u/Narrow_List_4308

One of the issues with non-scholarly answers is the underdetermination of a proper answer. Faced with different candidates we need a reliable way to sort out the noise from the meaningful, the good and the bad. That is why we accept the answers of experts: they stand for the proper and reliable methodology to derive the best answers.

Yet, it is my experience that there's plenty of underdetermination within scholarship. It even seems that plurality of interpretations, even to the point of giving mutually explicit answers is common.

For example, if I want to know how for Kant appearances stand in relation to things-in-themselves, there is the two worlds interpretation, or one object two aspects, the distinction being metaphysical vs epistemic(amongst other candidates, like T K Seung who not uncompellingly for me argues for Kant as Platonic, as weird as this sounds).

Or if I want to know Locke, some scholars read him saying that not all knowledge comes from experience in a strong sense, others take the classical reading of him as a representationalist, others as a direct realist, others in a third way.

What is fascism? What is modernity? What is idealism? What is realism? What is the ontological status of moral duties? Is Hegel a radical empirist(even a materialist as I read an expert comment), a rationalist, is his Absolute Spirit theological? Political? Something else?

It seems that whenever I try to determine something, when consulting scholarship the answer(sometimes explicitly so) is: experts differ. Which does not allow determination of the topic. And the disagreements are major and foundational, which gives radically different determinations. This is not like the odd biologist who may disagree with evolution. What is a lay guy like me to do?

I remember being particular confused(and frustrated) reading Vere Chappel's "The Cambridge Companion to Locke". Different authors(all considered, obviously, expert enough to appear on the Cambridge Companion) present a radically different Locke. After reading it, I was unclear as to what Locke even intended, much less so what he argued for. I was left with a Locke that was at the same time: an indirect realist, a skeptical/veil of perception representationalist, a direct presentational realist, and intermediate combinations between them. This not only in relation to his epistemology but as well to his morality, his religiosity and to his politics.

And this seems to be a pattern. It seems that for nearly all topic I reach for it's: "in this interpretative line which is foundational, there is both A, !A and an intermediary which is both and neither A or !A", which is entirely undetermined. Imagine I were to go to a car mechanic asking advice for which oil to use on my car, and one expert told me "do not use X oil, if you do so you will screw the motor", another says "you must use X oil, it is the best for your motor", and another say "it could be or could not be", another saying "it is good but not the optimal one", and another saying "it is bad but it will not destroy the motor, it will merely run less efficiently".

I need a reliable methodology to then distinguish scholars. I cannot treat them all equally. But this already seems a very problematic task. How do I know without being a scholar myself what is the proper determination(which is the entire point of consulting experts in the first place) for scholar selection? It not necessarily would be the most common view(which is already hard to know for there are, as far as I'm aware, no such granular surveys), or the latest view, or the most radical view. I think in other fields it can be easier, as if Feynman tells me X about physics, I know nearly for a fact that X about physics is true. My physics teacher may disagree, another scholar may disagree, but I stand on solid ground listening to Feynman. There are some leading figures in different fields within philosophy, such as making this easier(I can reliably trust their expertise on the consensus of a field), but fewer that one may wish for.

So, what is the realistic way for a layperson to get reliable and sound determinations of topics despite the plural indetermination in the literature?

¡Hola, qué tal! Soy Narrow. Un nuevo moderador de este sub. Encantando de conocerles. Como ustedes saben este sub tiene mucho potencial y hay algunos cambios que tenemos que hacer para elevar la calidad. Soy parte de este nuevo equipo.

En mi estilo de moderar seré muy comprensivo y estoy totalmente abierto al diálogo. Creo que lo principal en lo que me enfocaré es en que no haya golpes bajos, insultos o cosas así. Siento que eso perjudica mucho al sub. Ya hemos hecho unas modificaciones y pronto también tendremos las nuevas reglas claras para todos. Serán realmente muy razonables.

También estaré trabajando para tener un pequeño FAQ o Wiki para cuestiones que salen recurrentes. Hay muchos temas prácticos, del tipo "¿Mi vida tiene algun sentido?", y buscaré dar de manera neutral pequeñas exposiciones del tema.

Estaré siendo relativamente activo y soy totalmente accesible. Si están en desacuardo con alguna de mis acciones, sin ningún problema lo podemos hablar, y siempre estaré atento a cualquier recomendación para mejorar el sub.

I see all the time an internal discussion amongst Christians about whether Salvation is about works or about grace, but I think this is misleading. Because in traditional Christianity grace is not guaranteed. That would be universalism, in which GOD guarantees through His own goodness the salvific destiny of all. Nothing one can do from our finitude can destroy this because it is guaranteed by GOD.

So, the concept of grace operating within infernalism seems to me to actually require Salvation to be active on part of the finite human and to operate **within** our finitude. It is a human choice from within our human context which must respond to grace. That is, grace is not intrinsically salvific nor effective nor sufficient in itself, it is contingent upon the contingent. And this is the active finite choice of acceptance. But this seems to me logically not any different than any other finite choice.

So, I think this is a contradiction: insofar as Salvation is contingent upon the finite act of a finite human it would be a work and entail an insufficiency of grace by itself. To say that the finite act does not constitute nor force Salvation and that remains freely from GOD would be irrelevant, because that would respond to a different question.

In the Parmenides there is a very common objection which is raised(which is Plato criticizing the early optimism of the Republic). The objection, as I understand it, within the analytic tradition is: if things which are F-like require participation in a form F and F is F-like then it seems that F would require a new Form upon which F and F-like things participate in, ad infinitum.

So, Forms are not seen as separate "things" but as properties or a more general "that which explains". This bypasses this objection.

But I'm not sure the Third Man objection bites as it seems that Forms can be thing and participate unto themselves. This I view as strictly unavoidable. Consider entities in general. If we accept that there is a Form of being, that is, Being, then it seems necessary to say that the Form itself must be. If we don't say that it is, then it cannot be a property nor an explanation nor a Form. So, we must say that Being is. And if it's possible for Being to be, then there is no formal impossibility of a Form to participate in itself. Am I understanding the objection properly?