Iran's UN rep in Geneva, Ali Bahreini, stood up on July 4 and condemned "certain external actors" for supplying arms, financing, drones, and fighter recruitment to the RSF. He tied it to the situation deteriorating in El Obeid, pointed back to El Fasher and Darfur as the pattern, and called for accountability and "equal treatment of all crises without double standards."

Here's the thing though. Iran isn't some outside observer here. They're one of the main foreign backers propping up the other side of this war.

• In Feb 2025, Iran's FM Araghchi met his Sudanese counterpart and openly declared Iran's support for the Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF) against the RSF, using almost identical language about opposing foreign interference.
• Since then, multiple reports have documented SAF leaning heavily on Iranian drones for battlefield gains, with Iranian involvement reportedly going deeper than hardware, reaching into SAF command structures through IRGC channels.
• There's also a longer game here. Analysts point to Iran's interest in Sudan's uranium deposits as part of why Tehran keeps investing in this relationship.

So when Iran calls for accountability for "all external actors fueling this conflict" and no double standards, they're describing themselves. This isn't an outsider condemning a war they have no stake in. It's one side's foreign patron calling out the other side's foreign patrons, dressed up as neutrality.

• Tasnim News, July 4/5 2026: https://www.tasnimnews.ir/en/news/2026/07/04/3632859/iran-condemns-foreign-support-for-rsf-calls-for-sudanese-led-solution
• Islam Times, July 4 2026: https://www.islamtimes.com/en/news/1290103/iran-condemns-foreign-support-for-rsf-calls-sudanese-led-solution
• Sudan Tribune, Feb 18 2025: https://sudantribune.com/article297615/
• Foreign Policy, May 28 2026: https://foreignpolicy.com/2026/05/28/sudan-iran-war-gulf-proxy-ripple-effects-peace-talks-quad/
• Horn Review, Jan 13 2026: https://hornreview.org/2026/01/13/axis-of-entanglement-how-sudans-war-is-locked-to-irans-regime-stability/

Uwe Boll's film- about an American citizen bringing justice back to Europeans, which immigrants and EU officials have taken away from them- correlates quite closely with Vice President Vance's remarks: at the Munich Security Conference on February 14, 2025; in a Fox News interview on August 1, 2025, when he said that Europe is headed for 'civilisational suicide' because of its migration policies; and again on January 22, 2026, in a Newsmax interview, repeating the same thesis.

The film has been effectively banned by bureaucratic means in several European countries, but Elon Musk posted it for free on X. European media have mostly given it negative coverage, and this is one of those articles.

US President Donald Trump said it is "ridiculous" for the United States to continue its "one-sided" relationship with NATO.

United States President Donald Trump said Thursday it is "ridiculous" for the United States to continue its "one-sided" relationship with NATO, less than a week before a NATO summit in Ankara.

Trump wrote on his Truth Social platform: "They were not there for us!!!" and Washington's relationship with NATO "is not reciprocal."

Trump has repeatedly lashed out at European allies over their response to the war in Iran.

Trump also insists he wants Europe to take the lead role for its own defence, and Washington has already moved to scale back commitments.

His Truth Social post on Thursday included a chart showing NATO spending, with the United States investing vastly more than the other member states depicted.

Under pressure from Trump, NATO leaders agreed at a gathering last year to boost defence spending to 5% of GDP by 2035.

The upcoming NATO summit, which will bring together 32 member states, will be held in the Turkish capital on July 7-8.

After the collapse of the Soviet Union, many Western leaders hoped Russia could eventually be integrated into the European security and economic order. Russia joined the G8 (then G7 became G8), NATO and Russia established formal dialogue through the NATO–Russia Council, and economic ties especially in energy deepened significantly

Even after the 2014 annexation of Crimea, when Russia was suspended from the G8 and sanctions were imposed, Europe and Russia continued to maintain substantial economic and diplomatic engagement

Since 2022, however, the relationship appears fundamentally different: unprecedented sanctions, frozen Russian assets, large-scale military aid to Ukraine, NATO expansion, and a collapse in political trust.

Has the relationship now crossed a point of no return, or could a future normalization still be possible once the war ends?

From an international relations perspective, who faces the greater long-term strategic cost? Europe, which must now treat Russia as a long-term security threat and invest far more in defense, or Russia, which has pushed much of Europe closer to NATO and become increasingly isolated from Western markets and institutions?

Some IR scholars also argue that prolonged isolation and exclusion can make rival states more revisionist or aggressive by reducing incentives for cooperation, while others argue that sustained pressure is necessary to deter future aggression.

Which perspective do you think better explains the likely long-term trajectory of Russia–Europe relations?

This could have easily replaced Israel with the United States and it would come to the same basic conclusions.

Iran didn’t have to win to win, it just had to survive.

So many basic mistakes regarding strategy the “sunk cost fallacy” were made and continue to be made, including an understanding of what victory would look like, not only for yourself, but your adversary as well.

Hi everyone, I hope it's OK to share this here. I wrote a blog post about my assessment on how Europe would react if Russia ever tried to invade the Baltics.

“Don’t poke the bear!” Russians and their Western supporters - and fearers - liked to repeat it even before the full-scale invasion. After more than four years of war and crossing every imaginary “red line” without consequences, it has become a meme at this point. The line implies that Russia is a deadly beast that has the power to lash out violently if threatened, capable of killing whoever “pokes” it.

If Russia is a bear, then Europe is a sleeping dragon. It started dozing off after 1945 and militarily and geopolitically speaking went into deep sleep after the collapse of the Soviet Union. 2022 took the dragon totally off-guard, but the dangers weren’t grave enough to make it wake up, it merely entered its REM sleep phase.

I already shared my long take about a possible Russian invasion of the Baltics, but as the topic has the habit of re- and resurfacing, I felt the urge to expand on it.

Most public debate on the topic envisions Moscow pressuring the region in order to force Europe to stop further aid to Ukraine. Despite it being understandably a more concrete and pressing threat, this - in my opinion - is much less likely than the scenario I will outline.

A limited incursion or bombing campaign against EU and NATO territories would have a much less decisive benefit for Russia, while it would still mobilize increased European support for Ukraine. The lesson the continent would learn from it wouldn’t be that Russia is strong and we should just give in, but that Russia is a threat that needs to be dealt with, and the best way to do so is by arming Ukraine and boosting defence spending.

Let’s imagine a scenario that puts Russia in the best realistic position.

US President Trump or Vance manages to cut a deal with Putin. Russia agrees to a ceasefire on the current line in exchange for US withdrawal from the Baltics and Poland, easing of sanctions, and the normalisation of relations. While this would create widespread anxieties in Eastern Europe, a renewed crisis in EU-US relationships, and further weaken NATO by decisively putting Washington’s security guarantees in question, the continent can finally breathe a sigh of relief. The war is over, Russia managed to accept that they cannot take Ukraine, and has no more reason to threaten Europe, right?

But what if Putin didn’t see it that way? What if instead of demobilizing he would rapidly reconstitute his forces from Ukraine to Belarus and Russia’s north-western borders with the Baltics? He might conclude that with NATO castrated, a friendly administration in Washington, and a Europe still in its early phase of rearmament, this is the right moment to strike and change European security architecture favourable to Moscow.

What would be his goal? The pretext might be something between the good old “protection of Russian minorities”, and the “creation of a humanitarian corridor” to Kaliningrad. His true objective would likely be to force NATO troops to fully withdraw from the region, giving the organisation a final blow, while also weakening EU unity and cohesion, creating a divided continent. This would create a reality where Russia is the de facto “security guarantor” of Eastern Europe, and use this as leverage to influence its politics. Basically, the return of the Eastern Bloc as a buffer.

Putin’s base thesis is that the “West” and its democracies are in inevitable decline. Europeans are not ready for war, and there is little to no societal resolve to defend the Baltics. Sort of “he only needs to kick the door in, and the whole system would collapse”.

How would this play out?

Let’s assume Moscow gave an ultimatum for European capitals to withdraw their forces from the Baltics while amassing its troops near the border. How would these countries react? It is possible that they might start negotiations with Russia, but it’s extremely unlikely that they would comply. The best Putin could achieve would be the status quo, and the blocking of extra troops fearing escalation. 

Then day one comes, Russian forces cross the EU border in a full-scale invasion of all three Baltic states. Putin gives another long speech watched by the entire world where he threatens to use nukes and immediate long-range strikes on Berlin, Paris, London, and anyone who is willing to engage the Russian military.

This might cause an immediate political crisis in European capitals. Perhaps many would call for an urgent troop withdrawal from the Baltics, and assuming that Russia manages to avoid killing their soldiers already stationed there, it could avoid creating an immediate rally around the flag effect. Fear might override the resolve in the vast majority of European societies. It is already a big if, but dangerously plausible enough to run with the assumption.

However, there are nations that would not be deterred, and immediately treat any kind of incursion or attack on the Baltics as an attack on themselves. This would certainly include Poland, Finland, Sweden, and crucially Ukraine. No matter what other countries do, they would do everything possible to make sure that Russia cannot reach its objectives. It would be an existential issue for them from day one.

Similarly, EU institutions would unavoidably treat it as an attack on the whole Union. Brussels cannot accept a hostile country invading any part of its territory. It would create a deadly precedent that delegitimises its entire raison d'être as a guarantor of peace.

Estonian, Latvian, Lithuanian, Polish, Finnish, and Swedish officials occupy key positions in Brussels, and they would do everything in their power to push for a collective response. Let’s not forget that an Estonian, Kaja Kallas serves as the EU's chief diplomat. She guides the Union's common foreign and security policy and external action. She would immediately use her full political capital to make sure the EU will be mobilized to protect her country.

All in all, there would be enormous pressure from multiple directions that pushes EU institutions and member states to respond decisively.

As the days and weeks pass, it will become clear to everyone that the Baltics are not going to surrender, its population is ready to fight, and Finland, Sweden, and Poland will not back down either. Europeans would start seeing Russian bombardments and killings in EU territory. They couldn’t just ignore that nations they share decades long alliances and a common Union with are getting murdered.

These nations have not only been friendly for as long as they can remember, but essentially family. In Germany alone there are two million Poles. Many of them already have German family members, and all of them have German colleagues and acquaintances. This is true for other parts of Western Europe as well and other nations involved. 

The citizens alone would put a massive pressure on European capitals, but probably not the main one. I find it certain that Denmark, Norway, and the UK would shortly join the war as well. Geography and national identities would pull them in if NATO Article 5 wasn’t binding enough. This would create another wave of pressure on individual Europe states. As more and more countries join unilaterally, they would also start pushing everyone else for support. It would create a domino effect that couldn’t stop in Copenhagen or London.

The EU proved it time and time again that it can pull itself together to find money and political will to deal with a crisis. This was showcased clearly during the pandemic and then the full-scale invasion of Ukraine. It’s impossible to imagine that Brussels would not treat this at the very least as seriously as those two instances. 

Just for the pandemic recovery fund the Union managed to come up with €750 billion, and provided $226 billion in financial, military, humanitarian, and refugee assistance to Ukraine. €100s of billions would immediately be allocated for the war and eventually it would likely reach into the trillions mark. Russia’s roughly €165 billion military spending would immediately be put to shame.

This is where the dragon would awaken. The only reason Europe was sleeping on defence was due to its conviction that the US would protect it, and Russia would not be a threat anyway. Both of these assumptions would collapse immediately.

There would be arguments, disagreements, and not everybody would provide the same level of support. Perhaps Spain, Portugal, or Greece would not be willing to send troops (they did participate in the war in Afghanistan though, one might assume that the Baltics would be a more important cause), but they would certainly send other assistance, and would not be able to justify inaction.

History teaches us that an external attack often leads to centralization and unification. The European identity’s foundation myth is based on a story like this. The Battle of Thermopylae that united the Greeks against the Persians. More than two millennia later Bismarck showed us that a talented political operator can even provoke an external attack to create a push for unification. Europe already has the pieces scattered for this unification to happen.

Ukraine

In this situation, it would be foolish to imagine them sitting on their hands. The first place the EU would turn to would be Kyiv. They have the experience, the will to fight, and they are the only ones capable of fighting the drone war of the 21st century. Ukraine would be flooded with orders for drones and demand to train European drone pilots.

Kyiv would also eagerly take the opportunity to reopen the frontline to take back its territory. Since Russia is threatening the entire continent, now Europe would be incentivised to encourage them to do so to distract Moscow.

Eventually, Ukraine would be the real winner of this war. It would lock in European support like nothing else could, and retaking its full territories would become a likely prospect. It would clearly showcase that the continent needs them, and would give a giant boost to its EU membership aspirations.

A European Army

A European Army already enjoys popular support across the EU. All it needs is a final push.

The European Union (without Norway and the UK) has 450 million people. More than three times as many as Russia, and an economy ten times larger. Even if we are pessimistic, this would mean millions - but more likely tens of millions - of people who are ready to take up arms to defend the continent, and an economic base that can easily support them.

Perhaps the initial phases might go poorly - however knowing how the Russian army fared in Ukraine and how prepared the immediately involved countries are, this is at least doubtful -, but Europe could sustain a war much longer than Russia can, simply by the size of its economy and population.

The longer the war would go on the worse the outcome would be for Moscow. Europe would eventually organise its defence, train and equip the millions of people ready to fight, create a coherent fighting force, and learn how to wage war.

At the same time this would create an emotionally powerful story for Europe. We fight and bleed together to defend our continent and our democracies against tyranny and barbarism. This civilisational founding myth would make the EU a potential global superpower akin to the US and China. What we lack in comparison to these giants is unity. The economy and potential already exists, and a clear external threat would create that urgency for unity.

Summary

Moscow cannot just attack the Baltics and get away with it, but Putin might see it very differently. Just like Saddam Hussein didn’t learn from his disastrous war against Iran and still started another disastrous war against Kuwait in just two years, we cannot rule out Putin doing the same.

Similar incentives might be at play as well: more than one million men at arms need a purpose or they might become a domestic threat. He might think it is better to wage another war than to demobilize and face the economic and societal consequences.

Europe’s most important task for the coming years is to make sure that the Kremlin understand what would happen if they invaded. We must prepare for war so we never have to fight it. We must do everything to deter Russia regardless of what the US is doing. Moscow must hear the message clearly: don’t wake up the dragon!

From an outsider's perspective, it feels like the Trump era changed how many allies view the United States, especially regarding NATO, trade, tariffs, and America's role in international organizations.

Even if a future president has a very different approach, do you think U.S. foreign policy will mostly return to what it was before Trump, or do you think some of these changes are now permanent regardless of who is president?

I'm especially curious about NATO, relations with Europe, China, the Middle East, and trade policy.