r/foreignpolicy

From May 13 to 15, U.S. President Trump visited China, where he received a warm welcome and held talks with Chinese President Xi Jinping. The visit was highly ceremonial and friendly. According to the latest reports, the two sides have already reached multiple important agreements, such as China expanding market access for American trade and commerce, increasing mutual imports of goods, and reaching consensus on keeping the Strait of Hormuz open and on the denuclearization of Iran.

In his banquet speech, Trump also mentioned Benjamin Franklin’s admiration for Confucius and Franklin Roosevelt’s praise for the courage of the Chinese people during World War II, in order to illustrate that China and the United States share “common values.” Xi Jinping, meanwhile, stated during the talks that the “great rejuvenation of the Chinese nation” and “Make America Great Again” are not contradictory, and proposed a new blueprint for a “constructive and strategically stable China–U.S. relationship.” The talks between the two sides were very cordial. Trump also invited Xi Jinping to visit the United States in late September this year.

During this visit to China, Trump also brought along a large delegation of political and business figures, including Secretary of State Rubio, who has been sanctioned by China since 2020, billionaire Elon Musk, who is deeply involved in American politics, and NVIDIA CEO Jensen Huang, who is ethnically Chinese.

Judging from the agenda and developments of this visit, China–U.S. relations have clearly warmed significantly. Regarding more sensitive issues such as Hong Kong, Taiwan, Xinjiang, and Tibet, as well as the issue of releasing Jimmy Lai in Hong Kong, Trump did raise them, but handled them in a low-key manner and even deliberately avoided publicly answering reporters’ questions on Taiwan.

Trump does not wish to make the Chinese side unhappy, and in reality does not care very much about these non-economic issues that have relatively weak connections to America’s concrete interests. The topics of this meeting were mainly concentrated in the commercial and trade sphere, while also involving certain technological cooperation and major international affairs, showing a distinctly pragmatic diplomatic character.

This means that during the remaining two and a half years of Trump’s second term, China–U.S. relations will likely be centered on friendly and mutually beneficial cooperation, while competition between the two sides will mainly focus on the economic and trade sphere. Ideological differences and confrontation will be shelved, and bilateral relations will enter a relatively stable and harmonious new period. If the Chinese leader’s visit to the United States this September continues the tone and atmosphere of Trump’s current visit to China, then the new normal in which pragmatic competition and cooperation between China and the United States override ideology will become even more firmly established.

Since the founding of the People’s Republic of China, China–U.S. relations have displayed different characteristics and patterns in different periods. From 1949 through the 1960s, because of ideological confrontation, interstate conflict, and the atmosphere of the global Cold War, the two sides were locked in a highly hostile antagonistic relationship, even erupting into direct military conflict at one point. China viewed the United States as an imperialist aggressor, the most reactionary fortress of the bourgeoisie, and the manipulator behind Chiang Kai-shek’s regime. The United States, meanwhile, regarded China as a detestable communist state, a terrifying red demon, and an aggressive provocateur.

However, by the early 1970s, because of the Sino-Soviet split and the intensification of U.S.–Soviet confrontation, both China and the United States faced the enormous threat posed by the Soviet Union, as well as crises within their own countries. The ruling authorities of both nations therefore chose to end confrontation, shelve disputes, and normalize China–U.S. relations. In 1972, Mao Zedong and Nixon achieved their historic handshake. This laid the foundation for China and the United States to put aside ideological struggles and pursue pragmatic cooperation.

After Mao Zedong’s death, CCP leaders such as Deng Xiaoping continued this path of developing China–U.S. relations, strengthened cooperation between the two countries, and formally established diplomatic relations in 1979. Through expanding economic, trade, technological, and cultural exchanges, as well as mutual personnel exchanges, China and the United States deepened and normalized bilateral relations.

After the June Fourth Incident in 1989, China–U.S. relations briefly cooled because of political turmoil within China and related issues. China also restarted anti-Western and anti-Westernization political campaigns and propaganda, causing a decline in mutual trust between the two countries. However, cooperation and exchanges between China and the United States were not fundamentally destroyed, and relations warmed again after only a short downturn.

China’s enormous economic potential, especially its vast supply of cheap labor and huge market size, made the United States and other Western countries see the benefits of cooperating with China. At the same time, the West also believed that China’s economic development would promote political democratization and social openness, and therefore increased investment in China while supporting China’s entry into the WTO and its integration into globalization.

As a result, China and the United States maintained pragmatic cooperation for more than thirty years afterward, without interrupting exchanges because of ideological issues. However, during different periods, under different leaders, and under differing specific circumstances, the state of China–U.S. relations and their priorities varied. During the presidencies of the two Bushes, Clinton, and Obama’s first term, bilateral relations were relatively cordial, with more cooperation and fewer conflicts.

By contrast, during Obama’s second term, the Biden administration, and the latter half of Trump’s first term, friction and conflict between China and the United States increased, and the trend toward confrontation became more apparent. In addition, when Democrats are in power, conflicts are more likely to arise over China’s human rights issues and matters involving Hong Kong, Taiwan, Xinjiang, and Tibet, while Republicans, being more pragmatic, tend to have fewer clashes with China on these matters.

The reason China–U.S. relations have experienced repeated fluctuations and transformations is that, on the one hand, China and the United States possess obvious differences in political systems and ideology, leading to frequent conflict and difficulties in building mutual trust. China’s rise has also challenged American hegemony and intensified competition between the two countries. On the other hand, China and the United States also need each other and are interdependent in many fields, making true “decoupling” difficult under globalization and massive economic and trade exchanges.

Because China is not a democratic system based on political pluralism and competitive politics, but instead possesses highly centralized power, it has an inherent contradiction with the United States, which emphasizes liberal democracy and separation of powers. China’s official claim to uphold communist ideology also causes dissatisfaction among conservative anti-communist forces in the United States.

China’s frequent human rights controversies, the long-standing issues involving Hong Kong, Taiwan, Xinjiang, and Tibet, and disputes such as those in the South China Sea also attract criticism and concern from the United States, which places importance on human rights and the international order, while China’s countermeasures further provoke friction between the two countries. The United States has also never fully trusted China because of its lack of transparency and its institutional differences from the West, and together with allies such as Britain, France, Germany, and Japan, has sought to balance China strategically and ideologically.

However, China’s rapid economic growth, its rise as the world’s second-largest economy, the “world’s factory,” and a key engine of the global economy, as well as its enormous international influence, have made it an important economic and trade partner for the United States. These realities make it difficult for the United States to “leave” China; on the contrary, America needs China in many areas. Therefore, the United States has been forced to partially abandon or soften political and ideological confrontation with China in order to maintain pragmatic cooperation.

China achieved economic rise and strategic and technological competition with the United States on the basis of a system different from that of the West. Facing China’s dual challenge in ideology and economic trade, the United States also attempted to “decouple” from China. But facts have proven that under deep globalization, China’s indispensable influence, and America’s serious economic dependence on China, genuine “decoupling” is impossible. Even limited “decoupling” imposed heavy self-inflicted costs on the United States and proved not worth the price.

Trump promoted “decoupling” and a trade war during his first term. The Biden administration later worked with allies to contain China, and at the beginning of Trump’s second term there was also a tariff war against China. Yet none of these efforts achieved ideal results, and several “decoupling” and containment policies toward China ultimately began with great momentum but faded away without resolution.

Therefore, the United States must reconsider its relationship with China and once again place pragmatic cooperation at the forefront. This also has much to do with Trump’s own stance and preferences. Trump’s style is highly pragmatic and profit-oriented. He shows disdain toward democracy and human rights, has strengthened authoritarian tendencies even domestically, and does not care much about issues outside the scope of “America First.”

Internationally, Trump has been at odds with America’s traditional allies and with the European establishment based on shared liberal democratic values. Trump also admires political strongmen and has repeatedly publicly praised the strength and decisiveness of the leaders of China, Russia, and North Korea, envying their unquestioned authority. This has also enabled Trump and Xi Jinping to establish a good personal relationship.

Trump’s supporters, especially the “MAGA” camp, also care primarily about America’s own interests and not the human rights conditions of other countries. From both the American and global perspectives, liberal democracy has likewise shown signs of retreat, while populism and authoritarianism have become increasingly prevalent. Under such a background, a Trump-led United States pursuing détente and expanded cooperation with China faces not only fewer ideological obstacles, but also several additional favorable factors.

Of course, there have always been divisions and fluctuations within Trump’s governing team and China policy between hardline and moderate approaches. Figures such as Secretary of State Rubio, former Secretary of State Pompeo, former adviser Bolton, and current adviser Miles Yu have all advocated a hardline approach toward China out of ideological and geopolitical considerations. Meanwhile, important Trump collaborators such as Elon Musk and Treasury Secretary Bessent focus more on economic and trade considerations and place greater emphasis on cooperation with China.

Trump himself once stood with the hardliners and initiated the process of “decoupling” from China, but now he has clearly shifted toward a more moderate approach. In fact, cooperating with China and making money from such cooperation aligns more closely with Trump’s preferences. Even before becoming president, Trump already had extensive commercial dealings with China.

As an anti-establishment populist politician without a fixed political creed, Trump is not constrained by the human rights positions valued by traditional politicians, is indifferent toward sensitive issues involving Hong Kong, Taiwan, Xinjiang, and Tibet, and is even less likely to pressure China over the Ukraine issue. As for competition in economics, trade, and strategy, although intense, it is not a zero-sum game, and Trump, as a businessman, is willing and skilled at competing and cooperating simultaneously.

This year is a U.S. midterm election year. Facing domestic opposition, economic slowdown, and employment problems, Trump needs to improve relations with China in order to stimulate the American economy, sell more agricultural and industrial products, increase income and employment, and win voter support. American conglomerates and the business class also tend to favor cooperation with China. Under these circumstances, Trump has strong motivation to enthusiastically visit China and improve China–U.S. relations.

China, meanwhile, is also facing economic slowdown and many domestic problems, and therefore hopes to improve the external environment and expand foreign trade. At the same time, China has value-based disagreements with the European Union and worsening relations with Japan. Improving relations with the United States benefits China’s domestic and foreign policy goals and can also weaken the U.S.–Europe–Japan alliance aimed at containing China. Trump’s pragmatic orientation and lack of emphasis on ideological issues also suit the preferences of the Chinese side. China likewise has no intention of exporting ideology or changing the American system, and has also avoided direct confrontation with the United States on issues such as Iran and Venezuela, which has further increased Trump’s favorable impression of China.

During this meeting, Xi Jinping stated that China and the United States should avoid falling into the “Thucydides Trap” of great-power zero-sum rivalry. This also reflects China’s desire to avoid uncontrolled conflict with the United States and to maintain long-term stable cooperation. Both China and the United States recognize that cooperation is better than confrontation, and that a strong G2 partnership is preferable to mutual losses that would allow third parties to benefit. Therefore, Trump’s visit to China and the summit between the Chinese and American leaders proceeded naturally and encountered almost no obstacles. Compared with Xi Jinping’s 2024 visit to the United States and his meeting with Biden, where both sides had considerable disagreements and each harbored their own concerns and calculations, this Xi–Trump meeting was far more harmonious.

Although Trump’s visit to China can be described as friendly, smooth, and productive, it also has its limitations. Sensitive issues including Taiwan, as well as economic and trade competition and friction between the two countries, were handled in a low-key manner and shelved by both sides, which also means that they were not actually resolved, and contradictions and hidden dangers still remain.

The hardliners toward China within Trump’s governing team, such as Rubio, may accept compromises and visits to China, but this does not mean that they agree with a pro-China friendly approach. In the future, they will still advocate hardline policies toward China and continue to play important roles in decision-making within the Trump administration. In addition, although the atmosphere of this meeting was very friendly, the achievements reached were not truly groundbreaking and still remained within the scope of conventional cooperation.

Trump himself frequently changes positions and abruptly shifts policies, while circumstances constantly evolve. Whether the achievements of this visit to China can truly be realized, and how long the atmosphere of China–U.S. friendliness can last, remain uncertain. If Democrats regain control of Congress in this year’s midterm elections, or if the presidency changes hands again in 2028, China–U.S. relations may once again undergo major transformations. Therefore, Trump’s visit to China and its outcomes should not be overly glorified, and only cautious optimism is warranted regarding China–U.S. relations.

From a longer-term perspective, China–U.S. relations will continue to be characterized by the intertwining of pragmatic competition and cooperation with ideological confrontation. At times, friendly cooperation will outweigh confrontation and conflict, while at other times contradictions between the two sides will cause cooperation to stagnate and lead to mutual sanctions. The specific situation will depend on the domestic and international circumstances of the time, the decisions of the leaders of both countries, and the influence of unexpected events. Competition between China and the United States on the global level, as well as the risk of unintended escalation, will always exist, yet the two sides are also mutually dependent and unable to truly “decouple and sever supply chains.”

The author, of course, hopes that China and the United States can engage in more cooperation and as little conflict as possible, while balancing economic livelihood concerns with democracy and human rights, and promoting the well-being of China, the United States, and the world in a constructive manner.

(The author of this article is Wang Qingmin(王庆民), a Chinese writer living in Europe and an international politics researcher.)