (translated into both German and English versions):

Comrades and peoples in Germany and around the world should understand the history of China’s socialist movement and pay attention to the present suffering of the Chinese people!

1911–1949: from the national democratic revolution against the Manchu Qing and monarchical system, to resistance against the oppression of British imperialism and other great powers, resisting the brutal Japanese aggressors as part of the international anti-fascist war; from overthrowing domestic landlords, capitalists, and corrupt officials to promoting the establishment of a socialist state—Chinese left-wing progressives made immense contributions and paid heavy sacrifices!

The pioneers of the Chinese revolution passionately studied Marxism, admired Lenin, and aspired to a beautiful communist future; many Chinese gave their lives for this cause!

From the 1950s onward, the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) betrayed hundreds of millions of peasants, workers, intellectuals, and the humiliated and oppressed, degenerating from a vanguard of liberation into a privileged class that oppresses the people! This was a betrayal of Marxism!

Draped in a red “socialist” cloak, CCP bureaucrats, cadres, relatives, and interest groups imposed exploitation and oppression exceeding that of bourgeois regimes, strangled people’s democracy, caused tens of millions of Chinese to die in hunger, killing, and poverty—above all the peasantry!

Through household registration system and confinement of civil freedoms, freedom of movement was stripped away and peasants were reduced to serf-like status;

equality in name, rigid hierarchies in reality, worth and inferiority judged by bloodline and treatment decided by origin;

forced grain requisitions and special supply systems feeding one group with the sweat and blood of another; regional inequality, with central and southern China contributing greatly yet receiving little, while places like Beijing enjoyed privilege; foreigners favored, Chinese citizens reduced to pariahs;

Women’s liberation achieved gains yet remained limited: lower- and middle-class women failed to escape patriarchy and were further controlled by the Leviathan of the state; the elderly, the weak, the sick, and the disabled were denied care and protection;

Anti-intellectual policies such as “backyard steelmaking” and “ten-thousand-jin-per-mu yields” violated objective laws and science, violated the basic principles of Marxism, gravely damaged livelihoods and the economy, and obstructed social progress!

Mao Zedong was not a sincere communist; under the pretext of Marxism-Leninism he practiced feudal autocracy, ruling like an emperor. The CCP itself was hijacked by selfish and cruel individuals; idealistic communists were eliminated, bad money driving out good. Monopoly of power, information blockade, and preferential treatment for foreigners prevented the world—including leftists in all countries—from understanding the true reality of China from 1949 to 1976. Many were deceived!

For private and narrow interests, Mao Zedong and the CCP actively engineered the Sino-Soviet split, aligned with the American right, and shook hands with Nixon in 1972; in the Third World (such as Angola, Latin America, and Southeast Asia) they openly or covertly supported right-wing forces and military dictatorships, opposed pro-Soviet left-wing democratic forces, and split and betrayed the socialist camp!

From the Deng Xiaoping era to the present, China has been a “left in name, right in substance” system of elite capitalism; workers, peasants, the poor, and the vulnerable endure exploitation, oppression, bullying, and manifold injustices! Privileged classes (including bureaucrats, military and police, capitalists, entrenched interests across sectors, and criminal gangs) stand above the people, abusing power and plundering wealth! Beneath the glittering façade and achievements lie ugliness and filth!

State-owned enterprises have become tools for a small minority to seize wealth; communist party dictatorship has degenerated into bureaucratic rule! The CCP collaborates with the United States, Japan, and European powers, colluding internally and externally to jointly colonize and exploit the Chinese people! The prosperity under “Reform and Opening Up” and globalization is filled with the sweat and blood of the Chinese people!

From Mao Zedong to Deng Xiaoping and to today under Xi Jinping’s rule, the CCP has betrayed the Chinese people, failed the fallen martyrs, and distorted and damaged the global socialist cause—turning its back on the ideas and principles of Marx, Lenin, Trotsky, and other forebears!

Today’s Chinese workers, peasants, women, ordinary people, and vulnerable groups—and their contributions, suffering, endurance, and decline—need the understanding of the international community, especially progressive left-wing forces, as well as care and assistance for them!

More than one billion Chinese people, including Han Chinese and other nationalities, who must not be ignored or forgotten—yet in reality are—need to gain freedom and liberation; they need equality, justice, and humanity, a truly genuine socialism!

As in 2025, I followed the procession all the way to the end, displaying posters and distributing leaflets along the way, and bowed in front of Rosa Luxemburg’s grave. Today I also displayed a poster commemorating the 80th anniversary of the victory of the War of Resistance against Japan and the international anti-fascist war.

However, an incident occurred during this time. After arriving at the cemetery of Rosa Luxemburg and other socialists, a young German leftist saw the content on my poster about the Republic of China’s resistance against Japan and the Republic of China flag, and mistakenly thought it was Taiwan. I explained that it was mainland China. The person then asked me whether I liked Xi Jinping. I said I did not (because Xi Jinping is not a true socialist).

Then this person suddenly grabbed my poster and ran. I chased through the crowd for dozens of meters; he threw my poster back to me, and it was already somewhat damaged. At that time, the people maintaining order (also leftists) came over and instead asked me to put my poster away, saying that posters cannot be displayed in the cemetery, although I saw other people also displaying flags and images in the cemetery.

I am not willing to argue with leftist youth who do not fully understand the situation in China. But this kind of incident did indeed damage my mood for participating in the activity. Of course, in the process of participating in the march and displaying posters, I also received a good deal of positive feedback from socialists, for which I also express my thanks.

Because in the two days before participating in the activity, heavy snow fell across Germany and some train routes were suspended, I almost could not participate. In the end, I was still fortunate enough to take part.

u/Slow-Property5895 — 6 days ago
▲ 8 r/China

Looking Back at Jiang Zemin on the 100th Anniversary of His Birth: The Helmsman of China’s Transition from Conservatism to Openness, a CCP Leader Who Drew Both Praise and Criticism, and an Authoritarian Leader with Both Significant Achievements and Serious Failings

August 17, 2026 marks the centenary of the birth of the late Jiang Zemin (江泽民), former General Secretary of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) and the core leader of the third generation of the People’s Republic of China’s leadership. In mid-August, Chinese authorities launched a series of commemorative activities, including CCTV’s broadcast of the lengthy documentary Jiang Zemin and preparations for meetings to commemorate Jiang and extol his achievements. Among the public, memories and discussions of Jiang and the era of his rule have also been rekindled. Assessments vary, but positive evaluations are clearly more numerous.
Jiang Zemin’s life was rich in experiences and marked by many twists and turns. He came from a family that included both revolutionary martyrs and collaborators and traitors. His student years were spent in the heartland of the Japanese occupation and its collaborationist regime during Japan’s invasion of China, and he studied at National Central University in Nanjing under the Wang Jingwei puppet regime (汪伪政权). Jiang witnessed the Republic of China’s brief return of its capital to Nanjing and subsequent retreat, became an engineer in Red China, and then, through a combination of circumstances, entered politics and rose rapidly through the ranks.

In late June 1989, shortly after the 1989 Democracy Movement (八九民运) was suppressed, at a critical turning point in China’s transformation, Jiang Zemin replaced Zhao Ziyang (赵紫阳) as General Secretary of the CCP with the support of Deng Xiaoping (邓小平) and others, remaining in that position until he stepped down in 2002. More detailed accounts of Jiang’s life and its particulars can be found in works such as Robert Lawrence Kuhn’s The Man Who Changed China: The Life and Legacy of Jiang Zemin. There is no need to repeat them here. This article focuses primarily on the domestic and foreign policies pursued under Jiang’s leadership, as well as their benefits, drawbacks, successes, and failures.

When Jiang Zemin became China’s leader, the country was beset by internal and external difficulties, widespread uncertainty, and social unrest. At the time, most Chinese people neither placed any particular hopes in the new CCP general secretary nor harbored any particular dislike of him. Many regarded him as an inconsequential transitional figure, a “political puppet” on the public stage. Nor was Jiang a veteran of the CCP revolution like Mao Zedong (毛泽东) or Deng Xiaoping; his seniority and standing within the Party were not especially high.

Nevertheless, by demonstrating loyalty to Deng Xiaoping, avoiding direct involvement in the previous struggles between conservatives and reformists within the CCP, and escaping the stigma of direct participation in the June Fourth Crackdown (六四镇压), Jiang ultimately transformed himself from a leader with only partial authority into a paramount leader with full power, Deng Xiaoping’s formal successor, and the core of China’s third-generation leadership.

China had just experienced the 1989 Democracy Movement and the June Fourth Crackdown, while internationally the dramatic upheavals in Eastern Europe and the dissolution of the Soviet Union were unfolding. The country stood at a crossroads between continuing reform and opening up and turning toward isolation and conservatism. Decisions made at the highest level would determine China’s fate for decades to come. As people later came to know, the CCP ruling group chose a course of maintaining economic openness while accelerating and expanding the process of opening up, becoming more conservative politically and strengthening authoritarian rule, and loosening cultural restrictions while still retaining control.

The foremost figure in determining this course was indeed Deng Xiaoping, who at the time had not yet fully retired and still enjoyed enormous prestige. But Jiang Zemin undoubtedly also played an important role, inheriting and further advancing Deng’s established line of “taking economic development as the central task, upholding the Four Cardinal Principles (四项基本原则), and adhering to reform and opening up (改革开放),” as well as “building a socialist market economy (社会主义市场经济).”

Judging from Jiang Zemin’s conduct between 1989 and 1992, he did not appear willing to accelerate reform and was even preparing to partially revert to the planned-economy model and Stalinist political system of the Mao era before the Cultural Revolution (文化大革命). He sought in this way to win the support of CCP conservatives, draw a clear line between himself and reformists such as Zhao Ziyang, strengthen CCP rule, and consolidate his own power and position as leader of the Party and state. He may have believed that Deng Xiaoping wanted to pursue such a comprehensively conservative course and sought thereby to please Deng and other conservatives opposed to “color revolutions.”
But Deng Xiaoping vigorously promoted a dual-track course of intensifying economic reform while remaining politically conservative, declaring that “whoever does not reform must step down.” Jiang grasped Deng’s intentions and quickly changed course, following Deng’s line. This also reflected Jiang’s pragmatism and adaptability, and his skill at following the prevailing political winds rather than adhering rigidly to principles and dogma.

If Deng Xiaoping remained the principal decision-maker behind the choice to continue reform and opening up after 1989, then Jiang Zemin was undoubtedly the foremost decision-maker behind China’s accession to the World Trade Organization (WTO) and its integration into globalization. At the time, China’s conservative left opposed WTO accession on grounds such as that it would “undermine national independence and self-reliance” and “destroy domestic industry/agriculture.” They also accused supporters of WTO accession of “selling out the country” and “returning China to the pre-Liberation era.” But Jiang withstood the opposition, gave his full support to the WTO accession negotiations, and ultimately enabled China to join the WTO successfully and become one of its most important economies and participants.

Over the following two decades and more, China’s economy took off, the country became the world’s second-largest economy, and people’s living standards improved significantly. A major reason was China’s accession to the WTO and its full participation in globalization and the international division of labor, which enabled China to prosper and grow strong as the “world’s factory,” while Chinese consumers gained access to foreign products more cheaply and conveniently. This, in turn, demonstrated the correctness of joining the WTO. An even more far-reaching impact was that China went from being isolated from the world to becoming part of the “global village.” No matter how China and the West might subsequently come into conflict, it would no longer be possible for the two sides to truly “decouple” or become completely antagonistic. This has benefited peace and prosperity in both China and the world.

Jiang Zemin’s contributions to China’s opening to the outside world went beyond WTO accession. The successful hosting of the World Conference on Women in Beijing in 1995, the comprehensive opening of the Pudong New Area (浦东新区), China’s successful bids to host the Olympic Games and the World Expo, and the maintenance of friendly and cooperative relations between China and the United States despite repeated twists and turns were all inseparable from Jiang’s efforts.

This was particularly difficult given that, during the 1990s, the United States and the West at one point imposed tough sanctions on China, while incidents such as the Yinhe Incident (银河号事件), the bombing of the Chinese Embassy in Yugoslavia (中国驻南联盟大使馆被炸事件), and the China–U.S. aircraft collision over the South China Sea (中美南海撞机事件) occurred. Yet Jiang did not lead China toward comprehensive anti-Americanism. Instead, he eased relations with the United States and strengthened economic, trade, and cultural cooperation.

In other areas of foreign policy, Jiang continued the Mao-Deng policy of maintaining friendly relations with Japan and seeking Japanese economic and technological support. At the same time, on issues in China–Japan relations such as the history of Japan’s invasion of China, he also expressed a position of remembering history and condemning aggression, thereby safeguarding China’s national dignity. The War of Resistance Against Japanese Aggression (抗日战争) began to receive more formal and solemn commemoration, while veterans of the war—including former Nationalist soldiers—as well as victims such as laborers forcibly conscripted by Japan and “comfort women” received greater attention, particularly during the middle and later years of Jiang’s rule.

However, Jiang Zemin and the CCP leadership’s inaction in the face of the rape and massacre of ethnic Chinese during the 1998 anti-Chinese violence in Indonesia (1998年印尼排华屠杀), followed by improved relations with Indonesia, was another stain on their record. The Chinese government’s failure to regard this as a major issue requiring intervention was itself a serious problem and mistake. At a time when countries including the United States, Canada, and Australia were criticizing and sanctioning Indonesia, China’s silence was especially painful.

Jiang frequently traveled abroad. During his tenure, China’s relations with Europe and with countries across Asia, Africa, and Latin America made considerable progress, with commercial and trade cooperation increasing particularly markedly and “Made in China” products being exported overseas on a massive scale.
In domestic policy, Jiang Zemin made important contributions to the modernization, systematization, and professionalization of China’s economy, military, institutions, legal system, and other fields. After upheavals such as the Cultural Revolution, many areas in China—especially industry, science and technology, education, and the development of the rule of law—had long remained chaotic, disorderly, and inefficient. Even in the early years of reform and opening up, there was insufficient capacity and favorable conditions to rectify these problems. It was during the Jiang era that these conditions began to improve. Reducing the phenomenon of “laymen leading experts” and political interference, while placing localities and various sectors under the administration of technocrats, was also promoted and institutionalized during the Jiang era. This greatly benefited China’s development and modernization.

Term limits for CCP and Chinese state leaders, peaceful and stable leadership succession, and the timely retirement of elderly officials also became established conventions during the Jiang era. Although Jiang continued to serve as Chairman of the Central Military Commission for two years after stepping down as General Secretary and State President, overall, the timely retirement of leaders and regularized leadership succession were achieved. The CCP’s top leadership under Jiang also practiced collective leadership to a certain extent. The earlier personalized system in which rank and power were determined by individual prestige and “veteran revolutionary credentials” gradually evolved into a bureaucratic system in which officials performed duties according to their positions, promotion was determined by competence and political achievements, and a certain form of “rule of law” and institutional regularization operated under authoritarian rule.

During the Jiang Zemin era, there were some positive achievements in grassroots autonomy and democratic elections at the village level in China. CCP propaganda and textbooks even praised these as “the broadest and most profound practice of democracy.” At the time, citizens running independently as candidates for People’s Congress deputy (人大代表) were also permitted and praised. During the Jiang era, CCP officials, including Jiang himself, made statements advocating political reform and suggesting that China would become more democratic in the future and introduce direct elections at higher levels rather than limiting them to villages. Although democratic politics, direct elections of officials above the village level, and free competition in elections for People’s Congress deputies were ultimately never implemented, this at least indicated that the CCP at the time did not explicitly reject or repudiate democracy, and it gave people hope for a freer and more democratic future.

Also, the introduction of the strategy of “revitalizing the country through science and education” (科教兴国) brought more policy support and funding to China’s education, science, and technology sectors and became a key factor in China’s rise. Many children from poor families gained access to education and were able to change the course of their lives. Investment in scientific research, promotion of science popularization, advocacy of science, and efforts to combat superstition were of great significance to China’s modernization and civic enlightenment. The quality and efficiency of China’s economic and social development also improved as a result.

The disorder that had emerged after reform and opening up, in which the military engaged in business and used its power to compete with civilians for economic interests, was curbed through Jiang Zemin’s efforts and eventually disappeared. The Theory of the Three Represents (三个代表) provided a theoretical basis for the CCP to maintain its legitimacy in an era of peace and development. During the catastrophic floods along the Yangtze River and elsewhere in 1998 (1998年长江等地特大洪灾), Jiang personally went to the front lines to direct flood-control and disaster-relief efforts, striving to uphold the principle that the CCP and the people should remain closely connected and to maintain the image of “serving the people.” Judged on its own merits, this is also worthy of praise.

Another point particularly worth mentioning is that Jiang Zemin was a leader with a distinctive personality. When meeting foreign guests, traveling abroad, or making inspection tours around China, he frequently spoke eloquently and extemporaneously, displayed fluency in several languages including English, French, Russian, and Japanese, and readily drew upon poetry, classical prose, and historical allusions. His interview with American journalist Mike Wallace, as well as the famous scene in which he “scolded Hong Kong journalist” (斥责香港记者), were also widely circulated and repeatedly discussed and evaluated. These episodes reflected Jiang’s genuine talent and relatively open-minded outlook. A Chinese leader of this kind had greater personal appeal than one who rigidly followed conventions and was more likely to win favorable impressions both at home and abroad. This is also one reason Jiang had quite a few “fans” among the public.

Of course, the Jiang Zemin era also had a dark side, creating and exacerbating a number of serious problems. Rural poverty and the multiple layers of exactions imposed on peasants were not effectively resolved; it was not until the Hu Jintao (胡锦涛) era that the agricultural tax and the various onerous levies attached to it were abolished. The layoffs of workers also resulted in many tragedies and hardships. While the economy grew rapidly, the gap between rich and poor widened and corruption became increasingly rampant. Environmental pollution also grew increasingly severe.
China’s longstanding emphasis on science and engineering at the expense of the humanities, and its imbalance between growing hard power and inadequate soft power, became further entrenched during the Jiang era.

Jiang Zemin advocated “making a fortune quietly” (闷声发大财), while the authorities guided, implicitly encouraged, and incentivized people to pursue wealth by whatever means necessary. This led to the decline of idealism and public responsibility among Chinese people compared with the period before the June Fourth Incident (六四事件), as well as a deterioration in social morality. The elite in particular increasingly degenerated into “sophisticated egoists” (精致利己主义者).

Crony capitalism also rose during this period. Red elite families and the families of officials amassed wealth through manipulation and predation, enriching themselves at the expense of ordinary people and forming a community of shared interests. They became the true “masters” of China and the most powerful defenders of the CCP’s one-party authoritarian rule.

More seriously and fundamentally, political reform in China stagnated during the Jiang Zemin era. China did not enjoy as much freedom as it had in the 1980s, nor did it move toward democracy. Instead, the CCP’s authoritarian rule and monopoly on political power were strengthened, with no other parties or individuals permitted to share power or compete politically with the CCP. While the Three Represents emphasized the Party’s responsibilities toward the country and the people, it also meant that the CCP monopolized the position of representing the interests of the Chinese state and people—and forcibly claimed to “represent” them without having been voluntarily authorized by the people to do so.

Although there were some limited institutional and judicial reforms during the Jiang era that achieved a certain degree of progress, they cannot obscure the broader reality that authoritarian rule became institutionalized and democratization was rejected. While the regularization and improvement of various institutions and policies brought development and progress, a systematic apparatus of political repression and social control was also gradually established, and was subsequently strengthened and refined by Jiang’s successors, Hu Jintao and Xi Jinping (习近平). Alongside economic and technological modernization, authoritarian rule also underwent its own “modernization.”

Excessively brutal methods of repression against specific groups such as Falun Gong (法轮功), the arrest of numerous political prisoners, tolerance of local governments’ persecution of citizens defending their rights, and a hardline approach to the Tibet issue (西藏问题) also caused great suffering and prompted widespread human-rights criticism and negative repercussions. These policies were detrimental to civil rights and social cohesion within China, while also damaging the country’s international image and influence.

It was precisely the development path established during the Jiang Zemin era—economic openness combined with political conservatism—and its success that caused China to miss a crucial window and opportunity for democratization following the 1989 Democracy Movement and June Fourth Crackdown and the upheavals in the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe (苏东剧变). Economic development, certain advances in society and civil rights, participation in globalization, and the enhancement of national strength instead consolidated the CCP’s authoritarian rule and nourished the ruling establishment, which in the long run was detrimental to China’s democratization. For those concerned about human rights and hoping for political pluralism and liberal democracy in China, these developments were of course unfortunate.

The Jiang Zemin era was also the formative period of the “China Model” (中国模式). The “China Model” refers to the coexistence of political authoritarianism and economic openness: maintaining stability through high-pressure rule and suppressing those who resist; exploiting the cheap labor made possible by the “advantage of low human rights standards” (低人权优势) to develop production and gain a relative competitive advantage internationally; and using the resulting economic achievements to increase fiscal revenue, improve living standards, and strengthen national power, which in turn reinforces authoritarian rule and the interests of the CCP’s privileged class. By the Hu Jintao and Xi Jinping eras, the “China Model” had become increasingly refined and entrenched and was being exported internationally. Such a “China Model” has both advantages and disadvantages, and its impact is complex. I have discussed it in detail in another article and will not elaborate on it here.

Assessments of Jiang Zemin’s achievements and failures, and judgments about the rights and wrongs of that era, inevitably differ depending on people’s political positions, the perspectives from which they view the period, and the particular episodes and aspects they choose to focus on. If we set aside the political question of democracy versus authoritarianism and look more from a utilitarian perspective and from the standpoint of China’s development, Jiang Zemin, who assumed leadership of China in the 1990s amid internal and external difficulties and an uncertain path ahead, promoted China’s economic opening and peaceful, friendly relations with the outside world, persisted in developing the economy and improving people’s livelihoods, and led a China that had been poor, disorderly, relatively isolated, and turbulent for many years toward a new era of gradually increasing prosperity, stability and predictability, international integration, and modernization. Neither his achievements nor his efforts in this regard can be erased.

Jiang Zemin inherited the reform and opening-up policies of the Deng Xiaoping era and laid the foundations for the continued development and prosperity of the later Hu Jintao era and for China’s emergence as a country with formidable comprehensive national strength in the Xi Jinping era. From a pragmatic perspective, he can be regarded as a competent helmsman during China’s transitional era. Yet Jiang was also the head of an authoritarian regime that consolidated CCP rule after the June Fourth Crackdown, caused China to miss the opportunity for democratization, tolerated and exacerbated corruption and the suffering of workers and peasants at the bottom of society, and suppressed dissidents. Jiang also bears a certain degree of responsibility for China’s authoritarianism and human-rights problems from the period after he left office through the present day. He had both achievements and failures; he was open-minded and highly capable, yet also deeply attached to power and committed to maintaining authoritarian rule. Objectively speaking, his legacy was a mixture of accomplishments and wrongdoing.

Just as the centenary of Jiang Zemin’s birth approaches, Zhu Rongji (朱镕基), the former Chinese premier who served alongside him when Jiang was General Secretary and President, died on August 12. Compared with Jiang Zemin, whose principal activities focused on diplomacy, the military, and ideology, Zhu Rongji was the hands-on operator of China’s domestic affairs.

Zhu Rongji was known for his iron-fisted reforms. He restructured large numbers of inefficient state-owned enterprises, ultimately stabilized China’s public finances and prices after a period of high inflation, promoted the development of special economic zones such as Shenzhen (深圳), encouraged investment nationwide, advanced the development of China’s market economy, cracked down on some corrupt officials, and helped China through a period of considerable economic difficulty following reform and opening up.

However, Zhu Rongji’s reforms also had significant limitations and produced various negative consequences, including exacerbating the wave of layoffs and intensifying conflicts between officials and citizens as well as broader social tensions. His iron-fisted anti-corruption campaign also failed to eradicate corruption, as both the number of people involved in corruption and the sums involved continued to rise. Zhu Rongji’s reforms were also a clear example of rule by individuals prevailing over the rule of law and could not bring China lasting peace and stability. Corruption was so difficult to curb precisely because of the absence of democracy and the rule of law. No matter how determined Zhu Rongji was to fight corruption, such efforts could not succeed under authoritarian rule.Like Jiang Zemin, Zhu was an important transitional figure in China after reform and opening up and June Fourth. Together they participated in a wide range of domestic and foreign affairs, and Zhu therefore also shared in both Jiang’s achievements and failures.

Jiang Zemin was born into the turbulent Republic of China era, grew up under the iron heel of Japanese occupation, and rose all the way to the top in Red China through a combination of ability, shrewdness, and luck. He died at the age of 96, having participated in and witnessed nearly a century of China’s transformation. Although the Jiang era was politically conservative and lacked liberal democracy, it nevertheless had somewhat more freedom, openness, and democratic spirit than China has had under the more closed and conservative Xi Jinping era.

Some Chinese people praise Jiang Zemin not because they regard him as extraordinarily great, but because China today has more problems and causes greater disappointment, leading them to look back nostalgically on an earlier era marked by hope and an upward trajectory, while using that nostalgia to express dissatisfaction with present-day realities. The mixed but predominantly positive assessments of Jiang among various sectors of Chinese society, especially among ordinary people, embody the saying that “the people have a scale in their hearts” (老百姓心里一杆秤). They also reflect the sincere desire of Chinese people today to uphold reform and opening up and oppose isolation and regression.

(This article is written by Wang Qingmin (王庆民), a Chinese writer based in Europe and a researcher of international politics. The original version of this article was written in Chinese.)

reddit.com
u/Slow-Property5895 — 6 days ago

Rückblick auf Jiang Zemin anlässlich seines 100. Geburtstags: Der Steuermann Chinas in der Übergangszeit vom Konservatismus zur Öffnung, ein sowohl gelobter als auch kritisierter Parteichef der KPCh und ein autoritärer Staatsführer mit bedeutenden Verdiensten und schwerwiegenden Verfehlungen

Der 17. August 2026 ist der 100. Geburtstag des verstorbenen ehemaligen Generalsekretärs der Kommunistischen Partei Chinas (KPCh) und Staatsführers der dritten Führungsgeneration der Volksrepublik China, Jiang Zemin (江泽民). Mitte August begann die chinesische Führung mit einer Reihe von Gedenkveranstaltungen. So strahlte das chinesische Zentralfernsehen CCTV eine umfangreiche Dokumentation mit dem Titel Jiang Zemin aus, und es wurden Veranstaltungen zum Gedenken an Jiang Zemin und zur Würdigung seiner Verdienste vorbereitet. Auch in der chinesischen Bevölkerung sind die Erinnerungen an Jiang Zemin und seine Regierungszeit sowie die Diskussionen darüber erneut aufgeflammt. Die Bewertungen fallen unterschiedlich aus, doch positive Urteile überwiegen offensichtlich.

Jiang Zemins Lebensweg war reich an Erfahrungen und von zahlreichen Wendungen geprägt. Er stammte aus einer Familie, zu der sowohl revolutionäre Märtyrer als auch Kollaborateure und Verräter gehörten. Seine Studienzeit verbrachte er während der japanischen Invasion Chinas in einem Kerngebiet der japanischen Besatzung und der mit ihr kollaborierenden Marionettenregierung. Er studierte an der Zentraluniversität in Nanjing, die damals der Marionettenregierung Wang Jingweis (汪伪政权) unterstand. Jiang Zemin erlebte die kurzzeitige Rückkehr der Hauptstadt der Republik China nach Nanjing und deren anschließende Niederlage und Rückzug, wurde Ingenieur im Roten China und gelangte später durch eine Verkettung von Umständen in die Politik, wo er rasch aufstieg.

Ende Juni 1989, kurz nach der Niederschlagung der Demokratiebewegung von 1989 (八九民运), ersetzte Jiang Zemin in dieser entscheidenden Phase des chinesischen Wandels mit Unterstützung von Deng Xiaoping (邓小平) und anderen Zhao Ziyang (赵紫阳) als Generalsekretär der KPCh. Dieses Amt bekleidete er bis zu seinem Rücktritt im Jahr 2002. Ausführlichere Darstellungen von Jiang Zemins Leben und dessen Einzelheiten finden sich unter anderem in Robert Lawrence Kuhns Biografie über Jiang Zemin; sie sollen hier nicht wiederholt werden. Dieser Artikel befasst sich hauptsächlich mit der Innen- und Außenpolitik während Jiang Zemins Regierungszeit sowie mit deren Vor- und Nachteilen, Erfolgen und Misserfolgen.

Als Jiang Zemin die Führung Chinas übernahm, befand sich das Land in einer schwierigen innen- wie außenpolitischen Lage; die Menschen waren orientierungslos, und die Gesellschaft war von Unruhe und Instabilität geprägt. Die meisten Chinesen setzten damals weder besondere Hoffnungen in den neuen Generalsekretär der KPCh noch empfanden sie eine besondere Abneigung gegen ihn. Nicht wenige betrachteten ihn als unbedeutende Übergangsfigur, als eine „politische Marionette“ auf der öffentlichen Bühne. Anders als Mao Zedong (毛泽东), Deng Xiaoping und andere gehörte Jiang Zemin auch nicht zu den revolutionären Veteranen der KPCh; sein Dienstalter und seine Stellung innerhalb der Partei waren nicht besonders hoch.

Doch durch seine Loyalität gegenüber Deng Xiaoping, dadurch, dass er sich den vorherigen Auseinandersetzungen zwischen Konservativen und Reformern innerhalb der KPCh weitgehend entzogen hatte, und dadurch, dass er nicht unmittelbar an der Niederschlagung des 4. Juni (六四镇压) beteiligt gewesen war und daher nicht unmittelbar mit deren Makel belastet war, entwickelte sich Jiang Zemin schließlich von einem Führer mit nur begrenzter Macht zu einem mit umfassender Macht ausgestatteten Staatsführer, zum offiziellen Nachfolger Deng Xiaopings und zum Kern der dritten chinesischen Führungsgeneration.

China hatte damals gerade die Demokratiebewegung von 1989 und die Niederschlagung des 4. Juni hinter sich, während international die Umwälzungen in Osteuropa und der Zerfall der Sowjetunion (东欧剧变苏联解体) stattfanden. Das Land stand an einem Scheideweg: Sollte es Reform und Öffnung (改革开放) fortsetzen oder sich Abschottung und Konservatismus zuwenden? Die Entscheidungen auf höchster Ebene sollten Chinas Schicksal für die folgenden Jahrzehnte bestimmen. Wie man später sehen konnte, entschied sich die Führung der KPCh für einen Kurs, der wirtschaftliche Öffnung beibehielt und deren Tempo und Umfang beschleunigte beziehungsweise erweiterte, politisch jedoch konservativer wurde und die autoritäre Herrschaft verstärkte, während im kulturellen Bereich gewisse Lockerungen zugelassen wurden, die Kontrolle aber bestehen blieb.

Die wichtigste Persönlichkeit bei der Festlegung dieses Kurses war tatsächlich Deng Xiaoping, der damals noch nicht vollständig im Ruhestand war und weiterhin über enormes Ansehen verfügte. Doch auch Jiang Zemin spielte zweifellos eine wichtige Rolle, indem er Deng Xiaopings bereits festgelegten Kurs übernahm und weiterführte: „den wirtschaftlichen Aufbau in den Mittelpunkt stellen, an den Vier Grundprinzipien (四项基本原则) festhalten und Reform und Öffnung fortsetzen“ sowie „eine sozialistische Marktwirtschaft (社会主义市场经济) aufbauen“.

Nach Jiang Zemins Verhalten zwischen 1989 und 1992 zu urteilen, schien er zunächst nicht bereit zu sein, die Reformen zu beschleunigen. Vielmehr bereitete er sich darauf vor, teilweise zum planwirtschaftlichen Modell der Mao-Ära vor der Kulturrevolution (文化大革命) und zu einem politischen System stalinistischer Prägung zurückzukehren. Damit wollte er die Unterstützung der Konservativen innerhalb der KPCh gewinnen, sich klar von Reformern wie Zhao Ziyang abgrenzen, die Herrschaft der KPCh stärken und zugleich seine eigene Macht und Stellung als Partei- und Staatsführer festigen. Möglicherweise glaubte er, Deng Xiaoping wünsche einen derart umfassend konservativen Kurs, und wollte damit Deng sowie anderen konservativen Gegnern von „Farbrevolutionen“ entgegenkommen.
Deng Xiaoping hingegen setzte mit Nachdruck auf einen zweigleisigen Kurs: eine Vertiefung der Wirtschaftsreformen bei gleichzeitigem politischem Konservatismus. Er erklärte, „wer nicht reformiert, muss abtreten“. Jiang Zemin erkannte Deng Xiaopings Absichten, änderte rasch seinen Kurs und folgte Dengs Linie. Dies zeigt auch, dass Jiang Zemin pragmatisch und anpassungsfähig war und sich geschickt nach dem politischen Wind richtete, anstatt starr an Prinzipien und Dogmen festzuhalten.

Wenn Deng Xiaoping auch nach 1989 der wichtigste Entscheidungsträger für die Fortsetzung des Kurses von Reform und Öffnung blieb, so war Jiang Zemin zweifellos der wichtigste Entscheidungsträger bei Chinas Beitritt zur Welthandelsorganisation (WTO) und bei der Integration des Landes in die Globalisierung. Die konservative Linke in China lehnte den „WTO-Beitritt“ damals mit Argumenten ab, dieser werde „die nationale Unabhängigkeit und Eigenständigkeit beeinträchtigen“ oder „die heimische Industrie/Landwirtschaft zerstören“. Befürwortern des Beitritts warf sie außerdem vor, „das Land zu verkaufen“ und China „in die Zeit vor der Befreiung zurückzuführen“. Jiang Zemin hielt jedoch dem Widerstand stand, unterstützte die Beitrittsverhandlungen mit aller Kraft und ermöglichte China schließlich den erfolgreichen Eintritt in die WTO, in der das Land zu einer der wichtigsten Volkswirtschaften und einem der bedeutendsten Teilnehmer wurde.

In den mehr als zwei Jahrzehnten danach erlebte die chinesische Wirtschaft einen rasanten Aufstieg, China wurde zur zweitgrößten Volkswirtschaft der Welt, und auch der Lebensstandard der Bevölkerung verbesserte sich erheblich. Ein wesentlicher Grund dafür war Chinas WTO-Beitritt und seine umfassende Teilnahme an der Globalisierung und der internationalen Arbeitsteilung. Dadurch konnte China als „Werkbank der Welt“ wohlhabend und stark werden, während chinesische Verbraucher ausländische Produkte günstiger und bequemer erwerben konnten. Dies bestätigte im Gegenzug die Richtigkeit des WTO-Beitritts. Noch weitreichender war, dass China sich von einem gegenüber der Welt relativ isolierten Land zu einem Teil des „globalen Dorfes“ entwickelte. Unabhängig davon, wie stark China und der Westen später miteinander in Konflikt geraten würden, konnten sich beide Seiten nicht mehr wirklich „entkoppeln“ oder vollständig gegeneinander stellen. Dies ist dem Frieden und Wohlstand Chinas wie auch der gesamten Welt förderlich.

Jiang Zemins Verdienste um Chinas Öffnung nach außen beschränkten sich nicht auf den WTO-Beitritt. Die erfolgreiche Ausrichtung der Weltfrauenkonferenz 1995 in Peking (1995年世界妇女大会), die umfassende Öffnung der Neuen Zone Pudong (浦东新区), die erfolgreichen Bewerbungen um die Austragung der Olympischen Spiele und der Weltausstellung sowie die Aufrechterhaltung freundschaftlicher und kooperativer Beziehungen zwischen China und den Vereinigten Staaten trotz zahlreicher Höhen und Tiefen waren allesamt untrennbar mit Jiang Zemins Bemühungen verbunden.

Dies war besonders bemerkenswert angesichts der Tatsache, dass die Vereinigten Staaten und der Westen in den 1990er Jahren zeitweise harte Sanktionen gegen China verhängten und es zu Ereignissen wie dem Yinhe-Zwischenfall (银河号事件), der Bombardierung der chinesischen Botschaft in der Bundesrepublik Jugoslawien (中国驻南联盟大使馆被炸事件) und dem chinesisch-amerikanischen Flugzeugzwischenfall über dem Südchinesischen Meer (中美南海撞机事件) kam. Dennoch führte Jiang Zemin China nicht zu einem umfassenden Antiamerikanismus, sondern entspannte die Beziehungen zu den Vereinigten Staaten und stärkte die wirtschaftliche, handelspolitische und kulturelle Zusammenarbeit. Dies war keineswegs einfach.

Auch in anderen Bereichen der Außenpolitik setzte Jiang Zemin einerseits die von Mao und Deng verfolgte Linie freundschaftlicher Beziehungen zu Japan fort, um wirtschaftliche und technologische Unterstützung von japanischer Seite zu erhalten. Andererseits vertrat er in den chinesisch-japanischen Beziehungen, etwa bei Fragen zur Geschichte der japanischen Invasion Chinas, auch die Haltung, die Geschichte im Gedächtnis zu bewahren und die Aggression zu verurteilen, und verteidigte damit die nationale Würde Chinas. Der Widerstandskrieg gegen die japanische Aggression (抗日战争) wurde nun offizieller und feierlicher gewürdigt. Auch Veteranen dieses Krieges, darunter ehemalige Soldaten der nationalchinesischen Armee, sowie Opfergruppen wie von Japan zwangsrekrutierte Arbeiter und sogenannte „Trostfrauen“ erhielten größere Aufmerksamkeit, insbesondere in der mittleren und späteren Phase von Jiang Zemins Regierungszeit.

Ein weiterer Makel war jedoch die Untätigkeit Jiang Zemins und der Führung der KPCh angesichts der Vergewaltigungen und Massaker an ethnischen Chinesen und chinesischen Auslandsgemeinschaften während der antichinesischen Massaker in Indonesien 1998 (1998年印尼排华屠杀), während gleichzeitig die Beziehungen zu Indonesien verbessert wurden. Dass die chinesische Führung dies nicht als ein schwerwiegendes Problem betrachtete, das ein Eingreifen erforderte, war an sich bereits ein ernstes Problem und ein schwerer Fehler. Zu einer Zeit, als Länder wie die Vereinigten Staaten, Kanada und Australien Indonesien kritisierten und sanktionierten, war Chinas Schweigen besonders schmerzlich.

Jiang Zemin unternahm häufig Auslandsreisen. Während seiner Amtszeit machten Chinas Beziehungen zu Europa sowie zu den Ländern Asiens, Afrikas und Lateinamerikas erhebliche Fortschritte. Insbesondere die wirtschaftliche und handelspolitische Zusammenarbeit nahm deutlich zu, und Produkte „Made in China“ wurden in großem Umfang ins Ausland exportiert.

In der Innenpolitik leistete Jiang Zemin wichtige Beiträge zur Modernisierung, Systematisierung und Professionalisierung der chinesischen Wirtschaft, des Militärs, der Institutionen, des Rechtssystems und anderer Bereiche. Nach den politischen Erschütterungen wie der Kulturrevolution hatten sich zahlreiche Bereiche Chinas, insbesondere Industrie, Wissenschaft und Technologie, Bildung sowie der Aufbau rechtsstaatlicher Strukturen, lange Zeit in einem chaotischen, ungeordneten und ineffizienten Zustand befunden. Auch in der Anfangsphase von Reform und Öffnung fehlten ausreichende Ressourcen und Voraussetzungen, um diese Probleme zu beheben. Erst während der Jiang-Zemin-Ära verbesserte sich diese Situation. Auch die Verringerung des Phänomens, dass „Laien Fachleute führen“, und politischer Einmischung sowie die Verwaltung verschiedener Regionen und Wirtschaftszweige durch Technokraten wurden während der Jiang-Zemin-Ära vorangetrieben und institutionalisiert. Dies war für Chinas Entwicklung und Aufbau von großem Nutzen.

Die Begrenzung der Amtszeiten von Partei- und Staatsführern, ein friedlicher und stabiler Führungswechsel sowie der rechtzeitige Ruhestand hochbetagter Funktionäre wurden ebenfalls während der Jiang-Zemin-Ära zur üblichen Praxis (obwohl Jiang nach seinem Rücktritt als Generalsekretär und Staatspräsident noch zwei Jahre lang Vorsitzender der Zentralen Militärkommission blieb, wurden der rechtzeitige Ruhestand und der regelmäßige Führungswechsel insgesamt zur festen Praxis). Auch an der Spitze der KPCh wurde unter Jiang Zemin bis zu einem gewissen Grad eine kollektive Führung verwirklicht. Das frühere personalisierte Herrschaftsmodell, bei dem Rang und Machtumfang anhand des persönlichen Ansehens und der „revolutionären Seniorität“ bestimmt wurden, entwickelte sich allmählich zu einem bürokratischen System, in dem Funktionäre entsprechend ihren Ämtern jeweils ihre eigenen Aufgaben wahrnahmen, Beförderungen nach Fähigkeiten und politischen Leistungen entschieden wurden und innerhalb des autoritären Systems eine gewisse Form von „Rechtsstaatlichkeit“ und institutioneller Normierung entstand.

Während der Jiang-Zemin-Ära gab es einige positive Ergebnisse bei der Selbstverwaltung und den demokratischen Wahlen auf der chinesischen Basisebene, insbesondere auf Dorfebene. In der Propaganda und in den Lehrbüchern der KPCh wurden diese sogar als „die umfassendste und tiefgreifendste Praxis der Demokratie“ gepriesen. Damals wurde es Bürgern auch gestattet und positiv bewertet, als unabhängige Einzelkandidaten für Mandate als Abgeordnete der Volkskongresse (人大代表) anzutreten. Während der Jiang-Zemin-Ära äußerten sich Funktionäre der KPCh, darunter Jiang selbst, zugunsten politischer Reformen, einer künftig demokratischeren Entwicklung Chinas und allgemeiner Wahlen auf höheren Ebenen, statt diese auf die Dorfebene zu beschränken. Zwar wurden demokratische Politik, allgemeine Wahlen von Amtsträgern oberhalb der Dorfebene und freie Kandidaturen für die Volkskongresse letztlich nicht verwirklicht, doch zeigt dies zumindest, dass die KPCh damals die Demokratie nicht ausdrücklich verneinte oder ablehnte und den Menschen damit Hoffnung auf eine demokratischere und freiere Zukunft gab.

Darüber hinaus führte die Einführung der Strategie, „das Land durch Wissenschaft und Bildung zu stärken“ (科教兴国), dazu, dass Chinas Bildungs-, Wissenschafts- und Technologiesektoren stärkere politische Unterstützung und mehr finanzielle Mittel erhielten. Dies war ein entscheidender Faktor für Chinas Aufstieg. Viele Kinder aus armen Familien erhielten Zugang zu Bildung und konnten dadurch den Verlauf ihres Lebens verändern. Investitionen in wissenschaftliche Forschung, die Förderung populärwissenschaftlicher Bildung, die Verbreitung wissenschaftlichen Denkens und der Kampf gegen Aberglauben waren von großer Bedeutung für Chinas Modernisierung und die gesellschaftliche Aufklärung der Bürger. Auch Qualität und Effizienz der wirtschaftlichen und gesellschaftlichen Entwicklung Chinas wurden dadurch verbessert.

Die nach Beginn von Reform und Öffnung entstandene Fehlentwicklung, dass das Militär kommerzielle Geschäfte betrieb und seine Macht dazu nutzte, mit der Zivilbevölkerung um wirtschaftliche Interessen zu konkurrieren, wurde durch Jiang Zemins Bemühungen eingedämmt und verschwand schließlich weitgehend. Die Theorie der „Drei Repräsentationen“ (三个代表) lieferte der KPCh eine theoretische Grundlage, um ihre Legitimität in einer Epoche des Friedens und der Entwicklung aufrechtzuerhalten. Während der verheerenden Überschwemmungen am Jangtse und in anderen Regionen im Jahr 1998 (1998年长江等地特大洪灾) begab sich Jiang Zemin persönlich an die Front, um den Kampf gegen die Fluten und die Katastrophenhilfe zu leiten. Er bemühte sich, das Prinzip einer engen Verbundenheit zwischen der KPCh und den Volksmassen sowie das Bild des „Dienstes am Volk“ aufrechtzuerhalten. Für sich genommen ist auch dies anerkennenswert.

Besonders erwähnenswert ist zudem, dass Jiang Zemin ein Führer mit ausgeprägter Persönlichkeit war. Bei Treffen mit ausländischen Gästen, auf Auslandsreisen und bei Inspektionsbesuchen in verschiedenen Teilen Chinas sprach er häufig spontan und äußerst eloquent, beherrschte mehrere Sprachen wie Englisch, Französisch, Russisch und Japanisch fließend und griff mühelos auf Gedichte, klassische Texte und historische Anspielungen zurück. Auch sein Interview mit dem amerikanischen Journalisten Mike Wallace sowie die berühmte Szene, in der er „einen Hongkonger Journalisten zurechtwies“ (斥责香港(某位)记者), wurden weithin verbreitet und immer wieder kommentiert und bewertet. Dies zeigt, dass Jiang Zemin tatsächlich sehr talentiert und in seinem Denken vergleichsweise offen war. Ein chinesischer Führer dieser Art wirkte zugänglicher als jemand, der sich streng an Konventionen hielt, und konnte im In- und Ausland leichter Sympathien gewinnen. Dies ist auch ein Grund dafür, dass Jiang Zemin in der Bevölkerung nicht wenige „Fans“ hatte.

Natürlich hatte die Regierungszeit Jiang Zemins auch eine dunkle Seite und brachte verschiedene Missstände hervor oder verschärfte sie. So wurden die Armut der Bauern und ihre Ausbeutung durch zahlreiche Abgaben und Belastungen nicht wirksam gelöst; erst in der Ära Hu Jintao (胡锦涛) wurden die Agrarsteuer und weitere daran gekoppelte übermäßige Abgaben abgeschafft. Auch die Entlassungswellen unter Arbeitern führten zu zahlreichen Tragödien und großem Leid. Gleichzeitig mit dem raschen Wirtschaftswachstum vergrößerte sich die Kluft zwischen Arm und Reich, und die Korruption nahm immer weiter zu. Auch die Umweltverschmutzung verschärfte sich. Chinas langjährige Tendenz, Naturwissenschaften und Technik gegenüber den Geisteswissenschaften zu bevorzugen, sowie das Missverhältnis zwischen wachsender Hard Power und unzureichender Soft Power verfestigten sich in der Jiang-Ära weiter.

Jiang Zemin vertrat die Devise, „im Stillen reich zu werden“ (闷声发大财). Die Behörden lenkten, signalisierten und ermutigten die Bevölkerung dazu, beim Streben nach Wohlstand jedes Mittel einzusetzen. Dies führte dazu, dass Idealismus und öffentliches Verantwortungsbewusstsein unter den Chinesen im Vergleich zur Zeit vor dem Zwischenfall vom 4. Juni (六四事件) zurückgingen und die gesellschaftliche Moral verfiel. Besonders die Eliten entwickelten sich zunehmend zu „raffinierten Egoisten“ (精致利己主义者).

Auch der Günstlings- und Elitenkapitalismus stieg gerade in dieser Zeit auf: Familien der „roten“ Elite und von Funktionären eigneten sich durch geschickte Manipulation und Ausbeutung Vorteile und Reichtum an, lebten auf Kosten der Bevölkerung, bildeten eine Interessengemeinschaft, wurden zu den eigentlichen „Herren“ Chinas und zugleich zu den stärksten Verteidigern der Einparteienherrschaft der KPCh.

Noch schlimmer und grundlegender war, dass die politische Reform in China während der Jiang-Zemin-Ära stagnierte. Es gab nicht so viel Freiheit wie in den 1980er Jahren, und China bewegte sich auch nicht in Richtung Demokratie. Stattdessen wurden die autoritäre Herrschaft der KPCh über China und ihr Machtmonopol weiter gestärkt; keine andere Partei und keine Einzelperson konnte mit der KPCh Macht teilen oder politisch mit ihr konkurrieren. Während die „Drei Repräsentationen“ die Verantwortung der Partei gegenüber Staat und Volk betonten, bedeuteten sie zugleich, dass die KPCh die Rolle des alleinigen Vertreters der Interessen des chinesischen Staates und Volkes monopolisierte und diese „Repräsentation“ beanspruchte, ohne vom Volk freiwillig dazu ermächtigt worden zu sein.

Obwohl es in der Jiang-Ära einige begrenzte institutionelle und justizielle Reformen gab, die gewisse Fortschritte brachten, kann dies nicht darüber hinwegtäuschen, dass sich die autoritäre Ordnung insgesamt verfestigte und eine Demokratisierung abgelehnt wurde. Während die Institutionalisierung und Verbesserung verschiedener Systeme und politischer Maßnahmen Entwicklung und Fortschritt förderten, entstand zugleich schrittweise ein systematischer Apparat politischer Repression und gesellschaftlicher Kontrolle, der von seinen Nachfolgern Hu Jintao und Xi Jinping (习近平) weiter verstärkt und perfektioniert wurde. Parallel zur Modernisierung von Wirtschaft und Technologie wurde auch die autoritäre Herrschaft „modernisiert“.

Die übermäßig brutalen Repressionsmethoden gegen bestimmte Gruppen wie Falun Gong (法轮功), die Inhaftierung zahlreicher politischer Gefangener, die Duldung der Verfolgung von Bürgern, die ihre Rechte verteidigten, durch Lokalregierungen sowie die harte Haltung in der Tibet-Frage (西藏问题) verursachten ebenfalls viel Leid und führten zu weitreichender Kritik an der Menschenrechtslage und zu negativen Auswirkungen. Dies schadete sowohl den Bürgerrechten und dem gesellschaftlichen Zusammenhalt im Inland als auch Chinas internationalem Ansehen und Einfluss.
Gerade die in der Jiang-Zemin-Ära etablierte und erfolgreiche Entwicklungsstrategie, wirtschaftliche Öffnung mit politischem Konservatismus zu verbinden, führte dazu, dass China nach der Demokratiebewegung und dem 4. Juni 1989 sowie den Umbrüchen in der Sowjetunion und Osteuropa (苏东剧变) ein entscheidendes Zeitfenster und eine wichtige Chance zur Demokratisierung verpasste. Wirtschaftliche Entwicklung, gewisse Fortschritte in Gesellschaft und Bürgerrechten, die Teilnahme an der Globalisierung, die Verbesserung der Außenbeziehungen und die Stärkung der nationalen Macht festigten stattdessen die autoritäre Herrschaft der KPCh und stärkten die herrschende Gruppe. Langfristig war dies nachteilig für Chinas Demokratisierung. Für Menschen, die sich um Menschenrechte sorgen und politische Pluralisierung sowie Freiheit und Demokratie in China erhoffen, war dies selbstverständlich bedauerlich.

Die Jiang-Zemin-Ära war zugleich die Entstehungsphase des „chinesischen Modells“ (中国模式). Dieses „chinesische Modell“ bedeutet das Nebeneinander von politischer Autokratie und wirtschaftlicher Öffnung: Stabilität wird durch Hochdruckherrschaft aufrechterhalten und Widerstand unterdrückt; billige Arbeitskräfte werden auf Grundlage des „Vorteils niedriger Menschenrechtsstandards“ (低人权优势) für die Produktion eingesetzt, um relative Vorteile im internationalen Wettbewerb zu erzielen.

Wirtschaftliche Erfolge können die Staatseinnahmen erhöhen, den Lebensstandard verbessern und die nationale Macht stärken; diese Entwicklungen wirken wiederum auf die Festigung der autoritären Herrschaft und die Interessen der privilegierten Schichten der KPCh zurück. In den Ären Hu Jintao und Xi Jinping wurde das „chinesische Modell“ zunehmend vervollkommnet und gefestigt und auch international exportiert. Ein solches „chinesisches Modell“ hat Vor- und Nachteile und komplexe Auswirkungen. Ich habe dies in einem anderen Artikel ausführlicher analysiert und werde es hier nicht weiter ausführen.

Die Bewertung von Jiang Zemins Verdiensten und Fehlern sowie von Recht und Unrecht jener Epoche fällt je nach politischem Standpunkt, Betrachtungswinkel und den ausgewählten Ausschnitten und Aspekten zwangsläufig unterschiedlich aus. Wenn man die politische Frage Demokratie versus Autokratie beiseitelässt und stärker aus pragmatischer Sicht sowie aus der Perspektive von Chinas Entwicklung urteilt, lassen sich Jiang Zemins Leistungen und Anstrengungen nicht leugnen. Als Führer Chinas in den 1990er Jahren, als das Land mit inneren und äußeren Krisen zugleich konfrontiert war und der Weg nach vorn ungewiss blieb, förderte er die wirtschaftliche Öffnung Chinas und friedliche, freundschaftliche Beziehungen zum Ausland, bestand auf wirtschaftlicher Entwicklung und der Verbesserung des Lebensstandards und führte ein armes, chaotisches, relativ isoliertes und über Jahre instabiles China in eine neue Epoche, die zunehmend von Wohlstand, Stabilität und Berechenbarkeit, internationaler Integration und Modernisierung geprägt war.

Jiang Zemin erbte die Reform- und Öffnungspolitik der Deng-Xiaoping-Ära und legte zugleich die Grundlage für die anhaltende Entwicklung und Prosperität in der späteren Hu-Jintao-Ära sowie für den Zustand großer umfassender nationaler Stärke in der Xi-Jinping-Ära. Aus pragmatischer Sicht kann er als ein ausreichend kompetenter Steuermann in Chinas Übergangszeit gelten. Zugleich war Jiang Zemin aber auch der Anführer eines diktatorischen Regimes, das nach der Niederschlagung des 4. Juni die autoritäre Herrschaft der KPCh festigte, China die Gelegenheit zur Demokratisierung verpassen ließ, Korruption sowie das Leid von Arbeitern und Bauern der unteren Schichten duldete und verschärfte und Dissidenten unterdrückte. Jiang Zemin trägt auch einen Teil der Verantwortung für die autoritäre Herrschaft und die Menschenrechtsprobleme Chinas seit seinem Rücktritt bis heute. Er hatte Verdienste und Fehler, war aufgeschlossen und sehr fähig, zugleich aber auch machtorientiert und auf die Aufrechterhaltung autoritärer Herrschaft bedacht. Objektiv betrachtet war seine Bilanz gemischt, mit bedeutenden Leistungen ebenso wie schwerwiegenden Verfehlungen.

Gerade als der 100. Geburtstag Jiang Zemins näher rückt, starb am 12. August Zhu Rongji (朱镕基), der frühere chinesische Ministerpräsident und Jiang Zemins Partner in der Zeit, als dieser Generalsekretär und Staatspräsident war. Während Jiang Zemin vor allem in den Bereichen Außenpolitik, Militär und Ideologie aktiv war, war Zhu Rongji der konkrete Gestalter der chinesischen Innenpolitik. Er war für seine Reformen mit harter Hand bekannt, restrukturierte zahlreiche ineffiziente Staatsunternehmen, stabilisierte nach einer Phase hoher Inflation schließlich Chinas Staatsfinanzen und Preise, trieb den Aufbau von Sonderwirtschaftszonen wie Shenzhen (深圳) voran, förderte landesweit die Anwerbung von Investitionen, unterstützte die Entwicklung der chinesischen Marktwirtschaft, ging gegen einige korrupte Funktionäre vor und half China, eine wirtschaftlich äußerst schwierige Phase nach Beginn von Reform und Öffnung zu überstehen.

Doch Zhu Rongjis Reformen hatten auch erhebliche Grenzen und brachten verschiedene negative Folgen mit sich, darunter eine Verschärfung der Entlassungswelle, eine wachsende Kluft zwischen Arm und Reich sowie zunehmend heftige Konflikte zwischen Behörden und Bevölkerung und gesellschaftliche Spannungen. Auch seine Antikorruptionskampagne mit harter Hand konnte die Korruption nicht ausrotten; sowohl die Zahl der in Korruption verwickelten Personen als auch die betroffenen Summen stiegen weiter an. Zhu Rongjis Reformen waren zudem deutlich durch den Vorrang persönlicher Herrschaft vor Rechtsstaatlichkeit geprägt und konnten China keinen dauerhaften Frieden und keine langfristige Stabilität bringen. Dass Korruption so schwer einzudämmen war, lag gerade am Fehlen von Demokratie und Rechtsstaatlichkeit. So entschlossen Zhu Rongji auch gegen Korruption vorgehen mochte, unter autoritärer Herrschaft konnte dies keinen Erfolg haben. Wie Jiang Zemin war auch Zhu Rongji eine wichtige Übergangsfigur Chinas nach Reform und Öffnung und nach dem 4. Juni. Beide waren gemeinsam an zahlreichen innen- und außenpolitischen Angelegenheiten beteiligt und teilten daher auch einen Teil von Jiang Zemins Verdiensten und Fehlern.

Jiang Zemin wurde in der von Unruhen geprägten Republik China geboren, wuchs unter der japanischen Besatzung auf und gelangte im Roten China dank seiner Fähigkeiten, seines Scharfsinns und seines Glücks bis an die Spitze. Er starb im hohen Alter von 96 Jahren und hatte fast ein Jahrhundert chinesischer Veränderungen miterlebt und mitgestaltet. Politisch war die Jiang-Ära zwar konservativ und von einem Mangel an Freiheit und Demokratie geprägt, doch sie bot mehr Freiheit, Offenheit und demokratische Atmosphäre als das stärker abgeschottete und konservativere China der Xi-Jinping-Ära.

Wenn manche Menschen Jiang Zemin loben, dann nicht unbedingt, weil sie ihn für einen besonders großen Führer halten, sondern weil China heute mehr Missstände aufweist und stärker enttäuscht. Deshalb blicken sie nostalgisch auf eine frühere Zeit zurück, die von Hoffnung und einer aufwärts gerichteten Entwicklung geprägt schien, und nutzen diese Erinnerung zugleich, um ihre Unzufriedenheit mit der Gegenwart auszudrücken. Die heutigen Bewertungen Jiang Zemins in verschiedenen Teilen der chinesischen Gesellschaft, insbesondere in der Bevölkerung, fallen zwar unterschiedlich aus, sind aber überwiegend positiv. Dies entspricht dem Sprichwort, dass „die einfachen Leute eine Waage im Herzen tragen“ (老百姓心里一杆秤), und spiegelt zugleich den aufrichtigen Wunsch vieler Chinesen wider, an Reform und Öffnung festzuhalten und sich gegen Abschottung und Rückschritt zu wenden.

(Dieser Artikel wurde von Wang Qingmin (王庆民), einem in Europa lebenden chinesischen Schriftsteller und Forscher für internationale Politik, verfasst. Der Originaltext dieses Artikels wurde auf Chinesisch geschrieben.)

u/Slow-Property5895 — 6 days ago