u/Far_Huckleberry9807

Both compatibilists and incompatibilists frame the whole debate around one question: is free will compatible with determinism? But this framing is broken from the start, because there’s no way even in principle to tell whether we live in a deterministic or an indeterministic universe.

Any observation we could make is consistent with both. A “random” quantum outcome and a hidden-variable deterministic outcome produce the same observable statistics. No experiment settles it, and no experiment could. So determinism isn’t a discoverable fact about the world; it’s a metaphysical posit we can’t cash out.

If that’s right, then organizing the entire free will debate around compatibility with determinism is a mistake. We’re arguing about whether X is compatible with Y when we can’t even establish whether Y obtains, or ever could. Both “camps” inherit the same bad assumption: that determinism is the relevant variable.

The useful questions are the ones that don’t route through that undetectable posit — what capacities agents actually have, how deliberation and control function, when it makes sense to hold people responsible. Those we can investigate. Whether the universe is “really” deterministic we can’t, so it shouldn’t be load-bearing

Does anyone else here like the way that Pragmatists like James, Dewey, and Peirce address free will? Any reqs of pragmatists or neuro pragmatists for me to read? Anything similar would be nice if anyone has ideas ✌️

This is really a Peirce question routed through Descartes. Peirce’s first two grades of clarity are recognizing an idea (clearness) and defining it precisely (distinctness). He claims they’re insufficient, and that only his third grade, specifying a concept’s practical or experimental effects, secures genuine clarity. He doesn’t argue the insufficiency at length, so I’m trying to establish it on the strongest possible case.

The idea Descartes takes to be clear and distinct is the self as a thinking thing (res cogitans), and the cogito (I think, therefore I am) is the formulation that presupposes it. My objection targets that concept. Within Descartes’ thought experiment, the assumption that thinking requires a subject may very well be a demonic deception, and by his own rules any belief that can be doubted must be treated as false. The very concept of a thinking thing presupposes a subject for the thinking, and that presupposition is doubtable, so his own method should bracket it. The feeling of certainty is not a guarantee that the concept being recognized is accurately understood, and the demon could have corrupted the concept of thinking while leaving the feeling of indubitability entirely intact. So the clear and distinct idea Descartes is most certain of rests on a concept his own method should have doubted.

Two things I’d want stress-tested. First, the description of Descartes position. Does the performative reading (Hintikka), cogito as self-verifying performance rather than inference, block the objection by removing the inferential gap? Second, the Peirce. Am I reading the three grades right, or am I collapsing the clarity of a concept into something it isn’t?

I can say more on this if anyone is interested or my claims are unclear. I left some steps not explicitly stated in the argument for brevity, but i can explain those also if that helps with clarity. id appreciate any help!