u/AttorneyOk5749

Aircraft lacking stealth capabilities are likely to become expendable in future high-intensity conflicts.

The US military itself appears to have overlooked one factor: its long-standing air superiority has led it to neglect the development of its ground-attack missile forces, with the result that certain missions which could have been carried out using ballistic missiles must now be performed by aircraft—a course of action that entails higher costs than using missiles.

In recent years, the US military has been accelerating efforts to address this shortcoming. Examples include the Army’s Precision Strike Missile (PrSM) – with a range extended to between 500 and 1,000 kilometres – and the Dark Eagle land-based medium-range hypersonic weapon (LRHW), both of which are designed to gradually establish a long-range precision strike capability that can be launched directly without relying on air superiority.

Based on the news, it indicates that the hull of Japan's ASEV project is largely complete and the vessel itself is currently in the early-to-mid stage of construction or drydock assembly. Meanwhile, its "brain and eyes"—the SPY-7 radar and Aegis weapon system shipset—have entered a critical phase of live-target tracking and simulated engagement validation, paving the way for the system's official delivery and integration aboard the ship.

The project is being constructed in the drydock of Mitsubishi Heavy Industries' Nagasaki Shipyard, and upon completion, its displacement will exceed that of China's Type 055 destroyer.

Although it is a massive warship, it is fundamentally a "floating Aegis platform," with its offensive and strike weaponry mainly comprising Standard Missile-3 (SM-3), Standard Missile-6 (SM-6), and Tomahawk cruise missiles.

It remains to be seen whether the JMSDF will name it Yamato or Musashi.（Just joking）

From the perspective of a captain and company commander in an Army Aviation Brigade, the video illustrates how officers of equal rank can now cross-attach and transfer between different branches following the combined-arms restructuring (合成化). The primary goal behind this approach is likely to enhance coordination in joint command, foster mutual familiarity among different combat arms, and cultivate a talent pool for selecting future joint command officers.

The video employs psychological montage to highlight the tactical differences between helicopter pilots and infantrymen. The infantry complains that the helicopters dropped them straight into an ambush zone, while the pilot counters that the infantry lured the helicopters directly into an anti-air engagement zone.

This dynamic reminds me of a real-world exercise incident: due to an intelligence failure during a military exercise, a PLA special operations unit was heliborne-inserted right on top of an armored infantry company, resulting in the special forces unit being completely wiped out.

However, this psychological montage can also be interpreted in another light: the pilots braved heavy anti-aircraft fire to insert the infantry into a crucial position that simply had to be secured.

The military hardware featured in the video consists of familiar, classic systems: the Z-20, Z-10, Z-19, and Z-8L, alongside the "Lynx" all-terrain vehicle (ATV). Interestingly, the video doesn't seem to show the exact process of how the Z-8L loads or offloads the Lynx ATV—perhaps there are specific operational nuances or classified tactical procedures involved there?

The infantry units in the video are equipped with two types of helmets—the QGF-15 and the QGF-03—and their small arms have been fully upgraded to the QBZ-191 rifle family.

Finally, the video concludes with a CQB (Close Quarters Battle) demonstration, which, in my view, serves as yet another subtle nod toward a potential Taiwan scenario.

This episode focuses on the Army’s air defence units.

The closing credits also reveal that their former unit was a distinguished unit that had fought in the Korean War (presumably one of the 61st, 62nd, 63rd, 64th or 65th Divisions).

Compared to previous episodes, which focused mainly on drills, this episode features a great deal of scene re-enactment, using real soldiers to portray their daily lives. There is a small detail in the filming of this episode: in the flashback scenes, the protagonist is even shown wearing Type 07 camouflage rather than the Type 21 camouflage. Unlike the units featured previously, this air defence unit has not replaced its light weapons with the Type 191, but continues to use the Type 95-1, and their helmets are the QGF03 type, rather than the newer Type 19 model. Interestingly, however, at 2:43, all four of their magazines are fully loaded.

As an air defence unit, they utilise the HQ-16; at 3:00 in the video, the HQ-7 (a Chinese copy of the French Sidewinder air-to-air missile) appears.

The first batch of 120 "Katyusha" rocket launchers equipped by the Chinese People's Volunteer Army (PVA) was assigned to the 21st Artillery Division, which commanded five regiments at the time. Therefore, the unit featured in the video is undoubtedly a heroic unit reorganized from the former 21st Artillery Division—meaning it directly engaged US-led UN forces during the Korean War.

Judging from the footage, this unit is equipped with its own tactical medium-range reconnaissance UAV, likely the JWP-02 model, which uses rocket-assisted takeoff. This implies that for standalone reconnaissance and target-guiding missions, the unit no longer relies heavily on additional recon support from the Air Force or Army Aviation.

At 2:30, the video showcases a new type of tracked artillery forward observation vehicle. Visually, it appears to be modified from a ZBD-04A infantry fighting vehicle chassis. Although the vehicle’s profile is blurred, close-ups of its optical equipment are shown, likely to obscure specific organizational/unit designations while demonstrating its capabilities.

Unlike the People’s Liberation Army Rocket Force (PLARF), two-year conscripts are visible among the frontline personnel in this video. This indicates that operational technical thresholds for certain roles within long-range artillery (MLRS) units are not as high as those in missile units, indirectly underscoring the extreme importance and specialization required of strategic and tactical missile forces.

At 3:35, a banner reading "Achieve National Reunification" appears, indicating that this unit also serves as a frontline force assigned to Taiwan-related operational directions. Based on the assembly formation, a single battery appears to consist of a 42+1 structure, with a 4-man crew per vehicle.

At 4:03, the video demonstrates the modular loading process of the box-type rocket launcher. By 4:13, the PCH-191 long-range multiple rocket launcher can be seen loaded in a hybrid configuration: 300mm rockets in the left pod and 370mm rockets in the right pod. According to public data, when equipped with satellite guidance kits and coordinated with UAV real-time corrections, these rockets can achieve a CEP (Circular Error Probable) within 10 meters. Naturally, such precision-guided munitions come at a high cost, which only well-funded modern militaries can afford to field at scale.

The stellar performance of HIMARS in the Russo-Ukrainian war fully validates the formidable power of modern precision MLRS. However, compared to HIMARS, the PCH-191 demonstrates comprehensive superiority in fire specifications. While both utilize modular pods, the PCH-191 features a dual-pod launcher design, significantly increasing fire density and salvo payload. HIMARS’s main advantage lies in its rapid strategic airlift capacity via C-130 transports; however, for the PLA—which emphasizes homeland and peripheral defense operations—such compromises made for airlift transportability are far less critical.

One final point to consider: in high-intensity engagements involving these rocket launchers—or any artillery force, for that matter—the most critical factor is logistics. A steady, plentiful supply of ammunition is the core determinant of fire suppression and support efficiency. While the volume of logistical support is not shown in the video, in my view, this is not because it doesn't exist; rather, it represents a core critical element that demands strict operational security .

Judging by the information currently available, this brigade comprises two battalions and three detachments; I am unsure of the exact personnel strength.

Leaving aside the Geneva Conventions and such matters, the Russian military has organised these Ukrainian prisoners of war directly into a fully-fledged combat unit. Are they not concerned that they might mutiny en masse when deployed en masse on the front line?

My personal guess is that they are former Ukrainian military personnel who have been screened and have joined voluntarily; their treatment should be the same as that of other Russian troops, otherwise it would be impossible to control such a group.

The first batch of 120 "Katyusha" rocket launchers equipped by the Chinese People's Volunteer Army (PVA) was assigned to the 21st Artillery Division, which commanded five regiments at the time. Therefore, the unit featured in the video is undoubtedly a heroic unit reorganized from the former 21st Artillery Division—meaning it directly engaged US-led UN forces during the Korean War.

Judging from the footage, this unit is equipped with its own tactical medium-range reconnaissance UAV, likely the JWP-02 model, which uses rocket-assisted takeoff. This implies that for standalone reconnaissance and target-guiding missions, the unit no longer relies heavily on additional recon support from the Air Force or Army Aviation.

At 2:30, the video showcases a new type of tracked artillery forward observation vehicle. Visually, it appears to be modified from a ZBD-04A infantry fighting vehicle chassis. Although the vehicle’s profile is blurred, close-ups of its optical equipment are shown, likely to obscure specific organizational/unit designations while demonstrating its capabilities.

Unlike the People’s Liberation Army Rocket Force (PLARF), two-year conscripts are visible among the frontline personnel in this video. This indicates that operational technical thresholds for certain roles within long-range artillery (MLRS) units are not as high as those in missile units, indirectly underscoring the extreme importance and specialization required of strategic and tactical missile forces.

At 3:35, a banner reading "Achieve National Reunification" appears, indicating that this unit also serves as a frontline force assigned to Taiwan-related operational directions. Based on the assembly formation, a single battery appears to consist of a 42+1 structure, with a 4-man crew per vehicle.

At 4:03, the video demonstrates the modular loading process of the box-type rocket launcher. By 4:13, the PCH-191 long-range multiple rocket launcher can be seen loaded in a hybrid configuration: 300mm rockets in the left pod and 370mm rockets in the right pod. According to public data, when equipped with satellite guidance kits and coordinated with UAV real-time corrections, these rockets can achieve a CEP (Circular Error Probable) within 10 meters. Naturally, such precision-guided munitions come at a high cost, which only well-funded modern militaries can afford to field at scale.

The stellar performance of HIMARS in the Russo-Ukrainian war fully validates the formidable power of modern precision MLRS. However, compared to HIMARS, the PCH-191 demonstrates comprehensive superiority in fire specifications. While both utilize modular pods, the PCH-191 features a dual-pod launcher design, significantly increasing fire density and salvo payload. HIMARS’s main advantage lies in its rapid strategic airlift capacity via C-130 transports; however, for the PLA—which emphasizes homeland and peripheral defense operations—such compromises made for airlift transportability are far less critical.

One final point to consider: in high-intensity engagements involving these rocket launchers—or any artillery force, for that matter—the most critical factor is logistics. A steady, plentiful supply of ammunition is the core determinant of fire suppression and support efficiency. While the volume of logistical support is not shown in the video, in my view, this is not because it doesn't exist; rather, it represents a core critical element that demands strict operational security .

This is the trailer for a series of videos on the Army, comprising six episodes in total. This standalone trailer is not currently available in English; the video appears to showcase the Army’s joint operations system following its reform.

In my opinion, there are two particularly interesting aspects to this trailer.

Firstly, the background sound: unlike previous promotional videos, which emphasised military bearing and appearance, this one fully reveals the Army soldiers’ roars and raw intensity on the training ground. This is the genuine reaction of a surge in adrenaline following exercises that closely simulate real combat, as seen at 0:17.

Secondly, the demonstration of the rocket artillery’s destructive power: at 0:29, high-definition aerial footage combined with a circular firing range provides a vivid illustration of the lethality of the PCH191 rocket launcher’s 300mm rockets (the five-tube launcher visible at 0:27 confirms these are 300mm rockets, rather than 370mm or 750mm variants). This is a type of weapon lethality demonstration that has been relatively rare in previous videos.

It currently appears that this series will be organised according to the Army’s specialised branch responsibilities, with the titles: *Forging the Iron Fist*, *Breaking the Enemy’s Formation*, *Shooting the Celestial Wolf*, *Thunder and Lightning*, *Cutting the Invisible*, and *Tempering the Steel*. Those interested in researching the PLA Army may look forward to further updates.

This is the first episode, for which there is currently no English version. The video offers a glimpse into the main combat units of the PLA Army following military reforms, as seen through the eyes of the Chief of Staff (Major) of a combined arms battalion. By drawing a parallel between the Chief of Staff and a symphony orchestra conductor, it illustrates joint operations between the Army, the Air Force, Army Aviation and unmanned systems. The short film skilfully blends the artistry of military discipline with music; should an English version be produced in the future, it is hoped that the translation will achieve ‘faithfulness, elegance and fluency’.

The video primarily showcases the Type 05 Amphibious Armoured Assault Vehicle (ZLT05) conducting a beach landing. As is customary, some footage of the vehicle’s interior has been blurred, presumably for security reasons.

The vehicle has a combat weight of 28.5 tonnes and features a relatively lightweight aluminium alloy armoured hull. Additionally, lightweight supplementary armour has been fitted to the turret, whilst the rear of the turret is equipped with slat armour. The crew comprises a driver, commander, gunner and loader; in line with US Army configurations, no automatic loader is used, presumably due to weight considerations.

This unit is undoubtedly a combat-ready unit from the Eastern Theatre Command tasked with operations to liberate Taiwan. Judging by the close-up at 1:02, upon entering the command vehicle, the Kevlar helmets were replaced with TMT-3 passive tank helmets, though the newer TMT-5 passive tank helmets were not used.

‘Victory’ is a military documentary series produced by the People’s Liberation Army. The series comprises six episodes; no official full English version or standard English title has yet been released.

This is the fifth episode. Unlike previous instalments, which featured extensive blurring of close-up footage of missile units, this episode focuses extensively on the daily combat readiness routines of the missile forces, including close-ups of equipment. Those interested in the PLA’s missile forces may wish to watch it.

Although there is a wealth of footage, it is evident that security measures have still been applied, making it impossible to determine the exact location of the units directly from the images. China’s vast landmass and relatively harsh maritime environment mean that the country places greater emphasis on its land-based strategic nuclear forces than other nations.

This episode of the documentary marks the first time that the ‘Underground Great Wall’—the underground bunkers of the PLARF—has been publicly revealed in high definition. Filmed with long-take drone footage, the fortifications through which missile transport vehicles can pass stretch as far as the eye can see.

Judging by the footage, the frontline personnel of the PLARF consist entirely of non-commissioned officers and commissioned officers. This indicates that the unit is highly professionalised in terms of both organisation and personnel; they work year-round in their posts and are thoroughly familiar with their duties, rather than being conscripts who serve for just two years before being discharged.

The missile launched at 4:41 is the DF-15 (NATO designation: CSS-6; export designation: M-9), an older model; the latest variant, the DF-15C, was last produced in 2013. During the 2022 military exercises around Taiwan, the Eastern Theatre Command utilised the DF-15 with a ‘penetrating warhead’ in live-fire drills.

At 16:30 in the documentary, the exercise simulated a scenario in which the commander independently carried out the missile launch following the complete loss of all personnel.

At the time of filming, the United States and Israel had already begun bombing Iran. The documentary’s extensive depictions of underground bunkers and counterattacks carried out under simulated conditions of personnel casualties make its message particularly intriguing; however, the core focus of the entire episode remains defence and counterattack, rather than offence.

This statement aligns with previous assessments: during this round of conflict, the U.S. military bore the vast majority of missile defense missions for Israel, ranging from land-based THAAD systems to destroyers deployed in the Mediterranean. These high-intensity missile defense operations have progressively strained U.S. ammunition stockpiles.

In terms of impact, if the U.S. military cannot comfortably handle an attack on the scale launched by Iran, it will to some extent dampen morale in countries and regions directly facing military pressure from China, such as Taiwan, Japan, and South Korea. After all, compared to the U.S. homeland, the leadership of these countries and regions will directly confront Chinese military pressure.

On 31 July, Japan formally established a new National Intelligence Agency, marking the creation of the country’s first centralised national intelligence system since the Second World War. This move is the latest in Prime Minister Sanae Takaichi’s efforts to strengthen Japan’s intelligence capabilities and is expected to pave the way for the introduction of further counter-espionage legislation.

The agency’s establishment stems from a law enacted in May, which established it alongside the National Intelligence Commission—a central command body headed by the Prime Minister and nine other Cabinet ministers.
The newly established ‘National Intelligence Agency’ consolidates Japan’s traditional intelligence services. Kazuya Hara has been appointed Director-General and Cabinet Intelligence Officer. The new ‘National Intelligence Agency’ consolidates the capabilities of all of Japan’s existing intelligence services, including:

the National Intelligence Council (chaired by Sanae Takaichi)

the National Police Agency (180 staff, responsible for domestic counter-terrorism, counter-espionage and national security)

Ministry of Defence (100 staff, responsible for military intelligence, strategic reconnaissance and the collation and analysis of intelligence)

Ministry of Foreign Affairs (50 staff, gathering intelligence through overseas diplomatic personnel)

Public Security Intelligence Agency (40 staff, responsible for countering extremist organisations, counter-espionage and social security investigations)

Ministry of Finance (number of staff unknown, responsible for financial intelligence and anti-money laundering)

Ministry of Economy, Trade and Industry and other departments (number of staff unknown, responsible for economic security, supply chain and technology protection)

However, the timing appears to have been deliberately chosen to coincide with the official designation (tsūshōgō，つうしょうごう) of the Kwantung Army’s Epidemic Prevention and Water Supply Unit (Manchuria Unit 691), also known as Manchuria Unit 731, during the Second World War.

During the Second World War, Unit 731 engaged in activities that seriously violated international law, including the development of biological weapons, bacteriological warfare and human experimentation, thereby committing crimes against humanity and war crimes. Kiyoshi Kawashima, a member of the unit, confessed during the Khabarovsk Trials that Unit 731 had conducted bacteriological experiments on living human subjects, killing at least 3,000 people. Researchers believe the actual death toll may have exceeded 10,000. After the war, in order to obtain Unit 731’s research data, the United States granted key members immunity from prosecution; this deal was concealed for a long time and was only gradually exposed in the 1980s by journalists such as John William Powell and others.

This practice is reminiscent of the Japanese Empire’s notorious intelligence agency during the Second World War, the Tokubetsu Kōtō Keisatsu, abbreviated to ‘Tokkō’.（とくべつこうとうけいさつ）

Such an approach appears to be sending a strong signal to the outside world——Japan is attempting to restore the status quo of the Japanese Empire era.

Within the current rank structure of the Iranian Air Force, Brigadier General stands as the highest rank, which effectively places this martyred Su-24 pilot among the senior commanders of the force. However, it is also highly plausible that this rank was conferred posthumously following his death in action.

According to the military service record released by Iran, beyond his standard flight training, he successfully completed specialized courses in electronic warfare, navigation, and combat operations. Serving as a combat pilot, he frequently participated in a diverse array of operational missions, military exercises, and aerial parades.

His career was inextricably linked to the Su-24 from the very beginning of his service. It could be said that his entire military life was spent in the cockpit of this aircraft. Ultimately, alongside his navigator and their trusted "old friend," he made the ultimate sacrifice for his nation.

In the face of an overwhelmingly superior offensive by US and Israeli forces, the resolve of this pilot and his three comrades to launch a near-suicidal strike commands profound respect. Furthermore, the indomitable will to resist—demonstrated by such national ethos and combat valor—is precisely why the high commands of the United States and Israel dare not rashly initiate amphibious island-seizure operations or deploy special forces against nuclear facilities.

According to the latest reports: in the official obituary issued by the Iranian military on 29 July, the incident was explicitly characterised as combat damage sustained during the return flight following a successful penetration and completion of bombing runs, rather than—as previously reported by the US military—being destroyed whilst en route to the target.

https://www.tasnimnews.ir/en/news/2026/07/29/3659135/dna-tests-confirm-martyrdom-of-iranian-air-force-su-24-pilot

https://preview.redd.it/zijn1cizzvfh1.png?width=584&format=png&auto=webp&s=eeb5882142d2b1416cc97884b421fae11349b1e7

看到一个有意思的言论，大意就是目前新疆文旅展示的新疆是虚假的，来自世界各地的游客需要认清“原本的新疆”。（话说没被净化的新疆指的是七五的那种情况？杀烧抢掠在这帮土匪眼里属于半兽人乐园人间乐园？）

先说一下CFU（维吾尔运动）与WUC（世维会）属于同宗同源的分公司，连负责人都是同一个——新疆乌鲁木齐人茹仙阿巴斯，此人既是 CFU 的创始人兼执行董事，也兼任 WUC 执行委员会主席，丈夫和田人（就是那个产河田羊脂玉的河田）阿卜杜哈克木·伊德瑞斯是CUS（维吾尔研究中心）执行主任、WUC前监察长，如果说CFU算是同一个负责人的分公司，那么CUS就可以说是真正意义上的夫妻档了，CFU负责在街头和大使馆啥的搞点行为艺术，CSU负责搞理论工作，AI造点假材料论证下中共在新疆所谓反人类兽人暴行。

关于两人的信息不算太多，阿卜杜哈克木是1986年跑到埃及学习极端宗教，茹仙阿巴斯则是1967年出生，年龄算两人也应该60多了，按照美国目前的退休来看，还有两年应该也快退了，所以最近几年也在炒作年轻一代。

首先分公司多最直接的印象就是声势壮大（百万天兵浩浩荡荡，反共大业朝夕可成），即所谓的中心开花多点响应，类似于一种营销策略，搞得好像全世界的维族都是反共人士，结果仔细一看翻来覆去就这个几个鸟人，要么就是查无此人，一问就是中共已经把他们关起来，找不到人，至于其人其事是怎么来的，那你就别管，商业机密了属于是。

其次，多一个部门就多一批岗位，多一个“C-Level”，这个属于人类社会通用法则，全世界企业都一样，越多的安排自己人话语权也就越大，比如性骚扰出名多里坤·艾沙（Dolkun Isa）社会我坤哥就是欧洲派，阿巴斯和她丈夫代表华盛顿派，两派在话语权、人事、资源分配肯定存在一定竞争关系。

此夫妻二人经常以 CFU 和 CUS 两个不同机构负责人的名义，共同组团出访欧洲、智利、日本等地。在会见西方政客、大学教授或外媒时，两人分别代表“倡议组织”和“研究智库”，在同一个场合下相互呼应、交叉背书，当然最重要的是——这个人夫妻档可以分别以两个不同的实体分公司申请活动经费、政治捐款等各类基金援助。

反共可以作为口号，换着花样搞钱才是王道。

其家族也算是人才济济，她爹阿巴斯·包尔汉，中共党员，阿图什人，1978年出任新疆维吾尔自治区科学技术协会主席，第一届全国委员会委员，第二、三届全国委员会常务委员，属于是厅级领导了，结果一个女儿搞暴恐组织，另一个医生女儿，因参加恐怖组织罪、帮助恐怖活动罪、聚众扰乱社会秩序罪被中国司法机关依法判刑，不得不说家风很重要。

侧面也能看出来，如果中共真的是在新疆搞种族灭绝压迫维族，包尔汉这样一个南疆阿图什的普通人根本没有机会在那个年代获得如此好的上升渠道，官至正厅，而茹仙阿巴斯同样也是，如果中共真的要对维族搞抹杀，她根本没有去新大生物系读书的机会，更没有机会在新疆农大任教期间搞完事后还能去美国进修，当年的怀柔政策被这帮反贼搞成了一步步去试探政治和法律底线。

>以至于到今天，新疆差不多收拾完，开始请客的时候，这帮人终于开始慌了，毕竟当年没啥人去新疆，造谣也就造谣了，跟卖保健品一样，信的人自热也信进去了，反正吃不死人也没法论证，大不了让辟谣的跑断腿。但耳听而虚，眼见为实，去过的人见到了完全不一样的风土人情，自然就会怀疑，而怀疑一旦起来，造谣就没那么容易了，长此循环下去，针对新疆的谣言效果就会螺旋下降，以至于销声匿迹，这样一来要是遇到川皇这样的CEO准备裁员时，这帮人就是首当其冲，毕竟不产生效益了，阿巴斯和他老公这样捞够了的老登还好，后入职年轻人估计就得自主择业了，世维会有没有N+1就不知道了。

再说一个题外话，涉及新疆的强迫劳动其实就是为贸易战和关税战找个借口罢了，毕竟世界还没有进入完全的混沌状态，师出有名还是必要的，前有伊拉克洗衣粉化学武器后面还有俄国人去纳粹化，到最近轰炸伊朗还找了一堆借口，大家台面上都还要点脸，所以WUC CFU之类的夜壶组织才有存在必要。

夫妻二人一起合影（要饭）

CFU为CUS站台 群贤毕至

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如何能让这种类似传销的杀猪盘玩下去，最好的办法就是抵制新疆旅游，信息渠道只有一种的情况下，谣言才是最好散播的

Today I came across an interesting official Chinese article entitled ‘Comrades, please stop charging your mobile phones like this – it will seriously affect their lifespan!’ The article is in Chinese and essentially advises rank-and-file PLA personnel on how to protect and extend the battery life of their mobile phones, as well as ensuring electrical safety whilst charging.

This article does not, in fact, oppose the use of mobile phones by military personnel; rather, it emphasises the safe use of mobile phones. This indicates that the PLA has tacitly accepted the use of mobile phones by rank-and-file officers and soldiers, rather than, as some outsiders imagine, continuing to adhere to rigid regulations prohibiting their use in an era where mobile phones are ubiquitous.

This small detail speaks volumes: the PLA’s management approach has evidently been evolving and improving. Judging by the reforms to military regulations in recent years, the PLA is a relatively pragmatic military organisation in its management approach. The newly revised *Internal Regulations of the People’s Liberation Army* has introduced a series of practical measures to continuously reduce the burden on the rank and file, helping personnel to free themselves from cumbersome administrative tasks. For instance, by reducing the number of written undertakings and optimising duty rotas, living quarters arrangements, and leave application and cancellation procedures, the physical and psychological burdens on soldiers are alleviated. By safeguarding the welfare and benefits of frontline servicemen through practical regulations, the PLA is taking a realistic approach to boosting morale, rather than relying solely on ‘ideology’ to do so, as some might stereotypically assume.

Rough translation of the article:

Common misconceptions about mobile phone charging

1. Leaving the charger plugged in for long periods causes the device to overheat, which accelerates the ageing of components and materials. This can easily lead to short circuits or high-voltage breakdown, resulting in a fire.

2. Charging a mobile phone overnight poses a risk: if the charger’s safety mechanism fails, or if the battery itself has a manufacturing defect that goes undetected, this could cause a fire or even an explosion.

3. Charging to 100 per cent and keeping the mobile phone at full or high charge levels for extended periods reduces battery capacity and shortens its service life. It is recommended to maintain the battery level between 65 per cent and 75 per cent on a daily basis.

4. Using the mobile phone whilst it is charging: the device generates heat during charging, and using it or making calls rapidly increases this heat, posing a potential hazard.

5. Charging near the bedside or pillow: To make it convenient to use the phone whilst charging, many people habitually charge it near their bedside or pillow. In such circumstances, should a short circuit cause the device to catch fire, flammable items such as pillows will pose an even greater risk.

Do not take the following situations lightly:

1. The phone becomes excessively hot

2. The charging cable is damaged

3. The battery is faulty

4. There are visible changes to the battery’s appearance

According to Iranian sources, following an incident at the Natanz nuclear facility in 2020, Iran constructed a new nuclear facility to produce centrifuge components; this is the ‘Pickaxe Mountain’ underground nuclear facility.

Israel believes that Iran has already moved centrifuges and enriched uranium to this facility; according to a report by ISRAEL HAYOM, Israel is currently on high alert.

However, judging by the results of the previous ‘Midnight Hammer’ bombing campaign, it would be difficult for a B-2 fleet to inflict devastating damage on the ‘Pickaxe Mountain’ underground nuclear facility—which has been carved out of granite—from the outside, whilst the Israeli Air Force has virtually no capability to launch an effective strike against ‘Pickaxe Mountain’ on its own. The only viable solution appears to be a high-risk commando raid carried out by US and Israeli special forces, with the assistance of Iranian insiders, This would require the US and Israeli leadership to be willing to bear the high risks and heavy casualties that such an operation might entail; a similar operation was put to the test in a real-world scenario a few months ago during the rescue of the pilot.

From the leadership’s perspective, unless their political careers are already in serious jeopardy and they need to take a huge gamble to turn the situation around, the motivation to proceed with such a course of action is extremely low.

https://tw.voicetube.com/videos/215526

What to know about Iran's Pickaxe Mountain, home to an underground nuclear site

"American and allied warfighters need a solution that is battle-tested and budget-smart, and PAC-3 ACE delivers exactly that by building on the unrivaled performance of the PAC-3 MSE," said Tim Cahill, president, Lockheed Martin Missiles and Fire Control. "As we look to partner with our allies, we can further enhance resiliency and ensure our forces can swiftly counter emerging threats today and tomorrow."

According to Lockheed Martin, the PAC-3 ACE costs half as much as the PAC-3 MSE, but its performance does not appear to have declined significantly.

A comparison of the images shows that the two missiles are quite similar in appearance, but the PAC-3 ACE does not have a forward-mounted side-thrust engine.

The development of systems such as the PAC-3 ACE, Raytheon’s “Coyote,” Anduril’s “Road Runner,” and the reverse-engineered “U.S. version of the Shahed suicide drone” appears to be a form of self-evolution driven by the realities of battlefield economics facing the U.S. military.