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Recently, in the first round of Brazil’s 2026 presidential election, the far-right candidate Flávio Bolsonaro came out ahead and may win the second round to become president. The incumbent Brazilian president, the left-wing Lula, is trailing in the election. This has caused panic among large numbers of left-leaning Brazilians. Many people have publicly appealed to China, the Chinese Communist Party (CCP), and Xi Jinping on social media platforms such as X, hoping that China, this “communist country,” will intervene in Brazilian politics through military or other means to prevent a far-right victory.
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As a Chinese person with center-left political views, I understand the fear that many left-leaning Brazilians feel about the far right coming to power, as well as their desire for assistance from external forces in the face of US intervention and attacks by Brazil’s domestic right wing.
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But I must say that China is not a genuinely communist/socialist country. On the contrary, it is a capitalist country characterized by power, money, and ruthless competition. The CCP has long since degenerated from an idealistic party fighting for the poor and oppressed into a ruling group of powerful and privileged bourgeois elites. In China, labor rights, women’s rights, and LGBT rights are all violated, and those who fight for these rights face repression. And Xi Jinping is certainly not a communist, but a dictator who rejects democracy and suppresses freedom.
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Not only has China under the CCP transformed into a capitalist country since the era of Deng Xiaoping (邓小平), but the Mao era was also far from being as good as some Brazilian leftists imagine. This is evident even from China’s foreign policy alone. China established diplomatic relations with Brazil in 1974, precisely during the most brutal period of Brazil’s right-wing dictatorship. During the same period, Mao-era China also established diplomatic relations with other Latin American countries ruled by right-wing dictatorships, including Argentina. Mao Zedong (毛泽东) also shook hands and reconciled with Richard Nixon, president of the United States, the world’s largest capitalist country. All of this shows that even during the Mao era, China was not the communist utopia or anti-imperialist stronghold that many Brazilians aspire to. (Of course, China’s domestic policies at that time also had many non-communist/non-socialist characteristics.)
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Moreover, China under CCP rule has long pursued a highly pragmatic foreign policy, remaining reserved and conservative, unwilling to interfere in the internal affairs of other countries while also rejecting interference by other countries in China’s internal affairs. This is a choice made by the CCP to preserve the stability of its regime and avoid risks. Therefore, in terms of practical possibilities, China is also unlikely to actively and proactively influence the politics of other countries, including Brazil. Even when it engages in certain forms of extraterritorial interference, its purpose is to protect the interests of the CCP regime itself, rather than to pursue communist ideals or compete for international hegemony.
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I have written many articles discussing the nature and history of China. Among them, “Is China a Communist Country?” and “Chinese Foreign Policy Under Risk Aversion and the Principle That ‘Stability Overrides Everything’” offer brief analyses and commentary on these issues. I am sharing these articles below for reference.

Trump Is Anti-Communist Yet Close to Chinese Communist Party Leader Xi Jinping: Is China Today a Communist Country?

Recently, Xi Jinping, General Secretary of the Communist Party of China and President of China, visited the United States and received a warm welcome from U.S. President Donald Trump, with China-U.S. relations visibly improving. Some people have criticized this. For example, an article in The New York Times cited a scholar commenting that just a month ago Trump had called “communism the greatest threat our country has ever faced,” yet now he was “flattering and courting” the leader of a powerful Communist country. Many other commentators have raised similar criticisms: Trump opposes communism on the one hand while warmly receiving the leader of the world’s largest Communist Party on the other.
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So, does this reflect a contradiction on Trump’s part and suggest that his opposition to communism is insincere? The key to evaluating this question lies in whether China is actually a communist country, whether the Communist Party of China implements policies associated with communism, and whether Xi Jinping and the senior leadership of the CPC believe in and practice communist ideas and principles. These are themselves important questions worthy of discussion and careful distinction. They concern not only whether Trump is contradicting himself, but also whether various parties inside and outside China understand and assess China accurately and whether they can respond to it reasonably on the basis of facts.
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It needs to be stated clearly at the outset that China is indeed an authoritarian country, the CPC is also an authoritarian party that monopolizes power, and Xi Jinping is unquestionably a dictator. But authoritarian dictatorship and communism cannot simply be equated. They belong to two different dimensions, although they sometimes overlap.
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What is “communism”? An accurate and detailed description is quite complicated. Put simply and in accessible terms, it refers to a condition in which material goods and wealth are extremely abundant and collectively owned, people receive an equal distribution, social security is extraordinarily comprehensive, class and status differences are eliminated, and distinctions between nations and national borders no longer exist. Of course, this is Marx’s blueprint for communism, an ideal communist condition that no country or region has achieved to date.
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If the definition of “communism” is expanded more broadly, particularly to include countries ruled by Leninist parties that claimed adherence to communism, such as the former Soviet Union and the former socialist states of Eastern Europe, then the characteristics of this form of “communism” include comprehensive state ownership of the economy, a planned economic system, the Communist Party’s monopoly on power, and resistance to capitalist ways of life.
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In China during the Mao Zedong era, although the system was not a typical form of Marxian communism and differed considerably from the Soviet and Eastern European model, its radical left-wing policies, land revolution, elimination of private ownership, comprehensive public ownership, elimination of markets and commodity transactions between private individuals—with only some “black markets” and “underground markets” remaining—and emphasis on class struggle can also be regarded as a certain socialist model relatively close to communism.
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But by any of these standards, China today does not conform to the definition or characteristics of a “communist country.” Economically, China operates a market economy rather than a planned economy, while its ownership structure includes both a “state-owned economy” and a private economy. China’s “state-owned enterprises” are not genuinely enterprises owned by the entire population. Whether in terms of actual ownership, operating models, or the distribution of benefits, they are state-capitalist/bureaucratic-capitalist enterprises. The enormous private economy, including private enterprises and individually operated businesses, clearly exhibits non-communist economic characteristics.
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China’s economic market is also highly competitive, and the country has a stock market and various investment platforms, all of which are characteristics of capitalism. China has also long abandoned the line of “taking class struggle as the key link,” instead making economic development, the development of productive forces, strengthening the country, and increasing the prosperity of its citizens the primary focuses of policy.
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In terms of distribution, China not only does not implement extensive welfare protection, income equality, or distribution according to the results of labor or need; on the contrary, it is one of the countries in the world with the largest wealth gaps, the lowest levels of social protection, and the most severe inequalities in social-security benefits among different groups. For example, China’s Gini coefficient ranges between 0.45 and 0.6, and its wealth gap exceeds that of the overwhelming majority of countries. Chinese government cadres, employees, urban residents, and farmers receive completely different medical, pension, and other social-security benefits. Retired government cadres generally receive pensions ranging from several thousand to more than 10,000 yuan, while farmers receive pensions of only slightly more than 100 yuan. China’s minimum-living-standard benefits are not only low but also difficult to obtain. Officials, including Xi Jinping himself, have repeatedly and explicitly declared that China “must not fall into the trap of welfarism,” while promoting endurance of hardship and emphasizing individual striving.
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Politically, China is indeed a country in which the Communist Party of China monopolizes power, but it is not a “communist dictatorship” or a “dictatorship of the proletariat.” Rather, it is the authoritarian rule of a vast interest group called the “Communist Party.” Its members include elites and vested interests from various sectors, and it relies on technocrats to formulate and implement policies.
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Although its nominal ideology—including the CPC Constitution and China’s Constitution—proclaims belief in and a commitment to eventually realizing communism, its actual policies are pragmatic and are neither constrained nor guided by communist ideology. Communist ideology is indeed used to provide certain theoretical justifications for authoritarian rule and as a propaganda instrument, but only within particular contexts and largely as a matter of appearances.
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In culture, education, social life, and other areas, contemporary China as a whole likewise displays no significant communist characteristics. Although the authorities still promote content associated with communist ideology, such as the “Core Socialist Values” and “red history,” this is generally formalistic rather than something deeply embedded in people’s everyday lives. Although most Chinese people have received education and propaganda related to socialism and communism, this education and propaganda are themselves superficial and formalized. The overwhelming majority of people do not genuinely believe in them, and the authorities do not require people to put communism into practice.
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Chinese people are generally pragmatic and utilitarian, with the principal goals of life centered on money and other interests, while officials enthusiastically pursue power and other benefits rather than communist objectives. Judging from their long-term words and actions, even the highest-ranking CPC officials, including CPC General Secretary Xi Jinping, cannot be regarded as believers in communism. Rather, they are pragmatic political figures whose fundamental objectives are their own interests and those of the ruling group.
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The CPC ruling establishment even suppresses, monitors, and punishes some Chinese people who sincerely believe in communism, Marxism, or Maoism. For example, “Marxist societies” at Peking University and other universities promoted labor rights and organized labor movements while criticizing the capitalist policies of the incumbent authorities. These organizations were banned, and their members were summoned for questioning or even detained. In 2018, the “Jasic labor movement” in Shenzhen, in which Maoist students and workers participated together, was besieged by police and ultimately suppressed.
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The CPC also stigmatizes Western left-wing and communist groups that support Chinese domestic labor movements and other activities associated with communism as “hostile foreign forces,” preventing them from exerting influence within China. Even China’s indigenous Maoists are now regarded by the CPC ruling establishment as a source of instability and are monitored and controlled to prevent them from acquiring the ability to overthrow the existing system.
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Of course, there are many other characteristics and examples demonstrating the “non-communist” nature of CPC-ruled China, which cannot all be listed here because of space limitations. The examples above alone are sufficient to demonstrate that contemporary China is not a communist country and that the Communist Party of China no longer implements communist policies. On the contrary, China today has many typical capitalist characteristics and bears numerous similarities to the brutal capitalism of the nineteenth-century West—extremely low levels of social protection, ruthless competition, disregard for civil rights, and the sacrifice of human rights in the pursuit of development. In addition, China’s development model has selectively borrowed certain elements of neoliberalism, discarding its liberal-democratic components while amplifying its utilitarian and Social Darwinist characteristics.
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As for “socialism,” which is related to but distinct from communism and can be regarded as a certain preliminary form of communism, China likewise does not qualify as a socialist country according to the Marxist definition, nor does it operate a Leninist Soviet-style socialist system. Instead, countries in the European Union, the United Kingdom, Canada, and other countries with relatively extensive social welfare, the rule of law, stricter regulation, and an emphasis on equality are closer to “socialism” in the general sense and to Marx’s original intentions. “Socialism with Chinese characteristics,” meanwhile, consists only of nominal claims to socialism and a Leninist party model; in terms of its policies and the characteristics of the Chinese society those policies have shaped, it has far more in common with capitalism.
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Therefore, there is no contradiction between Trump fiercely condemning communism on the one hand and expressing friendliness toward the CPC and its General Secretary Xi Jinping on the other. Trump evidently believes that China is not a communist country and that Xi Jinping is not a communist leader, and this judgment is consistent with the facts.
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Another billionaire who frequently criticizes communism, Elon Musk, likewise has favorable views of China and cooperates extensively with the Chinese authorities for similar reasons. Musk established a Tesla factory in China, where he can utilize China’s inexpensive labor force to manufacture products at lower cost. China also has an enormous wealthy population and a huge market, allowing Musk to earn enormous profits. On both the production side and the consumer side, China is fertile ground for foreign capitalists.
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For Trump and many anti-communist political figures, countries such as Cuba—which operate planned economies, restrict markets and foreign trade, and still maintain pervasive communist propaganda and education in everyday life—are what they regard as “communist countries.” Moreover, Trump and many members of the American right also regard the relatively extensive social-security systems of European Union countries and Canada, as well as various forms of economic and social regulation, affirmative policies for minority and disadvantaged groups, and ideas of globalization pursued by those countries and by the U.S. Democratic Party, as “communism” or “socialism,” and they hold extremely negative views of these countries, parties, and associated political figures. These are the “communist enemies” and allies of “communism” as understood by Trump and his supporters.
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Moreover, for Trump and U.S. Republicans, the Democratic Party in the United States and the political establishments of the European Union, the United Kingdom, and Canada are the most direct parties with which they have conflicts of interest and their principal adversaries, because these forces directly affect whether they can continue to hold power and whether they can continue implementing policies different from those of the left and the political establishment. China, Russia, and other countries are not their primary threats; on the contrary, there is room for cooperation because they share certain ideological positions and interests.
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Nor is the lack of democracy in China and Russia relevant to Trump. Political strongmen such as Xi Jinping, Vladimir Putin, and Kim Jong Un even inspire admiration in Trump, who has long sought to monopolize power in the United States and despises his domestic political opponents. Trump has publicly praised the “strength” demonstrated by the CPC in suppressing the democratic movement in 1989, so naturally he is unlikely to harbor any particular aversion to authoritarianism, and his admiration for powerful rulers follows logically from this.
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Therefore, although China is an authoritarian country and Xi Jinping is a dictator, China is not a communist country, nor is Xi Jinping a believer in communism. Those who disagree with Trump’s friendliness toward the CPC regime and Xi Jinping can criticize his admiration for dictators and disregard for democratic values, but Trump’s behavior is indeed not inconsistent with his anti-communist position. Trump, Musk, and others do not regard China as a communist country, and that judgment is also accurate.
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Yet many Chinese and foreigners still regard China—which has undergone reform and opening-up for decades, where capitalist elements permeate virtually every sphere, where communism survives only as a slogan, and where socialism exists in name rather than reality—as a “communist country.” This is clearly a misconception. Such misunderstanding has also caused many people to misjudge China and has diverted attention away from the central issues that require change in China and the real targets against which resistance should be directed.
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For Chinese and foreign individuals who oppose CPC authoritarian rule and Xi Jinping’s dictatorship, opposition to authoritarianism and totalitarianism should be the foremost priority, with criticism directed at the CPC’s monopoly on power and suppression of individual freedom, rather than concentrating attacks on “communism.”

(The author of this article, Wang Qingmin(王庆民), is a Chinese writer living in Europe and a researcher on international politics.)

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Risk Aversion and “Stability Above All” in Chinese Diplomacy Under Anxiety Over Regime Legitimacy and Stability: Why China Responds Cautiously When the United States Attacks Countries Such as Venezuela and Iran
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From late February to early March 2026, the United States and Israel launched fierce attacks against Iran, killing Iran’s Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei and many senior officials. China, regarded as an important ally of Iran, merely issued verbal condemnations of the United States and Israel, but did not provide Iran with any actual military assistance or intelligence support, nor any other form of aid. China-U.S. relations were also unaffected, and there was no sign that Donald Trump’s planned visit to China at the end of March would be postponed.
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Earlier, in January 2026, the United States launched a military operation against Venezuela—another country opposed to the United States and friendly with China—and arrested Venezuelan President Nicolás Maduro. China likewise issued only verbal condemnation, without taking any substantive action to counter the United States or assist Venezuela.
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This surprised many observers concerned with international relations and Chinese affairs. They wondered why China stood by when these two “allies,” Iran and Venezuela, were severely sanctioned and attacked by the United States and had their top leaders “decapitated,” neither helping them nor retaliating against the United States.
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The reason many people feel confused is largely because they do not understand the core motivations, interests, and value considerations that guide decision-making by China’s ruling group when dealing with foreign affairs and military issues. Many also lack a clear understanding of China’s real relationships with countries such as Iran and Venezuela that appear to be allies.
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After the People’s Republic of China led by the Chinese Communist Party was established in 1949, China’s foreign policy experienced many changes and twists. During the Mao Zedong(毛泽东) era, China actively confronted both the United States and the Soviet Union and advocated “exporting revolution”(输出革命). After the start of the Reform and Opening-up period, it shifted toward “keeping a low profile”(韬光养晦) and prioritizing economic development. After the 2010s, China again appeared relatively assertive on the international stage.
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However, if one examines Chinese diplomacy more closely, it becomes clear that overall it is extremely conservative and restrained, prioritizing regime survival and stability above all else, even at the cost of abandoning overseas strategic interests and refusing foreign intervention in order to avoid risks.
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Although China under Mao participated in the Korean War, supported Vietnam, and promoted “exporting revolution,” after the mid-1950s it avoided direct war with the United States. While China actively promoted revolutionary movements abroad, it avoided directly entering wars itself. When the United States and the Soviet Union deployed troops around the world to compete for influence, and France and Britain frequently carried out military actions, China avoided deploying combat troops overseas (only in a few cases sending technical and logistical personnel from the military to assist friendly countries).
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At the Bandung Conference in 1955, the People’s Republic of China participated with a delegation led by Premier Zhou Enlai(周恩来) and proposed the “Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence”(和平共处五项原则), emphasizing non-interference in other countries’ internal affairs, including relinquishing recognition of nationality and responsibility for ethnic Chinese in Southeast Asia. The Five Principles—centered on mutual respect for sovereignty and non-interference in internal affairs—and the spirit of the Bandung Conference profoundly influenced China’s foreign relations for decades afterward and remain core principles of China’s foreign policy today.
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China has also shown unusual restraint when disputes arise with neighboring countries. For example, in the 1962 Sino-Indian border war, although China achieved military victory in its counterattack, the People’s Liberation Army voluntarily withdrew from the disputed area and ceded large areas of land to India. In the many years since, China has continued to maintain a restrained attitude on the Sino-Indian border issue.
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Many people find this incomprehensible. The reason is that, compared with territory and geopolitical rivalry, Chinese rulers care more about maintaining diplomatic relations with neighboring countries and avoiding the risks that large-scale war could pose to regime stability. They would rather compromise and retreat. Later, when war broke out between India and Pakistan and Pakistan requested Chinese assistance, China did not send troops but only offered verbal support for Pakistan, for the same reason.
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This applies not only to the Sino-Indian issue. After the “August Faction Incident” in North Korea in 1956, pro-China factions were purged; in the 1960s, pro-China forces in Southeast Asian countries such as Malaysia and Indonesia were suppressed. China did not intervene in these cases and even maintained or established cooperative relations with those involved in the purges. This demonstrates China’s fundamental position: it would rather abandon pro-China forces and certain national interests than risk the backlash and increased regime risk that might come from intervening in foreign affairs.
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After the end of the Cultural Revolution and the launch of Reform and Opening-up, China placed even greater emphasis in diplomacy on economic interests and peaceful development, and it disliked the troubles and war risks brought by foreign intervention. The 1979 Sino-Vietnamese War was a rare exception, and even then it was limited to a localized conflict, partly intended to please the West.
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In the 1990s, facing extremely unfavorable domestic and international circumstances, China’s rulers avoided confrontation with the United States even more. Even when incidents such as the forced inspection of the cargo ship Yinhe(银河号) by the U.S. military and the bombing of the Chinese embassy in Yugoslavia occurred, China did not retaliate militarily.
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At this time China was even less willing to stand up for other countries in opposing the United States. Chinese official propaganda domestically contains much anti-American, anti-Western, and patriotic or nationalist content, intended to consolidate domestic support for the rulers and resist external “color revolutions”(颜色革命) or “peaceful evolution”(和平演变). But in international affairs China practiced “keeping a low profile,” serving domestic political stability and economic development.
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In 1998, when India conducted nuclear tests and the United States imposed strong sanctions on India, China responded quietly. During the anti-Chinese massacres in Indonesia in 1998, China did not impose sanctions, whereas countries such as the United States, Canada, and Australia did impose sanctions and conduct rescue efforts. In 2003, when the United States invaded Iraq, China’s opposition was even weaker than that of France. In these incidents, many countries voiced stronger condemnation and imposed stronger sanctions than China, which had greater direct relevance and was stereotypically considered firmly anti-American.
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The reason China responded calmly and cautiously to these events can be summarized simply: China’s rulers need regime stability and want to avoid making too many enemies whose foreign policy conflicts could affect domestic politics. Compared with domestic political stability and regime survival, other foreign affairs issues—whether involving morality, international law, human rights, or interests—can be sacrificed and used as bargaining chips in exchange for foreign non-interference in internal affairs.
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As one of the five permanent members of the United Nations Security Council, China has used the veto the least and cast the most abstention votes. This also reflects China’s conservative and restrained stance in diplomacy and international relations.
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China’s official position is extremely tough only on the Taiwan issue, even willing to mobilize national resources and use military and economic pressure to force other countries to follow the principle that “there is only one China and the People’s Republic of China is the sole legitimate government of China”(只有一个中国，中华人民共和国是中国唯一合法政府).
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However, in Beijing’s view the Taiwan issue is clearly China’s internal affair and directly concerns the legitimacy of Beijing’s rule, which is why it attaches extraordinary importance to it and pressures other countries at great cost. China also takes a very tough stance on issues concerning Hong Kong, Xinjiang, and Tibet for the same reason.
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But on issues outside China that are international in nature and unrelated to Hong Kong, Taiwan, Xinjiang, or Tibet, China has always been restrained and avoided involvement in disputes. For example, on the Israeli-Palestinian issue China has long been regarded as pro-Palestinian and anti-Israel. Yet when Israel attacks Palestinians, China merely condemns Israel verbally without imposing actual sanctions and still maintains extensive economic and even military cooperation with Israel, showing less opposition than most Third World countries.
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In the past decade or so, China has become more active internationally and has shifted from “keeping a low profile” to a more assertive posture. Some diplomats have even been labeled “wolf warriors”(战狼). China has also displayed aggressiveness in places such as the South China Sea. Nevertheless, China still avoids intervening in the internal affairs of other countries or in conflicts between other states, and it is unwilling to provide a “protective umbrella” for pro-China forces abroad.
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For example, former Philippine President Rodrigo Duterte, who was relatively close to China, was wanted by the International Criminal Court. He once went to Hong Kong and appeared to seek help from China, but China provided no assistance, and he eventually returned to the Philippines and surrendered. When Bashar al-Assad’s government in Syria collapsed at the end of 2024, China also maintained neutrality. Assad and his wife, who had previously visited China and received a warm welcome, went to Russia rather than China for refuge.
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Returning to the issues of Venezuela and Iran: China indeed has relatively friendly relations with these two countries and their ruling authorities, and their economic and trade exchanges are fairly close. However, the survival or downfall of these states and regimes is not a core interest for China’s rulers. Moreover, Venezuela and Iran are not truly China’s “allies,” but only partners in limited cooperation.
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Both Venezuela and Iran possess relatively abundant oil and gas resources, while China has great demand for energy. Venezuela and Iran are also at odds with the West and actively oppose the United States, which gives them some common ground with China, which opposes Western values and competes fiercely with the United States. But their similarities end there; there are also many differences, and cooperation is limited. China has not signed any military alliance or mutual defense treaty with either country, nor has it stationed troops in either.
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China certainly does not welcome the possibility of Venezuela or Iran being attacked by the United States or experiencing regime change, but it is not willing to risk military conflict by providing military assistance to them or sanctioning the United States. Even if regime change occurs in these countries and pro-American forces come to power, China’s losses would be acceptable, and it could continue to maintain economic and trade relations with the new governments.
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For example, after the fall of Saddam Hussein’s regime in Iraq, China’s trade with Iraq did not decrease but instead increased, and Chinese companies expanded their oil extraction activities. Even if Donald Trump were to attempt to monopolize the resources and interests of Venezuela and Iran, China would rather abandon its interests in those countries than provide military assistance to them or sanction the United States, so as to avoid triggering American retaliation that could cause even greater losses.
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Many international observers are surprised and confused by China’s apparent willingness to “let pro-China allies die without help.” This is often because they do not understand the actual relationship between China and these so-called allied countries, nor do they understand the fundamental purpose behind the decision-making of China’s ruling group.
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Because the People’s Republic of China is not a genuine democratic system and the ruling Chinese Communist Party has not been authorized by democratic elections, its legitimacy and stability inevitably face long-term crises and challenges. For decades, the CCP, which holds power in China and determines domestic and foreign policy, has been anxious about challenges to internal stability and regime survival, and fears external “peaceful evolution” that could overthrow the regime. Therefore, all domestic and foreign policies must submit to, serve, and yield to the continuation of the regime and political security.
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For this reason, China’s rulers strongly dislike any risks that could harm this fundamental objective and are willing to pay costs in other areas in order to avoid such risks. Even national interests, international influence, economic relations, and profits must give way to political security.
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Compared with the frequent abuse of power and suppression of the public within China, the Chinese ruling group is particularly restrained in foreign affairs and far more conservative and cautious than in dealing with domestic issues.
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This is because, unlike the domestic sphere where the authorities can fully control the situation, foreign countries and external affairs are difficult for the Chinese Communist Party to control effectively. Once disputes arise with foreign states or foreign nationals, the Chinese state apparatus may find it difficult to calm the situation, and such conflicts could damage relations with other countries, harm the CCP’s image, and impact the stability of the domestic regime.
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Therefore, since the time of Zhou Enlai, the principle that “there are no small matters in diplomacy”(外交无小事) has been established: in handling foreign affairs, the priority is to remain as restrained as possible, calm disputes, and avoid conflict.
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Although China has long been opposed to and wary of the West and competes fiercely with the United States, China’s rulers also strive to avoid provoking the United States or triggering a hot war. Once war or strong Western sanctions occur, they could trigger chain reactions and impact domestic politics.
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Therefore, while China confronts the United States and the West firmly, it also does so cautiously, focusing mainly on domestic propaganda and blocking Western “peaceful evolution” or “color revolutions,” while observing U.S. and Western actions in other countries without becoming involved, so as to avoid bringing trouble upon itself.
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China’s policy of non-interference in other countries’ internal affairs and its restrained approach to international issues—seeking to avoid involvement in disputes as much as possible—is also intended to secure other countries’ non-interference in China’s internal affairs and human rights issues, and to prevent domestic and foreign anti-CCP forces from colluding to undermine the regime, thereby helping maintain the stability of CCP rule.
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Specifically regarding Venezuela and Iran, these two countries do not have the kind of neighboring “blood alliance” relationship with China that North Korea has, nor do they possess the strategic reciprocity and strength of Russia, nor even the close relationship with China seen in Cambodia. They therefore fall outside China’s core interests and the scope of military assistance. China is also unwilling to offend the United States or affect China-U.S. relations and the upcoming summit between the two countries’ leaders for the sake of Venezuela or Iran.
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Therefore, even though the arrest of the Venezuelan president by U.S. forces and the fierce U.S.-Israeli attacks on Iran that “decapitated” Khamenei and caused heavy casualties clearly violate international law, and although many countries have condemned the United States and there is strong opposition within the United States itself, China still treats the situation with restraint, limiting its opposition to verbal statements.
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Those who are surprised or confused by this only need to understand the fundamental interests and decision-making motivations of China’s rulers, as well as the real nature of China’s relations with Venezuela and Iran, to realize that China’s abandonment of support for them and its restrained and low-profile response are inevitable and consistent with the long-standing trajectory of Chinese diplomacy. It also reflects the Chinese ruling group’s deep anxiety about regime legitimacy and stability, which produces a strong aversion to risk and a political and diplomatic mindset in which “stability overrides everything”(稳定压倒一切).

(The author of both articles is Wang Qingmin (王庆民), a Chinese writer based in Europe and an international political researcher. The articles were originally written in Chinese.)

I am a Chinese writer and social activist currently living in Europe. China is one of the world’s most important carbon-emitting countries and, like other countries around the world, is facing the impacts of climate change. China has experienced droughts, heatstroke, floods, epidemics, and other disasters closely related to climate change, causing many people to die or fall ill and suffer property losses.

I am a Chinese writer and social activist currently living in Europe. China is one of the world’s most significant carbon emitters and, like other countries around the world, is facing the impacts of climate change. China has experienced droughts, heatstroke, floods, epidemics, and other disasters closely related to climate change, causing many people to die or fall ill and suffer property losses.

However, because of China’s political system and educational model, the public lacks the awareness and capacity to pay attention to and participate in issues concerning the climate crisis. Many people are completely unaware of the relationship between the climate crisis and the disasters occurring around them. Some also believe that climate change is false, or that it is a natural phenomenon rather than something caused by human activity.

In this article, I discuss the real dangers of the climate crisis, China’s situation and role in climate change, and the psychology and attitudes of Chinese people in confronting the climate crisis. I have also carried out some in-person advocacy in Germany, where I live, to raise awareness of climate issues related to China. However, as an individual with very limited influence, what I have been able to achieve has been extremely limited, and there has been little response. As the climate crisis intensifies, alongside increasingly severe political and ethnic conflicts around the world, I have become increasingly pessimistic.

Nevertheless, I am still publishing this article in the hope that more people around the world will understand China’s severely overlooked role and situation in the climate crisis, as well as its rights and responsibilities and its future fate.

Thank you.

Wang Qingmin

Because the article is quite long, I am posting it in several parts. A link to the full article is available in the comments. The following is Part One.

China and Its People Under the Climate Change Crisis 1
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The Harms of Global Warming and the Responses 1
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The Rights and Wrongs Concerning “Chai Jing Interviews Ding Zhongli” 3
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The Fallacies of Ding Zhongli 6
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The Interpretations, Reactions, and Paradoxes of the Chinese People Toward Climate Issues and Related Western Criticisms 8
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What China Should Not Do and Should Do Regarding Climate Issues 9
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From the Chinese Public’s Mockery of Greta Thunberg to an Examination of Mindsets and Values 11
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Is it really so necessary and urgent to curb global warming? 19
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Climate Issues and the Human Condition under Climate Policy 20
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In recent years, the issue of climate change has become a global hotspot. Climate change refers to the rapid rise of Earth’s temperature and the increasing frequency of extreme weather since the Industrial Revolution, especially in recent decades.
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As for the causes of this climate change, they almost unanimously point to human activities. To quote this definitional statement from Wikipedia (of course, this is not to say that Wikipedia itself is authoritative, but that its sources are authoritative—the following words come from the Tampa Bay Times, winner of 13 Pulitzer Prizes, and NASA), and the content is verifiable, concise, and highly summarizing: there is currently a strong scientific consensus that human economic activity has caused global warming in recent decades, and on the fact that “in recent decades, human-caused global warming exists and is occurring,” there is no dispute in the academic community. More than 97% of climate scientists believe that “global warming exists, and human activities are very likely the main cause of the global warming phenomenon observed in the past half century.”
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The Harms of Global Warming and the Responses
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The harms of this climate change are also very clear. Increasingly frequent extreme heat, rising sea levels submerging low-altitude areas due to melting glaciers, more frequent heavy rainfall and floods, the spread of infectious diseases into higher latitudes, drought areas becoming drier and more desertified, loss of biodiversity, ecological damage in extremely high latitudes due to melting snow and ice, an increase in epidemics, reduced crop yields, and stronger and more frequent typhoons and tropical cyclones. All of these pose severe harms and threats to the survival of humanity and all living beings on Earth. If the worsening of global warming cannot be stopped in time, humanity will suffer extremely painful natural disasters and induced human-made disasters in the future, and humans may even perish because of it.
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Global warming (global warming is the mainstream and key aspect of this round of climate change, and the main subject of discussion in this article, so unless otherwise specified, “global warming” will be used rather than “climate change.” Also, “global warming” not only refers to a natural phenomenon caused by human factors, but also represents a climate crisis that will cause disasters) is mainly caused by human activities, including industrial and agricultural activities as well as various aspects of daily consumption. To curb global warming, industrial and agricultural production and personal consumption must be restricted, reducing production, supply, and use associated with greenhouse gas emissions. This will greatly affect the economic development, employment, quality of life, and social stability of nations and their people. Moreover, curbing global warming requires broad international cooperation, but the impacts of global warming differ across countries, as do their levels of development, industrial structures, and quality of life. Thus, their responses also differ. Therefore, the climate issue is not only a scientific and environmental problem but also a political problem, an economic problem, a human rights problem, a livelihood problem, an international relations problem, and many other important and thorny issues for humanity. Behind these issues are massive conflicts of interest, affecting the rise and fall of nations and peoples, and relating to the livelihood, life, survival, and death of countless people.
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In addition, there is also the widespread influence of “climate change denial.” Due to factors such as religion, social trust, the spread and quality of education, values and culture, and most importantly, interests and positions, the forces denying or questioning global warming are very powerful. These include many politicians, social activists, and huge numbers of ordinary people, all holding to climate change denial. The main points of denial are nothing more than: “Global warming is a normal natural variation, not caused by humans or humans have little influence,” “The climate is not necessarily warming, it may even be cooling,” “Global warming is a scam fabricated by some politicians and scientists for power or profit,” etc. (and derived versions like “Global warming will not necessarily lead to disasters,” or “xx disaster is not caused by global warming but has always been a natural phenomenon,” and so on). These doubts can all actually be refuted and negated with large amounts of facts and clear evidence, but belief in these views remains very widespread. (On the fallacies of “climate change denial,” from academic journals to well-known media to experts in various countries, there are clear and credible criticisms. Because of space, they will not be reproduced here one by one. Those interested can consult reliable sources online or offline.)
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Thus, both nations and peoples have produced numerous disputes over whether global warming needs to be curbed and how to curb it. These disputes involve interests, values, and more often the intertwining of the two. And as the largest emitter of greenhouse gases, China’s related disputes are also very fierce. The impact of global warming on China, the reactions from the government to the public, their influence on policymaking, and the domestic and foreign relations issues reflected in these reactions and disputes are all very complex and sharp, deserving of analysis, discussion, and perhaps some possible suggestions.
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First of all, the Chinese government acknowledges the existence of global warming and its real threat to China, and has conducted massive research, analysis, and predictions on this. But regarding how exactly to solve global warming, and how much responsibility to bear in international emission reduction cooperation, there is great controversy with other countries, and China’s own policies are constantly changing.
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What is of more analytical and discussion value, however, is the attitude and behavior of the Chinese people (of course here “the people” also includes elites and vested interests).
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Among the Chinese people (hereinafter referred to as “the people”), the majority are actually skeptical of or even deny global warming. Their reasons are no more than the same arguments used by denialists in other countries, and their views and questions can similarly be refuted with vast and solid facts and data.
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However, these people who hold to climate change denial cannot determine China’s climate policy, and their skepticism has little discussion value in terms of scientific validity itself. What is truly worth discussing is the stance and attitude of the mainstream populace—including both believers and deniers of global warming—toward how China treats global warming, and the values, interests, and even more complex factors reflected behind this.
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Among the people, there is no shortage of those who agree with the reality of global warming, especially among the elite groups of Chinese society. Although their scientific literacy is not high, at least compared with those religiously devout “elites” in the United States, they are more able to understand and accept the conclusions reached by science. But this does not mean they have a correct understanding or attitude toward the role and responsibility China should assume in global warming, nor does it mean they are enthusiastic about environmental protection and curbing global warming. On the contrary, their stance is precisely one of strongly resisting global efforts to improve the climate issue, opposing China taking appropriate responsibility and making corresponding sacrifices.
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The Rights and Wrongs Concerning “Chai Jing Interviews Ding Zhongli”
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This stance and attitude are very typically and centrally reflected in the public’s reaction to former CCTV journalist Chai Jing’s interview with Ding Zhongli, a climate expert at the Chinese Academy of Sciences. In the interview, Chai Jing emphasized the urgency of reducing greenhouse gas emissions, the significant efforts made by developed countries to cut emissions, and advocated addressing global emission reduction and China’s responsibilities in a professional rather than political way. Ding Zhongli, on the other hand, emphasized the struggle over national interests (political factors) behind the division of climate responsibilities, the need for developed countries to bear more responsibility, the idea that China as a developing country should have more space for industrial development, and that the Chinese people have the right to the same per capita emission allowances as citizens of developed countries. Ding also specifically mentioned that developed countries industrialized earlier and had longer periods of unrestricted greenhouse gas emissions, and stressed that China, disregarding the past, only demanded the right to per capita emissions equal to 80% of that of developed countries in the future, which would be sufficient.
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On the surface, both Chai Jing and Ding Zhongli appear to have valid points (though those attacking Chai Jing do not believe she had any), and Ding’s words seemed more aligned with the interests of the Chinese people. In particular, Ding’s defense of Chinese people having emission rights equal to those of developed countries—phrased as “Are Chinese people not human?”—made the public feel stirred with nationalistic passion, calling him a “peerless national hero” and a “true expert.” Meanwhile, Chai Jing was seen as a traitor standing on the side of American and foreign interest groups, accused of lacking professional knowledge and disrespecting experts and scholars. She was vilified with slurs such as “public intellectual,” “American lapdog,” “holy whore,” and “traitor.” On platforms like Zhihu, Bilibili, and Weibo, one can find comments about this interview filled with vicious insults and defamation against Chai Jing.
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But is the truth really what the audience believes? Was everything Ding Zhongli said the whole truth (and similarly, was everything Chai Jing said the whole truth)? What role should China really play in global emission reduction, and how much responsibility should it bear?
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First, what Ding Zhongli said was factual, but only partially so, and clearly selectively presented. Indeed, as a late-industrializing nation, China’s level of economic development, per capita GDP, and standard of living are far below those of Europe and the U.S. For present-day China, economic development, employment, and raising national income are more urgent and tangible than tackling climate issues. Developed countries, with their first-mover advantage and relatively prosperous living conditions, do have greater responsibility and comparatively lighter pressure to cut emissions. This is precisely why developed and developing countries established the consensus of “common but differentiated responsibilities” in international climate negotiations, and why China participates in international cooperation to curb global warming on the basis of this principle.
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On the other hand, however, the Chinese public—intentionally or not—has ignored the greater sacrifices borne by developed countries and the necessity for China to make greater efforts. It is true that, per capita, even after reductions, developed countries’ carbon emissions remain higher. Yet, as Chai Jing and the background video pointed out, under the agreements, developed countries would reduce emissions by up to 80% (possibly even 95%), while developing countries would not cut as much, and could reach net-zero emissions later. Ding himself mentioned that developed countries’ emissions would then be 2.3 times those of developing countries, whereas before it had been 7.54 times. These figures show that the absolute cost and relative cost (compared with their original emissions) borne by developed countries far exceed those of developing countries. This means developed countries must make proactive sacrifices, including giving up many industrial achievements already attained, facing higher unemployment among traditional industrial workers, and further disrupting existing social orders.
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True, even so, developed countries would still have a per capita emission advantage and a historical debt. But for vested interests to willingly give up such a large portion of their existing and expected gains already constitutes a very considerable sacrifice. While it is right that they should pay more, it is unrealistic to demand that they reduce to the same per capita level as underdeveloped countries. This is like redistribution and taxation: vested interests must indeed surrender some income to subsidize the poor and maintain social fairness, but they cannot be required to reduce their income to the average wage or even minimum wage level. China’s top personal income tax rate is 45%, America’s is 35%, and in some European countries it reaches 75%. Even with a 75% tax, the remaining 25% for the wealthy is still many times greater than the average or minimum wage. Can they be required to reduce down to the average wage? Such complete “equalization of wealth” may be an ideal, but it is neither possible nor desirable in today’s world. Similarly, Bill Gates, even after donating most of his money to charity, still has wealth and consumption far above ordinary people. Must he eat, dress, and live exactly like a common worker or office clerk to be considered perfect?
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The carbon emission issue is the same. For developed countries, their industrialization is already very advanced, with high agricultural intensification and per capita output. Although the share of the tertiary sector has risen in recent years, their per capita industrial and agricultural output remains many times higher than that of developing countries. While some of this may come from unjust income (such as colonial accumulation and inequalities created by today’s international division of labor), the mainstream of their achievements still comes from hard work and innovation. Cutting emissions so drastically would bring huge economic and employment shocks. Even with industrial transformation and job resettlement, significant costs remain, and some vested interests will inevitably lose. In fact, such sacrifices have already triggered backlash from stakeholders—from oil companies to ordinary industrial workers—causing unrest within countries (as in the U.S.). Developed countries are already willing to make much greater sacrifices in both total and per capita terms for carbon reduction; must they also be forced to match developing countries’ per capita emissions levels, which are tightly tied to their much lower per capita industrial output and GDP? Is that realistic? Ding himself said dividing the cake is a “huge interest.” Are developed countries’ “interests” blown in by the wind? If developed countries are willing to make such concessions, should China and other developing countries not also make corresponding concessions?
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Some Chinese may know this deep down but still insist on absolute equality, and may accuse my words of siding with the rich, worrying about vested interests, or being a “traitor” standing with foreigners. But think: in China’s domestic emission reduction efforts, should Shanghai’s per capita emissions be cut down to Qinghai’s level to be fair (even though Shanghai is more affected by global warming and should contribute more)? Should Zhengzhou city’s per capita emissions be reduced to match the province’s rural areas? Even if developed regions and major cities grew partly by exploiting privileges and consuming more resources, is it fair to forcibly impose one standard of emissions? Would that benefit China’s overall development, including its underdeveloped regions? Everyone knows China’s wealth gap is huge, but in future redistribution, can or should China’s top elites and ordinary white-collar workers have the same income, white-collar workers equal to farmers, everyone exactly the same?
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If that were done, it would fit the principle of complete equality (even retroactively) advocated by Ding and his supporters. This is the ideal image of a utopian society, but in reality it is impossible. Many Ding supporters on platforms like Zhihu are themselves somewhat educated and above average income. Do they truly support such “equalization of wealth”? Do graduates of elite universities support having the same income as Foxconn assembly line workers (even when the latter often sweat more and come from poorer families more in need of compensatory welfare)? In terms of per capita emissions, are well-off Chinese willing to reduce their own industrial and consumer goods–related emissions down to the level of ordinary people? If their past consumption-based emissions were 10 times those of poor households, are they willing to reduce to twice as much through lower consumption?
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So, Ding’s position, seen in a completely idealized light, is indeed correct, but it is impossible to realize and unreasonable in practice. Humanity has not reached the conditions required for such absolute equality. Supporters themselves cannot equalize with those beneath them. Even within China, per capita emissions differ vastly by region. What right, then, is there to demand developed and developing countries have identical per capita emission levels?
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Developed countries drastically cutting emissions but still remaining higher per capita, developing countries cutting less both absolutely and relatively but still remaining lower, and the per capita gap narrowing greatly, with both sides reducing emissions under the principle of common but differentiated responsibilities to curb global warming—that is already the best possible solution at present.
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The Fallacies of Ding Zhongli
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In addition, Ding mentioned in the interview that as a geologist, he believed human activity had little impact on temperature, and later even said it cannot be absolutely certain that global warming is caused by human activity, and raised the idea that “is there really such a thing as mainstream science?” This was quite misleading. His words resembled those of climate change denialists. Originally, I did not intend to comment in detail on the long-debunked claims of climate denialism, but since Ding’s words are raised here, they must be judged specifically.
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Indeed, on the scale of geological time, a few decades or centuries of warming is not unique (the scientific community has shown natural cycles of tens of thousands to hundreds of thousands of years, the “Milankovitch cycles”), and today’s warming is but a tiny fluctuation in Earth’s extremely long history. The Earth has had periods where the average temperature was more than 10°C higher than now. But such “tiny” fluctuations from a macro-historical perspective have devastating impacts on humanity today. And this time it is not natural but man-made, not irresistible but preventable. For humans, fluctuations on the scale of tens of thousands or millions of years must and can be ignored. Just as the Sun will die in billions of years and Earth with it, this does not mean we should stop building, developing, or fighting natural disasters and climate problems. In normal conditions, humanity still has thousands, tens of thousands, even millions of years left to live. Should we strive to extend survival and make life better for future generations, or give up and ignore looming destruction, condemning billions to suffering and death? By a simpler analogy: everyone will die, but does that mean we should stop treating illnesses or striving to live longer once we are born?
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Furthermore, Ding’s words also subconsciously (let’s assume not deliberately) ignore the relationship between constants and variables. The warming value caused by human greenhouse gas emissions is indeed a small proportion of Earth’s total temperature, but that small increase is fatal. Like the human body: normal temperature is 36–37°C, fever is 38–39°C, severe at 42°C. The increase seems small, but it is enough to cause serious illness. Above 40°C may cause fainting, 42°C can cause death in hours. The earlier 36°C posed no problem, but the extra 6°C is deadly. Climate works the same: the added increase is a small proportion but enough to destroy ecosystems and habitability, even leading to extinction. (Similarly with sea-level rise: though Earth’s altitude differences span nearly 20,000 meters, just a few meters’ rise can submerge major cities; 15 meters would drown the Yangtze and Pearl River Deltas. The rise is tiny compared to total altitude variation, but devastating in effect.)
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As for “climate change cannot be absolutely proven to be caused by humans,” this is just exploiting scientific and logical loopholes. Regardless of the overwhelming evidence that human activity is the main cause, logic alone rebuts it. Scientific theories are never “100% certain,” but many can be treated as effectively certain. Geology itself, Ding’s field, is built on inference from evidence, not direct observation of ancient eras. Yet such inferences produce valid, valuable results. Science must “boldly hypothesize, carefully verify.” Reports avoid absolute language for rigor, but recent reports explicitly state human activity as the main cause of current warming, to prevent deniers from exploiting loopholes.
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Moreover, even if not 100% certain, if 90% certain, should we not act? Like a medical diagnosis: even “confirmed” cases may later be overturned, but does that mean diagnosis and treatment are unnecessary? Or surgery: without it, 90% chance of death within a year, 10% chance of recovery; with it, severe pain and 10% risk of failure. Should one do it? Individually one may refuse, but for humanity as a whole, no one has the right to refuse action on behalf of all.
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As for “is there really a mainstream in science,” it sounds scientific but is sophistry. Science is not about numbers deciding truth. But probability is part of science, and consensus emerges when a vast majority of experts agree. When 95% of scientists conclude climate change is man-made and extremely harmful, should we side with the 5%? If the 95% were coerced or baseless and the 5% free and well-grounded, then yes, but the opposite is true. The vast majority of climate scientists are free, well-trained, and provide robust evidence, with countless reports and papers. The small minority often have dubious ties—to oil companies, politics, or denialist agendas—and many of them don’t even outright deny warming, but hedge by saying it “cannot be absolutely certain.” So, whom should we believe? (By that logic, since most Chinese deny climate change and supported Ding after Chai’s interview, does that make them right? Clearly not—this is just muddying the waters.)
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As for Chai Jing, of course her scientific literacy and expertise cannot match Ding Zhongli’s. Her other work on environmental issues has also exposed gaps in her knowledge and rigor. For instance, her documentary Under the Dome was criticized for errors, including by noted science writer Fang Zhouzi. But mistakes aside, she did not deliberately mislead nor make grave errors. As a journalist, her knowledge was sufficient to conduct interviews, her questions were factual and necessary. Especially as Ding stressed China’s stance of politics and interests, her counterbalancing with human common interests and depoliticized professionalism was valuable. Similar “oppositions” in the interview made for a fuller truth, more like a debate. If the interview had only agreement, it would have failed. She was a qualified journalist, and the program was competent. Her past work also shows her to be someone concerned for her country and people. We may critique her errors, but not smear her with conspiracies.
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(Ironically, in recent years China has pledged a “carbon neutrality” plan, essentially acknowledging the international mainstream’s correctness on climate issues and solutions—contrary to Ding’s past views. Yet now, online, people both support carbon neutrality (or at least not oppose it publicly) and still strongly support Ding’s statements—even though his remarks predate China’s carbon neutrality pledge. This shows they do not even understand the basic facts, nor think independently. They have no grasp of what carbon neutrality policy entails or what Ding actually said. They have only positions, not principles—and positions can turn 180 degrees at any time. They claim to revere science, yet lack even basic scientific literacy or spirit.)

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Desde finales de septiembre de 2026, debido al descontento por las deficientes instalaciones escolares, el excesivo hacinamiento, la escasez de profesores y otros problemas, numerosos estudiantes de secundaria de toda Francia han iniciado huelgas y protestas a gran escala. Muchas otras personas descontentas con el Gobierno y con la situación actual de la sociedad también se han sumado a ellas, y las protestas pacíficas se transformaron rápidamente en disturbios marcados por la violencia.
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Los manifestantes han provocado incendios en escuelas y otros lugares, destrozado automóviles, atacado a quienes se oponen a ellos y perseguido a policías que se encontraban aislados, entre otras acciones, dejando algunas localidades en una situación de desorden y parálisis. Los enfrentamientos han continuado durante la represión policial de los disturbios. Los principales partidos y figuras políticas han condenado la violencia o han llamado a protestar pacíficamente, pero aparentemente sin resultado: el movimiento de protesta ha quedado fuera de control y es probable que los disturbios sean difíciles de apaciguar a corto plazo.
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Se trata, una vez más, de un típico movimiento político radical al estilo francés. Cuando algunos franceses están descontentos con el Gobierno y con la situación existente, salen colectivamente a las calles para protestar. La mayoría expresa sus reivindicaciones de manera no violenta, pero una minoría de radicales recurre a la violencia, haciendo que las protestas degeneren en disturbios. Los actos violentos son numerosos, pero en su mayoría no son letales, tienen una intensidad baja o moderada y consisten principalmente en la destrucción de bienes, con relativamente pocas personas heridas. Van acompañados de enfrentamientos entre la policía y los manifestantes, mientras la sociedad queda en un estado de semiparálisis. Sin embargo, una vez superado el punto álgido de los disturbios, la sociedad recupera gradualmente la paz y una relativa estabilidad.
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Situaciones similares se producen con frecuencia en Francia: algunas tienen lugar en localidades concretas, mientras que otras se convierten en disturbios de alcance nacional. Los disturbios derivados del movimiento de los «chalecos amarillos» de 2018, así como las protestas y la serie de incidentes violentos desencadenados en 2023 después de que un policía matara a tiros a un adolescente, fueron movimientos radicales de alcance nacional acompañados de violencia política. Al igual que el actual, pueden calificarse de «movimientos populares a la francesa».
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Los movimientos populares y la violencia política callejera en Francia pueden remontarse a la época de la Revolución francesa, hace más de 230 años. En aquel entonces, las clases populares francesas derrocaron la monarquía y el dominio aristocrático mediante una revolución violenta, pagando el precio de mucho derramamiento de sangre y numerosas muertes, y provocándolos también. De este modo, abrieron el camino a las revoluciones democráticas de abajo arriba, pero también dejaron un legado de violencia política. Marcados por la experiencia de la Revolución e influidos por las ideas radicales sobre los derechos civiles, muchos franceses consideran que, cuando el Gobierno «se aparta de la voluntad popular», sus políticas son perjudiciales o la sociedad es injusta, el pueblo tiene derecho a expresar su ira y resistirse mediante diversos medios, incluida la revolución violenta.
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Este precedente revolucionario y esta conciencia popular han inspirado numerosos movimientos de masas y revueltas en Francia durante los más de dos siglos transcurridos desde entonces hasta la actualidad. Entre los más conocidos se encuentran la insurrección de la Comuna de París de 1871 y el «Mayo del 68». La mayoría de estos movimientos han tenido un marcado carácter populista de izquierdas, con la oposición a los privilegios y la búsqueda de la igualdad como ejes principales, y entre sus participantes se han encontrado jóvenes estudiantes, intelectuales y miembros de las clases urbanas bajas y medias. La capital, París, suele ser el centro de los movimientos políticos y de las actividades violentas.
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En comparación con los pueblos de otros países del mundo, los franceses sienten un interés especialmente intenso por la política, poseen una mayor conciencia cívica y participan en los asuntos públicos de manera más activa y radical, entre otras formas saliendo a las calles, utilizando medios violentos o no violentos para expresar sus reivindicaciones, enfrentándose a las autoridades gobernantes y entrando en conflicto con el aparato coercitivo del Estado. La sociedad francesa muestra un grado relativamente alto de tolerancia hacia las formas radicales de protesta y también está acostumbrada a la violencia política. Han transcurrido más de dos siglos y, aunque la intensidad de la violencia de los movimientos políticos franceses ha disminuido considerablemente —por ejemplo, el número de muertos se ha reducido en gran medida—, estos siguen siendo bastante «ardientes» y los enfrentamientos violentos continúan siendo frecuentes. Las recientes protestas y disturbios no son una excepción.
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Más concretamente, las protestas actuales tienen su origen en problemas antiguos y profundamente arraigados del sistema educativo francés. Aunque Francia es un país que concede una importancia considerable a la igualdad y al bienestar social, siguen existiendo graves desigualdades en la distribución de los recursos educativos. En los centros de secundaria de zonas relativamente remotas y desfavorecidas, así como en aquellos con una elevada presencia de hijos de personas de las clases bajas y medias, estudiantes no blancos e inmigrantes, la financiación educativa es escasa, la calidad del profesorado es inferior, las clases tienen demasiados alumnos y están excesivamente masificadas, las instalaciones escolares son antiguas y la proporción de estudiantes que logran ingresar en universidades prestigiosas también es muy baja, por lo que resulta difícil progresar socialmente. Mientras tanto, los hijos de las élites francesas de la política, los negocios y otros ámbitos suelen estudiar en prestigiosos centros privados de secundaria de tradición católica y con excelentes condiciones, y también tienen más facilidades para ingresar en universidades de élite y acceder a las clases altas.
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La desigual distribución de los recursos educativos, la concentración de los recursos de alta calidad en favor de las élites y el reforzamiento de la rigidez de las clases sociales a través de la educación son, en realidad, problemas comunes en todo el mundo, y Francia difícilmente puede ser una excepción. Sin embargo, los franceses, con una mayor conciencia de la igualdad, están especialmente descontentos con estas diferencias y protestan con frecuencia por ellas. El movimiento de Mayo del 68 ya incluía reivindicaciones como la igualdad educativa y la apertura de las universidades al conjunto de la población.
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El Gobierno francés también ha intentado reducir estas diferencias aumentando la financiación destinada a las regiones y escuelas pobres y desfavorecidas y proporcionando becas a los estudiantes con menos recursos. Sin embargo, bajo el «efecto Mateo», los recursos educativos continúan concentrándose entre una minoría procedente de las élites. Quienes ya disfrutan de ventajas adquiridas siempre disponen de más recursos para invertir en la educación de sus hijos, mientras que las personas procedentes de familias menos acomodadas se encuentran naturalmente en desventaja, por lo que las políticas de igualdad de oportunidades tienen un efecto limitado.
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Las protestas actuales son precisamente una explosión del descontento de estudiantes procedentes de familias relativamente pobres y que estudian en centros con peores condiciones. Sin embargo, su descontento no se debe únicamente a la desigualdad de los recursos educativos, sino también a su situación de desventaja y a la discriminación que sufren debido a su origen de clase y su identidad étnica, así como a la rigidez de las clases sociales, los conflictos étnicos y el pesimismo respecto a sus futuras perspectivas de empleo e ingresos. La ira y la desesperación acumuladas por la combinación de estos numerosos factores los han llevado a salir a las calles e incluso a recurrir a la violencia.
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Entre los jóvenes estudiantes que participan en las protestas actuales, muchos son «inmigrantes de segunda generación/descendientes de inmigrantes», no blancos y no cristianos, en su mayoría negros y musulmanes cuyas familias proceden de África y del mundo árabe. Enarbolan banderas de Argelia y Palestina, lo que refleja claramente sus identidades y posiciones, así como las diferencias que mantienen con la identidad y los valores de la población blanca autóctona de Francia.
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Desde la Revolución francesa, Francia ha proclamado los valores de «libertad, igualdad, fraternidad» y, efectivamente, ha logrado grandes avances en materia de derechos civiles y justicia social. Sobre la base de valores comunes y de la ciudadanía, también ha conseguido, con relativo éxito, construir una identidad nacional francesa y una comunidad nacional. Sin embargo, Francia todavía tiene que afrontar los difíciles problemas de la división de clases y la desigualdad entre ricos y pobres, las antiguas diferencias y contradicciones étnicas, así como la fractura social y la violencia política derivadas de ellas. Entre personas de diferentes identidades y posiciones sociales, colores de piel y creencias existen divisiones profundamente arraigadas que ni las instituciones democráticas, ni las ideas de la Ilustración, ni los movimientos sociales pueden eliminar de raíz.
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En los últimos años, la polarización política mundial se ha intensificado cada vez más, y Francia no es una excepción. Francia celebrará elecciones presidenciales en abril de 2027. Le Pen, de la formación de extrema derecha «Agrupación Nacional», aventaja ampliamente a los demás en intención de voto, seguida por Mélenchon, de «La Francia Insumisa», de extrema izquierda, mientras que las fuerzas tradicionales del establishment y los centristas registran bajos niveles de apoyo.
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Tanto la violencia política callejera protagonizada principalmente por el populismo de izquierda radical como el continuo aumento del apoyo al populismo de extrema derecha en las encuestas y las elecciones reflejan la intensificación de las contradicciones de la sociedad francesa y el agravamiento de su crisis. La violencia política que se produce con frecuencia, incluidas las protestas y disturbios actuales, constituye una manifestación periódica de los males que aquejan a Francia y, objetivamente, también recuerda a los franceses y al resto del mundo la necesidad de prestar atención a la existencia y las necesidades de quienes se encuentran en situaciones difíciles y están marginados.
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Según la experiencia del pasado, aunque la violencia política es frecuente en Francia, su intensidad es limitada. Después de que la gente haya descargado su ira, vuelve gradualmente a la calma, y la sociedad puede recuperar un estado de paz y volver a funcionar con normalidad. Tras más de dos siglos de adaptación, los franceses han desarrollado una convivencia tácita con formas de violencia política como las revoluciones y los disturbios, por lo que tampoco hay motivos para ser excesivamente pesimistas.
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El uso de la violencia en la participación política no es deseable, pero las voces y reivindicaciones de las clases populares también necesitan ser vistas y escuchadas. Sus sentimientos y demandas no deberían ser simplemente rechazados y estigmatizados, ni borrados únicamente porque sus formas de expresión incluyan violencia. Al mismo tiempo, mientras las masas populares entusiastas de los «movimientos populares a la francesa» expresan sus reivindicaciones y persiguen la igualdad, también deberían comprender y respetar las preocupaciones de los demás, tener en cuenta los intereses generales y a largo plazo de la sociedad y participar en la política de maneras más pacíficas y constructivas.

(El autor de este artículo, Wang Qingmin (王庆民), es un escritor chino residente en Europa e investigador de política internacional. El texto original está en chino.)

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Desde que Rusia lanzó su invasión a gran escala de Ucrania en febrero de 2022, la guerra ruso-ucraniana se ha prolongado ya durante tres años y medio. El número de militares y civiles ucranianos muertos o heridos supera los 500.000, mientras que las fuerzas rusas han pagado el precio de casi un millón de bajas, entre muertos y heridos, de las cuales al menos 200.000 son muertos. El número de muertos y heridos de las fuerzas rusas ya supera con creces las bajas sufridas por las fuerzas soviéticas durante los diez años de guerra de la invasión soviética de Afganistán, entre 1979 y 1989 (15.000 muertos y más de 50.000 heridos). Rusia también ha sido objeto de diversas sanciones lideradas por Occidente, mientras su economía se ha deteriorado y las condiciones de vida de la población han empeorado. Ante la tenaz resistencia de Ucrania, respaldada por numerosos países, las fuerzas rusas avanzan lentamente, el curso de la guerra es desfavorable para Rusia y resulta difícil alcanzar el objetivo de anexionarse todo el territorio ucraniano.
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Sin embargo, hasta ahora Rusia no ha mostrado señales de querer sinceramente detener la guerra y alcanzar la paz. Aunque Putin y la parte rusa han declarado públicamente en repetidas ocasiones que desean un alto el fuego y la paz, no han llevado a cabo ninguna acción concreta para poner fin a la guerra. Por el contrario, las fuerzas rusas continúan atacando Ucrania sin cesar. Incluso durante las negociaciones informales entre Rusia y Ucrania y durante los encuentros de Putin con Trump, favorable a Rusia, las fuerzas rusas siguieron lanzando misiles y drones contra Kiev y otros lugares. Esto demuestra que la parte rusa carece de una voluntad sincera de paz, no desea negociar la paz y mucho menos pedirla.
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Entonces, ¿por qué, pese a las enormes bajas y a una situación bélica desfavorable, Rusia sigue sin querer la paz y continúa empeñada en prolongar la guerra?
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Una razón relativamente directa y fácil de comprender es que Putin necesita prolongar la guerra y desviar la atención de las contradicciones internas para consolidar su poder. Otra razón es que Rusia ya ha pagado un precio enorme, se encuentra en una situación de la que le resulta difícil salir y no quiere retirar sus tropas de manera humillante.
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Pero estas no son todas las razones por las que Rusia no desea un alto el fuego ni la paz. Además, si únicamente Putin y un número muy reducido de personas quisieran que la guerra continuara, mientras la mayoría de los rusos, especialmente los militares, se opusieran a ella y no quisieran morir como carne de cañón, Putin probablemente habría sido derrocado mediante un golpe de Estado, o la guerra no habría podido continuar debido a la resistencia de los militares y de la población. Pero la realidad es que no hay señales de un golpe de Estado dentro de las fuerzas armadas rusas ni tampoco se han producido rebeliones organizadas en el frente. Muchos ciudadanos rusos prefieren ser enviados al frente y morir allí, mientras sus familias contemplan cómo sus seres queridos se convierten en carne de cañón, antes que oponerse ampliamente a la guerra.
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Una explicación razonable de que la guerra siga prolongándose es que numerosos rusos, especialmente los hombres rusos jóvenes y de mediana edad que sirven en las fuerzas armadas, no rechazan la guerra, sino que incluso participan activamente en ella y, además, no temen a la muerte.
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El hecho de que muchos rusos no se opongan a la guerra, sino que incluso la apoyen y participen en ella, contribuyendo así al estallido y a la prolongación de la guerra ruso-ucraniana, tiene causas sociales complejas y profundas. En pocas palabras, Rusia ha atravesado numerosas catástrofes dolorosas y diversas dificultades en los últimos años; la mayoría de la población vive en la pobreza y en la degradación moral y ha perdido la esperanza de llevar una vida normal. Por ello, opta por apoyar el extremismo y las guerras de agresión, sin valorar su propia vida ni la de los demás.
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Aunque Rusia ha sido una de las potencias imperiales desde el siglo XVIII, su economía y el nivel de vida de su población han estado muy por debajo de los de los países europeos y Estados Unidos, y la mayoría de sus habitantes han sido pobres. Su fortaleza ha residido principalmente en las dimensiones del país y de sus fuerzas militares, así como en la excelencia de sus mejores talentos y de su tecnología. El entorno natural de Rusia también es relativamente hostil, y su clima extremadamente frío ha contribuido asimismo a moldear el carácter áspero de los rusos.
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En la primera mitad del siglo XX, la guerra ruso-japonesa, la Primera Guerra Mundial, la Revolución rusa y la guerra civil, la Gran Purga de Stalin, la invasión nazi y la Gran Guerra Patria constituyeron una sucesión de guerras y convulsiones extremadamente sangrientas y violentas que influyeron profundamente en el destino de Rusia, causaron enormes daños materiales y espirituales a la nación rusa y provocaron profundos traumas psicológicos y consecuencias sociales entre los rusos. Estas guerras y convulsiones no solo redujeron drásticamente la población rusa y perjudicaron sus capacidades agrícolas, industriales, científicas y tecnológicas, sino que también hicieron que el carácter y el comportamiento ya de por sí ásperos de los rusos se volvieran todavía más violentos y extremos.
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El modelo de gobierno de la época soviética también deterioró a largo plazo el pensamiento y el comportamiento de la mayoría de los rusos. Durante el período soviético, debido a la ausencia de democracia y a la represión de la libertad, mientras el comunismo era instrumentalizado y corrompido por el grupo gobernante del Partido Comunista de la Unión Soviética, los rusos cayeron de manera generalizada en el nihilismo moral, mientras faltaban una fe sincera y el humanismo. Los «chistes soviéticos» que han llegado hasta nuestros días son precisamente un reflejo de la desconexión entre la propaganda oficial y la realidad durante la era soviética, de una sociedad llena de mentiras y de cómo los rusos se volvieron cínicos en medio de esas mentiras.
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El colapso de la Unión Soviética destruyó aún más las convicciones que les quedaban a los rusos. Tras su desintegración, Rusia volvió a caer en dificultades económicas, una oleada de desempleo y pobreza entre la población, lo que agravó todavía más el nihilismo moral y la degradación de la población rusa, provocó desorden social y generó un círculo vicioso. La gente cayó en una forma de cinismo en el sentido moderno: no cree en ninguna promesa política, ni en el idealismo, la moral o las cosas buenas, y se burla de todo ello. También ha perdido la confianza y la capacidad de actuar para reconstruir una sociedad justa, próspera y armoniosa, y prefiere observar cínicamente desde fuera o incluso contribuir a que el Estado y la sociedad se degraden aún más y avancen hacia la destrucción.
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Los efectos provocados por los cambios históricos y los traumas de la Unión Soviética/Rusia han sido ampliamente descritos, analizados y comentados por diversas personas y en sus obras, entre ellas el escritor ruso Aleksandr Solzhenitsyn en «Archipiélago Gulag», la premio Nobel bielorrusa Svetlana Alexiévich en «El fin del “Homo sovieticus”», Aleksandr Yákovlev, miembro del Politburó del Partido Comunista de la Unión Soviética, y los académicos chinos Qin Hui y Jin Yan. Por razones de extensión, aquí me limito a enumerarlos sin desarrollar más citas.
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Por supuesto, la crisis de los rusos no existe únicamente en el plano moral, sino también en la realidad material. Durante la época soviética, las personas vivían en la pobreza dentro de una vida relativamente estable; después del colapso de la Unión Soviética, la vida de los rusos pasó a estar llena de inestabilidad al mismo tiempo que continuaban viviendo en la pobreza.
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Desde el colapso de la Unión Soviética hasta la actualidad, en Rusia se han ido formando gradualmente nuevos grupos privilegiados y comunidades de intereses. Los grupos privilegiados y las personas estrechamente vinculadas al poder obtienen privilegios, monopolizan recursos y llevan una vida lujosa y extravagante. Los cargos públicos se venden en los círculos de poder con precios establecidos abiertamente, y también los funcionarios ordinarios incurren en corrupción para obtener beneficios personales. El poder y el dinero son el pasaporte hacia el éxito, mientras que la conciencia y la justicia son el epitafio del fracaso.
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La mayoría de la población rusa, en cambio, no puede obtener una parte razonable de los recursos nacionales ni de los frutos económicos. En particular, los habitantes de las vastas regiones alejadas de Moscú y San Petersburgo, donde «el cielo está alto y el emperador está lejos», no solo viven en medio de la pobreza y la corrupción gubernamental, sino que además carecen gravemente de la protección del Estado de derecho para su seguridad y sus bienes. Los rusos sin poder ni influencia, aunque todavía disponen de lo necesario para alimentarse y vestirse, viven en la pobreza y sin dignidad. También les resulta difícil cambiar su destino o ascender socialmente, y se hunden en la desesperación. La amplia presencia de drogas y el alcoholismo generalizado en Rusia también reflejan la degradación de la población.
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Los problemas étnicos y religiosos dentro de Rusia también son muy graves. Bajo la paz superficial creada mediante una fuerte represión, las relaciones entre los grupos étnicos permanecen tensas y existen corrientes conflictivas bajo la superficie; periódicamente se producen actos de violencia relacionados con la etnia y la religión. Tanto los «skinheads» rusos como los extremistas islamistas de Chechenia y otras regiones del Cáucaso exaltan la violencia y atacan a personas de otras etnias y religiones.
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La pobreza material, el nihilismo moral, los traumas históricos, la desesperación ante la vida, así como el frío y duro entorno natural y las diversas contradicciones internas han llenado de violencia la sociedad rusa. La tasa de homicidios de Rusia, la incidencia de la violencia doméstica y la tasa de mortalidad causada por esta, la tasa de delitos violentos y la tasa de delincuencia organizada superan las de la mayoría de los países del mundo y se encuentran aún mucho más por encima del promedio europeo.
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Por ejemplo, más del 40 % de los rusos han sufrido violencia doméstica por parte de familiares, una cuarta parte ha sido golpeada por sus familiares y cada 45 minutos una mujer rusa es golpeada hasta la muerte por su marido. La delincuencia organizada es desenfrenada en Rusia, y numerosas personas de los círculos políticos y empresariales están vinculadas con el crimen organizado y son sospechosas de delitos como asesinato y lesiones que provocan discapacidades. Toda la sociedad rusa está llena de violencia: desde los altos funcionarios hasta las clases medias y los sectores más bajos de la población, todos están acostumbrados a resolver los problemas mediante distintas formas de violencia. La generalización de la violencia arrastra a más personas a participar en ella y también destruye el desarrollo y la construcción normales. Esto, a su vez, estimula aún más violencia, generando un círculo vicioso.
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Una Rusia llena de pobreza y violencia, degradación moral y falta de esperanza no es, en absoluto, una sociedad normal. La mayoría de sus habitantes tampoco son personas que lleven una vida saludable, sino que se han vuelto patológicos y distorsionados en medio del sufrimiento. Un entorno social y un estado de la población como estos pueden considerarse un caldo de cultivo para el extremismo, y también hacen que las personas de allí no se preocupen por la moral ni por la paz, ni valoren su propia vida o la de los demás. En cuanto a las dificultades provocadas por las sanciones, tras haber experimentado demasiados sufrimientos se han acostumbrado a ellas y se han vuelto insensibles. Incluso para algunos rusos desesperados ante la vida, morir en la guerra quizá sea una forma de liberación. Para las familias que durante mucho tiempo han sufrido violencia doméstica por parte de hombres jóvenes y de mediana edad, la muerte en la guerra de un marido, padre o hijo tampoco tiene por qué ser algo inaceptable y puede representar asimismo una forma de liberación.
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Un presentador ucraniano de un programa de entrevistas contó una vez esta broma:
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«A estas alturas de la guerra, todos están cansados; incluso Putin se siente cansado. Pero ahora hay un gran problema: muchos hombres rusos consideran que morir en Ucrania es más feliz que vivir en Rusia, y no hay forma de detenerlos. Zelenski les dice: “¡No vengan a Ucrania, si vienen a Ucrania morirán! ¡Si mueren, nunca volverán a ver a sus familias!”. Y resulta que estos tipos de repente se entusiasman. Le dicen a su esposa: “¡Natasha! ¡Me voy de vacaciones! ¡Y después nunca volveré a verte!”. Luego, nadie sabe en qué lugar de Ucrania murieron. Ya ven, Rusia es un lugar así de deprimente».
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Estas palabras no son únicamente humor negro, sino también la realidad de Rusia. Es precisamente porque muchos rusos viven en la pobreza y la desesperación por lo que han llegado a no valorar su propia vida, a exaltar la violencia y a perjudicar tanto a los demás como a sí mismos. Sus raíces se encuentran en más de un siglo de convulsiones atravesadas por Rusia, de degradación de la nación y de sufrimiento de la población, que han dado lugar al estado patológico de la sociedad rusa actual y a la distorsión de los valores de sus ciudadanos.
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Wang Yangming, pensador neoconfuciano chino de la dinastía Ming, dirigió cuando ejercía como funcionario una campaña para eliminar a unos bandidos de las montañas y comentó con pesar: «Es fácil derrotar a los bandidos de las montañas; es difícil derrotar a los bandidos del propio corazón». El mismo principio se aplica a la actual guerra ruso-ucraniana y al problema de Rusia. Las guerras de agresión de Rusia contra otros países tienen causas sociales complejas y profundas. Son precisamente estas causas sociales las que han contribuido a que los rusos apoyen el lanzamiento de esta guerra de agresión contra Ucrania, una guerra que, en principio, no debería haberse producido y que, desde un punto de vista racional, no era necesaria; y también a que no teman a la muerte, sean insensibles ante las sanciones y estén dispuestos a prolongar la guerra a cualquier precio. Casi un millón de muertos y heridos, una situación bélica desfavorable y el sufrimiento causado por las sanciones tampoco han cambiado la voluntad de la mayoría de los rusos de continuar la guerra. Y si no se pueden eliminar de raíz los factores que llevan a los rusos a apoyar las guerras de agresión, incluso sin Putin, los rusos elegirán a otras figuras de línea dura que continuarán provocando a otros países y generando violencia.
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Por supuesto, dado que los problemas sociales de Rusia son consecuencia de toda clase de problemas históricos heredados y de complejas realidades actuales, son muy difíciles de cambiar; e incluso si pudieran cambiarse, eso de ninguna manera podría lograrse de la noche a la mañana. Además, Rusia ya ha invadido Ucrania, por lo que ayudar ahora a mejorar su situación interna se convertiría en una «recompensa» por la agresión. Incluso si se ayudara a Rusia a mejorar su situación interna, ello debería tener como condición previa un mayor apoyo a la victoria y la reconstrucción de Ucrania. Y esta sería una tarea aún más costosa y duradera, difícil de realizar en las circunstancias actuales. Sin embargo, los distintos países y actores del mundo deberían, como mínimo, tener una comprensión clara y un juicio preciso sobre las diversas causas y factores que han llevado a Rusia a iniciar la guerra y a sumergirse en ella, en lugar de atribuirla a causas excesivamente simples y prescribir remedios equivocados.
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Más importante aún, conocer y comprender los problemas sociales de Rusia y las causas de su belicismo también puede ayudar a prevenir y afrontar mejor otras posibles crisis sociales y riesgos de guerra. Ante los diversos «Estados fallidos» y las crisis internas de los distintos países, otros Estados, especialmente las economías desarrolladas, deberían esforzarse por promover un desarrollo mundial más equilibrado y mejorar el bienestar de las poblaciones de todos los países. Un desarrollo equilibrado y una prosperidad compartida constituyen la base de la armonía interna de los países y de la paz internacional. Ignorar el sufrimiento de los demás equivale a permitir que prolifere el caldo de cultivo de las guerras; al final, esto también se volverá contra quienes permanezcan de brazos cruzados y hará que el mundo entero pague un precio aún mayor.

（El autor de este artículo es Wang Qingmin (王庆民), escritor chino residente en Europa e investigador de política internacional. El texto original está escrito en chino.）

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Récemment, Xi Jinping, secrétaire général du Parti communiste chinois et président de la République populaire de Chine, s’est rendu aux États-Unis, où il a reçu un accueil chaleureux du président américain Donald Trump, tandis que les relations sino-américaines se sont nettement améliorées. Certains ont formulé des critiques à ce sujet. Ainsi, un article du New York Times a cité le commentaire d’un universitaire selon lequel, il y a encore un mois, Trump affirmait que « le communisme est la plus grande menace à laquelle notre pays ait été confronté dans son histoire », alors qu’il se livre aujourd’hui à des « flatteries et complaisances » envers le dirigeant d’un puissant pays communiste. De nombreux autres commentateurs ont également critiqué ce point : Trump s’oppose au communisme d’un côté, tout en réservant de l’autre un accueil chaleureux au dirigeant du plus grand parti communiste du monde.
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Cela révèle-t-il donc une contradiction chez Trump et un manque de sincérité dans son opposition au communisme ? La clé pour porter un jugement à ce sujet consiste à déterminer si la Chine est réellement un pays communiste, si le Parti communiste chinois met en œuvre des politiques liées au communisme, et si Xi Jinping ainsi que les hauts dirigeants du PCC croient aux idées et principes communistes et les mettent en pratique. Ce sont en soi des questions importantes qui méritent largement d’être discutées, analysées et clarifiées. Il ne s’agit pas seulement de savoir si Trump se contredit, mais aussi de déterminer si les différentes parties, en Chine comme à l’étranger, comprennent et jugent correctement la question chinoise, et si elles sont capables de l’aborder raisonnablement sur la base des faits.
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Il convient tout d’abord de préciser un point particulièrement important : la Chine est effectivement un pays autoritaire, le PCC est également un parti autoritaire qui monopolise le pouvoir, et Xi Jinping est incontestablement un dictateur. Mais l’autoritarisme dictatorial et le communisme ne peuvent être assimilés l’un à l’autre ; ils relèvent même de deux dimensions différentes, bien qu’ils puissent parfois se recouper.
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Qu’est-ce que le « communisme » ? Si l’on veut en donner une description précise et détaillée, la question est assez complexe. Pour le dire de manière simple et accessible, il s’agit d’une situation dans laquelle les biens matériels et les richesses sont extrêmement abondants et collectivisés, où les individus bénéficient d’une répartition égalitaire, où la protection sociale est extrêmement complète, où les différences de classe et de statut sont abolies, et où les distinctions entre nations et frontières nationales disparaissent. Il s’agit bien entendu du projet de Marx concernant le communisme, de l’état communiste idéal, qu’aucun pays ni aucune région n’a jusqu’à présent réalisé.
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Si l’on élargit la définition du « communisme » à un champ plus vaste, notamment aux pays dirigés par des partis de type léniniste se déclarant communistes, tels que l’ancienne Union soviétique et les anciens pays socialistes d’Europe de l’Est, les caractéristiques de ce « communisme » comprennent alors la propriété publique généralisée de l’économie nationale, un modèle d’économie planifiée, le monopole du pouvoir par le Parti communiste et le rejet du mode de vie capitaliste, entre autres.
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Quant à la Chine de l’époque de Mao Zedong, même si elle ne constituait pas un communisme typiquement marxien et présentait également d’importantes différences avec le modèle soviétique et est-européen, sa ligne de gauche radicale, sa révolution agraire, l’abolition de la propriété privée, la généralisation de la propriété publique, la suppression des marchés et des échanges de marchandises entre particuliers — à l’exception de certains « marchés noirs » et « marchés clandestins » — ainsi que l’accent mis sur la lutte des classes peuvent également être considérés comme une certaine forme de socialisme proche du communisme.
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Mais quel que soit le critère retenu, la Chine actuelle ne correspond ni à la définition ni aux caractéristiques d’un « pays communiste ». Sur le plan économique, la Chine pratique une économie de marché et non une économie planifiée, tandis que son régime de propriété comprend à la fois une « économie d’État » et une économie privée. Les « entreprises d’État » chinoises ne sont pas véritablement des entreprises appartenant à l’ensemble du peuple : qu’il s’agisse de la propriété réelle, de leur mode de fonctionnement ou de la répartition des bénéfices, ce sont des entreprises relevant du capitalisme d’État/capitalisme bureaucratique. L’immense économie privée, comprenant les entreprises privées et les activités individuelles, présente manifestement des caractéristiques économiques non communistes.
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Le marché chinois est également hautement concurrentiel ; il existe en outre une Bourse et diverses plateformes d’investissement, qui sont toutes des caractéristiques du capitalisme. La Chine a depuis longtemps abandonné la ligne consistant à « prendre la lutte des classes comme axe central » et privilégie désormais dans ses politiques la construction économique, le développement des forces productives, le renforcement de la puissance nationale et l’enrichissement de la population.
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En matière de répartition, non seulement la Chine ne pratique pas une protection sociale généreuse, l’égalité des revenus ou une distribution fondée sur les résultats du travail ou les besoins, mais elle compte au contraire parmi les pays du monde où les écarts entre riches et pauvres sont les plus importants, où le niveau de protection sociale est le plus faible et où les prestations sociales dont bénéficient les différents groupes sont gravement inégales. Ainsi, le coefficient de Gini de la Chine se situe entre 0,45 et 0,6, et ses inégalités de richesse dépassent celles de la grande majorité des pays ; les cadres de l’État, les salariés, les citadins et les paysans chinois bénéficient de prestations totalement différentes en matière de soins médicaux, de retraite et d’autres formes de protection sociale. Les pensions de retraite des cadres de l’État atteignent généralement plusieurs milliers, voire plus de dix mille yuans, tandis que celles des paysans ne dépassent guère une centaine de yuans. Le montant de l’allocation chinoise garantissant un niveau de vie minimum est non seulement faible, mais celle-ci est également difficile à obtenir. Les autorités, y compris Xi Jinping lui-même, ont à plusieurs reprises explicitement affirmé que la Chine « ne devait pas tomber dans le piège du welfarisme », tout en faisant l’éloge de l’endurance face aux difficultés et en valorisant l’effort individuel.
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Sur le plan politique, il est vrai qu’en Chine le Parti communiste chinois monopolise à lui seul le pouvoir, mais il ne s’agit pas pour autant d’une « dictature communiste »/« dictature du prolétariat » ; il s’agit plutôt du pouvoir autoritaire exercé par un immense groupe d’intérêts portant le nom de « Parti communiste ». Ses membres comprennent des élites de différents secteurs ainsi que des groupes bénéficiant d’intérêts acquis, et il s’appuie sur des technocrates pour élaborer et mettre en œuvre ses politiques.
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Bien que, sur le plan idéologique officiel, aussi bien les statuts du PCC que la Constitution chinoise proclament l’adhésion au communisme et l’objectif de sa réalisation, les politiques effectivement mises en œuvre sont pragmatiques et ne sont ni contraintes ni guidées par l’idéologie communiste. L’idéologie communiste est certes utilisée pour fournir certaines justifications théoriques au régime autoritaire et comme instrument de propagande, mais uniquement dans certains domaines spécifiques et essentiellement comme une « façade ».
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Dans les domaines de la culture, de l’éducation, de la vie sociale et autres, la Chine actuelle ne présente pas non plus, dans son ensemble, de caractéristiques communistes significatives. Bien que les autorités continuent à promouvoir des contenus liés à l’idéologie communiste, tels que les « valeurs fondamentales du socialisme » et l’« histoire rouge », ceux-ci restent généralement formels et ne pénètrent pas véritablement dans la vie quotidienne des individus. Bien que la plupart des Chinois aient reçu une éducation et une propagande liées au socialisme/communisme, celles-ci restent également superficielles et formalistes ; l’immense majorité des gens n’y croit pas véritablement, et les autorités n’exigent pas non plus que la population mette le communisme en pratique.
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La population chinoise est généralement pragmatique et utilitariste, les principaux objectifs de la vie étant centrés sur l’argent et d’autres intérêts matériels ; les responsables politiques poursuivent eux aussi avec ardeur le pouvoir et d’autres avantages, plutôt que des objectifs communistes. Si l’on examine sur la durée les déclarations et les comportements des plus hauts responsables du PCC, y compris de son secrétaire général Xi Jinping, on peut également constater qu’ils ne sont pas des adeptes du communisme, mais plutôt des personnalités politiques pragmatiques dont l’objectif fondamental réside dans leurs propres intérêts et ceux du groupe dirigeant.
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Le groupe dirigeant du PCC va même jusqu’à réprimer, surveiller et sanctionner certains Chinois qui croient sincèrement au communisme, au marxisme ou au maoïsme. Par exemple, les « associations marxistes » de l’Université de Pékin et d’autres établissements universitaires ont défendu les droits des travailleurs, organisé des mouvements ouvriers et critiqué les politiques capitalistes des autorités actuellement au pouvoir ; elles ont pourtant été interdites, et leurs membres ont été convoqués pour des interrogatoires, voire placés en détention. En 2018, le « mouvement ouvrier de Jasic », auquel ont participé conjointement des étudiants maoïstes et des ouvriers à Shenzhen, a fait l’objet d’un encerclement policier avant d’être finalement réprimé.
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Le PCC stigmatise également comme des « forces hostiles étrangères » les groupes occidentaux de gauche et communistes qui soutiennent les mouvements ouvriers en Chine et d’autres activités liées au communisme, afin de les empêcher d’exercer une influence à l’intérieur du pays. Même les maoïstes chinois sont aujourd’hui considérés par le groupe dirigeant du PCC comme des facteurs d’instabilité ; ils sont surveillés et contrôlés afin d’éviter qu’ils n’acquièrent la capacité de renverser le système actuel.
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Bien entendu, il existe encore de nombreuses autres caractéristiques et de nombreux autres exemples illustrant la nature « non communiste » de la Chine dirigée par le PCC, que je ne peux énumérer un à un faute de place. Les éléments mentionnés ci-dessus suffisent déjà à montrer que la Chine contemporaine n’est pas un pays communiste et que le Parti communiste chinois ne met plus en œuvre de politiques communistes. Au contraire, la Chine actuelle présente de nombreuses caractéristiques typiquement capitalistes et possède de nombreux points communs avec le capitalisme sauvage de l’Occident du XIXe siècle — niveau de protection extrêmement faible, concurrence impitoyable, mépris des droits civiques et sacrifice des droits humains au nom du développement. En outre, le modèle de développement chinois a emprunté de manière sélective certains éléments du néolibéralisme, tout en rejetant ses composantes libérales et démocratiques et en accentuant ses caractéristiques utilitaristes et social-darwinistes.
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Quant au « socialisme », qui est proche du communisme tout en étant distinct de celui-ci et constitue une certaine forme initiale du communisme, la Chine ne correspond pas davantage à la définition marxiste d’un État socialiste, et elle n’est pas non plus dotée d’un système socialiste soviétique de type léniniste. Au contraire, les pays de l’Union européenne, le Royaume-Uni, le Canada et d’autres pays caractérisés par une protection sociale relativement élevée, l’État de droit, une réglementation plus stricte et une attention particulière portée à l’égalité sont plus proches du « socialisme » au sens général et des intentions initiales de Marx. Quant au « socialisme à la chinoise », il ne conserve du socialisme qu’une revendication nominale et le modèle du parti léniniste ; dans ses orientations politiques et dans les caractéristiques de la société chinoise qu’il a façonnée, il présente davantage de points communs avec le capitalisme.
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Il n’y a donc aucune contradiction entre le fait que Trump attaque violemment le communisme d’un côté et qu’il exprime de l’autre son amitié envers le PCC et son secrétaire général Xi Jinping. Trump considère manifestement que la Chine n’est pas un pays communiste et que Xi Jinping n’est pas non plus un dirigeant communiste ; ce jugement correspond aux faits.
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Le milliardaire Elon Musk, qui critique lui aussi fréquemment le communisme tout en ayant une opinion favorable de la Chine et en coopérant largement avec les autorités chinoises, se rapproche de la Chine dirigée par le PCC pour des raisons similaires. Musk a implanté une usine « Tesla » en Chine, ce qui lui permet d’utiliser la main-d’œuvre chinoise bon marché afin de produire à moindre coût. La Chine possède également une immense population aisée et un marché gigantesque, permettant à Musk de réaliser d’énormes profits. Tant du côté de la production que de celui de la consommation, la Chine constitue un terrain fertile pour les capitalistes étrangers.
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Pour Trump et de nombreuses personnalités politiques anticommunistes, ce sont des pays comme Cuba — qui pratiquent une économie planifiée, restreignent les marchés et le commerce extérieur, et où une forte propagande et une éducation communistes restent présentes dans la vie quotidienne — qui correspondent à ce qu’ils considèrent comme des « pays communistes ». En outre, Trump et une grande partie de la droite américaine considèrent également comme du « communisme » ou du « socialisme » les systèmes de protection sociale relativement développés des pays de l’Union européenne et du Canada, ainsi que du Parti démocrate américain, certaines réglementations et normes imposées à l’économie et à la société, les politiques d’égalité en faveur des minorités et des groupes vulnérables, les conceptions favorables à la mondialisation, etc., et ils portent un jugement très négatif sur ces pays, ces partis et les personnalités qui leur sont associées. Ce sont eux qui constituent les « ennemis communistes » et les alliés du « communisme » aux yeux de Trump et de ses partisans.
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De plus, pour Trump et les républicains américains, le Parti démocrate des États-Unis ainsi que les forces politiques établies de l’Union européenne, du Royaume-Uni et du Canada constituent les parties avec lesquelles leurs conflits d’intérêts sont les plus directs et leurs principaux adversaires, puisqu’il en va de leur capacité à continuer de détenir le pouvoir et à poursuivre des politiques différentes de celles de la gauche et de l’establishment. La Chine, la Russie et d’autres pays ne constituent pas pour eux une « menace vitale » ; au contraire, certaines convergences idéologiques et certains intérêts communs leur offrent des possibilités de coopération.
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Et le caractère non démocratique de la Chine et de la Russie ne concerne pas non plus Trump. Des hommes forts comme Xi Jinping, Vladimir Poutine et Kim Jong-un suscitent même l’envie de Trump, qui a toujours souhaité monopoliser le pouvoir aux États-Unis et déteste ses adversaires politiques intérieurs. Trump a publiquement fait l’éloge de la « force » dont le PCC a fait preuve en réprimant le mouvement démocratique en 1989 ; il est donc naturel qu’il n’éprouve guère d’aversion particulière pour l’autoritarisme, et son envie à l’égard des détenteurs d’un pouvoir fort s’inscrit dans cette logique.
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Ainsi, bien que la Chine soit un pays autoritaire et que Xi Jinping soit un dictateur, la Chine n’est pas un pays communiste et Xi Jinping n’est pas un adepte du communisme. Ceux qui désapprouvent l’attitude amicale de Trump envers le régime du PCC et Xi Jinping peuvent critiquer son admiration pour les dictateurs et son mépris des valeurs démocratiques, mais le comportement de Trump n’est effectivement pas contradictoire avec sa position anticommuniste. Trump, Musk et d’autres ne considèrent pas la Chine comme un pays communiste, et ce jugement est également exact.
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Pourtant, de nombreux Chinois et étrangers continuent de considérer comme un « pays communiste » une Chine qui connaît depuis plusieurs décennies la réforme et l’ouverture, où des éléments capitalistes ont pénétré tous les domaines, où le communisme ne subsiste plus que sous la forme d’un slogan et où même le socialisme ne correspond plus à son appellation. Il s’agit manifestement d’une erreur. Cette méprise conduit également de nombreuses personnes à porter un jugement erroné sur la Chine et détourne l’attention des aspects essentiels qui doivent être transformés en Chine ainsi que des véritables objectifs contre lesquels il faut lutter.
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Pour les Chinois et les étrangers qui s’opposent à l’autoritarisme du PCC et à la dictature de Xi Jinping, la priorité absolue devrait être de s’opposer à l’autoritarisme et au totalitarisme, de critiquer le monopole du pouvoir exercé par le PCC et la répression des libertés individuelles, plutôt que de concentrer leurs attaques sur le « communisme ».

L’auteur de cet article, Wang Qingmin (王庆民), est un écrivain chinois vivant en Europe et chercheur en politique internationale. Le texte original de cet article est en chinois.

On September 20, a local parliamentary election was held in Berlin, the capital of Germany. According to the results, Die Linke (The Left), a party with a far-left position and populist tendencies, came in first with 25.7% of the vote and won 47 seats (the Berlin State Parliament has a total of 158 seats). Both its vote share and number of seats more than doubled compared with the previous election, and the candidate it nominated is very likely to become the new mayor of Berlin. This is also the first time that a far-left party has become the largest party in the Berlin State Parliament, and it may also be the first time that such a party takes control of the city’s highest executive office. Of course, since it won less than one-third of the total seats, it would need to form a coalition with other parties in order to govern and would find it difficult to exercise power alone. The most likely possibility is a governing coalition with the center-left Social Democratic Party (SPD) and the environmentalist left-wing Greens.
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In this election, the far-right populist party Alternative for Germany (AfD) also saw a substantial increase in its vote share, finishing third. Meanwhile, the three traditional establishment parties—the center-right Christian Democratic Union (CDU), the left-leaning and environmentalist Greens, and the center-left SPD—all suffered significant declines in both votes and seats, finishing second, fourth, and fifth respectively. In addition, BSW, an emerging left-wing populist party with anti-immigration and pro-Russian positions, received 4.72% of the vote. Although it failed to reach the 5% threshold required for seat allocation, it still demonstrated a considerable level of support.
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In the Mecklenburg-Western Pomerania state parliament election held on the same day, the far-right AfD achieved a major victory and finished first, while the SPD and CDU suffered sharp declines in their vote shares. The election in Saxony-Anhalt a week earlier produced a similar result, with the AfD receiving nearly 50% of the vote, setting a historical record.
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These election results quite clearly reflect the rise of far-left and far-right populism and the intensification of political polarization in Germany. Of course, there are specific differences among different regions of Germany. Populism and political polarization are more severe in the former East Germany than in the former West Germany, while the far right is also more successful than the far left. The far left enjoys high levels of support in major cities such as Berlin, while the far right has greater advantages in rural and suburban areas.
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This Berlin election likewise reflects such regional differences. In West Berlin, which formerly belonged to West Germany, the CDU prevailed in most constituencies, while in East Berlin, Die Linke and the AfD were roughly evenly matched. Die Linke won most constituency seats in the city center, while the AfD prevailed in the eastern and southern suburbs of Berlin. This also indirectly reflects the geographical distribution and identity characteristics of the supporters of the various parties.
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According to opinion polls, general political tendencies, post-election statistics, and other data, Die Linke receives relatively strong support among ethnic minorities, women, people with low and middle incomes, intellectuals, young people, and students; the AfD has a greater advantage among native white Germans, men, people with low and medium levels of education, blue-collar workers, and farmers; while the traditional establishment parties can still maintain relatively stable support among the middle class, businesspeople, and high-income groups, although their overall support is declining.
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Far-left and far-right populism has always existed in Germany, but for many years it remained quite marginal, receiving few votes and winning few seats. In recent years, however, its support has increased substantially. In the latest local elections in three German states, the far right came first in two states and the far left came first in one, reflecting the reality of a major intensification of political polarization in Germany, a substantial rise in populist forces, and a contraction of the establishment, as well as the changes compared with the past.
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The far left and far right are highly opposed to each other in terms of ideology and policy positions. For example, the far left advocates pluralism, equality, high levels of social welfare, high taxation, strong support for women’s rights and LGBT rights, and support for ethnic minorities, immigrants, and refugees. The far right, by contrast, advocates ethnic homogeneity and white supremacism, emphasizes economic efficiency over fairness, rejects immigrants and refugees, and holds negative attitudes toward women’s rights and LGBT rights. However, both the far left and the far right have a strong anti-establishment character. Their policy positions are relatively extreme, although in different directions. Both are dissatisfied with the status quo, oppose establishment parties and traditional political elites, and tend to seek to overturn or substantially change the existing system and policies.
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The increasing polarization of German politics, including in Berlin, has complex causes. The issue of immigration and the related ethnic tensions are the most direct catalysts. In the decades following World War II, especially after the end of the Cold War, large numbers of immigrants moved to Germany from abroad, most of them non-white and non-Christian. Immigrants differ considerably from native white Germans in terms of ethnic identity, religious beliefs, values, language and culture, and ways of life, making estrangement and conflict difficult to avoid.
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The upper strata of different ethnic groups have benefited more from globalization and coexist relatively harmoniously with one another, while the lower and middle strata of different ethnic groups are more likely to compete and clash over limited resources. Although Germany, because of its historical responsibility for Nazism, has been particularly vigorous in suppressing racism and extreme nationalism, racial prejudice and xenophobia remain deeply rooted in German society.
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Although the German government and many nongovernmental forces have continuously worked to build and promote a diverse and harmonious society, and have achieved some results, making ethnic relations appear relatively harmonious on the surface—with Berlin in particular being an international and diverse city—the reality is that ethnic tensions have always existed in Berlin and throughout Germany. For example, Christians, Muslims, and other religious groups also have significant differences in values and behavior. Although they can coexist more or less peacefully, they have not been able to integrate without friction.
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Since around 2015, many refugees have entered Germany, exacerbating immigration-related problems and ethnic tensions. This has also been a direct driving force behind the rise of the far right, whose main slogans oppose immigration and refugees. Meanwhile, ethnic minorities have moved closer to the far left, which advocates pluralism. For example, Eralp, the new mayoral candidate nominated by Die Linke, which won this election, is of Turkish descent.
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Economic weakness has likewise been a driving force behind the rise of populism and political polarization. In recent years, especially since the outbreak of the COVID-19 pandemic, the German economy has been sluggish, incomes have stagnated, while unemployment and prices have risen. At the same time, the German government has allocated enormous sums of money to aid Ukraine. Although some members of the public support this policy, it has also caused dissatisfaction among many Germans struggling with economic hardship, who believe that these resources should instead be used as a priority to improve living conditions at home. Economic weakness has also intensified class and ethnic tensions within Germany. Calls to prioritize native citizens and oppose immigration and refugees have grown increasingly strong and have gained greater resonance and support.
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In addition to immigration and the economy, Germany is troubled by many other problems, some emerging and some longstanding, some chronic and some sudden. For example, gender tensions have become increasingly serious in recent years, with men and women having more disagreements and less consensus regarding values, interests, and demands. On the issue of LGBT rights, Germans with different value systems likewise hold sharply divergent views. Different perceptions of the Russia-Ukraine war and the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, as well as differing positions on German foreign policy, have also divided German society. Meanwhile, many problems have accumulated over a long period in everyday issues closely related to people’s livelihoods, such as public security, housing, healthcare, pensions, childcare, and transportation. Traditional establishment parties have offered few new ideas or breakthrough advances, which has also disappointed voters.
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Against this background, the relatively clear and disruptive reform proposals of radical populist parties—for example, the far left’s proposal to “socialize” some housing and rent it cheaply to poor people; the far right’s proposal to expel immigrants and refugees in order to save public funds and use them for the native population; and policies advocated by both the far left and far right to reduce or even end aid to Ukraine—have attracted the resonance and approval of a considerable number of people, especially those who are more frustrated and suffering. Under a democratic system, public support for radical parties and populist figures can easily be transformed into votes and seats, gradually changing the balance of power among political forces, the control of public authority, and official positions and policies in places such as Berlin.
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The rise of radical populist political forces and the decline of the traditional establishment are not good news for either Berlin or Germany as a whole. Although radical populist forces offer forceful criticism of Germany’s current problems, they do not possess a greater capacity for constructive development than the establishment. Once in power, they often cannot genuinely solve existing social problems, or they may solve certain specific problems through radical methods that amount to “robbing Peter to pay Paul,” while paying a greater price and causing more damage.
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For example, far-left populist policies such as substantially increasing social welfare spending, raising taxes, and socializing some housing may improve the living conditions of the lower and middle classes in the short term, but they inevitably increase the fiscal burden and damage economic vitality and efficiency. They may also cause inflation and capital flight, further worsen the economy, create more unemployment and lower incomes, and make people’s livelihoods even more difficult. Far-right populists, meanwhile, blame everything on immigrants, refugees, and ethnic minorities. If they come to power, these minority and vulnerable groups will inevitably suffer injustice and harm. Moreover, removing immigrants cannot genuinely solve the various existing problems and would leave many lower- and middle-level industries in Germany even more short of labor, thereby also harming the economy and people’s livelihoods.
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Whether left-wing or right-wing, radical populist forces pursue policies that are short-sighted, narrow, and treat the symptoms rather than the root causes. Moreover, the shortcomings of the establishment, such as bureaucratism, resistance to change, and selfishness, will also gradually emerge among populists after they come to power, and may become even more severe.
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Although the author holds a relatively negative view of radical populist forces and disagrees with most of their policies, he fully understands the motivations that lead voters toward polarization and support for populism. For many German voters, especially those from the lower and middle strata of society, it is entirely understandable that, under severe and painful pressures in their daily lives, lacking sufficient voice and confronted with the selfishness and arrogance of bureaucrats and elites, they feel abandoned and desperate, urgently want to escape their difficulties, and turn toward radical populist forces in an attempt to change the status quo—or even simply to bring down and spite establishment elites. This is understandable even if their choices are not wise. Ordinary people who live difficult lives and have experienced misfortune should not be harshly blamed. They should not be required to “consider the bigger picture,” think about the long term, and endure all kinds of suffering, nor should their choices simply be reduced to “ignorance” or “extremism” and their character disparaged.
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Likewise, neither the far-left Die Linke nor the far-right AfD should simply be labeled and dismissed with reductive stigmas such as “remnants of the East German Communist Party” or “heirs to the Nazis.” Their rise has objective causes rooted in reality. At most, they have taken advantage of existing circumstances and public opinion; they did not single-handedly incite and brainwash the population. Both parties have also obtained parliamentary seats and participated in politics through democratic procedures and universal suffrage, and are therefore legitimate in institutional and legal terms.
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Although Die Linke traces its lineage to the Socialist Unity Party (SED), the Leninist authoritarian party that ruled former East Germany, after democratization and many years of evolution, it has clearly become a qualified democratic party that supports democracy and speaks up for vulnerable groups. It should therefore no longer be stigmatized and rejected because of origins dating back several decades. In this election, Die Linke received more votes than the two major establishment parties, the CDU and SPD, which also reflects the political preferences of part of the public.
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From the SED losing public support and falling from power in 1990 because of its authoritarian rule and bureaucratism, to Die Linke gaining public support and entering government in 2026 by speaking forcefully for vulnerable people and focusing on difficult livelihood issues, this process also reflects the reflection and transformation of the radical left. Of course, the author is not optimistic about some of Die Linke’s proposals and promises either, but merely supports its governing and making some attempts at reform.
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As for the AfD, which represents the far right, although some of its policy proposals violate human rights and justice, its support also reflects a part of public opinion, and there are objective reasons for its rise. Simply “putting labels on it” and rejecting it cannot curb its development. On the contrary, this has prompted many people to vote for the AfD as a reaction, while also making establishment parties less inclined to reflect on themselves and change, leaving them increasingly unable to compete with the AfD.
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Faced with the radicalization of the political and social climate and the rise of radical populist forces, traditional establishment parties and social elites need greater self-reflection and change, and must seek more active and effective ways to address the difficulties faced by the public and respond to their reasonable demands. If traditional parties and elites are genuinely unable to deal with reality, or do not truly care about ordinary people and are unwilling to put the public interest before their own interests and undertake substantial reforms, populism and political polarization will become increasingly severe and difficult to stop.
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Judging from the current reality, because of the prevalence of “identity politics” in Germany and around the world, people of different ethnic groups, genders, classes, backgrounds, and beliefs align themselves according to their identities, oppose one another, side with those who belong to their own camp, and attack those who think differently. German society is already deeply divided, and this fragmentation will be difficult to reverse in the short to medium term. People share less and less common ground while their differences grow larger and larger. There is widespread mutual distrust and increasing hostility, while conflicts are becoming more frequent and difficult to reconcile. This naturally fuels the growth of populist forces with extreme positions. Extreme populism, in turn, stimulates and intensifies conflict and division. At present, there appear to be no clear opportunities or paths for improving this situation. The results of this election have further encouraged radical and populist forces on both the far left and far right, further intensifying divisions among different social groups and political polarization.
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However, there is also no need to be excessively pessimistic about Germany’s future. Today’s political polarization and social tensions are still, on the whole, expressed and played out peacefully, and large-scale political violence is unlikely to occur in the short to medium term. Germany’s democratic system also remains stable for the foreseeable future and is unlikely to be overthrown by extremist forces. People continue to work and live relatively normally. Compared with the periods before the end of World War II, or even before the end of the Cold War, when wars, riots, and terrorism were widespread, Germany today remains much more peaceful and stable.
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Nevertheless, people should remain mindful of potential dangers even in times of peace. While remaining vigilant against the harm that radical populist forces may cause to democratic politics, people should also confront problems more honestly and seriously and critically examine their own shortcomings, promote mutual understanding and harmonious coexistence, gradually curb political polarization and the underlying social divisions, ease conflicts, and thereby enable the country to achieve lasting peace and stability.
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(Regarding populism and extreme politics in Germany, the far right and the anti-immigration wave, and the problems of traditional establishment parties and elites, among other issues, the author already provided a detailed analysis two weeks ago in a commentary on the Saxony-Anhalt state election and the AfD’s major victory, titled “The Causes and Consequences of the Far Right’s Major Victory in a German State Election: The ‘Alternative Choice’ of the Lower and Middle Classes Amid Social Crisis, the Intensification of Political Polarization, and Xenophobia.” Points already discussed there will therefore not be elaborated on again in this article.)

(The author of this article, Wang Qingmin (王庆民), is a Chinese writer based in Europe and a researcher of international politics. The original text was written in Chinese.)

Del 13 al 14 de octubre de 2025 se celebró en Beijing la «Cumbre Mundial de las Mujeres» (全球妇女峰会), organizada conjuntamente por el Gobierno chino y ONU Mujeres. El presidente de China, Xi Jinping (习近平), pronunció un discurso, y dirigentes políticos y personalidades destacadas del ámbito de las mujeres de numerosos países asistieron a la cumbre. La propuesta y celebración de esta cumbre se debieron, en gran medida, al propósito de conmemorar y rendir homenaje a la «Conferencia Mundial sobre la Mujer» (世界妇女大会) celebrada en Beijing treinta años antes.
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En septiembre de 1995 se celebró en Beijing, China, la Cuarta Conferencia Mundial sobre la Mujer. El entonces presidente chino Jiang Zemin (江泽民), el primer ministro Li Peng (李鹏) y otros dirigentes políticos, así como representantes de las Naciones Unidas e invitados distinguidos de diversos países, asistieron a la conferencia. Fue precisamente en aquella conferencia donde la entonces primera dama de Estados Unidos y posteriormente secretaria de Estado, Hillary Clinton, pronunció un discurso y formuló aquella declaración feminista que se hizo mundialmente célebre: «Los derechos humanos son derechos de las mujeres, y los derechos de las mujeres son derechos humanos (human rights are women’s rights, women’s rights are human rights)», que alentó al movimiento feminista mundial.
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La Conferencia Mundial sobre la Mujer de 1995 también adoptó la «Declaración de Beijing» (北京宣言) y la «Plataforma de Acción» (行动纲领) que la acompañaba. China y los demás países del mundo establecieron numerosos objetivos para el desarrollo de la causa de las mujeres y asumieron los correspondientes compromisos. Esta conferencia también tuvo una profunda influencia en la causa de las mujeres tanto en China como en el resto del mundo.
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La celebración de la Conferencia Mundial sobre la Mujer de Beijing de 1995 no fue casual. A comienzos de la década de 1990, China, por diversas razones, se encontraba en una situación difícil tanto interna como externamente. El Gobierno chino intentaba abrirse paso y conseguir apoyo económico, comercial y diplomático, incluida una renovada aceptación por parte de los países occidentales que dominaban el ámbito internacional. La cuestión de las mujeres se convirtió en un punto de avance.
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Tanto la fundación y el desarrollo del Partido Comunista de China como los de la República Popular China son inseparables de la causa de las mujeres. Durante mucho tiempo, como partido de izquierda, el PCCh consideró la liberación de las mujeres uno de sus objetivos y una parte importante de su agenda. Durante la revolución agraria, el movimiento obrero, el movimiento estudiantil, la Guerra de Resistencia contra Japón (抗日战争), la lucha entre el PCCh y el Kuomintang, el trabajo del frente unido y la propaganda internacional, el PCCh enarboló las banderas de la liberación de las mujeres, de la oposición a las restricciones y la opresión contra ellas y de la igualdad entre hombres y mujeres para conseguir el apoyo de las mujeres y de personas progresistas. Esto también constituyó una razón importante para el ascenso y la victoria del PCCh.
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Las primeras integrantes femeninas destacadas del PCCh, como Cai Chang (蔡畅), Xiang Jingyu (向警予) y He Xiangning (何香凝), hicieron grandes contribuciones al crecimiento y fortalecimiento del PCCh y a la causa de las mujeres en China. Mao Zedong (毛泽东), dirigente del PCCh y de China, también afirmó que «las mujeres sostienen la mitad del cielo», criticó la opresión ejercida por la autoridad marital y la autoridad del clan y promovió la causa de la liberación de las mujeres. La primera ley de la República Popular China fue la «Ley de Matrimonio» (婚姻法), que garantizaba la libertad matrimonial y promovía la igualdad entre hombres y mujeres. Aunque posteriormente una serie de convulsiones y malas políticas en la China gobernada por el PCCh, así como un giro político cada vez más conservador, perjudicaron gravemente los derechos e intereses de las mujeres, el legado histórico de la liberación femenina se conservó en cierta medida.
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Estos antecedentes históricos constituyeron una importante condición favorable para que China lograra obtener el derecho a organizar la Cuarta Conferencia Mundial sobre la Mujer.
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En la década de 1990, China seguía siendo relativamente pobre, el Estado de derecho era deficiente, la seguridad pública era caótica y las vulneraciones de los derechos de las mujeres eran generalizadas. La trata de mujeres y niños, la violencia doméstica contra las mujeres, la violación y el acoso sexual, la falta de escolarización de las niñas, la explotación y el maltrato de las trabajadoras y los suicidios de mujeres rurales eran bastante comunes en la China de aquella época. La protección jurídica y social de las mujeres era insuficiente, y sus derechos necesitaban urgentemente mejorar.
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Aunque en la China de la década de 1990 tanto la situación de las mujeres como las condiciones de vida de la población eran relativamente pobres y atrasadas, China era entonces más abierta que ahora y deseaba con mayor intensidad integrarse en el mundo. Era además la época de la gran ola de globalización posterior a la Guerra Fría, y China promulgó la «Ley de Protección de los Derechos e Intereses de las Mujeres» (妇女权益保护法) como muestra de sinceridad. Por ello, las Naciones Unidas, los países europeos y americanos y las fuerzas defensoras de los derechos humanos y de los derechos de las mujeres de diversos países apoyaron que China organizara la Cuarta Conferencia Mundial sobre la Mujer, con la esperanza de aprovecharla para ampliar la cooperación sobre cuestiones relacionadas con las mujeres tanto con las autoridades como con la sociedad civil china, difundir el feminismo en China, aumentar la visibilidad de los problemas de las mujeres chinas, promover la mejora de sus derechos y fomentar la causa feminista mundial.
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En términos generales, la Conferencia Mundial sobre la Mujer de Beijing de 1995 fue un éxito. No solo Hillary Clinton pronunció un discurso bastante radical, sino que la líder del movimiento democrático birmano Aung San Suu Kyi también intervino en la ceremonia inaugural, y Beverley Palesa Ditsie, una mujer negra y lesbiana de Sudáfrica, pronunció un discurso sobre los derechos LGBT. Esto demuestra que las autoridades chinas de entonces se esforzaban mucho por proyectar una imagen abierta. También fueron reconocidas la capacidad organizativa de China y sus compromisos con la promoción de los derechos de las mujeres. Como resultado de esta conferencia, mejoró la imagen internacional de China y también mejoraron sus relaciones con los países occidentales.
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Sin embargo, durante los treinta años posteriores y hasta hoy, los derechos de las mujeres, la situación de las mujeres y el movimiento feminista en China no han avanzado de manera continua y sin obstáculos, sino que han experimentado numerosos giros y retrocesos, pasando del progreso al retroceso.
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Desde 1995 hasta comienzos del siglo XXI, las autoridades chinas sí promovieron una serie de leyes y políticas destinadas a proteger los derechos de las mujeres. También difundieron mensajes sobre la protección de mujeres y niñas y toleraron el desarrollo de organizaciones de la sociedad civil dedicadas a cuestiones relacionadas con las mujeres. Por ejemplo, se combatió severamente la trata de mujeres y niños, disminuyó considerablemente el número de niñas sin escolarizar, se reforzó mucho la lucha contra delitos como la violación y aumentó el número de organizaciones específicamente dedicadas a los derechos de las trabajadoras. Con el desarrollo económico, también aumentaron los ingresos medios de las mujeres y sus opciones laborales. La seguridad, los derechos y los ingresos de las mujeres mejoraron de forma evidente.
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Pero, al mismo tiempo, las autoridades chinas siempre se mantuvieron vigilantes y reprimieron a las fuerzas feministas ajenas al sistema que tenían un carácter político más marcado y una mayor independencia. Las autoridades solo permitían actuar a organizaciones y personas dedicadas a actividades de interés público que carecieran de carácter político o de movimiento por los derechos y se limitaran a mejorar las condiciones económicas, educativas y de vida de las mujeres.
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No obstante, aproximadamente hasta 2010, gracias al desarrollo de la economía nacional, la mejora de las condiciones de vida de la población y un entorno político y de opinión pública relativamente relajado, los derechos e intereses de las mujeres sí mejoraron de forma significativa.
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Pero posteriormente, los derechos de las mujeres y la causa feminista en China entraron en un período de estancamiento y comenzaron a retroceder gradualmente. Por ejemplo, en varios casos representativos de violencia doméstica ocurridos alrededor de 2010, así como en casos en los que mujeres sometidas a una brutal violencia doméstica mataron a sus maridos después de no encontrar ayuda, las sentencias favorecieron a los hombres y perjudicaron a las mujeres. Esto significó un grave revés para la lucha contra la violencia doméstica, una agenda de enorme importancia dentro de las cuestiones feministas.
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Alrededor de 2015, las autoridades chinas lanzaron una dura ofensiva contra las organizaciones y activistas feministas. Algunas activistas callejeras y feministas radicales fueron detenidas temporalmente y varias organizaciones feministas fueron prohibidas. Esto significó que las autoridades restringieron aún más el espacio de supervivencia de las fuerzas feministas independientes de la sociedad civil y dejaron de tolerar las expresiones feministas radicales. Cabe señalar que China ya había celebrado en 2015 una «Cumbre Mundial de las Mujeres»; ya entonces se manifestó claramente la actitud de las autoridades de monopolizar las cuestiones relacionadas con las mujeres y excluir al feminismo de la sociedad civil.
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El movimiento «MeToo», que desde 2017 se extendió por todo el mundo, también llegó a China. Las autoridades no hicieron comentarios al respecto, pero en la práctica adoptaron una actitud claramente negativa y represiva hacia las cuestiones y la difusión de MeToo. En casos relacionados con personas dentro del sistema, como las acusaciones de Xianzi (弦子) contra Zhu Jun (朱军), las autoridades restringieron las discusiones y búsquedas en Internet. A las mujeres denunciantes y a sus partidarios se les borraban con frecuencia las publicaciones y se les bloqueaban las cuentas. Las decisiones de los órganos de seguridad pública, las fiscalías y los tribunales también tendían a favorecer a los hombres, mientras que los medios de comunicación de China continental básicamente no informaban sobre estos casos y guardaban silencio. Los grandes influencers favorables al Gobierno y figuras conservadoras, por su parte, expresaban abiertamente su desprecio por el movimiento MeToo, y criticaban e incluso insultaban a las mujeres que formulaban acusaciones.
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En 2020, en medio de una enorme controversia, las autoridades chinas aprobaron leyes y reglamentos que establecieron un «período de reflexión para el divorcio» (离婚冷静期). Esto perjudicó la libertad matrimonial y también hizo más difícil que las mujeres sometidas a situaciones desgraciadas, como la violencia doméstica, pudieran librarse del hostigamiento del hombre. El caso de la «Pequeña Casa Roja» de Shanghái (上海“小红楼”案件) de 2021 y el caso de la «mujer encadenada» del condado de Feng (丰县“铁链女”事件) de 2022 reflejaron que en China, donde aparentemente se había erradicado el delito de trata de mujeres, en realidad siguen existiendo numerosos fenómenos de trata y esclavización de mujeres. En particular, las mujeres pobres, procedentes de zonas rurales o con discapacidades siguen siendo vulnerables a la restricción de su libertad personal y a sufrir abusos.
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Al mismo tiempo, las mujeres también están disminuyendo en número y siendo marginadas entre los funcionarios de todos los niveles, incluida la máxima dirección de China. En el pasado, China tuvo dirigentes femeninas con considerable influencia tanto nacional como internacional, como Soong Ching-ling (宋庆龄), Jiang Qing (江青), Chen Muhua (陈慕华) y Wu Yi (吴仪), y la mayoría de ellas ejercieron poder efectivo en ámbitos importantes. Sin embargo, en los últimos años su número ha disminuido cada vez más. En el Buró Político del Comité Central del Partido Comunista de China (中共中央政治局) y su Comité Permanente, que constituyen de hecho los máximos órganos de decisión de China, los 24 miembros —incluidos los siete miembros del Comité Permanente— son todos hombres; no hay ninguna mujer. Shen Yiqin (谌贻琴), actualmente la mujer de mayor rango político en China, es únicamente consejera de Estado dedicada específicamente al trabajo relacionado con las mujeres y los niños, un cargo ligeramente inferior al de viceprimera ministra. Las mujeres ya se encontraban en una posición débil en los órganos de decisión chinos, especialmente en los niveles más altos, y ahora su representación y su capacidad de expresión se han debilitado aún más.
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El estancamiento de la causa de la liberación de las mujeres en China y el retroceso de sus derechos en los últimos años han sido provocados conjuntamente por múltiples factores.
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En primer lugar, esto es una consecuencia inevitable del creciente conservadurismo del sistema y de las políticas oficiales de China, y también el resultado del enfriamiento del clima político chino en los últimos años. En los primeros tiempos del PCCh, este, como partido revolucionario, promovía activamente la liberación de las mujeres. Movilizar a las mujeres para que participaran en la revolución también podía fortalecer sus fuerzas y concordaba con la corriente general de «derribar el viejo mundo» y abatir las «tres grandes montañas» (三座大山): el imperialismo, el feudalismo —el modelo confuciano de autocracia agraria— y el burocratismo.
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Sin embargo, después de que el PCCh llegara al poder en 1949, se convirtió en una fuerza dedicada a construir y mantener un nuevo orden y pasó a inclinarse más hacia la preservación del statu quo. Las exigencias de armonía y estabilidad prevalecieron sobre la innovación y la justicia, y el poder pasó a apoyarse en el lado masculino, que se encontraba en una posición dominante en cuanto a violencia, poder y bienes. Las mujeres, en cambio, fueron relativamente sacrificadas: pasaron de desempeñar el papel de personas liberadas al de personas disciplinadas, y en la familia, el trabajo y la sociedad se les exigió «subordinarse a los intereses generales».
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Por ejemplo, durante la era de Mao se hablaba nominalmente de la liberación de las mujeres, pero en la realidad los tribunales a menudo no permitían el divorcio solicitado por mujeres, y algunas incluso fueron obligadas de manera parcial a casarse con militares. La Federación de Mujeres, que en principio debía proteger los derechos de las mujeres, carecía por completo de independencia, estaba altamente subordinada al Partido y al régimen y se convirtió más bien en un instrumento para diluir los conflictos, apaciguar y mantener la estabilidad. Incluso la llamada idea de que «las mujeres sostienen la mitad del cielo» y el movimiento de liberación de las mujeres consistían en hacer que las mujeres, al igual que los hombres, asumieran la responsabilidad de consolidar el régimen y la obligación de construir la sociedad, mientras se descuidaban los derechos y la autonomía de las propias mujeres.
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Esta tendencia ya se manifestó desde la década de 1950, cuando el PCCh fue transformándose gradualmente de un «partido revolucionario» en un «partido conservador». Posteriormente, el grupo gobernante del PCCh osciló en numerosas ocasiones entre posiciones abiertas y conservadoras, pero después de 2015 el péndulo se inclinó claramente hacia el conservadurismo. Las protestas políticas presenciales fueron completamente prohibidas, la libertad de expresión se restringió notablemente, organizaciones ciudadanas moderadas que anteriormente habían sido toleradas fueron prohibidas y numerosas personas fueron detenidas. Las activistas feministas y el feminismo, naturalmente, también se encontraron entre los objetivos de esta represión.
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Las autoridades temen que diversas corrientes progresistas, incluido el feminismo, constituyan una amenaza para su dominio, y también les preocupa que la existencia de distintas formas de autoorganización ciudadana, incluidas las organizaciones feministas de la sociedad civil, perjudique el monopolio del poder. Los grupos gobernantes tienden por naturaleza a mantener el orden y a reprimir a quienes se rebelan contra él. Un sistema y unas políticas conservadoras conducen inevitablemente a reprimir el feminismo y la resistencia y las denuncias de las mujeres. Así ocurre con los gobiernos de tendencia conservadora en todo el mundo.
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En segundo lugar, la mejora de los derechos de las mujeres y el desarrollo de la causa de las mujeres han entrado en una «fase de cuello de botella»: cuantos más resultados se consiguen, más difícil resulta seguir avanzando. Anteriormente, la situación de los derechos de las mujeres era extremadamente mala y las características delictivas de las conductas que las perjudicaban eran evidentes, como la trata de mujeres, las violaciones frecuentes o la falta de escolarización de las niñas. Tanto entre las autoridades como en la sociedad existía un consenso relativamente amplio y una fuerte voluntad de resolver estos problemas, y la resistencia a combatir esos delitos también era relativamente pequeña.
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Pero cuando estos problemas graves y manifiestos de vulneración de los derechos de las mujeres se resuelven, avanzar un paso más para promover la igualdad entre hombres y mujeres —de modo que las mujeres sean iguales a los hombres en cuanto a derechos y posición social, condiciones económicas y capacidad de expresión, y tengan mayor influencia en el Estado, la familia y los distintos sectores— ya no consigue tanto apoyo como antes y se enfrenta a una mayor indiferencia y a más obstáculos.
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Y cuando las feministas cuestionan y desafían de manera sistemática y fundamental la sociedad patriarcal desde perspectivas como la estructura social, el poder y las instituciones, la ideología y la distribución de recursos, afectan a los intereses adquiridos de un número mayor de personas y a realidades sociales ya existentes, por lo que encuentran aún menos comprensión y aceptación tanto en las instituciones oficiales como en la sociedad civil dominadas por los hombres. Cambiar estas realidades complejas y profundamente arraigadas también resulta aún más difícil. Esto conduce naturalmente a que la causa feminista entre en una nueva etapa de dificultades.
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En tercer lugar, las fuerzas antifeministas compuestas principalmente por hombres han ido creciendo y han formado una «fuerza de reacción» frente al feminismo, obstaculizando una mayor ampliación de los derechos e intereses de las mujeres. La causa de la liberación de las mujeres en la época moderna y contemporánea se desarrolló con gran intensidad, golpeó el orden patriarcal tradicional y promovió la igualdad de género, pero también provocó descontento y reacciones entre los hombres.
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Ya se trate de violencia doméstica, acoso sexual, matrimonio, conflictos de intereses entre hombres y mujeres en el empleo y la educación o distribución de recursos sociales, cuando las mujeres se agrupan para defender sus derechos y resistirse al patriarcado, muchos hombres también reaccionan instintivamente con rechazo y se agrupan para oponerse al feminismo. La «política identitaria» de las mujeres también ha estimulado la «política identitaria» de los hombres. Además, en los últimos años se observa una clara tendencia al rejuvenecimiento entre los hombres antifeministas. Los jóvenes son más activos en Internet y dominan mejor las estrategias discursivas, lo que ha fortalecido enormemente las voces antifeministas dentro de la sociedad. Algunas mujeres también han realizado efectivamente declaraciones o actos excesivos y formulado acusaciones falsas; estos casos han sido amplificados y utilizados por hombres, haciendo que más hombres participen en la oposición al feminismo.
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Además, el deterioro económico de China y la agudización de los conflictos sociales en los últimos años también han intensificado los conflictos entre los sexos. Muchos hombres viven en condiciones difíciles; en particular, hombres de los estratos medios y bajos sufren opresión sin tener capacidad para resistirse y terminan dirigiendo sus ataques contra las mujeres. Hombres y mujeres también se enfrentan a algunos problemas comunes, mientras que las feministas prestan mayor atención a las mujeres —aunque esto no tiene nada de reprochable—, lo que también genera descontento entre los hombres y agrava la confrontación entre los sexos.
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Las fuerzas antifeministas masculinas también se expresan a través de Internet y otros canales, humillan y difaman a las mujeres que promueven el feminismo e incluso las denuncian ante sus lugares de trabajo, escuelas y otras instituciones como forma de atacarlas. Por su parte, las autoridades, en aras de la estabilidad social y teniendo en cuenta las posiciones y demandas de los hombres, también reprimen con mayor intensidad el feminismo. En los últimos años, tanto en el presunto caso de fotografías clandestinas de la Universidad de Sichuan (四川大学的疑似偷拍事件) como en el presunto caso de acoso sexual de la Universidad de Wuhan (武汉大学疑似性骚扰事件), las autoridades adoptaron decisiones favorables a los hombres y desfavorables a las mujeres.
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En cuarto lugar, el retorno mundial del conservadurismo, el ascenso del populismo de derecha y el entorno general desfavorable para el feminismo también han influido naturalmente en China. Desde que Donald Trump derrotó a Hillary Clinton y fue elegido presidente de Estados Unidos en 2016, numerosos países de todo el mundo han experimentado el auge de corrientes claramente antifeministas, conservadoras de derecha y populistas. Esto redujo la presión externa para instar a China a mejorar los derechos humanos y los derechos de las mujeres y, al mismo tiempo, alentó las tendencias antifeministas tanto entre las autoridades como en la sociedad china.
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Bajo la influencia de múltiples factores, era inevitable que la actitud de las autoridades chinas respecto a los derechos de las mujeres pasara de abierta y amistosa a conservadora y fría. En comparación con la China pobre y atrasada de 1995, que necesitaba del apoyo de Occidente y del resto del mundo, la China de 2025 es mucho más rica y poderosa, y sus gobernantes son también más autónomos y seguros de sí mismos. Ya no necesitan agradar a Occidente ni integrarse en el mundo y, en materia de derechos de las mujeres, actúan cada vez más a su antojo y con menos escrúpulos.
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Desde la perspectiva de la dirección central china encabezada por Xi Jinping, la cuestión de las mujeres forma parte de la construcción del «socialismo con características chinas para una nueva era» (新时代中国特色社会主义), mientras que las mujeres son tornillos destinados a construir el Estado, servir a la sociedad y a la familia y hacer realidad el «Sueño Chino» (中国梦) y el «gran rejuvenecimiento de la nación china» (中华民族伟大复兴); las mujeres deben subordinarse a los intereses generales. Quienes se niegan a obedecer las decisiones oficiales, persiguen la independencia, se expresan de manera autónoma o revelan las injusticias y los aspectos oscuros que padecen las mujeres son considerados por las autoridades «saboteadores» y objetivos que deben ser reprimidos. Para las autoridades, el movimiento MeToo y las actividades feministas de la sociedad civil son notas discordantes que destruyen la armonía y deben ser prohibidas y silenciadas.
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Por ello, la posición, el estilo y los objetivos de la Cumbre Mundial de las Mujeres de 2025 son muy distintos de los de la Conferencia Mundial sobre la Mujer celebrada treinta años antes. Frente al elevado grado de internacionalización de aquella conferencia, la cumbre actual presenta marcadas «características chinas», en consonancia con los principios promovidos en los últimos años por las autoridades chinas de organizar actividades internacionales bajo las ideas de «confianza cultural» (文化自信), «confianza institucional» (制度自信) y «con China como eje principal» (以我（中国）为主). En realidad, el PCCh tampoco defiende verdaderamente los derechos y la dignidad de las mujeres chinas desde la perspectiva del Estado y de la nación; el discurso estatal y nacional que proclama no es más que una estrategia propagandística y una fachada. Las resoluciones y el legado de la Conferencia Mundial sobre la Mujer de 1995 también son utilizados de forma selectiva e instrumental por el actual Gobierno chino, sin ser tratados con sinceridad ni heredados íntegramente.
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Las mujeres presentadas y elogiadas en esta cumbre, como Wang Haoze (王浩泽), Zhang Guimei (张桂梅), Chen Wei (陈薇) y Hua Chunying (华春莹), son figuras pertenecientes al sistema o reconocidas por las autoridades, mientras que las mujeres chinas independientes de las autoridades o con identidad disidente están completamente ausentes. Esto era previsible y demuestra también el monopolio de las autoridades chinas sobre las recompensas, los castigos y la propaganda relacionada con las mujeres; las mujeres también deben ser leales al Partido y al sistema.
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En esta cumbre, Xi Jinping anunció que se destinarían 110 millones de dólares estadounidenses a apoyar la causa de las mujeres en todo el mundo y declaró que China reforzaría la cooperación internacional, especialmente para ayudar a las mujeres y niñas de los países del Sur Global —países menos desarrollados—. En las explicaciones concretas sobre cooperación y ayuda también puede observarse que China hace hincapié en los derechos e intereses económicos y culturales de las mujeres y las niñas, mientras resta importancia a los derechos políticos de las mujeres y a sus reivindicaciones específicas. China intenta extender a más países su propia narrativa sobre las mujeres y su propio modelo para la causa de las mujeres, con el objetivo de competir con Occidente. En un momento en que Trump ha cortado la ayuda financiera estadounidense destinada en distintos países a cuestiones relacionadas con los derechos de las mujeres y de los grupos vulnerables, China también intenta proyectar una imagen de internacionalización y apertura y competir con Estados Unidos por el liderazgo mundial.
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Si el «modelo chino» (中国模式) se extendiera también al ámbito de las mujeres en todo el mundo, sería una noticia con aspectos tanto positivos como preocupantes para la causa de las mujeres en los distintos países. Lo positivo sería obtener el apoyo financiero, humano y político de una gran potencia como China; lo preocupante sería que China, que rechaza un modelo de la causa de las mujeres basado en la libertad y la democracia, aprovechara esta vía para exportar e introducir su modelo en más países, perjudicando las causas de las mujeres basadas en valores universales y en el feminismo moderno.
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Precisamente mientras se celebraba la «Cumbre Mundial de las Mujeres» organizada por el Gobierno chino, medios oficiales como el Diario del Pueblo (人民日报) acusaron al feminismo de la sociedad civil de «recibir apoyo de fuerzas extranjeras y socavar la estabilidad de China». Esto también demuestra que la cumbre oficial no solo no fomenta la causa feminista de la sociedad civil, sino que utiliza «conferencias de mujeres organizadas por el Estado» para monopolizar la representación, el derecho de interpretación y el derecho de participación en las cuestiones relacionadas con las mujeres en China.
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Esto no solo obstaculiza las voces de mujeres distintas de las oficiales, sino que también hace inevitable que las fuerzas participantes y el discurso de la causa de las mujeres en China sean débiles y burocratizados. Las mujeres carecen de autonomía y las comunidades de mujeres carecen de vitalidad, lo que no favorece el desarrollo de los derechos de las mujeres ni la defensa de sus intereses. En el ámbito internacional, las voces de las mujeres chinas y la atención que reciben suelen ser incluso menores que las de algunos pequeños países de Asia, África y América Latina. Por ejemplo, entre las cien mujeres seleccionadas cada año por la BBC rara vez aparecen mujeres chinas —aunque las mujeres de China continental representan más de una sexta parte de todas las mujeres del mundo—, lo que refleja las consecuencias negativas de la represión de las voces de las mujeres de la sociedad civil e independientes en China.
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Por supuesto, con el fin de proyectar tanto dentro como fuera del país una imagen de sí mismas como representantes de las mujeres chinas y defensoras de sus derechos e intereses, las autoridades chinas han invertido enormes recursos en esta cumbre y en las cuestiones relacionadas con las mujeres. La cumbre de este año seguirá produciendo algunos resultados para la causa de las mujeres en China y en el mundo y tendrá también cierto valor positivo. Sin embargo, comparada con la Conferencia Mundial sobre la Mujer de hace treinta años, queda claramente deslucida. La Conferencia Mundial sobre la Mujer de Beijing de 1995, al igual que los logros reales del PCCh en la causa de las mujeres durante sus primeros años, se ha convertido en un «escaparate» utilizado por el actual grupo gobernante chino para embellecer su imagen y atraer y cultivar relaciones: se conmemora su forma exterior mientras se abandona su contenido esencial, y en numerosas cuestiones concretas incluso se actúa en sentido contrario.
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Los tiempos y las circunstancias han cambiado. Dos conferencias sobre cuestiones relacionadas con las mujeres celebradas en una misma ciudad han tenido motivaciones e impactos diferentes. Las mujeres chinas de la época moderna y contemporánea han atravesado sufrimientos y momentos de gloria, y sus destinos han experimentado grandes altibajos; hoy vuelven a verse, contra su voluntad, condicionadas por las circunstancias de su tiempo. La causa de la liberación de las mujeres en China conoció en otro tiempo avances brillantes y posteriormente sufrió numerosos reveses; su futuro se presenta aún más difícil y poco alentador.

(El autor de este artículo es Wang Qingmin (王庆民), escritor chino residente en Europa e investigador de política internacional. El texto original está en chino y fue escrito en octubre de 2025.)

《태백산맥》이라는 영화（물론 조정래의 동명 원작 소설도 포함합니다）가 1940~1950년대 한반도의 격변을 반영한 최고의 작품이라고 해도 결코 과장이 아닙니다. 이 작품은 하나의 작은 지역을 출발점으로 삼고, 여러 평범한 인물들을 등장인물로 내세워 한반도 전역의 거대하고도 비통한 역사를 그 안에 녹여내어 보여 주며, 모든 묘사는 실제 역사를 바탕으로 하고 있습니다. 영화에 등장하는 다양한 인물들은 모두 그 시대에 실제 원형이 존재합니다. 이 작품은 한민족의 서사시입니다. 한국 영화계의 최고 권위 상인 ‘청룡영화상’을 수상한 것도 명실상부하다고 할 수 있습니다. 이 작품은 한국인들에게만 널리 알려져야 하는 것이 아니라, 세계 각국의 사람들에게도 알려지고 감상되어야 합니다.
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영화는 좌익과 우익, 노동당원들과 한국의 군·정 기관 사이의 사활을 건 투쟁을 묘사하면서도 어느 한쪽으로 치우치지 않고, 인간성과 한민족 전체의 입장에 서서 모든 것을 객관적이면서도 감정이 충만하게 기록하고 보여 줍니다. 어느 한쪽을 미화하지도 않고, 어느 한쪽을 추하게 묘사하지도 않습니다. 그렇다고 해서 아름다움과 추함에 대한 묘사가 없는 것은 아니며, 다만 그 안의 아름다움과 추함은 모두 역사적 사실에서 비롯된 것이고 과장하거나 덧붙여 꾸며낸 것이 아닙니다. 역사 속의 좌익과 우익, 북과 남, 노동당원과 반공주의자들은 모두 복잡한 존재였으며, 고결한 사람도 있었고 비열한 사람도 있었으며, 수많은 개인들 자신에게도 여러 측면이 존재하였습니다.
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물론 굳이 어느 정도 감정적인 경향이 있다고 말한다면, 작가는 그래도 좌익에 대해 조금 더 많은 동정과 이해를 보여 줍니다. 예를 들어 영화에서 붉은 진영의 염상진은 정직하고 소박하며 신념이 확고한 인물로 그려지는 반면, 그의 형제이자 한국 정부 편에 선 염상구는 오히려 도덕적으로 타락하여 도박과 간음이라는 악습을 지닌 인물로 묘사됩니다. 중국의 자유주의 인사들이 구체적인 상황과 단계를 구분하지 않은 채 늘 좌익 혁명을 폄하하고 농민과 약자를 오명화하며 지주와 향신층을 미화하는 것과 달리, 《태백산맥》 원작과 영화는 모두 농민의 빈곤, 약자가 겪는 억압, 좌익 지식인들의 이상주의를 보여 줍니다. 염상진의 아내가 재판을 받을 때 말했듯이, 많은 사람들이 좌익 혁명과 반란에 뛰어든 것은 먹을 것이 없었고 지주들의 착취가 가혹했기 때문입니다. 그러나 소설과 영화는 동시에 피억압자들이 점차 잘못된 길로 들어서는 과정, 혁명의 화려한 외양 아래 존재하는 갖가지 잔혹함과 음험함, 그리고 혁명 이후 농민을 비롯한 여러 신분과 계층의 사람들이 오히려 더욱 열악한 처지에 빠지게 된 사실도 분명하게 보여 줍니다.
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마찬가지로 공산주의 혁명과 잔혹한 내전을 겪은 중국에서는 지식인들의 작품과 발언이 흔히 지주 등 기득권층에 크게 기울어 있으며, 혁명을 폄하하는 경우가 많습니다. 작가 팡팡（方方）의 《연매（软埋）》가 그 한 사례이며, 노벨문학상 수상자인 모옌（莫言）을 비롯한 다른 작가들의 작품에서도 비슷한 입장과 특징을 찾아볼 수 있습니다. 《연매》를 비롯한 적지 않은 작품들은 지주와 자본가를 근면하고 선량한 존재로 묘사하면서 계급 불평등과 가난하고 약한 노동자·농민의 고통은 외면합니다. 그렇다고 해서 팡팡 등의 작품에 묘사된 지주계급의 모습이 사실과 다르다는 뜻은 아니지만, 분명히 일면적이며 객관적이고 완전하지 않고, 진실을 왜곡하고 있다는 뜻입니다. 이러한 중국 지식인들은 마오쩌둥 시대 극좌 세력의 박해를 겪었고 언론의 자유가 결여된 중국공산당 체제 아래에서 살아왔기 때문에 좌익에 대한 반발심을 형성하였으며, 이는 이해할 수 있는 일이지만 결국 사실과 어긋나고, 일면적인 인식은 그들의 신뢰성도 훼손하였습니다. 이는 매우 안타까운 일입니다. 한국과 비교하면 중국 지식인들의 우경화되고 보수적인 경향은 더욱 뚜렷하며 안타깝게 느껴집니다.
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그리고 《태백산맥》의 객관성과 감화력, 위대함은 이 작품을 중국인들이 반드시 보고 읽으며 그 예술성과 역사관을 참고할 만한 훌륭한 작품으로 만들었습니다. 필자 역시 영화평의 후반부, 즉 영화의 세부 내용에 대한 평론을 마친 뒤 중국 근대의 좌익 혁명과 혁명가들의 변질, 중국과 한국의 비교, 그리고 대만과 베트남 등 그 밖의 유사하고 관련된 지역의 상황과 오늘날의 중국과 한국에 대해서도 논평하고자 합니다.
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순수하게 예술적인 측면에서 보더라도 《태백산맥》의 원작과 영화는 모두 매우 높은 수준의 작품입니다. 작가 조정래 선생은 한국 장편소설계를 대표하는 인물이며, 그의 《태백산맥》 역시 프랑스에서 기원하여 한국에서도 상당한 성취를 이룬 ‘대하소설’ 장르를 대표하는 작품입니다. ‘대하소설’은 흔히 사실주의 작품으로서 한국의 역사와 현대를 배경으로 감동적인 인간의 이야기를 들려줍니다. ‘대하소설’은 규모가 방대하며 러시아의 톨스토이 등의 작품 및 그 사상과 상당한 유사성을 지니고 있고, 강렬한 사실성과 인도주의 정신을 담고 있습니다.
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《태백산맥》 영화의 감독 임권택과 여러 배우들은 소설을 영상으로 구현하여 본래부터 생생했던 글을 더욱 생동감 있게 만들고, 소설의 줄거리를 완벽하게 연기해 냈습니다. 영화 속 전쟁과 사랑, 증오와 폭력, 인간의 본성은 관객에게 마치 그 현장에 직접 있는 듯한 느낌을 주며, 한반도 전라남도의 작은 마을 벌교에 도착하여 수십 년 전의 그 잔혹한 세월로 돌아간 듯한 느낌을 줍니다.
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《태백산맥》의 모든 묘사와 감정 표현은 인간성, 현실, 가장 기본적이고 소박한 도덕에 기초하고 있습니다. 모든 것을 ‘사람을 근본으로 삼는 것’에 두고 정치적 입장과 선전에 의해 왜곡되지 않는다는 점이 이 작품의 가장 귀중한 부분이며, 또한 높은 평가를 받는 가장 중요한 이유입니다. 그러나 동시에 순전히 개체/개인만을 반영하는 얕고 협소한 작품으로 전락하지 않고, 개인과 민족을 하나로 연결하며 작은 것 안에 큰 것을 담아냅니다（단순히 ‘작은 것을 통해 큰 것을 보여 주는 것’만이 아닙니다）. 그리하여 작품은 깊고 웅대한 면모를 갖게 됩니다. 각각의 구체적인 인물은 모두 한민족의 일부이자 한반도가 겪은 고난과 비극의 증인입니다.
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그리고 《태백산맥》이 가져다주는 감정적 충격과 성찰은 한민족을 이루는 한 사람 한 사람의 정신에도 영향을 미치며, 민족의 변화를 촉진하고 동포들의 분발을 북돋습니다. 이 작품은 예술적 가치와 현실적 가치를 동시에 지닌 위대한 작품입니다.

第五共和国（之一）：夭折的民主和复起的专制
2005年上映的韩国电视剧《第五共和国》，完整的呈现了朴正熙遇刺后，以全斗焕为首的军人集团实行专制统治的过程，也描绘了韩国追求自由民主的志士不屈不挠的斗争，以及韩国政坛的种种细节和隐秘内幕。本剧质量极高、演员演技精湛，内容既忠于史实，又生动和具吸引力，是了解韩国1980年代即韩国“第五共和国”时代政治史的上佳剧作。

本剧经中国的有心之人进行字幕翻译之后，流传于关心政治和历史的部分国人之中，引起了不小的反响。这很大程度是因为，韩国历史与中国颇多相似，如1980年“光州民主化运动”和后续的暴力镇压，就与中国的1989年“八九民运”和“六四事件”相当类似，因此能够引发国人共鸣。而中国由于政治原因，现时不可能拍摄关于中国现当代政治史的影片，相关中国历史讨论也是禁忌，也使人们寄情于这部韩剧。

不同于绝大多数以爱情、伦理、传奇为题材的韩剧，《第五共和国》是一部严肃的历史剧。除对其中人物和事件的细节有一些艺术加工和主观演绎外，本剧主线内容均严格根据史实编排，史料使用考究，制作精良。通过本剧，即可大致了解韩国那段专制与民主、保守与进步激烈较量的年代（当然，如果要做学术研究等专业工作，还是要看正式的文字史料）。

本剧在开篇部分，详细还原了朴正熙遇刺事件及此后一个多月（1979年10月26日至12月12日）韩国政治、军事、情报等领域的变动、各种人物的活跃。本文所述，即以该剧及历史史料为基础。

1979年10月，时任韩国中央情报部长的金载圭，在因私人恩怨杀死警卫室长车智澈，并同时击杀“第四共和国”独裁者朴正熙后，原本韩国可能就此结束所谓“维新体制（即朴氏建立起的由军人、亲信、技术官僚主导的专制体制）”，实现民主化。当时韩国最有权力的三人，即参谋总长郑升和、名义上的国家领袖代总统崔圭夏，以及刺杀朴正熙的金载圭，都倾向于结束军人干政、让韩国走向民主。而以金泳三、金大中等人为代表的在野民主派人士，更是长期致力于韩国的民主事业。在朴正熙遇刺后，在野势力都暗暗称贺，以为民主即将到来。

但就在此时，朴正熙生前在军队中培植的亲信全斗焕等人，不满于临时当权者郑升和等人倾向民主的态度和对朴正熙遇刺案的冷淡，悄然准备向后者发难。朴正熙有恩于全斗焕，全斗焕也对朴正熙非常忠诚。全斗焕依靠主要由韩国陆军士官学校毕业生组成的秘密组织“一心会”，召集起了思想保守、忠于“维新体制”、仇视进步势力、反对施行民主的大批高级军官（从上将到少将、校官，分布在韩国军事单位），包括卢泰愚、郑镐镕、黄永时、余学圣、朴熙道、张世东等人，酝酿发动政变、掌握国家最高权力、延续朴正熙时代的专制体制。

对于政变阴谋，参谋总长郑升和等临时当权派几乎一无所知，也没有宣布开启民主化，反而逮捕了金载圭，并向朴正熙的“维新残党”妥协。在野的金泳三金大中等民主派人士则对形势过于乐观，忽视了朴正熙遗留力量的强大，低估了军人再次干政的危险。支持民主化的各派势力缺乏互信和互动、未能有效的团结起来，没有和执政集团开明派合作，更未积极建立民主政治的实体，也没有动员民众参与捍卫民主，使得这时的韩国处于实际上的政治真空状态。这就给了全斗焕等人政变夺权的可乘之机。

1979年12月12日夜，全斗焕及其军中同党发动了政变。他们首先利用驻扎在首都的第30警卫团和保安司令部的兵力，“擒贼先擒王”的逮捕了参谋总长郑升和。然后，分布在韩国各地的政变军队，如第一空输旅团、第三空输旅团，迅速向首都进军。担任首都警备司令官的张泰玩等反政变军人试图反击，但全斗焕方面已取得先机，还掌握了当时很先进的军用电话监听系统，对反政变一方的一举一动都了如指掌。这使得政变军队成功通过幸州大桥等战略要地，顺利抵达汉城。而反政变的军人抵抗也不坚决，最终向政变反妥协和投降。

而名义上的国家最高领导人、代总统崔圭夏，在全斗焕等人的逼迫下，签署了同意逮捕郑升和的文件，等于默认了政变的合法性。崔圭夏此时已处于实际上的被软禁状态，被迫签字还情有可原。但军方最高代表、国防长官卢载铉，却在政变发生后未履行责任，选择带着家人逃出官邸，导致政变方和反政变方在关键时刻都无法找到他。卢载铉的行为客观上纵容了全斗焕一方的政变行为。如果他当时站在反政变一方以国防长官名义号召抵抗，政变或许有可能被平息。

在“双十二政变”中，反政变的抗争是分散的、零星的、被动的。相反，全斗焕等政变军人高度团结、筹划严密、目标明确、行动迅猛，非常果断的以暴力手段扼杀了民主的萌芽。即便那时政府高层和多数民众普遍心向民主，也难以对付荷枪实弹的军人。在历史的重要过渡时期、动荡年代，军人集团的态度往往起到决定性作用。尤其当大批高级军官出于利益和情谊等因素勾结在一起时，即便站在正义一方的大多数，因手无寸铁、一盘散沙也只能坐以待毙。有了枪杆子，就可以制造历史的逆流。

此外，外部力量对于政变成败乃至国家走向也非常重要。全斗焕发动“双十二事变”，是被美国方面默许的。从朴正熙遇刺到政变发生，美国一直以“不干预”为基本原则，只关心美国在韩国的政治军事存在以及朝鲜的威胁，而不在意韩国是民主还是专制。相反，美国乐于看到朴正熙、全斗焕这样的政治强人稳定局势、为美国所用。这样的态度在后来的光州事件上表现的更为明显。

与一些视美国为“民主灯塔”的中国知识分子直观印象不同，美国在大多数时候并不积极在世界各地推行民主，相反经常扶植右翼专制政权。从越南的吴庭艳到智利的皮诺切特、刚果（金）的蒙博托，都是经美国大力扶植才上位、长期维持统治的。朝鲜战争前后，美国在韩国扶植的李承晚政府，也是半专制政权。美国对韩国最大的期许是对抗中苏朝等红色阵营国家，与日本共同构成东亚的反共堡垒，而非将韩国改造为美式民主国家。

   这就决定了美国对全斗焕发动“双十二事变”，最终选择姑息纵容，而不是干预阻断。虽然吉米·卡特政府曾对全斗焕政变做出一些批评和施压，但力度有限。而后来罗纳德·里根执政后则对全斗焕高度支持。这就让全斗焕没了最大的外部压力，实现了较长的稳定统治。

政变成功后，全斗焕很快对民主派进行了镇压。金泳三、金大中被软禁，最大在野党新民党骨干成员纷纷被拘禁、不少人受到酷刑。工人运动、学生运动遭严厉打击，韩国上下一片白色恐怖的气氛。1980年5月，就在这样的历史背景下，光州爆发了大规模群众运动，大批学生和市民抗议独裁、要求民主，全斗焕出兵弹压，酿成了血腥的悲剧，至少数百平民死亡、超过一千人受伤。

同时，全斗焕一步步迈向最高权力，并对政府、军队进行大换血。倾向民主的高官纷纷被解职、强制退休，总统崔圭夏也被迫辞职。而参与“双十二政变”的那批高级军官，则全都得以高升，占据了军政两界各机要职位。1980年8月，全斗焕被其控制的议会“选举”为总统，标志着全斗焕为首的“第五共和国”专制体制正式建立。

   至此，朴正熙遇刺之后本已摇摇欲坠的专制得以延续，刚刚露出希望的民主被残酷扼杀。这其中，旧政权残余势力中的军人集团的取向起到了决定性作用。而倾向民主的各界人士一系列错误、失误，助长了朴正熙余党的气焰，让韩国重新失陷于军人专政之中。
第五共和国（之二）：尔虞我诈的权力斗争与此起彼伏的民主运动
   如前所述，第五共和国正式建立后，全斗焕迅速将自己的亲信安排在了各重要岗位。但他的亲信也分成不同的派系，并在此后几年纷纷陷入到五共政权内部的权力斗争之中。

   全斗焕所信任和任命的亲信，除了那一班追随于他的高级将领，就是被称为“三许一李”的四名年轻干员。他们分别是负责五共创制的许和平、掌管内政的许三守、操控舆论的许文道、管理情报与“对共事务”的李鹤捧。

   这四人的共同特点是年轻干练、富有才华、高度忠诚。具体说来，四人的政治态度和性格特征也有所区别，而非脸谱化的专制鹰犬。

   其中，许和平最锋芒毕露，有着极大的政治野心。他一方面积极镇压民主运动和助力全斗焕当政，却同时致力于推动一种由保守势力主导的“政治革新”，主张打击腐败、让老一代军头和政治人物退出政坛；

   许三守是全斗焕政策的忠实贯彻者，为全斗焕得力的打理着军政事务，既是“秘书长”也是“总理”；

   许文道则是一幅封建卫道士的风格，有才华却顽固保守，成为五共时期扼杀新闻自由的“总设计师”；

   李鹤捧如同“救火队长”般负责四处弹压民主运动、打击全斗焕的政治敌人，是五共时期政治打手的头目、右翼版的捷尔任斯基。

全斗焕任用这四人，既是看重了他们的才华和忠诚，也是试图制约位高权重的高级将领们。相对于卢泰愚、郑镐镕、权翊铉等军方高层被任命为“外朝”的大吏，“三许一李”就是全斗焕的“内朝”骨干。还有后来被任命为安企部部长的张世东，虽长期在“外朝”做官，但与全斗焕关系非常亲密，多数时候也可算作“内朝”的一员。

五共建立后，不仅这两派之间产生了剧烈的矛盾，各派内部也严重不和，各方为争夺权力明争暗斗。发生于五共初期的诈骗大案“张玲子案”，就引爆了各派系之间的冲突，还牵涉和影响到了全斗焕妻子李顺子和弟弟全敬焕。

   许和平试图藉此机会打倒全斗焕的“亲属帮”、压制高级将领集团，以实现其自命的作为“保守派革命家”的政治野心。但最终，全斗焕倒向老一代将领和亲属，许和平被全斗焕流放到美国，许三守后来也被排挤出权力中心。而许文道和李鹤捧则为全斗焕的专制统治“奋斗到底”了。

全斗焕和二号人物卢泰愚的关系也是五共权力斗争的一条重要线索。对于有着数十年友谊和利益关系的卢泰愚，全斗焕既有信任，也有防备。全斗焕在执政之初，就考虑到接班人问题。权衡之后，他认为卢泰愚是最合适的人选。他一边扶植卢泰愚成为五共的二号人物，一边却又不希望卢泰愚威胁到他的总统地位。二人之间时而亲密、时而疏远，卢泰愚“伴君如伴虎”般的在全斗焕政府度过了七年。

   当然，最终卢泰愚有惊无险的接了全斗焕的班，成为韩国第六共和国的首任总统。全、卢二人的微妙关系，是各国独裁者和接班人都会面临的。相对于苏联、中国等国“老大”和“老二”的政治斗争，卢泰愚可算是相当幸运了。

虽然五共时代政治斗争不断，但全斗焕政治手段颇为高超，没有让权斗影响他的大政方针，政权始终保持着高度稳定。韩国经济也延续了朴正熙时代“汉江奇迹”带来的高速发展。

与权力斗争同时发生的，还有韩国在野的、民间的力量发起的民主运动。光州民主运动虽被残酷镇压，但韩国各界的抗争从未停止。其中，最为活跃的就是金泳三和金大中二人。金泳三等人创建了“民主推进协会（民推协）”，通过组织集体登山等方式串联、开会，坚持与全斗焕当局抗争。抗争激烈时，金泳三还采取了绝食等手段。这些手段虽然未能直接撼动全斗焕政权，但保住了民主的火种，让韩国民间始终保有可观的反对派力量。

金大中则比金泳三更激进反对独裁政权，也更为当局所忌惮。曾在总统选举中惜败于朴正熙的金大中，是朴正熙、全斗焕及其爪牙的眼中钉。早在1973年，时任韩国中央情报部长的李厚洛，为挽回其在政坛失势的局面，决定杀死金大中以向朴正熙献功。但暗杀事件被美国情报部门侦知，通过日本海上自卫队阻止了韩情报部溺杀金大中的行动。

   全斗焕上台后，又将金大中投入监狱并判处死刑（后改判为无期徒刑）。1982年，在国际社会的压力下，全斗焕当局将金大中流放至美国。在美期间，金大中成为哈佛大学客座研究员，继续致力于韩国民主事业。1985年金大中返回韩国，重新成为仅次于金泳三的在野领袖。

在五共时期，金泳三和金大中以合作为主流，但并未完全合流。相反，二人的政治主张和个性有很大差异。金泳三倾向于和保守势力妥协，思想较为中道；金大中则是旗帜鲜明的反对派，带有明显的左倾色彩。金泳三在其家乡庆尚南道影响力无可匹敌，而金大中则在包括光州在内的全罗南道拥有压倒性优势，二人各自有自己的基本盘。

两人在朴正熙和全斗焕的独裁统治下，多数时候在积极的沟通合作，多次进行重要会晤。可是在五共末期，二人因政见不和及政治利益纷争，最终分道扬镳。

   在1987年总统选举时，二人正式走向分裂。二人没有通过妥协推选其中一人参选，而是同时参选。支持民主派的选民也陷入分裂，有的支持金泳三、有的支持金大中。这就让原本处于不利境地的卢泰愚，在“一卢对三金（还有一位是共和党的金钟泌）”的格局下，于大选中意外获胜，让保守威权势力对韩国的统治在五共终结、第六共和国开幕之后又延续了数年。

为镇压此起彼伏的民主运动，全斗焕政权绞尽脑汁。对于金泳三和金大中这样的在野政治领袖，采取的是软禁、流放等策略。而对于普通的民主运动、学生运动、社会运动人士，则更多使用直接的暴力措施。

全斗焕政权以打击黑社会为由，成立了“三清教育队”，将数以万计的、包括社运人士、青年学生、反全氏政权的军人（如与全斗焕有私人恩怨的前保安司令官姜昌成）、不良人员等“社会不安定分子”，投入类似于中国的劳改队那样的营地监禁，施以经常性暴打、强制劳动、体罚、饿饭等各种虐待。

   据后来调查统计，这样的以“打黑”为由的“黑打”至少导致400多人死亡，数千人残疾或患上精神疾病。全斗焕政权就是用这样的手段，弹压了对体制造成威胁的力量，维持了社会稳定，也得到了明面上的良好治安。

针对学运，全斗焕政权还实行了被冠以“绿化事业”的分化瓦解行动。军情部门通过威逼利诱的手段，让一些被盯上或已被捕的学生做政权的暗探，打入学运组织内部，为军情部门提供相关信息，继而抓捕学运骨干分子、破坏学运事业。一些意志薄弱的青年学生被迫充当政权的探子，背叛同学和革命同仁。

   这些手段的确给韩国学运带来沉重打击，许多学运骨干因此被捕，也导致进步学生之间的相互猜忌。还有充当暗探的学生出卖同学后，因愧疚而留下遗书告白后自杀。这些悲剧都是全斗焕政权的分化行动所致。

对于新闻界，全斗焕采纳了许文道的“言论统废合”有关建议，实行新闻审查制度，将《朝鲜日报》、《东亚日报》、《中央日报》等媒体的新闻报道严密管控起来，严禁发表对全斗焕政权不利的信息。虽然其力度远不如隔海相望的邻居国家，但这套言论管制也是韩国建国以来最为严厉和系统化的。

   在压制新闻自由的过程中，媒体人出身、投靠了全斗焕的许文道，起到了相当恶劣的作用。许文道就是典型有才无德的危险品，是既有新闻学才能又思想极端保守的高级打手。

与各独裁政权一样，全斗焕政权也利用外部威胁来增强自身统治的合法性、争取民心。全斗焕政权渲染朝鲜修建金刚山大坝对韩国的威胁，将民众的注意力从国内改宪与选举制度问题上引开，减轻政权面临的改革压力。此外，韩国情报部门还利用一起普通刑事案件，炮制了虚假的“金玉分共谍事件”，以强化白色恐怖，以此为借口加大力度打击国内左翼势力。

在挥舞“大棒”打击反对力量的同时，全斗焕政权也适时向民众发放“胡萝卜”。全斗焕听从伊藤忠商事会长濑岛龙三的建议，以申办奥运会来淡化光州事件的影响，试图让人民沉浸于民族自豪感与娱乐化之中。同时，全斗焕也通过发展经济让人们聚焦于追求物质利益，而减少对民主的热情。

全斗焕政权的这一系列举动，的确在中短期内维护了其独裁统治、打击了追求自由民主的力量。1980-1987年，韩国社会看起来相对稳定、经济继续高速增长，继承了朴正熙时代的“汉江奇迹”。

   但这些成就显然是以牺牲民主与人权为代价的，受惠者主要也是高官及财阀等权贵。广大劳工遭到残酷剥削压榨，知识分子备受压抑，官商勾结腐败横行，军情机构飞扬跋扈，人民的政治权利与自由被剥夺，社会矛盾愈演愈烈。如著名工人运动者全泰壹自焚事件，就是韩国劳工抗争激烈和悲剧的写照。

虽然全斗焕政权采取各种措施维护独裁统治，但韩国人民仍然努力追求民主，政治活跃人士起到关键作用。随着当时国际形势的变化、民主成为大势（“第三波民主化浪潮”）、独裁不得人心，韩国民主运动又来到新的高潮。

   1987年，以大学生朴钟哲拷问致死事件为导火索，韩国全国各地的民主运动突破了政权的压制，星星之火已成燎原之势。当年6月，学生、工人、市民的各种形式的抗争已演变为覆盖韩国各主要城市的全国性政治运动，全斗焕政权的丧钟即将敲响。
第五共和国（之三）：铭记历史才有未来
1987年6月，韩国各地的民主抗争达到高潮。全斗焕一度试图再次动用武力镇压，但遭到部分军方高层的抵制。与中国六四事件时只有徐勤先等少数将领抵制不同，此时的韩国大多数高级军官和执政党主要成员均倾向于反对对民众动武。这也在于民主思想此时深入韩国人心，这些既得利益者也不愿意逆势而动、做历史罪人。全斗焕虽是政治强人，却不得不考虑包括统治集团高层在内的普遍民意。

全斗焕最终决定妥协。6月29日，全斗焕的接班人卢泰愚宣布，将修改宪法，实行总统直选，并释放政治犯，即“6.29宣言”。这标志着韩国民主运动的重大胜利，预示着民主即将到来。

对全斗焕而言，他希望卢泰愚能够通过民主手段延续他的内政外交政策，并使他免于接受审判。全斗焕并非真的无条件信任卢泰愚，只是他已经没有了其他选择。与其被左翼进步势力、长期反对他的人取代，他自然更愿意让“志同道合”的卢泰愚继承他的衣钵。

接下来就是1987年总统大选的竞选。如前所述，金泳三和金大中分道扬镳，均宣布参选，致使在野民主阵营分裂。这既缘于二人之间固有的芥蒂，也有专制政府故意挑拨的因素。无论如何，二金的分裂严重削弱了在野民主力量的竞争力，使卢泰愚渔翁得利。

   不过，在竞选压力下，卢泰愚也只好承诺追究包括全斗焕在内光州事件参与者的责任，清算历史问题。最终，卢泰愚以36.6%的得票率，力压金泳三的28%和金大中的27%（二金得票相加显然远超卢泰愚，若双方统合，其中一人参选，很可能胜利），当选韩国第六共和国首任总统。

在反对党和强烈民意的压力下，卢泰愚决定软禁全斗焕，拒绝让其出席1988年汉城奥运会开幕式。之后，又正式将全斗焕逮捕。但卢泰愚曾为全斗焕政权的重要一员，对旧政权的清算工作一直能拖就拖、敷衍公众。直到金泳三上台后，拨乱反正、清算历史的工作才走上快速轨道。1995年，连卢泰愚也被逮捕。

1996年，韩国法院对全斗焕等人发动“双十二事变”和制造光州事件进行了审判，一审和终审分别判处全斗焕死刑、无期徒刑。卢泰愚被判17年监禁，其他相关责任人则普遍被轻判。1997年底，即将上任的新任总统金大中宣布特赦全斗焕和卢泰愚等人，以实现社会和解。

可是，被特赦后的全斗焕在直到如今这20多年间，并未表现出悔过的态度，而是通过出书、演讲的方式颠倒黑白、粉饰暴政。其他许多被特赦或免于被追责的前军警和情报机构人员，大多也未表现出充分的悔悟姿态，反而纷纷利用新政权出于善意给予的自由，千方百计为自己制造的暴行辩护。

   例如，他们普遍将光州事件说成是“市民暴乱”、“北方（朝鲜）渗透”、“市民先杀害军人”等，为军方镇压寻找借口。他们也以经济高速发展、社会稳定等局部的成就，为朴正熙、全斗焕统治时期贴金。这种情况一直持续到如今，韩国保守势力与威权政治的阴影始终笼罩在半岛之南。包括全斗焕的“第五共和国”时期在内的种种历史遗留问题，也成为今日韩国政治不良、权力斗争激烈的原因之一。

对于全斗焕等旧势力核心人物的轻罚及赦免，究竟利大于弊还是弊大于利，众说纷纭。有人认为这有利于社会和解和民主过渡，也终结了冤冤相报的政治仇恨史。但笔者对称嗤保留意见。因为没有彻底的清算，就留下了旧势力庞大的残余，让社会进步遥遥无期。容忍这些刽子手们好好活着并且颠倒是非，对于专制时期的受难者们如光州事件的死难者，更是不公与屈辱。

   何况，韩国政坛的局势并未因这轮赦免而缓和，政治斗争依旧残酷，这些年多位韩国总统入狱就是例证。在笔者个人看来，宽容旧势力并没多少积极作用，倒是贻害无穷。

专制结束了，民主来临了，但并不意味着历史过去了。专制政权的残渣余孽势力依旧庞大，还在孜孜不倦的篡改历史、扭曲事实。更重要的是，旧势力树大根深，在当今的政、军、警、情、商各界均有广泛人脉，仍旧是庞大且牢固的利益共同体。民主体制的建立，并未切断这些利益连结，特权政治、官商勾结、军情机构干政等积弊仍存。如朴槿惠政权的上台后对进步力量的打压（如将近万进步派艺人列入黑名单），就是保守势力借民主之壳进行的疯狂反扑，再度露出了独裁者的青面獠牙。（这不仅在韩国，许多国家旧势力的残渣余孽都在颠倒是非、伺机反扑）

正是因此，韩国进步势力一直在与旧政权残余作斗争。金大中、卢武铉、文在寅，都致力于清除积弊、革新吏治、推进公正，但遭遇激烈阻击。金大中和卢武铉都未能善终，就表明了韩国政治环境的险恶、反抗旧势力的艰难。

   而韩国的知识分子则在努力记录历史、拒绝遗忘、对抗谎言。其中，韩国文艺界一直站在铭记历史、反思悲剧的前沿。电影《出租车司机》、《辩护人》、《华丽的假期》、《26年》、《挖掘机》、《1987：黎明到来的那一天》、《爱的色放》……都在反映光州事件那段血腥的历史和前后那些年的黑暗岁月，让韩国人民不忘曾经的残酷专制年代。而这部《第五共和国》，更是全景式的展现了全斗焕专制时代的历史变迁，当然也包括对光州民主化运动从兴起到被镇压的史实。

许多国人不能理解韩国人为何如此铭记光州事件。在韩国现代史上，光州人民用生命谱写了追求民主、反抗强权的悲歌。这些影视剧反映的是人性的伟大与脆弱、人民对正义和光明的向往。通过这些作品，我们可以看到许多人用生命在捍卫作为人的尊严与权利，不惜一切与邪恶和暴行抗争。这是许多被专制驯化的国民不明白的。

一个国家，一个民族，只有深刻反思自身历史上的悲剧、祸乱，才能痛定思痛、醍醐灌顶，认识到暴政的可耻和人权的可贵，做出必要的应对和变革，清除积弊、未雨绸缪，实现持久的民主与安宁。否则，历史悲剧就会以各种形式重演，民族要不断受到暴政的祸害，人民的尊严与利益也会一再被践踏。正视历史，是治愈民族创伤的前提；挖掘真相，是维护公民权利的基础。相反，忘却历史，民族就没有未来；无视真相，时代就会被谎言覆盖。

韩国政治界、知识界、艺术界一直铭记历史，也是为了对抗前专制政权头目及其爪牙颠倒黑白、歪曲事实的行为。因为全斗焕等人一直在粉饰专制时期的丑恶、掩盖当年暴行的真相，所以更需要有人站出来驳斥谎言、道出真相。否则，历史上的真相就会被抹杀、黑白就会颠倒、善恶就会易位。专制与民主在政治层面的斗争告一段落了，但在价值观与话语权方面的对抗，还远未结束。

对中国这样仍处于专制统治之下的国家而言，了解他国民主与专制斗争的历史，更有着特殊的意义。改革开放后的中国与朴正熙-全斗焕政权时期的韩国，有着非常相似的历程，如均是在经济高速增长、社会表面安定的同时，处在政治高压中，剥夺/侵犯公民权利的情况相当普遍。

   而光州事件与中国的六四事件又多么类似，都是军队对本国和平抗议民众的血腥镇压，都改变了历史的轨迹，之后的国家沉沦于专制压迫之下。不同的是，韩国在光州事件后7年就走出了专制，十几年内就实现了哪怕是部分的正义。而中国不仅在1989年重蹈了光州的覆辙，到了2020年还处在专制的桎梏之下，民主化和转型正义更是遥遥无期。

在中国，八六学潮、八九民运、六四镇压，都是不能公开提及的敏感话题，与之相关的回忆录、文学作品更是在中国大陆被完全封禁，当今也绝不会有相关影视剧，真相被掩埋、国民被欺骗。看到韩国一系列记录光州事件的作品，再看看已过去30年，却仍未得到平反和伸张正义的六四事件，我们怎能不感到可悲和焦虑？

有所安慰的是，已经有不少人在借了解和评价韩国这段历史，来对比和影射中国。这部《第五共和国》被有心之人翻译，并且得到广泛传播、产生很大反响，就是一个例证。这证明并不是所有国人都被洗脑和蒙蔽，还是有不少知晓是非、向往光明之人的。

我相信，未来的民主中国，关于镇反、反右、大饥荒、文革、六四等历史悲剧的影视剧和文学作品将层出不穷，会带给人们以深刻的反思，让国人重新拾起人性的尊严，知晓民主法治、公平正义的可贵，重塑国人的道德与灵魂。那时的中国，才能真的实现民族复兴、民权保障、民生安乐。我们距这样的创作自由时代或许还很遥远，但那样的时代终究会来临的。

不要忘记悲剧，不要忘记伤痛，不要忘记历史。忘记过去，就是对受难者的离弃、对家国天下的背叛、对未来千秋万代的不负责。通往未来的道路是由过去和现在铺成的，以史为鉴、矫正勘误、扶正祛邪，国家和民族才有光明的前途。

On September 13, Japan held the Okinawa gubernatorial election. Genta Kosha, a candidate backed by the Liberal Democratic Party (LDP), defeated incumbent Governor Denny Tamaki and was elected the new governor of Okinawa. This marks a major shift in Okinawa’s political direction and will also have a significant impact on the situation in the surrounding region.
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The Ryukyu Islands, where Okinawa Prefecture is located, lie in a region of Japan adjacent to Taiwan. Historically, Ryukyu was once an independent kingdom and was a tributary state of the dynasties that ruled mainland China. Later, Japan’s influence over Ryukyu gradually increased and surpassed that of the Qing dynasty, and Ryukyu was eventually annexed by Japan in 1872. Japan subsequently used Ryukyu as a springboard to invade Taiwan on multiple occasions and ultimately occupy it.
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After Japan surrendered in 1945, Ryukyu was placed under U.S. administration. The Allies at one point considered transferring sovereignty over Ryukyu to the Republic of China, but because of changes in the international situation and the United States’ need to support Japan, Ryukyu ultimately remained part of Japan and was formally returned to Japanese administration by the United States in 1972. The changes in sovereignty over Ryukyu show that it has found it difficult to determine its own fate, instead being dominated by major powers, with its political status determined by great-power rivalry.
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Although Ryukyu/Okinawa was handed over to Japan by the United States, Okinawa still hosts tens of thousands of U.S. military personnel, accounting for roughly half of all U.S. forces stationed in Japan, as well as two major U.S. military bases, Futenma and Kadena. The U.S. forces stationed here are responsible for defending Japan, the United States, Taiwan, and the Pacific islands between Japan and the United States, and stand on the front line of confrontation with the People’s Republic of China and its military forces. If war were to break out between China and the United States or between China and Japan, Okinawa would almost certainly be among the first areas to face the fighting.
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Because the Ryukyu Islands are close to Taiwan, Okinawa could also be affected if war broke out between mainland China and Taiwan and the mainland attempted to unify Taiwan by force. If Japan decided to intervene in a Taiwan Strait conflict and use military force to prevent the People’s Liberation Army from attacking Taiwan, Okinawa would likewise become a battlefield. Moreover, several Japanese prime ministers since Shinzo Abe have stated that “a Taiwan contingency is a Japan contingency,” undoubtedly greatly increasing the risk that Japan, and Okinawa in particular, could become involved in a war over Taiwan.
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After Sanae Takaichi became prime minister of Japan, she stated even more explicitly that Japan would intervene in the event of military action by the mainland against Taiwan, causing China–Japan relations to deteriorate sharply. The risk of war facing Okinawa has risen further. In places such as Ishigaki City in Okinawa, which is among the closest parts of Japan to Taiwan, evacuation drills simulating the outbreak of a war in the Taiwan Strait have already been conducted. Warships and military aircraft from Japan, the United States, mainland China, Taiwan, and other parties also frequently operate in the area, creating an atmosphere of intense confrontation.
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Against this backdrop, the choices made by the local government and the people are also important to Okinawa’s fate. Although, as mentioned above, Ryukyu’s fate has been dominated by major powers, Okinawa today exists under a democratic system, and its people still have the right to democratically elect their local chief executive—the governor—as well as the local assembly, while retaining a certain degree of local autonomy.
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Although Okinawa’s local government cannot expel U.S. military bases or prevent exercises by Japan’s Self-Defense Forces, and has little prospect of achieving independence or a high degree of autonomy, it still has some autonomy in various civil and administrative affairs. For example, regarding the activities of the U.S. military and Japan’s Self-Defense Forces in Okinawa, the local authorities can choose either to cooperate actively or to respond passively.
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Even in foreign affairs, the Okinawa government and its people have some room for initiative. Denny Tamaki, who has served two terms as governor of Okinawa, has sought to balance relations with Japan’s central government, mainland China, Taiwan, and other parties. Tamaki visited China in 2019 and 2023 and paid respects to the ancestors of Ryukyuan people buried on the mainland.
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During Tamaki’s tenure, Okinawa consistently sought friendly relations with China, while taking a relatively passive stance toward U.S. military bases and the activities of the Self-Defense Forces. It also clearly expressed its unwillingness to become involved in a possible war in the Taiwan Strait or between China and Japan, and its hope for peace. The Tamaki administration was also unwilling to follow the Takaichi central government, which actively advocates lifting restrictions on the exercise of the right of collective self-defense and strengthening military preparations, instead seeking to uphold a position of peace and neutrality and to stay away from war. This added some notes of peace and harmony to Okinawa and its surrounding region, where the atmosphere of impending conflict has grown increasingly strong.
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The winner of this Okinawa gubernatorial election, Genta Kosha, however, holds positions clearly different from those of Denny Tamaki. Although Kosha is an independent, he has close ties to the Liberal Democratic Party, and his candidacy was supported by six parties leaning toward right-wing conservative positions, including the LDP and Sanseito. Kosha explicitly supports lifting restrictions on the exercise of the right of collective self-defense, expanding military capabilities, and strengthening Okinawa’s military defenses. Unlike Tamaki, Kosha is also less resistant to U.S. military bases, advocating active efforts to resolve disputes over the relocation and placement of U.S. bases so that U.S. forces can continue to be stationed securely in Okinawa. In addition, Kosha emphasized economic issues, seeking to link the strengthening of Okinawa’s military preparedness with economic development in order to gain more support.
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Although Denny Tamaki had governed for two consecutive terms, had considerable achievements in office, and enjoyed relatively high popularity, the newcomer Genta Kosha, backed by most major political parties including the ruling party and equipped with abundant resources, nevertheless defeated Tamaki by a relatively large margin. In particular, a large amount of information attacking and even defaming Denny Tamaki appeared online before the election, while Kosha faced relatively few attacks and received much more support. The climate of public opinion was clearly unfavorable to Tamaki.
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Thus, the change in Okinawa’s governorship also means that the next Okinawa government will pursue domestic and external policies significantly different from those of the current administration. It is entirely foreseeable that Kosha will align himself more closely with Sanae Takaichi’s central government in Japan and strengthen military deployments and preparations for war in Okinawa and the surrounding region. Nor will Kosha be as friendly and close toward China as Tamaki was; he may even adopt a tough stance toward China similar to that of the authorities in Tokyo.
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Such a political change may be an ominous sign for the people of Okinawa and the Ryukyu Islands. Historically, Ryukyu has repeatedly been drawn into great-power rivalries and wars, the most devastating of which was the Battle of Okinawa in 1945, when U.S. forces landed on Okinawa and fought the Japanese military. More than 100,000 Okinawan residents, most of them civilians, died in the fighting, while Ryukyu’s historic sites and cultural relics also suffered enormous destruction. In the decades that followed, Ryukyu/Okinawa became home to U.S. military bases, and incidents involving U.S. military personnel harassing local residents and raping women occurred from time to time.
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Although Japan’s central government has provided considerable economic support to Okinawa, discrimination and exploitation have also existed. The people of Okinawa have experienced many misfortunes, and the Ryukyuan people have never been completely assimilated into Japan, remaining on the margins of Japanese society.
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Today, faced with increasingly tense conditions in the Taiwan Strait and the western Pacific, as well as deteriorating China–Japan relations, the best choice for Okinawa’s local government and people would be to seek friendly relations with all sides and, as far as possible, keep military buildups and war away from their homeland, rather than actively taking sides, eagerly becoming involved in conflicts, and attempting to profit from a dangerous situation. Genta Kosha is himself a native of Okinawa. If he places the interests of the Takaichi administration of the LDP and the authorities in Tokyo above the interests of Okinawa’s local people, then although he may be repaying the support he received and working for Japan, he would be sacrificing the peace and stability of his home, Okinawa. That would not be the best choice.
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Fundamentally, because Okinawa/Ryukyu is too small and weak, it is indeed difficult for it to determine its own fate. This gubernatorial election was clearly influenced by powerful forces from outside Okinawa, including endorsements from major political parties such as the LDP, as well as financial resources, media and public-opinion resources, and support provided by various sides. Meanwhile, local Okinawan voices were weak and drowned out. From the ancient Kingdom of Ryukyu to modern-day Okinawa, this land and its people have still not escaped the fate of being dominated and exploited by major powers and becoming the ones who pay the price and make the sacrifices.

(The author of this article, Wang Qingmin(王庆民), is a Chinese writer based in Europe and a researcher on international politics.)