u/Far-East-locker

I am a local and I said that

The whole Solar sector - He hate renewable

wind turbine stock - He hate renewable

FICO - he signed the Credit Score Competition Act in 2018 to break the monopoly

single-family rental - which actually is a good policy though

And short

GEO/CXW private prison

The whole Solar sector - He hate renewable

wind turbine stock - He hate renewable

FICO - he signed the Credit Score Competition Act in 2018 to break the monopoly

single-family rental - which actually is a good policy though

那工作强度简直恐怖。

光是看他们操作，就已经像开了1.5倍速。

单子还是源源不断地进来，别说休息了，动作稍微慢一点都不行。

现场的顾客和外卖员，明明看着他们手都没停过，却还是一直催。搞不好还要挨骂，但也无法反抗，只能低头说对不起。

别说其他行业了，即使在餐饮界，这强度也绝对算得上是顶格受罪吧。

Phase 2 HexAgon data indicate INBRX-106 may substantially boost pembrolizumab efficacy, particularly in HPV-positive head and neck cancer.

Come next midterm, a lot of politicians will try to use restrictions on datacenters as a policy to get votes.

Vote against them!

The current CapEx is just a commitment. If datacenters are not getting built, or are facing a lot of restrictions, spending will slow down! and we definitely don’t want that.

Don’t vote for those who oppose datacenters because of 'not in my backyard' attitudes. We need fewer restrictions on datacenters! let them be built anywhere they want to protect stock prices.

While 8% gain doesn't sound a lot percentage wise, it totally suck the capital out a lot of AI stock

Inputs

Tier 1, from the 10-Q for the quarter ended June 30, 2026:

Item Amount

Cash and cash equivalents, 6/30/26 $11,242,068

Net cash used in operating activities, 9M ended 6/30/26 $43,777,688

Net cash used in investing, 9M (Syntone JV contribution) $2,100,000

Loss from operations, 9M $38,321,148

Loss from operations, Q3 alone $10,810,209

Total current assets $23,168,201

Total current liabilities $28,679,051

Atlas note, fair value $18,227,000

Atlas principal + accrued interest + exit fees $20,311,749

Tier 2, company-stated: August offering net proceeds of approximately $51.1 million.

Not disclosed: Q3 operating cash burn on a standalone basis. The cash flow statement is presented for the nine months only. Every quarterly burn figure below is therefore derived.

Step 1: what the burn actually is

The nine-month average is $43,777,688 ÷ 3 = $14.59M per quarter (derived).

But there's a detail worth pulling out, because it changes the forward estimate. Nine-month cash burn of $43.78M exceeded the nine-month operating loss of $38.32M by $5.46M. The gap is working capital: accounts payable fell $3.63M, accrued expenses fell $1.67M, and inventory rose $1.71M. They were paying down payables and building stock.

So cash burn has been running at roughly 1.14x the P&L operating loss (derived). Anyone modelling from the income statement will understate the cash draw by about 14%. That is exactly the error the framework's "net loss is not a substitute" rule exists to prevent, and here it is measurable.

Trajectory is downward on the P&L: Q1 plus Q2 operating loss was $27.51M (derived, $38.32M less Q3's $10.81M), averaging $13.76M, against Q3's $10.81M. R&D fell from $7.13M in Q3 FY25 to $3.25M in Q3 FY26 as the clinical program wound down.

So $10.8M per quarter is the floor, and it is about to reverse.

Step 2: what the burn becomes

This is where I'm making assumptions rather than reading figures, and they're labelled as such.

Stated plan: roughly 30 customer-facing commercial hires plus roughly 20 field reimbursement personnel, from a base of 17 employees.

Assumption (mine, not the company's): fully loaded cost of $300k per head for specialty-pharma commercial and field reimbursement staff, covering salary, benefits, bonus, travel, fleet, and systems. 50 heads × $300k = $15M annually, or $3.75M per quarter incremental.

On top of that, unquantified but real: launch marketing, medical affairs, a patient services hub, market access consulting, 3PL and trade setup, the HCPCS application, and commercial inventory build. Inventory already rose $1.71M over nine months at trivial EU volume.

Step 3: three runway scenarios

Starting position, August 14, 2026:

$11.24M (6/30/26 cash) + $51.1M (offering net) = $62.34M

That figure ignores burn between July 1 and August 14. At the derived rate that's roughly $7.3M, so realistic cash at the offering close is closer to $55M (derived). I'll run the scenarios off $62.34M measured from June 30 to keep the arithmetic clean.

Scenario A, flat burn. Floor case, not realistic.

Burn holds at $14.59M/quarter, no commercial ramp.

$62.34M less Atlas obligation of ~$20.3M = $42.0M for operations

$42.0M ÷ $14.59M = 2.9 quarters

Operating cash exhausted around Q2 CY2027

Scenario B, launch ramp. Base case.

Quarter Burn (assumed) Cumulative Cash remaining

Q4 FY26 (Jul–Sep 26) $15M $15M $47.3M

Q1 FY27 (Oct–Dec 26) $19M $34M $28.3M

Q2 FY27 (Jan–Mar 27) $21M $55M $7.3M

Q3 FY27 (Apr–Jun 27) $21M $76M ($13.7M)

Now layer the Atlas redemptions. Atlas can take up to $3M per quarter starting September 16, 2026. Three redemptions land inside this window (Q4 FY26, Q1 FY27, Q2 FY27) = $9M.

Adjusted, cash crosses zero in February 2027, roughly two months after launch.

And the residual Atlas balance, call it $11-13M plus accrued interest and the 7.5% exit fee, still comes due June 16, 2027.

Scenario C, revenue helps.

Guidance is $50-75M in first-year US net sales. But three things push the cash benefit right:

Launch is planned for late CY2026, and the permanent HCPCS code application is only due October 1, 2026, so H1 CY2027 likely bills under a miscellaneous code.

Revenue is not cash. Buy-and-bill receivables run 60-90 days.

Inventory must be funded ahead of the first sale.

Even generously assuming $10M of cash actually collected by June 2027 (assumed), the base-case shortfall only moves from roughly $23M to roughly $13M by that date. It does not change the conclusion.

Step 4: the six-month buffer test

The framework test is whether runway clears the next catalyst with six months to spare.

Next catalyst: US launch, before end of CY2026. Call it December 15, 2026.

Six-month buffer: June 15, 2027.

Base case cash exhaustion: February 2027.

Even the unrealistic flat-burn floor case: Q2 2027, and only by deferring Atlas.

It does not clear. It misses by roughly four months in the base case, and the Atlas maturity lands one day after the buffer date.

Step 5: correcting my own claim

I wrote "expect another raise inside twelve months." The detailed math says that was too generous. Base case puts the funding need at roughly Q1 CY2027, so within about six months, not twelve.

In practice they will raise earlier than the wall, because nobody prices equity from a position of two months' cash. The realistic window is Q4 CY2026 to Q1 CY2027, most likely on a launch announcement, a J-code decision, or a first revenue print. The reactivatable $100M ATM and roughly 356M of authorized headroom mean it requires no shareholder action and no announcement lead time.

Sensitivity

Quarters of runway from $62.34M, after reserving $20.3M for Atlas, so $42.0M available:

Quarterly burn Quarters Cash-out date (from 6/30/26)

$12M 3.5 May 2027

$15M 2.8 Mar 2027

$18M 2.3 Feb 2027

$21M 2.0 Dec 2026

$24M 1.75 Dec 2026

The entire plausible range lands between December 2026 and May 2027. There is no burn assumption inside the realistic band that gets them past mid-2027 unaided.

Step 6: how far from self-funding

Worth doing, because it reframes "another raise" as "a series of raises."

Assumption: net realized price of ~$400 per vial against a WAC guided below $500, and COGS of ~$100 per vial, giving ~75% gross margin. COGS is not disclosed; this is an estimate.

To cover a $20M quarterly operating cost base from gross profit:

$20M ÷ 0.75 = $26.7M of net revenue per quarter, or roughly $107M annually (derived).

That is about 1.7x the midpoint of first-year guidance ($62.5M) and roughly a fifth of the 2030 target. On the company's own ramp, operating cash breakeven is a 2028 to 2029 event at the earliest.

So this is not one more raise. It is a multi-year sequence of raises, into a share count that has already gone from 23.9M in September 2024 to 243.4M in August 2026, against 600M authorized.

Two caveats on this math

The forward burn ramp is the weakest link. The $15M / $19M / $21M path is my construction from the hiring plan and the Q3 opex base, not company guidance. Management gave a qualitative "higher commercialization cost base" comment on the call and no quarterly number. If they launch far more slowly than announced, deliberately waiting on the J-code, burn could stay near $13-15M and the picture improves by roughly a quarter. That is a genuine possibility and arguably the rational move.

Second, the working capital deficit at June 30 was $5,510,850, but that is a classification artifact, not an operating payables problem. Strip the $18,227,000 Atlas note out of current liabilities and working capital is positive $12.7M (derived). Worth knowing so the deficit isn't double-counted as a separate stress.