The study found that air quality either improved or remained stable across the city in the first year of congestion pricing.

The New York City (NYC) Health Department has unveiled its first evaluation of the Congestion Relief Zone Tolling Program’s impact on neighborhood air quality. The study found that the city’s air quality remained stable or improved slightly in the first year of congestion pricing, continuing a 20-year trend of improving air quality and declining pollution. Further, the study revealed that environmental justice communities alongside major highway corridors identified in the Congestion Relief Zone Tolling Environmental Assessment did not experience increased air pollution attributable to congestion pricing. 

“Cleaner air means healthier communities, and New Yorkers deserve to know how major policies affect the air they breathe,” said NYC Health Department Commissioner Dr. Alister Martin. “This report gives us the clearest picture to date of how air quality has changed during the first year of congestion pricing, and we now know that air quality across New York City was not any different because of congestion pricing. By continuing to monitor neighborhood air quality over time, we’re helping to ensure that decisions affecting our city are informed by strong health data.”

The department also notes that the report found that the reduced congestion, improvements in transit systems and investments through the mitigation program—which directs funds toward initiatives in environmental justice communities—demonstrates the benefit of the program.

“With congestion pricing, we’ve seen fewer vehicles entering Manhattan’s central business district and more people choosing to bike, walk and take mass transit,” said New York City Department of Transportation Commissioner Mike Flynn. “Health’s findings, combined with the program’s investment of over $120 million into the city’s air quality and public health initiatives like NYC [Department of Transportation]’s (NYCDOT) Clean Trucks Program, mean that congestion pricing will help communities across the city breathe cleaner.”

To conduct the evaluation, the Health Department says that it expanded its existing New York City Community Air Survey (NYCCAS) monitoring network in partnership with the Metropolitan Transportation Authority (MTA), the NYCDOT and the New York State Department of Transportation.

The analysis examined concentrations of four traffic-related air pollutants, fine particulate matter, nitrogen dioxide, nitric oxide and black carbon, within the Congestion Relief Zone and in environmental justice communities where concerns had been raised about potential traffic changes—areas that include the Major Deegan Expressway, Cross Bronx Expressway, Brooklyn-Queens Expressway, Staten Island Expressway, FDR Drive and Trans-Manhattan Expressway. 

Using data starting one full year before tolling began and continuing one year after, researchers were able to distinguish the effects of congestion pricing from other factors that influence air quality, such as weather, seasonal changes and regional wildfire smoke, by using a control site that was not affected by congestion pricing and statistical modeling.

For nearly two decades, the Health Department has used NYCCAS to monitor neighborhood-level air quality to better understand what causes differences between neighborhoods, how pollution changes over time and how it affects health. NYCCAS has found that air quality improved dramatically in all NYC neighborhoods over the past decades, but more work is needed to mitigate traffic-related air pollution, which is linked to asthma, heart disease, stroke and other serious health conditions.

In May, the city announced a $20 million investment from the MTA to improve childhood asthma outcomes in the Bronx. The Health Department says this investment allows it to further support the Bronx Asthma Program and expand the Asthma Case Management Program.

“Before we turned the cameras on, there was concern about the potential for increased pollution caused by drivers looking to avoid the toll,” said MTA Chair and CEO Janno Lieber. “As this study confirms, that didn’t happen, and congestion pricing is already funding additional investments to further improve air quality.”

Capacity will rise by a record 45GW this year, according to S&P Global Energy

Donald Trump is presiding over an unexpected clean energy boom, as rising electricity demand spurs investment in new capacity despite the US administration’s efforts to thwart a solar and wind rollout.

Clean energy additions will rise by a record 45 gigawatts this year, according to S&P Global Energy — equivalent to the average electricity demand of Turkey. The increase is roughly 25 per cent higher than the previous record set in 2024.

The US president’s war in Iran, which has driven up global energy prices, along with surging power demand from AI data centres and developers’ rush to capitalise on expiring tax credits, are driving the cleantech boom, said analysts. Trump’s administration has also been pragmatic in the face of its energy needs.

“There was a campaign promise to go against renewables, but at the same time they’re realising that you can’t do without it,” said Izzet Bensusan, chief executive of Captona, an energy infrastructure investment group. “I don’t see a world where power demand is flattening out.”

S&P said new solar and wind capacity will jump in 2026 by nearly a third and almost 50 per cent respectively. Solar will set another record in 2027, while wind falls back before recovering.

White House spokesperson Taylor Rogers, however, touted “record-high oil and gas production” under Trump.

“The president has delivered on his promise to unleash American energy,” Rogers said. “At the same time, the administration has ended subsidies for costly and unreliable energy sources that American taxpayers were unfairly forced to fund.”

The solar and wind additions come despite Trump’s early efforts to kill an energy transition pushed by his predecessor Joe Biden.

The Trump administration broke up Esmeralda 7 in Nevada. It would have been the largest single solar project in the US.

The president’s One Big Beautiful Bill Act also slashed tax credits for solar and wind, and his administration has interfered with routine project approvals, including for more than 150 onshore wind projects. But under the terms of the OBBBA, solar and wind developers had until July 4 to begin work on projects and until 2030 to finish them.

The deadline “prompted developers to hurry and begin construction”, said S&P Global renewables analyst John Murray.

Expectations for sharply higher electricity demand are also driving the pace of the rollout.

US power consumption is expected to grow 39 per cent by 2035, according to consultancy ICF, driven by energy-hungry data centres and the electrification of household appliances and transport. The surge comes after demand remained steady for more than a decade.

Solar and wind are among the quickest, cheapest forms of energy to add to the grid. According to RMI, a think-tank, new solar and wind sites have a lead time of less than two years, compared to at least three years to develop gas projects.

Producers can break even by selling solar and wind power for as little as $38 and $37 per megawatt hour respectively, compared to at least $48 per megawatt hour for gas, according to investment bank Lazard. However, these figures do not fully account for system upgrade costs and batteries to smooth out intermittency.

Renewable power developers also stand to profit, as electricity prices are expected to rise 40 to 120 per cent once Biden’s Inflation Reduction Act subsidies expire.

“Candidly, it’s a good time to be a developer,” said Ethan Zindler, head of country and policy research at BloombergNEF. “Data centres need power and they need it basically yesterday.”

Extreme weather and Trump’s Iran war have also contributed to the growth.

Consumer investment in residential solar panels, batteries and zero-emission vehicles led clean energy spending in the second quarter of 2026, increasing 45 per cent from the previous quarter and 21 per cent from the same period in 2025, according to researcher Rhodium Group.

“People in Florida are installing a lot of home batteries to ensure their house still has power in a hurricane,” said Hannah Hess, a director with Rhodium’s energy and climate practice. “And with the Iran war driving higher fuel prices, we’re seeing more EV and hybrid [vehicle] purchasing.”

US courts have slowed Trump’s war on green energy. A district court judge in Oregon recently ordered the Pentagon to cease blocking onshore wind development. The courts have blocked all five of the administration’s attempts to halt construction at wind projects off the US’s east coast.

Developers are having some success lobbying the administration directly, leaning on people with ties to the administration to advocate for individual projects, people familiar told the FT. Among the arguments is that the projects will not displace fossil fuels — Trump’s preferred source of energy.

“What we found on the permit side is that the administration is pretty pragmatic,” said Cliff Graham, chief executive at clean energy company Avantus. “There’s a lot of land between Reno, Tucson and Barstow, where there’s no better use than solar-plus-storage.”

U.S. President Donald Trump's trade czar stood with Canada-U.S. Minister Dominic LeBlanc in Washington on Wednesday and touted a draft deal which appears to have averted a new round of punishing tariffs on Canada.

United States Trade Representative Jamieson Greer said he feels confident that the agreement will protect American workers and jobs while strengthening the North American market, making the continent a manufacturing and energy powerhouse.

"We certainly, I think, have eliminated some of the irritants that we've had over the past year," he said, "We also are taking a strong foot forward."

Prime Minister Mark Carney said in a statement that the new deal reinforces and builds on Canada's existing trade advantages with the U.S. He was set to brief his cabinet and Canada's premiers Wednesday afternoon.

LeBlanc and Greer had their latest meeting the morning after Trump announced a three-day pause on 50 per cent tariffs that were set to slam an array of Canadian goods just after midnight Wednesday.

LeBlanc did not provide many details about the specifics of the draft agreement he had hammered out with Greer during weeks of heightened negotiations. He did say Canada's dairy supply managed system would remain intact.

LeBlanc's spokesperson said Wednesday he was returning to Ottawa to meet with Carney and hold other meetings to put finishing touches on Canada's side of the trade negotiations.

Greer said he also will brief Congress and American stakeholders on what the two sides have been talking about.

Earlier Wednesday, Trump called the deal "very fair" and made claims about what was in the agreement, including that tariffs on U.S. farmers would be "totally eviscerated -- down to zero."

When asked whether the U.S would lower tariffs on Canadian automobiles, Trump said "we're doing certain things," adding Canada was paying high tariffs on certain industries.

"We've got to give something," Trump told reporters outside the White House.

The postponed round of tariffs would have hit $28 billion of Canadian goods, ranging from hockey sticks and ice skates to honey and some dairy products.

Unlike many of the previous tariffs Trump has imposed on Canada since his return to office in January 2025, the latest duties would not exempt any goods covered under the Canada-U.S.-Mexico Agreement, or CUSMA.

The Trump administration said the duties were in response to Canada's dairy supply management system, as well as tariff-free auto quotas and provincial bans on American alcohol enacted in response to the president's earlier tariffs.

A proclamation on the delay from The White House said Canada agreed to work toward resolving these trade irritants.

The new tariff deadline if the documents aren't finalized is 12:01 a.m. ET Saturday.

Members of the prime minister's advisory council on Canada-U.S. relations, who were briefed about the deal Tuesday night, welcomed the tariff pause but said uncertainty continues to harm Canadian businesses.

Dan Darby, Canadian Manufacturers and Exporters Association CEO, said the manufacturing sector still needs to see movement on the steel and aluminum tariffs.

Lana Payne, Unifor national president and fellow Canada-U.S. council member, said the "devil is going to be in the details" of the agreement.

"Hopefully everything is much better, but as I said, we will have to see what the details are," Payne said.

Conservative Leader Pierre Poilievre said his party was relieved to hear there was a "new and excellent deal" in the works but repeated his claim that any agreement must include zero tariffs on steel, aluminum, autos and lumber as well as an exemption to the "Buy America" policies.

"We hope that over the next couple of days we'll hear the good news that Mr. Carney will have kept his promise and Canadians will get (an) even better deal than we had before," he said at a press conference in Charlottetown.

The deal could come together by Trump's latest deadline, said William Pellerin, a partner in international trade at McMillan LLP in Ottawa.

Unlike CUSMA negotiations, Pellerin said this would amount to adjustments to tariffs on the margins -- those rates and retaliatory measures can be adjusted with letters, executive orders in the U.S. or an order-in-council on the Canadian side.

But Pellerin also cautioned that there's very little Canada can do at this stage to hold the United States to its word. He noted Trump has gone back on tariff deals struck with other countries.

"We have to understand that any deal that we strike could get overturned and that we're buying temporary relief," Pellerin said.

If elected to form a government, the Parti Québécois says it would not call a referendum on sovereignty until at least 2029. 

PQ Leader Paul St-Pierre Plamondon announced the news on Tuesday morning as Quebec political parties gear up for an election campaign that is expected to begin before the end of August.

In a statement posted on social media, St-Pierre Plamondon said that a PQ government would not put the sovereignty question to a vote as long as U.S. President Donald Trump is in the White House. 

But he stressed that his party still plans to call a referendum on whether Quebec should separate from Canada in its first mandate.

St-Pierre Plamondon said an issue as crucial as the future of Quebec requires a clear and serene debate, which should not be disrupted by American politics or surprise announcements coming from the U.S. president.

St-Pierre Plamondon also says the unpredictable nature of the Trump administration could harm the referendum process as well as the quality of a debate about Quebec's future.

The PQ leader believes he is disarming his opponents’ argument that this would be the worst time to elect a separatist government because of Trump.

The Coalition Avenir Québec and the Quebec Liberals pushed back against St-Pierre Plamondon's latest promise, saying it will add to political and economic uncertainty. 

Speaking to journalists in Montreal, Quebec Premier Christine Fréchette said it would be "worse" to hold a referendum at the end of a mandate. 

"If you organize a referendum at the beginning of a PQ mandate, at least after a year or two, you're set, you know if it's a yes or a no," she said. 

St-Pierre Plamondon is recognizing that Quebec is under economic and political pressure due to trade tensions with its southern neighbour, she said, and that a referendum would add a "thick layer" of unpredictability. She added her electoral campaign will focus on the cost of living.

Liberal Leader Charles Milliard said in a statement that the PQ is admitting that its referendum promise is "too risky" without abandoning it. 

"He’s right about one thing: it is risky. But what’s risky today will still be risky after Donald Trump," said Milliard. 

He said Quebec should be building alliances within Canada, "not choosing the best moment to cut them.”

Quebec's leftist sovereigntist party, Québec solidaire, maintains that Quebec should become a country. But parliamentary leader Ruba Ghazal promised her party would hold extensive consultations, including with First Nations and Inuit, to first build social acceptability. 

Ghazal said she finds it "concerning" that support for independence has stagnated, with about a third of Quebecers saying they would vote yes in a referendum. She added that, regardless of who is at the legislature, it's up to Quebecers to decide on sovereignty. 

"Our independence project should not depend on the Trumps of the world," she said. "This is the new normal, and we don't know who will replace Trump." 

St-Pierre Plamondon insisted he wants to run a campaign based on proposals to help Quebecers, including tackling the housing crisis and cost of living, rather than on what he calls “redundant and fruitless fearmongering.” 

“In any case, the fact remains that, given Quebec’s current state, a government called upon to clean up the mess left by the Coalition Avenir Québec (CAQ) will have plenty of challenges and tasks to tackle right from the start of its term," St-Pierre Plamondon wrote.

The PQ has been leading in recent public opinion polls ahead of a general election in Quebec that must be held by Oct. 5.

Russians are pulling billions from the country’s banking system ― a record cash outflow amid intensifying Ukrainian drone attacks and rising fear that the Kremlin could start seizing deposits to finance its war.

Nearly $3.4 billion (286.4 billion rubles) was withdrawn in the first two weeks of August, on top of the $7.3 billion withdrawn in July and more than $4.5 billion in June, according to Russian Central Bank data.

Total withdrawals this year could nearly double the amount taken out in the first year of Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine, according to Taras Skvortsov, a senior executive at Sberbank, Russia’s biggest retail financial institution.

The withdrawals are causing liquidity problems, according to Skvortsov and a former senior Russian finance official, overstretching a financial sector already strained by increasing levels of bad debts following a government-directed lending boom to ramp up military output.

“Drones are flying. Things are burning down. Nervousness is growing. And people’s everyday wisdom may be kicking in that they need to have cash under their pillow and not somewhere in banks where it may never be returned,” said the former finance official, who like others spoke on the condition of anonymity to discuss sensitive issues.

“For some banks this really is a problem,” the former official said. “They didn’t expect this and they invested all the cash elsewhere, and yet people are coming and taking out half a trillion rubles a month.”

Alexandra Prokopenko, a former adviser to the Russian Central Bank, said the withdrawals reflected deepening fear among the Russian public.

“It means people have no trust in the Russian banking system or in the Russian financial system,” Prokopenko said. “This is all a consequence of the fear that the government will do something with the banking system, that it could nationalize deposits.”

She said she believed that such a nationalization was unlikely but added, “I would not exclude that the authorities could impose limits on withdrawals.”

The total siphoned out this year already exceeds the $24.7 billion (2 trillion rubles) removed in the first year following the February 2022 invasion.

In the first two weeks of the invasion, $23 billion fled the system, and banks appeared to be imperiled by depositors and businesses lining up to empty their accounts, until the government stemmed the drain by imposing tough capital controls and sharply raising interest rates.

Now, big businesses are also seeking to move money out of the reach of Russian regulators as anxiety grows over potential asset seizures. That is further exacerbating the problems, the former official said.

In all, more than $9.4 billion was transferred out of Russia in the second quarter of 2026, according to Central Bank data.

“Each month there is a big outflow,” Skvortsov told RBK Radio, a Russian radio station. “If the trend continues things are not going to get better.”

The withdrawals have already undermined the Russian government’s efforts to raise money to finance the war through issuing state bonds.

The Finance Ministry last month was forced to cancel planned bond issues, even though it has become ever more dependent on them as a means of filling a yawning budget deficit as spending on the military continues to grow while the economy stalls.

Skvortsov told RBK Radio that the banks’ liquidity problems mean many cannot spare cash to buy government bonds.

“If there is an ominous sign of imperial overreach, this is clearly one of them,” said Craig Kennedy, a former vice chairman in investment banking at Bank of America Merrill Lynch who is now a scholar at Harvard University’s Davis Center for Russian and Eurasian Studies.

“Great powers don’t have repeated treasury bond failures in the middle of a war,” Kennedy said.

As a result of government orders to ramp up lending to the defense sector, Russian banks “appear to have so much exposure to nonviable borrowers that they’re not certain how it’s going to get restructured, when it’s going to get restructured and how much of that they are going to have to eat,” Kennedy added.

In a sign of how sensitive the strain on Russia’s finances is becoming for the Kremlin, the chief economist at VEB, one of the country’s biggest state banks, Andrei Klepach, was fired from his post this weekend after commenting that Russia could not win a war of attrition against Ukraine while Kyiv is supported by the West. 

“We won’t win the competition in this war of attrition,” Klepach said in a presentation he made in May, which was circulated in the media last week. “We’re under the illusion that everything [in Ukraine] will collapse. It hasn’t, and it won’t. Meanwhile, the costs we bear are mounting.”

Ever since Ukraine began expanding its drone campaign against Russian oil facilities this spring, taking out more than 30 percent of the country’s refining capacity and causing the worst fuel crisis since the fall of the Soviet Union, anxiety has intensified.

In June, the Russian Central Bank was forced to limit an expected interest rate cut because of fears that fuel price hikes could spur inflation. Panic spiraled through the bond market, driving interest rates up to 17 percent for the government’s 10-year bonds and forcing the Finance Ministry to postpone further issues.

With the budget deficit for January to July already at 6.46 trillion rubles ($76.1 billion) — far exceeding the 3.8 trillion rubles forecast for the entire year — fears are mounting that the Kremlin could seize big businesses’ revenue to finance the war.

“If the government needs cash, Putin will just do a grab for assets. He doesn’t care,” said an associate of one Russian billionaire. “And that’s where I think it’s heading.”

In addition, “there is the feeling that political power is becoming not quite as stable, and this is such a period when it is better not to be present,” the former finance official said.

Already several businesses owned by Russian billionaires have been targeted by the government in a nationalization drive that last year alone saw $51.5 billion in assets seized for the state, according to Russian prosecutors.

In June, the Russian state seized $7.6 billion (550 billion rubles) of assets linked to Vadim Moshkovich, who founded Rosagro, one of Russia’s biggest agricultural holdings, after the billionaire was detained and charged with large-scale fraud.

It was the biggest asset seizure in Russia since the start of the full-scale invasion. Others who have lost assets to the state include Dmitry Kamenschik, who previously owned Domodedovo airport in Moscow, and Konstantin Strukov, who controlled one of the country’s biggest gold mines.

Some economists argue that the Kremlin’s drive to direct bank lending into cranking up military output is strangling the civilian economy, especially because high interest rates and inflation leave banks and companies with few funds left for investment in nonmilitary sectors.

The Russian economy ground to a halt in the first half of 2026, with gross domestic product growth falling to 0.3 percent, compared with 1.2 percent in the first half of 2025.

For now, however, the Trump administration’s war with Iran has pushed oil prices back up and given the Kremlin a partial reprieve from its budget squeeze.

Russian state oil and gas revenue increased by 60 percent in July compared with the same month the previous year, as global oil prices rose, but it is still down 11 percent between January and July compared with the same period last year.

Ukraine’s attacks on Russian oil refineries as well as on the sprawling network of warehouses belonging to Wildberries, Russia’s largest online retailer, are also hitting Russian billionaires’ bottom line.

“It’s costing these guys money,” said the associate of the Russian billionaire, referring to Russia’s richest individuals. “They have to put their hands in their pocket. They’re not used to having all these problems.”

Ukraine has hit more than 20 Wildberries warehouses since it began targeting the company’s facilities on July 18, in an onslaught that some economists estimate has destroyed more than $6 billion in goods and caused more than $3 billion in damages to Wildberries infrastructure.

“It’s not a place you want to be doing business,” the billionaire’s associate added. “If you can pull money out, you do it.”

One Moscow business executive said, “Everyone who can is trying to move money out of the country, but it’s getting more and more difficult to do so.”

A key channel for removing money from Russia, amid increasing government restrictions on large cash transfers abroad, involves opening brokerage accounts in neighboring Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan and Armenia, according to the Moscow business executive and the former finance official.

“From there this money can be invested across the world,” the former finance official said.

As concerns grow over the war’s mounting financial toll, several senior officials have staged rare public interventions in recent weeks.

German Gref, the head of Sberbank, broke ranks at the end of June by publicly saying everyone wanted the war to end as soon as possible.

Then early in August, the powerful Moscow mayor, Sergei Sobyanin, spoke out against calls by hard-line members of parliament to further focus the economy on the war.

“If there’s no economy of peaceful life itself, there will be no taxes, no income for the population, the political situation will be completely different, and then we won’t achieve success in the war either,” Sobyanin told Tass, a state news agency. “And to kill life, to kill the civilian economy, is to kill the country itself.”

Why is the AfD so strong? A look at the latest research reveals who votes for the party—and which eight structural factors make the difference.

41 percent in Saxony-Anhalt, 36 percent in Mecklenburg-Western Pomerania, 16 percent in Berlin: according to polls, the AfD is set to perform very strongly in the state elections this September. This could alter the country's political landscape. It is a fitting moment to examine the current state of research, particularly regarding the party's electorate. Five key insights can be drawn from the latest studies that may help in understanding these elections.

Overview:

1. The AfD electorate consists of three types
2. The West is catching up—and is sometimes more radical
3. Falling numbers—it doesn't matter: migration is the symbolic rallying issue
4. Too old, too few women: demographics are decisive
5. Experts seem at a loss

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1. The AfD electorate consists of three types

Who are the people intending to vote for the AfD despite its increasing radicalization? The composition of its electorate has shifted over the years. Continuously reassessing this makeup is crucial, as it determines which segments of the AfD’s supporter base remain within reach of other parties. A study by sociologist Céline Teney outlines the current situation. Drawing on data from the GLES panel collected last year, the Freie Universität Berlin professor demonstrates that AfD voters can be categorized into three groups: conservative hardliners, radical-right authoritarians, and moderate conservatives.

According to Teney, conservative hardliners make up the largest share of the AfD electorate, accounting for approximately 67 percent. These voters are typically middle-aged individuals from small and medium-sized towns. For them, migration remains the defining issue; they advocate for strictly limiting it—even as the number of asylum applications has steadily declined. Other issues, such as the economic situation or foreign policy, are of less importance to this group.

Conservative hardliners are certainly radical in their focus on immigration, yet they are more moderate in other respects—at least when compared to the second-largest group of AfD voters (accounting for about 20 percent): the far-right authoritarians. According to Teney’s analysis, members of this group tend to be older, have lower levels of education, and are more likely to live in rural areas. They, too, are extreme in their rejection of immigration and lean toward authoritarian leadership and antisemitic views. "This profile is the one furthest removed from fundamental democratic and pluralistic norms," ​​writes Teney.

In Teney’s typology, the third group of AfD voters—comprising just under 13 percent—consists of moderate conservatives. "Compared to the other AfD profiles, they show the least inclination to exclude minorities or isolate Germany," states the study from June 2026. Furthermore, moderate conservatives within the AfD electorate are the least likely to endorse authoritarian and antisemitic positions. Economic and foreign policy issues are also relatively more important to them, making them more open to alternatives; the sociologist notes that this moderate group is the most receptive to overtures from other parties. This is also reflected in the fact that this segment of the party's supporters views the SPD in a comparatively positive light.

It is also helpful to examine the other characteristics of the three voter types. In terms of policy—such as the question of the size of the welfare state—they differ only slightly. The groups also share a similar pessimistic view regarding Germany’s trajectory. This perspective is particularly pronounced among radical-right authoritarians.

Thus, genuine differences lie less in specific policy issues than in the degree of radicalism. The AfD’s electorate is quite heterogeneous in this regard; there remains no single "typical" far-right supporter. The various attitudes span the entire right-wing spectrum, from moderate to extreme. However, there is a marked tendency toward radicalism regarding migration policy: those with generally moderate views are in the minority here, just as they are within the party as a whole. Consistent with this, a study by sociologist Julius Kölzer and his colleagues (PDF) shows that the AfD is particularly strong in areas where far-right parties have historically performed well.

2. The West is catching up—and is sometimes more radical

Kölzer’s work suggests that regional differences play a role. Recent research reveals how the situation has changed of late. In 2025, sociologist Andreas Hövermann examined—on behalf of the Hans Böckler Foundation (PDF)—how the AfD’s electorate managed to double nationwide within just a few years. While the party has long been established in East Germany, it has recently attracted new voters primarily in the West—including, for the first time, more women.

Berlin-based sociologist Teney points to a key difference: whereas East Germany was once considered the stronghold of the party’s radical supporters, data analyzed by Teney now show that radical-right authoritarians make up a larger share of the base in West Germany. This suggests that support for the AfD in the East has broadened—effectively becoming normalized—whereas in the West, it remains concentrated among a core group of supporters.

3. Falling numbers—it doesn’t matter: Migration as a symbolic rallying point

Beyond the makeup of the AfD electorate, it is worth examining the policy area that particularly preoccupies them: Why does immigration remain so important to the majority of AfD voters, even though the numbers have been steadily declining and the issue has recently played a less prominent role on the agenda?

While there are no specific new studies on this, a look across existing research over time reveals a shift: whereas immigration was a central policy issue for AfD supporters (as it was for the electorate at large) at the height of the so-called refugee crisis, it has since evolved into a symbolic meta-issue. Actively leveraged by the party, this topic encapsulates the full range of AfD voters' concerns and attitudes: fears regarding a loss of control and status, anxieties about perceived cultural transformation (e.g., the "Great Replacement" narrative), elements of racism and fear of "foreigners," and a fundamental distrust of state institutions. Viewed in this light, the actual volume of ongoing immigration is of little consequence. For other parties, this has a far-reaching implication: there is no policy outcome they could achieve that would satisfy a significant portion of the AfD’s support base.

4. Too old, too few women: Demographics are the decisive factor

What structural conditions allow the AfD to flourish in this way? A study by the German Institute for Economic Research (DIW) identifies eight characteristics that determine whether or not a district leans toward the AfD: disposable income, youth unemployment, the density of skilled craft businesses, the share of employees in the manufacturing sector, the rate of university-entrance qualifications (Abitur), the proportion of the population over 60, the share of foreign nationals, and changes in the proportion of asylum seekers. Whether the party performs strongly or weakly in a given area is therefore no coincidence; rather, it depends systematically on regional factors—though the study does not specify the exact interplay between them. Instead, the DIW study identifies a key variable: the demographic situation within a district is the decisive factor for the AfD’s success.

This was already known. As early as 2019, sociologist Katja Salomo pointed out—based on a case study of Thuringia—that the East German combination of an aging population, a shortage of women, and low birth rates created a uniquely unfavorable environment for regional living conditions. The DIW now highlights this factor as crucial: "The AfD garners significantly more votes in areas where there is a particularly large number of people over the age of 60 and where young, well-educated people are moving away—a trend that also leads to a marked drop in the rate of university-entrance qualifications among those who remain," states the analysis from July 2026.

The link between demographics and support for the AfD is multifaceted and well-researched. A shrinking, aging population leaves regions increasingly structurally weak. Investments—in local public transport, daycare centers and schools, libraries, and swimming pools—decline in line with reduced demand. The result is the widely documented sense of being left behind, a feeling that fosters susceptibility to populism and extremism.

This dynamic creates a vicious circle. Structural weakness and rising AfD vote shares drive further out-migration, particularly among the young, the educated, and women. Research indicates a prevailing surplus of men, especially in rural East German areas—a factor the AfD deliberately exploits with narratives claiming that migrants are taking German women away from local men. Another consequence is reduced inward migration—including, and especially, among migrants themselves; they are barely represented in regional AfD strongholds.

5. The scientific community appears at a loss

How should the other parties deal with these developments? Surprisingly, there are hardly any significant new recommendations from researchers on this matter. Political scientist Johannes Hillje, for instance, advocates trying a strategy based on greater emotion and a positive narrative about the future. This approach, he argues, could appeal to a substantial segment of the population. But does that include the many people intending to vote for the AfD?

At least there is solid evidence regarding what the other parties should *not* do: attempts to outflank the AfD on the right or to co-opt its issues are doomed to failure. The research findings on this point are quite clear.

The campaign for Quebec’s Oct. 5 provincial election has not yet formally begun – technically, it has not yet been called – but it is already under a shadow.

At some point after the election – after all the members of the provincial legislature have taken their seats, after they have passed any number of bills – the whole thing could be invalidated. The members might find themselves barred from sitting. Every law they passed might be thrown out. The province could potentially find itself in an unprecedented political and legal void.

No, I’m not talking about the consequences of a unilateral declaration of independence, of a kind that might follow from the election of a Parti Québécois government. Though the legal void that would plunge the province into would be profound, that remains a minor probability.

I’m talking, rather, about the consequences of a little-noticed legal case just filed in Quebec Superior Court by the Public Interest Litigation Institute, a legal advocacy group, and its founder, Lawrence David, a professor at University of Ottawa. The case may strike you as trivial, but it is anything but: not only in its potential for mayhem, but because of the constitutional issue at stake – in a nutshell, whether we are to be a society governed by the rule of law.

That’s the broader issue. The immediate issue is rather more prosaic: whether members of Quebec’s legislature should have to take an oath to the King before taking their seats.

The constitution of Canada is crystal clear on this. Section 128 of the Constitution Act 1867 states, in part, that “every Member of a Legislative Council or Legislative Assembly of any Province shall before taking his Seat therein take and subscribe before the Lieutenant Governor of the Province or some Person authorized by him, the Oath of Allegiance.”

The oath is spelled out elsewhere in the document: “I A.B. do swear, That I will be faithful and bear true Allegiance to Her Majesty Queen Victoria,” to be updated in the event with the name of whoever is on the throne at the time.

It is impossible to read this as meaning anything but what it says: “every Member ... any Province ... shall.” And yet, if you consult the copy of the Constitution maintained by the federal Department of Justice on its website, you will find another section just below Section 128, Section 128Q.1, which reads, simply: “Section 128 does not apply to Quebec.”

As a note to the section explains, this is because of a provincial law, passed in December, 2022, entitled An Act to recognize the oath provided in the Act respecting the National Assembly as the sole oath required in order to sit in the Assembly. And indeed the law, also known as Bill 4, does state:

“The Constitution Act, 1867 is amended by inserting the following section after section 128: ‘128Q.1. Section 128 does not apply to Quebec.’”

Well, that’s tidy. But you can’t exempt yourself from the Constitution just by saying it doesn’t apply to you, nor can a province unilaterally amend the Constitution – not, at any rate, the parts of it that consist of general rules to be applied to the whole country.

There is a provision – Section 45 of the Constitution Act 1982 – providing that “the legislature of each province may exclusively make laws amending the constitution of the province.” But note the words: the constitution of the province. Not the Constitution of Canada.

This isn’t like that other recent case involving the oath, the one over whether lawyers in Alberta should be compelled to take it in order to practise law in the province. That’s an ordinary provincial law, which may or may not conflict with the Constitution’s Charter of Rights.

By contrast, the requirement for members of provincial legislatures (and MPs, and senators) to take the oath is spelled out in the Constitution itself. There’s no higher law that can invalidate that – no, not even a unanimous resolution of the Quebec National Assembly.

You may think it is silly to require people to swear oaths to the King. You may wonder why it should matter to anyone if someone refused – though you might equally wonder why it should matter so much to those who insist on refusing. You may regard the whole institution of the Crown, not as the foundation stone of our system of law and government, but as an antiquated relic at best, a badge of colonial servitude at worst.

You are entitled to your opinion. What you are not entitled to do is break the law. The framers of our Constitution thought the oath important enough to include it. Whether or not you think they were right to do so, the fact remains it is in the Constitution.

When the members of the Quebec legislature voted to exempt themselves from it, they weren’t simply passing a law intended to address some social ill or other that happened to infringe on a provision of the Constitution, or that might be interpreted as having done so. They were directly and deliberately flouting the Constitution, and for no purpose other than flouting the Constitution – asserting a power they do not possess, in the name of an independence they have not established.

It would be one thing if this were the only such incident. But provinces have increasingly taken of late to passing flagrantly unconstitutional provisions, apparently for no other reason but to see whether they can get away with it.

There is Quebec’s Bill 96, for example, which asserts, not only that the sole official language of the province is French (it is not, under the Constitution, so far as its courts and legislature are concerned) – again, this is now supposedly part of the Constitution of Canada – but that in pursuit of this objective the province has the power to regulate federally regulated corporations.

There is the Alberta Sovereignty within a United Canada Act, also passed in December, 2022, whose absurdity is expressed in its very title, and which likewise asserts a power the provincial government does not possess, in this case to ignore federal legislation it dislikes.

There is the Saskatchewan First Act, passed in 2023, which like Quebec’s legislation, purports to amend the Constitution of Canada, in this case to say that “Saskatchewan has autonomy with respect to all of the matters falling under its exclusive legislative jurisdiction pursuant to this Act.”

On one level: of course it does; to say it’s autonomous in matters in which it has autonomy (“exclusive legislative jurisdiction”) is a tautology. On another: You don’t get to unilaterally make the Constitution of Canada say so, any more than you can unilaterally amend it to say the sky is blue.

It’s outrageous enough that the provinces have taken to these sorts of lawless stunts. It’s even more outrageous that no one, until now, has pushed back: not at the federal level, at any rate. Instead, the Department of Justice quietly adds each of them to its own copy of the Constitution, with a note that it “aims to amend” the constitution of the province in question. So it is good to see Prof. David (a born-and-bred Quebecker, in case anyone’s wondering) and the PILI taking up the cause.

Not only can Quebec not unilaterally amend the Constitution to exempt itself from the oath-taking requirement, they argue, but so far as removing the oath touches upon the “office of the Queen” and “the office of the Lieutenant Governor,” would require the unanimous consent of Parliament and all the provincial legislatures, as provided for by Section 41 (a) of the Constitution.

Moreover, they argue, so far as it results in Quebeckers being represented in their provincial legislature by “politicians who are not constitutionally qualified to hold office” – indeed, “whose votes on legislation and other activities in the National Assembly are constitutionally void” – it deprives Quebeckers of the right to effective representation, as guaranteed by the Charter’s Section 3.

Prof. David is aware of the consequences if the court were to declare, as the case petitions it to do, that both Bill 4 and the provision of the Constitution it purports to add were “of no force or effect.” The election in October is the first since the law was passed. The legal case is unlikely to be heard until well after the election; it could well take years to decide, after appeals.

So the strong likelihood is that a court contemplating such a declaratory judgment would be faced with a legislature composed almost exclusively of members who had not taken the oath, and were all therefore ineligible to hold office, and after they had passed any number of bills, all of which would be invalid.

As the PILI factum calmly puts it, “the automatic and instantaneous invalidation of all laws passed by the National Assembly by a majority of Members who did not take the Oath prior to taking their seat after the October 2026 election would undoubtedly plunge Quebec into an unprecedented legal crisis threatening the rule of law in the province.”

Needless to say, that is not what they recommend. Rather, they advise the court to issue a “hybrid suspended declaration of invalidity.” Bill 4 would be declared ultra vires, meaning all members of the National Assembly would have to take the oath if they wished to continue sitting. No further laws could be passed until they had.

But the declaration would be suspended with regard to existing laws – meaning they would remain in effect – for a period of time sufficient for MNAs to take the oath and re-pass all the laws they had illegally passed before then.

That’s sensible enough. And yet it’s hard to see how the doomsday scenario could be avoided. It’s hard to see, first, how any court could rule otherwise than that the legislature of Quebec had no power to remove the oath requirement or to amend the Constitution.

And it’s equally hard to see how any Quebec government, having gotten rid of the oath, would submit to reintroducing it. And if it refuses to comply with the court’s order – or, more likely, if it drags its feet about complying with it, offering ridiculous timetables for action and even more ridiculous excuses for failing to meet even these – then what recourse would the courts have but to suspend the suspension, and throw out the lot, MNAs, laws and all?

The tiger of lawlessness, having been set loose, will be hard to return to its cage.

The going rate to organize a string of attacks on synagogues and Jewish community centres is a measly US$10,000: a third up front, the rest after the terror has been inflicted.

We have evidence not only that such a cash-for-terror campaign has hit Canada, but also that it’s being financed by Iran.

You wouldn’t know it from listening to our security services and politicians. While our allies have publicly attributed this violence to Tehran — and Moscow — Canada stays frustratingly mum.

It’s time for Ottawa to be frank with the public: credible evidence suggests a hostile foreign power is trying to stoke division in our society and, particularly, to make Jews in Canada afraid.

We know there has been a rise in violence targeting Jews in Canada in recent years. According to an audit of antisemitic incidents by Jewish organization B’nai Brith Canada, there have been at least 100 acts of outright violence against the Jewish community since 2023. (This is corroborated by police data.) But this summer, B’nai Brith observed a massive jump: 27 incidents in just the first half of 2026. These attacks, along with a rise in harassment and vandalism, have shattered many Canadian Jews’ sense of safety.

Thankfully, the police have made arrests. In June, officers arrested a man in North York who screamed about Israel as he pelted a real estate agent with rocks and death threats. He was charged with a hate crime. And last year, Toronto police arrested Amir Arvahi Azar, charged with attacking six different Jewish institutions and advocating genocide.

Other incidents are unsolved. Toronto police don’t know who opened fire on Kiva’s Bagel Bar. The Bais Chaya Mushka Elementary School in North York has been shot at three times: police have laid charges in only one of these incidents and are investigating it as a potential hate crime. 

The masterminds behind some of these attacks, however, remain a mystery. Earlier this year, Mohamed Ilyess Akodad pleaded guilty to firebombing a synagogue in Montreal’s West Island but said he had not committed the attack out of animus for the Jewish community; rather, he said, he’d been given a “mission” and promised $15,000. Akodad told a Montreal courtroom he received $3,000 upfront but backed out after the first attack. “They saw I wasn’t serious, and they blocked me,” Akodad said, per CBC Montreal.

Who they are is unclear.

Meanwhile, in Toronto, police have made a spate of arrests pertaining to what they allege is a gun-for-hire network of young mercenaries who accept payment to shoot up locations at the behest of anonymous benefactors. Two seized firearms have been tied to more than two dozen shootings — including one that targeted the U.S. Consulate in downtown Toronto.

The Toronto Police Service told me in a statement that “those ballistic links did not include the shootings targeting synagogues or Jewish schools,” but Chief Myron Demkiw has confirmed that they “appear to share a similar alleged modus operandi: criminals for hire.”

That’s essentially where things stand now. The police continue to investigate, but they lack the evidence to determine conclusively who might have ordered these attacks and why. But in May, prosecutors in New York seemingly cracked the case wide open, when they arrested Mohammad Al-Saadi.

Al-Saadi is an Iraqi national and allegedly a commander of Kata’ib Hezbollah, an Iraqi paramilitary group openly affiliated with the Iranian regime. (It is distinct from the similarly named Lebanese organization.)

In May, Al-Saadi was charged with providing material support to Kata’ib Hezbollah, which the U.S. considers a terror group. Prosecutors allege that al-Saadi helped carry out at least 18 attacks in Europe — including the bombing of a Belgian synagogue and the firebombing of a Jewish school in the Netherlands — and two successful terror plots in Canada.

Prosecutors cite Twitter and Telegram posts in which Al-Saadi allegedly encourages and celebrates attacks against Jewish communities, the U.S. and Israel. They’ve also produced taped phone calls in which Al-Saadi boasts of running “multiple teams” in Canada and claims “our people” were behind attacks on “the consulate and the Knesset,” Israel’s parliament. He offered, allegedly, US$10,000 for three attacks in the U.S.

After his arrest, Al-Saadi allegedly told FBI agents he had been a commander in “the resistance,” which includes Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guard. Prosecutors allege he was “like a son” to Qassam Soleimani, the Iranian general who was killed in American airstrikes in 2020.

In the call, Al-Saadi allegedly stressed the importance of sponsoring more violence in the West — but said the recruits needn’t be true believers; they could be “the Mafia” or “a Mexican person.” The allegations haven’t been tested in court, but using local criminals to conduct state-directed violence is increasingly common — “part of a broader geopolitical shift to the use of criminal actors,” as Jessica Davis, president of Insight Threat Intelligence, told me last week. Davis specializes in illicit and terror financing and has worked throughout Canada’s national security community.

Laundering violence and terror through thugs and gangs — “disposable assets,” Davis calls them — is cheap, quick and nearly impossible to prevent.

Tehran, we know, hired a Russian mobster to kidnap and kill the Iranian dissident Masih Alinejad (the would-be assassin thankfully failed). It also allegedly planned to conduct a similar hit on Canadian human-rights icon Irwin Cotler. And we know Indian intelligence hired goons to kill Hardeep Singh Nijjar, a Sikh activist, in British Columbia in 2023.

Targeting dissidents is bad enough. But if Iran is using criminal intermediaries to perpetrate random violence against the Jewish community writ large, that’s a worrying escalation. “They’ve added on a layer of chaos-sowing,” Davis said.

Last May, a series of arson attacks targeted then-British Prime Minister Keir Starmer’s car and home. Recriminations flew as to which domestic faction might be responsible. The two culprits, convicted in June, told a familiar story: an anonymous social media account had offered them money to carry out the attack.

The anonymous benefactor also hired them to spray-paint anti-Muslim graffiti on London mosques and hang posters advertising a far-right group. A BBC investigation connected the paymaster to a senior Russian official.

This is just the tip of the iceberg in Russia’s pan-European terror campaign, which is plainly intended to whip up division by exploiting animosity towards migrants, Muslims and Jews across the continent. It’s what the Soviets called “active measures.”

While the evidence suggests Iran is responsible for recent acts of violence in Canada — possibly through other groups, as well as Kata’ib Hezbollah — Davis said the Russian government remains a “plausible suspect.” Senior Canadian intelligence officials told me last year they were actively monitoring for the possibility that Russia would extend its campaign to Canada.

Credible evidence is mounting that foreign adversaries are paying Canadians to attack other Canadians in hopes of turning us against one another. Why won’t the federal government just say so?

I requested a background briefing with CSIS and the RCMP on these attacks, and on the broader threat Iran and Russia pose in recruiting criminals. Both agencies declined. The office of Public Safety Minister Gary Anandasangaree sent me a lengthy statement that failed to address the threat posed by Iran or the mercenaries they employ.

Ruby Sahota, secretary of state for combatting crime, came close when she told the House of Commons that “the shootings at the synagogues” seemed to have been conducted by shooters “paid and hired by a foreign entity.” But Sahota admitted she was only referencing what had already been reported in the media.

Some level of secrecy is needed, especially around ongoing investigations — but it is increasingly absurd that Ottawa has refused to acknowledge ample evidence that a foreign plot is afoot. And it’s particularly galling as Canada comes fresh off a big national discussion about how secrecy can be self-harming.

Last year, Canada’s public inquiry into foreign interference warned that “adversary states are becoming increasing aggressive,” crossing “‘red lines,’ such as acts of violence, with impunity.” Its advice was plain: attribute this violence to these rogue states and disclose such threats to the public.

Ottawa has simply ignored the recommendation.

Our allies have been more forthcoming. Paris has pointed the finger at Tehran for a foiled terror plot in France, while London has identified and banned an Iranian proxy group for its involvement in arson attacks on British soil. (Both the Conservative Party of Canada and the Centre for Israel and Jewish Affairs have called upon this country to take similar action.)

Canada co-signed a statement with 21 allies, accusing Iran of using “local criminal groups” to target Jews worldwide — but ask Ottawa if Iran is conducting its campaign here, and they won’t tell you.

There is a lot of good police work happening on the ground to stop this violence, whether domestic or foreign-directed: in June, Toronto officer Marc Pinizzotto gave his life to bring in an alleged gun-for-hire network member.

As a society, we have more to do to prevent homegrown hate and violence. But this work is made only more difficult by the murky involvement of hostile foreign powers hoping to keep us at one another’s throats.

Canadians need to be briefed on the real possibility that Jews in Canada — and Canada itself — are the targets of this terror.

Mario Voigt is expected to step down and the "blackberry coalition" to collapse: The BSW’s national leadership is significantly toughening its tone regarding Thuringia. The party executive is citing the revocation of the Minister-President’s doctoral degree as the reason.

The revocation of Thuringia’s Minister-President Mario Voigt’s (CDU) doctoral title could turn into a battle for power. The BSW’s national leadership has called on Voigt to resign immediately. At the same time, the party executive urged its own state branch in Thuringia to withdraw support for Voigt, according to a resolution by the Bündnis Sahra Wagenknecht (BSW) executive board seen by the news agency dpa. According to the party, the resolution was passed unanimously, with one abstention.

Party founder Sahra Wagenknecht and the national leadership have long been at odds with the BSW’s Thuringia state branch. The latter is governing as part of the so-called "blackberry coalition" with the CDU and SPD—an arrangement the national leadership dislikes. Now, the conflict appears to be escalating.

The demand for Voigt’s resignation, outlined in the executive board’s resolution, stems from the fact that Chemnitz University of Technology revoked the CDU politician’s doctoral title. He is accused of academic misconduct. Voigt’s objection to the decision was rejected. The Minister-President has since filed a lawsuit challenging the revocation of his doctorate. The Administrative Court of Chemnitz confirmed to dpa that the lawsuit was received on Friday; no date has yet been set for a hearing.

BSW parliamentary group to discuss resolution

A resolution by the BSW’s national leadership states: "There must be no double standards in politics." The resolution criticizes Mario Voigt for "refusing to step down, thereby severely damaging the office of Minister-President and public trust in politics."

Addressing its own ranks in Thuringia, the resolution declares: "The BSW must not allow itself to serve as a source of a parliamentary majority for a man who places his personal interests above the well-being of the state. We therefore expect the BSW parliamentary group in the Thuringian state legislature to withdraw its support for Mario Voigt and to back the path toward a non-partisan Minister-President who governs with shifting majorities—a model that should be adopted in Thuringia as well."

Katja Wolf, the Thuringia leader of the BSW, emphasized the trusting cooperation with Mario Voigt. Meanwhile, Stefan Wogawa, the parliamentary group manager for the BSW in the Thuringian state parliament, announced that the group intends to discuss the federal executive board's directive on Monday. "For me personally as a member of parliament, this directive is moot," Wogawa said. He noted that this was his personal stance and that the parliamentary group had not yet coordinated on the matter. He stressed that, as a member of parliament, he was not bound by this instruction from the party executive board.

Höcke with an idea – Wagenknecht with a counter-offer

The demand comes at a critical moment. Two days earlier, Björn Höcke—the Thuringia state leader of the AfD and a right-wing extremist—had called on Wagenknecht to seek election as minister-president in the Erfurt state parliament. The BSW founder rejected this proposal. "The office of Thuringia’s minister-president is not a floating trophy that Mr. Höcke can award at will," Wagenknecht told the news agency dpa.

However, Wagenknecht had a counter-offer ready. "Not least to discuss the differences and commonalities between the BSW and the AfD, the BSW leadership had offered Ms. Weidel a public debate with me—an offer she declined, to our regret," Wagenknecht told Der Spiegel. "I call upon Mr. Höcke to take on this debate with me instead of Alice Weidel," she proposed.

Translated by Google Translate, mistakes are my own.

Russia on Friday dismissed the idea of a ceasefire with Ukraine in the Black Sea, saying it saw no grounds for “half-measures” that would offer a respite to the other side.

Both Russia and Ukraine have stepped up attacks in recent weeks against commercial ships in the Black Sea, driving world grain prices higher.

In a statement, Foreign Ministry spokeswoman Maria Zakharova accused Ukraine of “brazen acts of terrorism” against shipping, while making no mention of Russia’s own attacks.

“We view these attacks (by Ukraine) as a deliberate policy aimed at destabilising civilian shipping in the Black Sea region to further escalate tensions and prolong the conflict, all with the blatant acquiescence of regional neighbours,” Zakharova said.

“At the same time, we see no signs of improvement in the situation and, consequently, no grounds for half-measures that merely grant the Kyiv regime a temporary breathing space.”

Zakharova said she was commenting on a statement by Turkey’s Foreign Minister Hakan Fidan in a media interview that Ankara had put proposals to both Russia and Ukraine for a moratorium on military operations in the Black Sea.

She said Russia had received no formal proposal from Turkey.

Reuters reported on Thursday that Ukraine has transmitted an offer to Russia, via a third party, for both sides to halt attacks on civilian targets in the Black Sea.

Zakharova said it was not feasible to return to the 2022-23 Black Sea grain initiative brokered by Turkey, an arrangement that allowed Russia and Ukraine - both major grain exporters - to continue to supply world markets. The agreement, which she called one-sided, broke down after Russia accused Ukraine and the West of failing to honour their side of the deal.

SS: This article highlights the institutional contrast between the Colombian and Venezuelan governments response to earthquakes. The long and short of it is that Venezuela lacked the state capacity to quickly react to the earthquake at La Guaira. Colombia's response on the other hand was relatively quick. This is despite the in-fighting between the newly elected President Abelardo de la Espriella and the outgoing administration of Gustavo Petro. Despite their differences the Colombians responded to the disaster within hours, while the Venezuelan government reacted slowly. This left Venezuelan civilians no choice but to dig through the rubble in search of survivors with their own hands.

Archived version: https://archive.fo/4MWL9

SS: Today marks the 52rd anniversary of Richard Nixon's resignation following the Watergate scandal, and yet the lessons of the dangers of an all-powerful executive have seemingly fallen to the wayside. Although legislation had been passed in the 70s that aimed to constrain the executive, the growing weakness of the legislature and the growing acquiescence, if not collaboration, of the supreme court has reversed any gains following Watergate. Now it wouldn't be an exaggeration to say that Nixon's assertion that “when the president does it, that means it is not illegal" is becoming reality.

Adding insult to injury the populace are now seemingly uninterested in holding the president accountable nor addressing the problems with the imperial presidency, with the endless scandals coming out of the Trump admin coming and going within the news cycle.

Donald Tusk says it is first time ‘someone on the order of Russia’ has sought to attack US citizen in Nato country

A Russian plan to kill a Ukrainian American citizen in Warsaw was thwarted by Poland before it could be carried out, the Polish prime minister has said.

Donald Tusk said it was the first time that “someone on the order of Russia” had sought to attack a US citizen on the territory of another Nato country.

Western officials have previously warned that Russia stepped up a campaign of targeted killings since Vladimir Putin’s 2022 invasion of Ukraine, saying they had disrupted several plots across Europe. But Tusk said this incident was unprecedented.

The suspect, who was allegedly recruited by Russia’s secret services, was detained by Polish authorities on 7 August. He will be held in custody for three months, the Warsaw police said in a statement.

The American Ukrainian citizen “was uncomfortable for the Putin regime”, Tusk said in a news conference, without elaborating.

The operation was carried out in cooperation with US services, said Tomasz Siemoniak, Poland’s minister overseeing intelligence services. He said the targeted victim was a US citizen “of Ukrainian origin”. Officials did not immediately provide further details.

The Russian foreign ministry did not immediately respond to a request for comment.

The US state department said it was aware of the reports but said it had no additional information.

Russia has long been accused of targeting its enemies abroad, including by using rare poisons. But intelligence officials previously told the Associated Press that Russia’s security services are now more brazen in their choice of targets, going after Russian activists and foreign supporters of Ukraine as well as military defectors.

Tusk said: “We must assume that the Putin regime will try to eliminate people who are inconvenient for various reasons, in various places around the world.” He added that Poland and other countries must be prepared to counter such actions.

Western officials see the campaign as connected to Russia’s broader efforts to undermine European countries that support Ukraine. The AP has mapped about 200 acts of sabotage, arson and other disruption across Europe since the start of the war in Ukraine that officials have linked to Russia. Putin told the AP in June that Russia was not waging a sabotage campaign against Europe.

In 2006, British authorities accused Russia of being behind the killing in London of the former FSB officer Alexander Litvinenko with radioactive polonium. The UK also blames Russia for the attempted killing of the former Russian military intelligence officer Sergei Skripal in Salisbury in 2018 with the nerve agent novichok.

German authorities said Russia had organised the 2019 killing of Zelimkhan Khangoshvili, a former Chechen rebel commander who was shot in a Berlin park by Vadim Krasikov, a hitman who was later greeted by Putin after he was exchanged in a spy swap.

In June, a Russian artist who was critical of Putin was shot and killed at close range near his home in eastern Poland. Tusk said at the time that the killing of Robert Kuzovkov, known by the pseudonym Semyon Skrepetsky, had the hallmarks of a political assassination. He suggested it was possible Russia was behind it but Polish officials have not yet attributed it to Moscow.

Last year French officials disrupted a plot that they believe was aimed at killing Vladimir Osechkin, a Russian exile who lives under police protection and works to help military defectors flee Putin’s war. Lithuanian officials also disrupted a plot last year to kill a Lithuanian supporter of Ukraine and another against a Russian activist. Officials in Germany have similarly broken up two plots: one to target the head of a German weapons company supplying Ukraine, the other against a Ukrainian military official.

Polish authorities arrested a man in 2024 in what they said was a plot to assassinate the Ukrainian president, Volodymyr Zelenskyy. That year, a Russian helicopter pilot who defected was killed in Spain – Russian operatives were the prime suspects.

“This campaign is not by accident or chance,” a senior European intelligence official previously told the AP. “There is political authorisation.”

SS: Relevance to the subreddit is the growing tempo and audacity of Russian interference in countries that support Ukraine. This has seen a growing number of cases of sabotage, arson and in this case attempted murder.

Our midterms model finds that polls, fundamentals and history all point toward a strong Democratic year. The House is theirs to lose, but winning four Senate seats is still a tall order.

Our midterms model, which we’re now calling FLIPR 🐬 — Forecast with Leading Indicators, Polls and (Expert) Ratings — launched today! There’s a lot of detail both on the model landing page and in the accompanying methodology story. We’ll be updating the model nearly every day, and will have lots more analysis to come.

FLIPR is in the lineage of the f/k/a FiveThirtyEight election forecasts1, but we’ve also put a lot of obsessive work into refining and improving it. We greatly appreciate your patience as we’ve gotten everything ready.

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Some elections fill me with a sense of existential dread. Even the most carefully designed models, which dutifully consider not only how to forecast each state but also how to calibrate the degree of uncertainty in the forecast, will have trouble evaluating the impact of a once-in-a-century pandemic like in 2020 or a major party switching candidates midstream like in 2024.

The next tier down from this are elections that seem relatively normal on the surface, but where typically reliable indicators are contradictory. In 2022, President Biden’s deep unpopularity and the long history of the president’s party performing poorly in midterm elections suggested the possibility of a red wave. Polls of individual races, however, and special election results, were much more equivocal, perhaps reflecting the degree to which the Supreme Court’s decision to overturn Roe v. Wade had galvanized Democrats. In the end, the race-by-race polls were basically right.2 Democrats pared their House losses to just 9 seats and actually gained a seat in the Senate, but it wasn’t an easy election to forecast.

The 2026 election is not in either of those categories. It looks like a pretty normal midterm, to the extent anything can be normal in American politics these days. And normal midterms mean bad news for the incumbent president’s party, especially when the incumbent is as unpopular as President Trump. Polls, historic trends and leading indicators are all fairly consistent in pointing toward Democratic gains.

There is, of course, still considerable uncertainty in the outlook. We’re still 84 days out from the election, for one thing. The uncertainty is something that inherently probabilistic models like our midterm election forecast, a.k.a. FLIPR, are specifically designed to grapple with.

In the House, Republicans basically won the war in an unprecedentedly aggressive round of mid-decade redistricting, which left the map with a mild Republican bias. That gives Democrats a hurdle to clear. Not to be overlooked: extremely partisan maps drawn by both parties have greatly reduced the number of competitive districts in the House. Even if Democrats have a great year — say, they win the national popular vote for the U.S. House by 9 percentage points, which would qualify as a landslide by modern standards — they’ll have trouble matching the 41-seat gain that they had in 2018.

In the Senate, the hurdle for Democrats is much higher. The current composition of the Senate is 53 Republicans and 47 Democrats3, and Vice President JD Vance casts the tiebreaking vote. That means Democrats need to gain a net of 4 seats to take control of the chamber.

In a roughly neutral, presidential-year-type political environment, that would be a nearly impossible task, requiring gains deep into Republican territory. Moreover, it’s plausible that Democrats will have to pick up 5 Republican seats, not 4, because Abdul El-Sayed currently trails Mike Rogers in the polling average in Michigan, a state that Democrats are defending.

But every available indicator suggests that this very much isn’t going to be a neutral political environment. The Democratic Party has a whole host of problems, which we chronicle obsessively here at Silver Bulletin. Turning out their voters in midterms isn’t one of them, however.

And for midterm election purposes, you’d rather have a little internal disarray than have a president with a 38 percent approval rating on the basis of an unpopular quagmire in the Middle East and understandable voter anxiety about spiking gas prices. Not to mention voter fatigue over an 80-year-old, lame duck president at a time when the incumbency “advantage” has turned into persistent anger all around the world toward the status quo and whoever is in charge of it.

Let’s get into more specifics about these indicators, and then we’ll discuss why FLIPR is spitting out the probabilities that it does.

Polling, history and recent elections tell the same story

Our generic ballot average, which we update every day, currently shows Democrats ahead by 6.7 percentage points. Silver Bulletin readers and other election nerds can become obsessed with every little zag in the polls, but our version of the generic ballot has been fairly stable for several months now.

However, that 6.7-point margin might actually lowball Democrats. That’s because most generic ballot polls at this not-exactly-early-but-not-exactly-late point are being conducted among registered voters rather than likely voters — and therefore, don’t account for turnout. FLIPR makes a likely voter adjustment. In line with our longstanding practices, the adjustment is based mostly on polls that release both likely and registered voter versions of the same survey. Typically in such polls, the LV version has been better for Democrats than the RV version. Thus, FLIPR’s version of the generic ballot shows Democrats ahead by 8.1 points instead.

How about the longer sweep of history? Well, FLIPR has a calculation for that, too. We estimate a “prior” based on all congressional elections since 1946, calibrated based on the president’s approval rating, the result of the previous election, and whether the election was a midterm, and adjusted for ever-increasing partisan polarization. In that calculation, Democrats are favored to win the popular vote for the U.S. House by 8.7 points instead.

Trump’s approval rating? It’s now roughly -20. And contrary to the media narrative that tends to view Trump’s support as ironclad, even some of his base is wavering; only 22 percent of Americans strongly approve of Trump’s performance in office. Republicans who feel ambivalent about Trump probably won’t vote for Democrats — but they might not vote at all.

What about polls of individual races? That story is slightly more complicated. There are a few rough patches for Democrats. El-Sayed, for example, currently trails Mike Rogers by about a point-and-a-half in our polling average for Michigan — though the more advanced versions of our forecast deem him a favorite to eventually catch up. But Jon Ossoff leads by 9 points in Georgia, a state where Democrats rarely win anything by more than a point or two. Roy Cooper leads by about the same margin in North Carolina. And James Talarico is slightly ahead in Texas. Even Iowa is currently polling as a toss-up.

Don’t trust the polls? Well, in the last major set of elections in November 2025, Democrats had basically a perfect night. Polls underestimated them, and their margins in Virginia, New Jersey and other states were consistent with a blue wave.

But isn’t the DNC having a fundraising crisis? Yes, but that’s partly because Democratic donors are finding better ways to spend their money. Among Senate candidates, the top 7 in fundraising so far this cycle are all Democrats.

To repeat: Democrats certainly have plenty of problems. I’m one of those people who thinks the empirical evidence strongly points toward more moderate candidates being more electable. In addition to El-Sayed, our polling average currently has Francesca Hong in a tossup in the Wisconsin gubernatorial race — her primary is tonight — and our model is much less confident that she’ll revert to the mean because gubernatorial races are still considerably less partisan than races for Congress.

Archived link: https://archive.fo/J3cqh

The long and short of it is that America is undergoing a cultural and political fracturing into smaller atomized groups. This atomization is not defined by the typical left-right divide, but into smaller political tribes.

A Syrian court has sentenced ousted dictator Bashar al-Assad to death in absentia, after convicting him of committing war crimes and crimes against humanity during the country's civil war.

It is the first conviction against Assad, who fled from Damascus to Moscow with his family after his regime was overthrown in December 2024, ending his family's five-decade grip on power.

Assad's cousin and the former head of political security in southern Syria's Deraa province, Atef Najib, was also sentenced to death. He had been put on trial and appeared wearing a striped prison uniform inside a cage in the courtroom as the judge read out his sentence.

Deraa is widely seen as the birthplace of the uprising against Assad's rule.

In March 2011, the detention and alleged torture of a group of teenagers accused of writing anti-government graffiti sparked protests in the city, which were met with a violent crackdown by security forces.

That response helped ignite nationwide demonstrations that escalated into civil war in which hundreds of thousands of people were killed.

Syria's interim government began trying officials associated with the Assad regime, which ruled the country for more than 50 years, earlier this year.

Najib is one of the highest-ranking officials to be put on trial.

He was convicted of crimes including murder, "the intentional killing of children under 15" and "torture leading to death".

The court also sentenced six former military and security officials in absentia to death, including Bashar al-Assad's younger brother, Maher. He ran the army's elite Fourth Division and also fled to Moscow when the regime fell.

The others convicted include former defence minister Fahd al-Freij.

Nouha al-Masri has spent 15 years waiting for this moment.

She is not just part of the five person prosecution team, she is also a plaintiff in this case.

Masri lost her brother during the March 2011 crackdown and massacre at Al-Omari Square in Deraa.

"The verdict reflects the magnitude of the sacrifices we made, the sacrifices of the martyrs, the suffering and pain of the victims, the missing, and the detainees," she told the BBC.

"We have been waiting for 15 years to reclaim even a small part of our rights, for all those who have spilled our blood, committed crimes, violated our rights, killed, and tortured us."

For Masri, the verdict is a new chapter.

"Our demand is that this not be the end of the trials... In the new Syria, there will be no impunity from this day forward."

It remains unclear whether Syria's new authorities will be able to secure Bashar and Maher al-Assad's extraditions from Moscow.

It is not the first move against Assad by Syria's new leadership.

An arrest warrant was issued against him last December on charges of murder and torture.

He left for Russia as forces under Ahmed al-Sharaa - now Syria's president - swept to power in a rapid, 11-day campaign that brought down the Assad dynasty.

Since then, the new government has detained numerous former officials and security personnel, though most senior figures from the old regime, including Assad himself, remain out of reach in Russia.

Attempts by Syrian opposition figures to pursue Assad through courts in Western countries during the final years of his rule did not lead to any convictions.

Assad came to power in 2000 after the death of his father. The second son of Hafez al-Assad, he was not destined to be Syria's ruler until his brother, Basil, died in a car crash in 1994.

Part of the Alawite minority, he continued to favour their dominance in many roles in the military, security and intelligence agencies.

Much of his rule was defined by the civil war.

Leipzig Airport appears to have narrowly escaped a disaster—even more so than previously known. According to information obtained by Die Zeit, the armed drone struck an aircraft.

Since an armed drone was discovered at Leipzig Airport overnight into Wednesday, many details have come to light—such as the drone's size (a quadcopter with four rotors, roughly the dimensions of a microwave oven), where it was found (near a Ukrainian cargo plane also used to transport military equipment), and the type of explosive it carried (Semtex).

However, some crucial questions regarding the sequence of events have remained unanswered until now. These include how the armed drone managed to get close to the Ukrainian aircraft in the first place, the path it took, and whether it was scouting the plane or, for instance, attempting to fly underneath it.

According to information obtained by *Die Zeit*, video footage shedding light on these matters has now been analyzed, as the majority of the airport grounds are under camera surveillance. The videos reveal that Leipzig narrowly escaped a catastrophe—far more narrowly than previously known.

The footage shows the Antonov cargo plane parked at the airport. It also appears to show an object flying directly toward the aircraft around 7:30 p.m. on Tuesday evening. It ultimately struck one of the wings. Wings are particularly critical parts of an aircraft because they typically house fuel tanks; anyone intending to blow up a plane would detonate a bomb there. However, that did not happen in Leipzig. The footage indicates that the object bounced off the wing and fell to the ground. Traces found on one of the Antonov's wings confirm this suspected sequence of events. It remains unclear why the explosive device failed to detonate.

The drone was not discovered by chance until four hours later. Die Zeit had already reported on Wednesday that it was the bus driver for a tourist group who spotted the device. Previous reconstructions had assumed that he kicked the device and later pinned it to the ground. This was also the account given by CDU Member of the Bundestag Detlef Seif, who, along with other lawmakers specializing in home affairs, was briefed on the incident by the federal government on Thursday.

Camera footage, however, now reveals that the drone was already on the ground when the bus driver arrived. After a brief moment of hesitation, he placed his foot on it and alerted security personnel. Ultimately—contrary to earlier reports—the explosive device was not found on the drone itself but at some distance away; it may have detached upon impact with the aircraft.

This provides new insights for the Federal Criminal Police Office (BKA) officers who took over the investigation over the weekend. It is now clearer exactly how the drone approached the aircraft: not cautiously, but with the obvious intent to cause damage. Its purpose has also become clearer. Previously, one working hypothesis was that it might have been intended merely as a sort of warning—armed, yes, but not meant to actually detonate. That hypothesis is now difficult to maintain. Leipzig Airport narrowly escaped a devastating attack.

When Federal Interior Minister Alexander Dobrindt (CSU) interrupted his vacation on Wednesday to travel to Leipzig, he avoided making clear statements about whom he suspected of commissioning the attack. While he spoke of a "hybrid attack scenario" and "foreign powers"—phrasing commonly interpreted as a reference to Russia—he refrained from explicitly naming Russia as the perpetrator. He faced criticism for this from figures such as Konstantin von Notz, a Green Party MP and security policy expert. The federal government must make clear "where all the trails lead and state unequivocally that such operations will have clear consequences," von Notz said.

So far, the investigation has not yielded clear evidence that Russia is behind the attempted attack. However, several details point to highly professional perpetrators. The drone was not purchased off the shelf but custom-built—in a manner beyond the capabilities of petty criminals or hobbyists. Because it was a so-called non-commercial drone, it could not be detected by conventional radar systems. The Semtex explosive with which it was equipped was powerful enough that it would likely have caused the aircraft to explode. While Semtex is occasionally available on the black market, it is typically used by the military. Consequently, the involvement of a state actor in the attack—in whatever capacity—has become one of the increasingly likely hypotheses in the investigation.

Translated by Google Translate, mistakes are my own.

Archived version for original German text: https://archive.ph/IjK7L.

Moscow turns to raids, pressure and deception to enlist soldiers to fight against Ukraine

Russian army recruiters are resorting to increasingly coercive tactics, including snatching men off the street and tricking students into signing up, as Moscow’s manpower advantage in Ukraine comes under strain.

The pressure stems from Vladimir Putin’s refusal to adapt his war strategy built on Russia’s willingness to sacrifice more soldiers than Ukraine, even as western estimates put Moscow’s losses at more than 30,000 men a month.

“Year by year and month by month, it’s harder for the Russian army to find people,” said Grigory Sverdlin, director of Get Lost, a non-profit that helps Russian soldiers desert. “Putin is evidently putting off a new wave of mobilization, so the defence ministry has to put more pressure on all sorts of people to sign contracts.”

Still, Putin insists Russia’s advance is inexorable and Ukraine’s collapse is only a matter of time. Another mobilisation is “nonsense”, according to his stand-in, former president Dmitry Medvedev.

Military analysts say Putin’s sweeping territorial ambitions have spread Russian forces thin, yielding only incremental gains at heavy cost. New units are sent straight to the front to sustain slow-moving offensives rather than build reserves.

“The more the Russian military grew in size, the less of it they were able to employ on the battlefield at any given time,” said Michael Kofman, a senior fellow at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. “The scale of Russian offensive action decreased as the size of the force deployed in Ukraine increased.”

Russia was also slow to adapt to Ukraine’s defensive tactics, sending its already high casualty rate even higher. Western governments estimate nearly 500,000 Russian soldiers have been killed in action during the war; Ukraine claims to have killed 131,000 this year alone.

“They became complacent and failed to adapt,” Kofman said. “If they’re not able to increase this recruitment rate, or conduct mobilisation, Russian units will start to deplete again and that will leave them vulnerable. Not only will the offensive effort stall, but they will face significant reversals on the battlefield over time.”

Although Medvedev claims the army recruited 200,000 more men in the first half of 2026, high attrition has forced Russia to send most of them to replenish frontline units rather than build reserves.

That has left Russia stretched thin outside its main axis of attack in Ukraine’s eastern Donbas region.

Russia’s defence ministry claimed in July that its forces seized 2,226 sq km in the first half of the year. The Institute for the Study of War puts its net gain at just 81.1 sq km, after Ukrainian counter-attacks.

Recruiting enough men to sustain even the current slow pace of attack has become increasingly difficult. Although new soldiers receive bonuses of up to Rbs4.5mn ($56,000) for signing up, officials are under increased pressure to find recruits, according to analysts.

Get Lost’s Sverdlin said: “They replenish the losses with people who sign new contracts, and there haven’t been enough people willing to sign up for quite some time — even for the huge sums offered in the contracts.”

The Kremlin and defence ministry have ordered local officials to meet quotas for new recruits as part of this year’s 409,000 target, said people familiar with the matter. Russians can also receive referral bonuses for persuading others to sign up, spawning a cottage industry of remote headhunters who cold-call potential recruits.

The pressure has increased in recent months. Activists describe the efforts as an attempt to help Putin avoid another politically unpopular mobilisation drive — the first since autumn 2022, when hundreds of thousands of men fled the country.

Instead, officials are “trying to squeeze as much as they can from every category of men”, said Artyom Klyga, a military law expert at Connection e.V., a Germany-based group supporting conscientious objectors and deserters. “There are traps for each group to trick them or pressure them into signing a contract.”

In Penza, a city in southern Russia, police have raided workplaces and taken people off the street to military recruitment offices, where they have been forced to sign contracts, according to activists.

Similar sweeps have taken place in other cities, including Ulyanovsk, where a man who had lost an eye said he was forced to sign a contract, and Rostov, where police detained 35 factory workers.

Russian police denied the raids were aimed at sending people to the front.

A report from a district in Russia’s Belgorod region suggests many recruits enlist only after pressure, with officials approaching “suitable candidates” for “conversations” at their homes and workplaces, including debtors, recently discharged draftees and men serving suspended sentences.

In the far-eastern region of Khabarovsk, police said they held 2,500 such “conversations” last year and persuaded 32 people to sign up — all but four of them suspects in criminal investigations.

“Local authorities are under enormous pressure to recruit enough soldiers each year,” said Janis Kluge, a Russia expert at the German Institute for International and Security Affairs, who compiled the reports. “They know who is in debt, who is under police investigation and who has recently lost their driving licence, and they home in on these men.”

Many others have been summoned to verify their military service records, including women with medical or other skills used by the armed forces. Starting in 2026, Russia gave local recruitment offices the power to issue such summonses year-round, a tool activists say is often used to pressure people into joining.

Indira, a real estate agent from Nalchik, told the FT that she and several former female classmates received draft notices in May because they have degrees in pharmacology. “The fact of receiving it is itself certainly very concerning, but there is no reason to worry just yet,” she said.

The notices have also been used to pressure political activists.

Roman Malozemov, 22, a lawyer from Novosibirsk who represents farmers suing the government over the culling of their cattle, said he received a draft notice on the same day a hearing was scheduled in the case. “I call it a jump-scare prank,” Malozemov told the FT.

The increase in coerced recruitment has coincided with a surge in desertions. At least 28,000 people have been convicted of fleeing their posts, according to rights organisation Peace Plea. Leaked internal documents indicate the real annual total is likely at least twice as high, according to Ukrainian analytical group Frontelligence Insight.

In private conversations and Telegram chats, Russians are increasingly voicing fears that a new mobilisation could follow September’s State Duma elections. Some are already checking flights abroad to avoid the last-minute price surge seen during the previous call-up, while others are considering leaving for several weeks before the vote as a precaution.

“I have no clue whether they will announce mobilisation or not. But everyone just has a feeling that something is about to happen after the elections,” said Yaroslav, a manager from Moscow.

But another mobilisation would carry at least as much risk for Russia as reward, said a person close to the defence ministry. “The political effect of major losses among mobilised men, combined with likely significant desertion, could be very negative domestically.”

Normally, a federal party stays out of the process of forming state governments. However, with an eye on the election in Saxony-Anhalt, Frei—the leader of the Union parliamentary group—has now made it clear: a coalition between the CDU's eastern branch and the AfD would not be tolerated.

Following the state election in Saxony-Anhalt, the CDU leadership in Berlin would not allow its state branch to make an independent decision regarding a coalition with the AfD. "The federal party normally stays out of government formation at the state level. However, this fundamental issue affects the entire party," Thorsten Frei, parliamentary group leader of the CDU/CSU, told newspapers belonging to the Funke Media Group.

Frei had been asked whether the CDU in Saxony-Anhalt would remain steadfast if, after the election, it found itself in a position to govern jointly with the AfD. He emphasized: "The ban on cooperation with the AfD is a fundamental policy decision within the CDU." This stance could not be interpreted differently depending on the federal state.

Germany's domestic intelligence agency has classified the AfD in Saxony-Anhalt as a "confirmed right-wing extremist" movement. In opinion polls, the party is running well ahead of the CDU, which currently holds the office of Minister-President—held by Sven Schulze—and governs in a coalition with the SPD and FDP.

That affects us all.

However, Frei acknowledged the foreseeable consequences of the state elections for the federal coalition.

The elections in September certainly wouldn't be a disaster, but they would undoubtedly impact the work of the government in Berlin. "But this affects us all. One thing is clear: for the massive reforms we have set out to achieve, we need strong governing parties and strong party leaders."

Frei backs Merz.

In doing so, Frei also countered speculation that Merz could be replaced as party leader and chancellor should the elections in Saxony-Anhalt, Mecklenburg-Western Pomerania, and Berlin in September turn out disastrously for the CDU.

"Friedrich Merz is the elected Chancellor; he will remain in office for the entire term," said the parliamentary group leader. "The Chancellor's authority is intact."

Translated by Google Translate, mistakes are my own.

Last week, the US software company Turnitin revealed 53.6% of Australian tertiary education submissions run through its system used some form of AI in the period from October 2025-April 2026. The company, whose plagiarism-detection technology is widely used in universities, also reported 10% of these submissions contained more than 80% AI-written content.

Meanwhile, separate data from AI safety company Anthropic showed Australia now leads in per capita use of its Claude chatbot. Coursework makes up a significant share of that use.

Our 2026 analysis found while most Australian universities have introduced generative AI policies, significant gaps remain in translating these into practice.

So what can unis do to keep up?

How AI is used matters

The headline figure is striking, but it should be interpreted with care. AI detection tools estimate the likelihood that assisted writing is present, not whether a student breached university rules. A high AI score could reflect disclosed use rather than academic misconduct.

The real concern is not whether AI is present in students’ work, but how it is being used and assessed.

Generative AI can be used in many ways to assist in learning, such as brainstorming ideas, refining structure, improving grammar, generating practice questions, or receiving formative feedback. These activities are increasingly recognised by universities as appropriate when used transparently and within institutional guidelines.

Experts say AI can become problematic when it replaces, rather than supports students’ thinking.

Rethinking how units are taught

A big challenge for universities is distinguishing whether students are using AI to help or as a substitute for learning. Unis need to ask whether their current approach to AI is effective in providing students with the knowledge, judgement and skills required for their degree.

One way unis can approach this is by modifying units to focus on the learning process rather than the final assessment.

For example, instead of asking students to submit a single essay at the end of the semester, an educator might ask them to document how they used AI throughout the unit. They might be asked to evaluate the accuracy of AI responses and reflect on why they accepted or rejected particular suggestions. The final grade would therefore recognise not only the finished product, but also the student’s reasoning, judgement and learning process.

But changing assessment alone is unlikely to improve learning outcomes. Students need repeated opportunities to practise the kinds of thinking, judgement and AI-supported decision-making in adapted assessments. This is why highlighting the learning process as part of a unit restructure is important.

Still, this sort of curriculum change takes time. Teaching activities, assessments, learning outcomes and staff development all need to be reviewed and tested before being introduced at scale.

Tools designed for education

The Turnitin report also found educators are increasingly demanding education-specific AI tools to help them navigate AI use in tertiary education.

Generic AI assistants, such as ChatGPT, are designed to answer almost any question. Universities, however, need AI systems designed around learning, assessment and institutional policies.

Used well, education-specific AI tools can support students through structured brainstorming, provide them with tailored feedback, and guide them to relevant course resources. For teachers, education-specific AI tools can allow them to set limits in how AI can be used by students, and to see how students have used AI in assessments.

Many universities now provide institutionally supported AI tools. Other unis are piloting the technology.

The goal is not to replace educators or automate assessment. It is to create AI that supports learning, transparency and academic integrity. If AI becomes an accepted, routine part of university study, these education-specific systems may become as important to learning as the technologies and software platforms universities currently rely on.

We also need to remember, there is not one simple fix around AI. It’s not something that can be solved by a one-off solution. Unis therefore need to treat AI as an ongoing educational and governance challenge. Effective responses require continuous evaluation, adaptation and investment in teaching, assessment and policy as the technology changes.