u/Maximus_En_Minimus

For context, I would regard myself as practicing both the above.

As for how I would personally understand Antinatalism - generally - it would be: the treatment of procreation as imposing either possible or definite harm on or from the newly born, and, as such, treating it as immoral, along with the practice of non-procreation.

In regards to Secular Buddhism, I would understand Antinatalism to be one of the many cessations of the - here quite literal - cycles of rebirth, that cause and condition suffering.

(Provisional secular metaphor of ‘Rebirth’ as those enacted and consequently recursive and cyclical patterns of similarity that eventually incur suffering.)

I would appreciate your perspectives on this.

However, please remember the Subs rules, as I would appreciate no ad hominems that are specifically derogatory; I understand we can never remove perspective, motives, and intentions from argumentation, but please be respectful nonetheless.

(I notice a lot are going to take the route of upvote/downvote, rather than actually engage)

I was particularly disappointed in Jan’s representation of Madhyamaka.

As someone who has been investigating both Svatantrika & Prasangika Madhyamaka, and Tibetan derivatives, for the last near 2years, I felt that Jan really lacked a coherent narrative of explication for the traditions, which inevitably confused the whole podcast.

I feel the reasoning for this is several fold:

- Jan is German, translating ideas from Sanskrit, Tibetan, Pali, over to the English language.

- Jan never really elucidated the Conventional and Perfected Understandings, and their relationship.

- This partly occurs because Alex was insistent on the ontologising of Sunyata and applying it to referents, when Paramartha-Satya is ultimately, phenomenologically soteriological.

- Jan I feel was possibly sneaking in his own Secularised Process-relation Non-essentialism compared to Madhyamaka - which is relatively fine, as I do the same - but for the uninitiated in Madhyamaka, this can be confusing.

Jan is far more educated and researched in Madhyamaka that my autodidactic personage, however, I still feel the Ep was confusing for many listeners, especially if it was for me.

Overall, I was quite disappointed in presented of Madhyamaka; I would love if Alex could get Jay Garfield, as he introduced me to Madhyamaka, but there is also Tenzin Namdak, Yongey Mingyur Rinpoche, Dzongsar Jamyang Khyentse Rinpoche, and, of course, His Holiness the 14th Dalai Lama.

Just to clarify, I am not a Jainist.

I mostly lean secular madhyamaka.

But I am drawn to the idea of Anekantavada / No-one-side / Multisidedness

Below is a quote from the Jain Wiki (I understand you guys understand more than the wiki); I am interested in how you understand this in relation to the Buddhist idea of Sunyata / Emptiness / Nonpresence-of-Ownbeing?

——

The Upanishadic thought (Hindu) postulated the impermanence of matter and body, but the existence of an unchanging, eternal metaphysical reality of Brahman and Ātman (soul, self). The Buddhist thought also postulated impermanence, but denied the existence of any unchanging, eternal soul or self and instead posited the concept of anātman (no-self).[45][46][47]According to the Vedāntin (Upanishadic) conceptual scheme, the Buddhists were wrong in denying permanence and absolutism, and within the Buddhist conceptual scheme, the Vedāntins were wrong in denying the reality of impermanence. The two positions were contradictory and mutually exclusive from each other's point of view.[48] The Jains managed a synthesis of the two uncompromising positions with anekāntavāda.[49][50]

From the perspective of a higher, inclusive level made possible by the ontology and epistemology of anekāntavāda and syādvāda, Jains do not see such claims as contradictory or mutually exclusive; instead, they are seen as ekantika or only partially true.[51] The Jain breadth of vision embraces the perspectives of both Vedānta which, according to Jainism, "recognizes substances but not process", and Buddhism, which "recognizes process but not substance". Jainism, on the other hand, pays equal attention to both substance (dravya) and process (paryaya).[52]

This philosophical syncretisation of paradox of change through anekānta has been acknowledged by modern scholars such as Arvind Sharma, who wrote:[50]

“Our experience of the world presents a profound paradox which we can ignore existentially, but not philosophically. This paradox is the paradox of change. Something – A changes and therefore it cannot be permanent. On the other hand, if A is not permanent, then what changes? In this debate between the "permanence" and "change", Hinduism seems more inclined to grasp the first horn of the dilemma and Buddhism the second. It is Jainism that has the philosophical courage to grasp both horns fearlessly and simultaneously, and the philosophical skill not to be gored by either.”

——

Generally I see that which is been referred as changing, as not necessarily ‘substantive’ or ‘absolute’, but immanent - in that the ‘immanence’ is the bridge that links the change here.

But I would be interested to understand your perspective.

As a Process-relationally orientated thinker and practitioner of Madhyamaka and Non-essentialism in general, I find the language of Whithead deeply troubling.

Despite the point of speculative philosophy of Process & Reality been to move metaphysics towards less substance ontologies and more philosophies of becoming, process, and relation, it seems Whitehead uses explicitly substantialist language:

- Actual Entities
- Subject-Superject
- Satisfaction (quasi-teleological)
- Eternal Objects
- God (depolarised)
- Creativity (as a force)

Whitehead himself critiques the belief in a ‘perfect dictionary’, but I honestly believe he could of done better here.

Has any philosopher developed the language and ideas of Whitehead more towards process-relational and non-essentialist philosophy?

Hi All,

I wanted to touch upon the relatively recent, not-so-recent ‘shouting match’ with a Q&A audience member after a discussion with William Lane Craig.

I have watch the Q&A Youtube video that Alex O’Conner did recently, and I have to say, having watched both videos together, I do fall into the camp that Alex was more confrontational on intellectual side, than merely on any failures of etiquette by the audience member.

Despite my disdain of WLC, and been more philosophically Buddhist myself, I genuinely think his two major points on his Newsletter are actually relevant to this event.

WLC stated two points: that AOC made a ‘strategic mistake with talking to him about the Kalam Cosmological Argument’, and that ‘any illusion of AOC been a non-resistant non-believer was shattered’.

I kind of agree with him, but with major caveats.

I genuinely think this ‘shouting match’ occured - and you could tell AOC was getting frustrated - because of his discussion with WLC about the KCA, which even as a discussion, was nevertheless deconstructive and so intellectually irritating.

I think AOC built up a lot of ‘debating frustration’ that couldn’t be symmetrically released upon WLC on the KCA, and so when the rude audience member spoke up, AOC vented.

Add the poor skills of the moderator and you have an even worse situation.

AOC in this sense, put himself in an awkward spot, because he does present himself as ‘resisting’ in this situation.

Now, do I fully agree with WLC’s presentation of AOC? No, the guy is empathically and pretentiously foul human.

Do I think AOC was really ‘shouting’, not really, although his voiced was necessarily raised.

But I do think AOC has kind of sidelined a lot of the psychological causes and conditions of that venting state onto the actions of the audience member, without realising the broader scope of influences that led up to that event.

I see a lot of talk from ANs on this sub about the devastation humanity brings upon the ‘ecology of the world’, and that this is a grave sin and evil.

I would like to remind those people, that they live upon the largest factory farm in the solar system, possibility within the galaxy.

Under the Sun, all the pain, suffering, and harm you know of has occurred.

Romance the red jewel of the sky - Mars - or any of its siblings for their barren desolations, and the absence of sentience and sapience this allows.

1. Procreation is an act of infinite responsibility undertaken by those only capable of finite accountability.

2. Imperfect world, imperfect people, imperfect parents; I assume no causa sui ill will in those who brought me into it.

3. Why merely extinguish a single candle flame when one can ensure that innumerable others are never lit?

4. Many lives are like the fruits of Eden, whose sweetness is tasted not by themselves, but only by others.

5. One of life's greatest ironies: we’re most potent when we’re most foolish, and most impotent when we’re wisest; such is aging.

6. That I cling to the cliff's edge is no surprise; that I found myself hanging above the abyss, in the first place, is.

7. A thousand thorns for the rose's scent: that life's beauties are reserved for the martyrs who seek them.

8. My dearest children, I hope - I will - to meet you in those blackened halls long before you meet me upon these bloodied streets; we'll sing sonnets of silence, not you and I.

9. The seasons of one's life wax and wane; though spring and summer may nourish you, they cannot keep you, for in time the final winter always comes.

10. 'I am here, Mother nature, bear your chest!' - only to find the flat and unbecoming circles of Father Time.

TL;DR learn to read a 3min post…

\/

Hi,

I have felt this for a while.

I want to clarify I am not promoting violating bodily autonomy. But I do want to highlight both the hypocrisy and concession Pro-choice makes to Natalism:

_____

Pro-choice elevates bodily autonomy as a foundational moral principle, yet that principle is never meaningfully extended to the very person who, if the pregnancy continues, will bear the lifelong consequences of the decision. The moral concern begins and ends with the existing individual, while the autonomy of the future individual is simply never considered. The framework is therefore fundamentally asymmetrical; it affords decisive moral weight to the autonomy of the parent, while the autonomy of the person brought into existence is treated as morally irrelevant.
 
The same asymmetry exists in the very notion of choice. Pro-choice derives its moral force from defending an individual's freedom to choose whether a pregnancy continues, yet the only meaningful choice throughout the entire process belongs to the parent. If the pregnancy proceeds, the resulting person is denied any say over the single most consequential event of their existence; should they exist at all? It is therefore not choice as a universal moral principle that is being defended, but the reproductive choice of those who already exist.
 
Compare this with another moral intuition. Most people would regard forcibly sterilising another person as an extraordinary violation of bodily autonomy. Yet forcing a person into existence - thereby exposing them to suffering, coercion, vulnerability and death - is treated as morally ordinary. The former is widely condemned, while the latter is celebrated, despite imposing far greater and irreversible consequences upon another individual.
 
Fundamentally, the one person who must bear every consequence of the decision for an entire lifetime is also the only one categorically excluded from both choice and autonomy. From an AN perspective, this reveals pro-choice as protecting parental agency, rather than autonomy or choice as consistent moral principles.
 
_____

For this reason, I would argue that pro-choice already concedes the very premise that AN rejects: that creating a new person is a morally legitimate option.

While we cannot - and should not - physically compel people in matters of reproduction, moral philosophy does not begin or end with legal enforceability. AN addresses the ethical responsibility of the individual. Its criticism is directed not at what should happen once pregnancy exists, but at the prior decision to risk creating another person in the first place.

By framing reproduction as a matter of parental choice, pro-choice implicitly accepts procreation as a morally permissible act, rather than questioning whether anyone is justified in choosing existence on behalf of another.

Hi,

My partner and I have reached season 8.

We plan to binge the season from a kind of midpoint, but unsure where that would be from.

Anyone have any good suggestions from what episode we should work to, and then parcel out part of a day to binge the rest of the season?

I've been wondering whether anyone here has thought about the relationship between philosophical pessimism and non-essentialist approaches to metaphysics.

A lot of philosophical pessimism seems to come from very different metaphysical starting points (Schopenhauer, Mainländer, Benatar, etc.), although the general trend is an intermediate informative conclusion that existence is non-contingently harmful, so I'm curious how pessimism looks from a more anti-essentialist perspective, which often treats harm as contingent and conditional. 
 
I'm especially interested in traditions like Madhyamaka and contemporary process-relational philosophy, where reality is understood in terms of relations, processes, and dependent arising rather than fixed substances or essences.
 
Does rejecting substantial entities or fixed essences change your understanding for the basis of Pessimism? Does it undermine or deepen your philosophic pessimistic viewpoint?
 
Personally, it was a major transition for me to go from Substance Metaphysics to Non-essentialist and Process-relational Ontology and Epistemics.

Hi all,

I wanted to share what I call the ‘Non-Natalist’ argument for Antinatalism.

Technically, it is not Antinatalist, as one of the specific conditions needed to argue such is that of the ‘(unconditional) immorality of procreation’.

Nor is it an Argument, but a rhetorical tool.

However, NN is symbiotic and already a specific tactic used by AN that essentially focuses on procreations as not an injustice, but as **unjustified**.

We can think of a vegan and non-vegan talking to a hunter about not hunting a dear:
___
• ⁠the vegan says it is immoral, that the dear is sentient and will suffer.
• ⁠the non-vegan merely points to the fact they have plenty of food already, more than even a hard winter would exhaust, and there is merely no need to hunt.

**Since some are confused, and I think this metaphor is the point of confusion, the Non-vegan here would not propose under certain conditions that it is alright to hunt, but merely deconstruct any reason given.

**A better way to regard the the Vegan then is as Anti-hunting, and the non-vegan as Non-hunting.**
___
Each technically support one another in outcome, and the end result (might be) that still the hunter doesn’t hunt.

The same principle applies to Non-natalism: you’re not defending the nonexistent, by acclaiming an injustice, you’re focusing on the prospective parents values; you don’t just attack via injustices, you also show the unjustified reasons, such as how a child might not bring meaning to their life, might not act as a carer, might bring more hardship, might not reconcile their relationship with their parents, etc.

The reason why I think this is an important rhetorical line of argumentation that should be honed by the AN members is that it address a fundamental dichotomy that is often overlooked:

When ANs argue with a Natalist, they counter-pose the position of Natalism against that of AN; it becomes an axis of contrast and disagreement of two ethical poles.

Now, either the Natalist can do 1 of 3 things: hold each in balance and consider them, tilt towards Natalism in opposition against AN, or tilt towards AN in opposition of Natalism.

The issue with this is, that there can be a seeming retention of ‘evaluative weight’ assigned to each position, especially Natalism, that isn’t technically addressed by AN arguments proper.

What NN is meant to do, is chip away at the evaluative weight of the Natalist justification, without promoting AN, as a kind of deconstruction, rather than negational critique.

This effectively weakens the evaluative weight of the Natalist position, allowing the AN position arguments - Philanthropic & Misanthropic: Net-zero, Non-consent, Gamble, Negative Utilitarianism, Prima Facie Duties, and Pessimism - to have more of an impact on the Natalist position.

I hope the above makes sense, and if anyone has any questions, feel free to ask.

Hi,

I just want to clarify that **Misanthropic AN arguments** are not ‘I hate humans, so they should not exist’.

While this can be a reason for AN, theoretically, within academia and AN proper, Misanthropic AN refers to those arguments that believe bringing humans into existence risks or necessitates incurring harm upon other beings, and so is immoral.

If you hate humans because of this risk or necessity of harm, morally your hate is incidental.

I can hate my high-school bully (I never actually had one), but it doesn’t follow I can make a moral action from this, such as not saving him from being ran over by a train.

Furthermore, it is important to clarify that AN is not conditional; that been, the arguments and moral imperatives are universal and don’t change under differing conditions.

On the other hand, if you want less breeding, but not a total cessation, based upon Misanthropic Arguments, then your reasons are non-universal and can change under conditions, and so you follow a Misanthropic Conditional Natalism.

Hi,

Bunch of my colleagues have begun getting pregnant (dunno if there is stud making the rounds or something), and as such I have had ‘congrat cards’ handed to me.

My solution, without pissing off the colleagues or going against my beliefs:

“Dear … “

“Wishing flourishing, safety, and health for your newborn; may they live a life of content and joy”

Just thought this may help others.