Playing through Trail in the Sky FC(The OG) and it seem pretty suspicious that they keep mentioning how the Queen daughter(or grand daughter) is a student and suddenly this noble looking student show up in town!
She gotta be Liberl princess right?!
From what I read opinions on this subject seem to split in the middle
Camp1: The more popular camp
The Prussian army(Moltke) have invented new system of warfare that made 'Napoleonic warfare' obsolete,Infact it is thanks to their adherence of Napoleon in the face of advance in fire power&technology that result in lackluster performance of these powers in the mid century war(1859 Franco-Austrian,US civil war,Austro-Prussian,Franco-Prussian)
Supposedly only the Prussian have grasp the new realities of war and made improvement on their C&C(There some who even said that the reasons that Napoleon did his finest work in 1814 is because the size of the French army reduced back to the level he can handle,And prior to that he and every else before Moltke can't properly handle hundred thousands strong armies)
This is on top of the Prussian masterly of rail ways and their new armanents(Breech loading rifle and field gun)
Thus the mid century opponents of the Prussian weren't necessarily incompetent they were just behind the time,Even Napoleon(The real one) himself wouldn't have done much better in their shoes
Camp2: Doesn't seem to be as popular with modern historian
The principle of war remain the same.Thus the Prussian success and the failure of their opponents are due to their proper understanding of Napoleon or the lack thereof
The Prussian did well but there are weakness in their deployment and plan,If they face generals imbued with Napoleonic spirit they would be punished badly
Interestingly I have read books debating this subject written in the 1890s so people back then was curious about this too
Which camp are you?
The common views seem to hold that during the course of WWI technology have move so far beyond earlier period that principles from Napoleon time no longer work,And that infact the senior generals adherence to the old methods is the cause of horrific casualties of that war
But It seem to me that senior commanders from both side during the Great war have made errors that wouldn't fly even during the Napoleonic period
In case of Austria-Hungary for example
-The military leaders of Austria-Hungary know for sometimes that war with Serbia would Inevitably lead to war with Russia also.They insisted in a warplan that include offensive into Serbia thus taking away manpowers away from the more crucial Eastern front,This seem to fly in the face of proper Napoleonic force concentration(including at the strategic level which can be seen with Napoleon 1805 campaign in which he only leave token force in Italy)
During the Italian campaign they would do it again by spliting force between Isonzo front and the interior
-The proper understanding of Terrain/logistic. This point can be seen most clearly in the 1914 Invasion of Serbia,Abandoning the traditional Northen invasion route that lead to Belgrade and instead choosing the Southen invasion route that have rugged mountainous terrains/crossing major rivers/and perpendicular to most major roads. Once again they fail in something Napoleon is famous for
-Tactic,This would seem like the areas that WWI moves away from Napoleonic war the most.
But during the battle of Galicia the Austro-Hungarian used literal human wave tactic.
While It is an allegation that generally untrue for most WWI armies but thank to certain Franz Conrad who wanted his army training to be more 'war-like' it become so for Austria and Infantry-artillery co-ordination become something that offiecers do not understand
In 1914 the Austrian artillery arms often was unable to take lart in the battles stuck in traffic or were deploy piecemeals/on poor ground and got easily silenced/make minimal impact
Napoleon is obviously very skilled with tge usage of these arms and understand their value very well
"The organization of the artillery is the most urgent, because of all the combat arms it always requires much more time to get ready.It is always the artillery that holds up the formation of armies. Only with cannon can one wage war.Great battles are won with artillery. It may be true that good infantry is the nerve of the army, but if it has to fight for long against superior artillery it would become demoralized and be destroyed.. . . No infantry, however brave, can march 3,000 or 3,600 feet with impunity against sixteen or twenty-four well-placed guns, served by good gunners. Before it would get two thirds of the way its men would be killed, wounded,or scattered. Field artillery has acquired too much accuracy in its fire for us to agree with MachiaveUi, who, enamored of the ideas of the Greeks and Romans, wanted to make only one discharge of artillery before withdrawing it behind his line of battle.
The formation and function of artillery. . . profoundly influences our modern tactics for success in battle, and almost exclusively it dominates the capture and defense of modern fortresses. In siege warfare, as in the field, artillery plays the principal role: it has wrought a complete revolution. It is artillery that takes the forti- fied cities—infantry can only give assistance.
In the initial campaigns of the war of the Revolution, France always excelled in the artillery. I cannot think of a single example in this war where twenty guns, suitably posted, were seized a la ba'ionnette by infantry alone. At the affair of Valmy, the battle of Jemappes, and at Noerdlingen and Fleurus in 1792, our artillery was superior to that of the enemy, although often we had only two guns per thousand men simply because our army was so large. It was generally better drilled and more skilled than its adversary, having at hand better infantry, and it obtained success during a part of the campaign even though its artillery park was much inferior. But on the decisive day of a general engagement, it will cruelly feel its inferiority in artillery and will run the risk of losing everything in an instant."
Aside from that during the battle of Galicia the commander of Austro-Hungarian third army(an old school aristocratic cavalry general) in the wake of collision with Russian force three time his own would make the mistake of crossing a river with predictable result
During the Serbians campaign,Austro-Hungarian units would routinely fell victim to Serbian surprise attack too
I'm less familiar with other fronts but there seem to be a pattern.
The German armies strung out and unable to support each others would get defeated seperately(Not sure that Napoleon would make such a mistake),The Russian strung out armies advancing into East Prussia would be defeated in details at Tannenberg and Masurian lake(The German army would act according to classic Napoleonic principle here)
Now that we have seen the WWI Generals violating Napoleonic principles of war and getting punished for it,There are many areas which might even baffles Napoleom
The Western front trench warfare for example,Every breech would be reinforced by railways which ran parallel to the front giving the defenders disproportionate advantages
This would seem fair bit different than how entrenchment work in Napoleon time.And perhaps only bear resemblance to River crossing operations(Amongst Napoleon handful of defeats would be during such crossing as Aspern) there are ways in which competent Napoleonic and earlier generals undertake such crossing,They would use deception(demonstrated their force against certain point to draw the enemies attention) and cross with overwhelming force at the other point. But WWI Generals routinely did that too
There also the advance in Fire power of breech loading rifle,Machine gun and Quick firing artillery
75mm field guns could fire a shell containing 200-300 shrapnel balls at a rate of 15 rounds per minute
A battery of four such guns could deliver the equivalent of eighteen thousand rounds per minute to range of 7km into a 40,000 square meter area.
Far beyond anything in Napoleon times
What do you think? And what about newer conflict such as WWII?
Found this interesting snippet from some old forum
I thought it would be from Napoleon St.Helena talk but couldn't find this in there
Also,Anyone know good place to read up on Arcduke Charles 1796 campaign aside from Dodge book and Jomini art of war?
This general was said to be the second best Austrian commander of the period only behind Archduke Charles
He seem to be a decent subordinate commander under Prince Coburg,And after he himself assume supreme command in 1795 did manage to gain decent victories
Battle of Höchst in particular where he bested Jourdan(Although in this case Clerfayt may have only conduct his bold maneuver on the assurance of Pichegru treachery,Which is not the same if his decision is based on his military judgement alone) after that is releiving the siege of Mainz and a victory at Pfeddersheim
Do you think this one deserved his spot as number 2? He did face less formidable foe than Wurmser,Alvinczi and Melas(Not that they do not have their own considerable share of mistakes and false ideas of war)
And if we can compare him to others commander,Where should we place him? Bernadotte tier?
He definitely a quite flawed commander but when one contrast him to some other generals such as Scherer or Kray(both of whom play a big part in the war of second coalition) you will noticed that unlike them Wurmser led his troop with determination and energy
Although he is a somewhat poor strategist(by approving Weyrother plan for his Italian 1796 campaign that unnescessary split his army into three part)
He is a decent tactician and did decently in 1793(mixed records) and also against Napoleon(that is avoiding annihilation) at Castiglione
Seem pretty comparable to Victor and Blucher
IMO The Archduke definitely stood head and shoulder above Daun who is loterally Archduke Charles lite
The two shares a lot of the same flaw(perhaps inherent to the Austrian army culture) lack of drive for victory/failure to exploit victories but the Archduke face far more formidable enemies
And although Daun was able to land more crushing victories against Frederick than the Archduke did in his battles it was largely thank to Daun numerical superiority
Laudon was more enterprising than both Daun and the Archduke,But still no match for the Archduke track records
Browne was able to give Frederick his own version of Aspern and seem pretty capable,But I guess that still not quite as good as the actual Aspern and Wagram
Traun arguably acheive better results than the Archduke 1796 campaign just by marching alone,Traun seem like he could really give Charles a run for his money
Prince Eugene seem to match Laudon enterprising spirit to the Archduke military skills, Perhaps 1796 Archduke Charles qas on this level
Montecuccoli.Aside from St.Gotthard seem pretty comparable to the Archduke
Lastly Radetzky.While his Italian campaign of 1848-49 was better than the First half of 1809 it doesn't seem to be on the same level as 1796,Radetzky seem to be on a more similar level to Jourdan(1792-1794), Soult(1809-1813) or Laudon
What do you think?
The game was never release outside of Japan and information on it is very scare
Does anyone still have game files/assets?
Napoleon bold crossing of the Alp result in the Battle of Marengo,A battle in which Napoleon was brought closer to the bring of defeat than anything prior to Aspern
In contrast Moreau Rhine campaign of 1800 was a smooth sailing reminiscence of Napoleon own 1796 Masterpiece
In this specific war not before or after,Did Moreau outclass Napoleon?
The extent to which this man intrigues against Archduke Charles boggle the mind and seem to single-handedly won the war of Second Coalition for the French
He reject Charles plan at the beginning of the campaign in favor of ones by Thugut and Bellegrade resulting in further spliting the Austrian force and passive course of action for Charles main force
He also block Charles plan to advance into Switzerland,Archduke Charles wisely disregard this order a d defeat Massena at the First battle of Zurich but this contribute to him not advancing further or pursue Massena force
Worst Sovereign of Revolutionary/Napoleonic war? And utter bum?
Looking through Napoleon Marengo campaign with it tremendous logistical challenges across the Alps really remind me of Austria-Hungary warplan for the Invasion of Serbia
Quoting John R. Schlinder Fall of double eagle
Potiorek’s war plan looked similarly adequate on paper. He intended to send the Fifth Army, his main strike force, across the upper Drina river, advancing southeast toward Valjevo, while to the north the Second Army on the Sava river would conduct supporting attacks as long as it could.
To the south, the Sixth Army, initially defending eastern Bosnia-Hercegovina against expected Serbian and Montenegrin probing attacks, would invade Serbia five days after the Fifth Army crossed the Drina, through the Užice mountain gap, advancing into the enemy’s rear and causing havoc.
Once primary objectives were reached, the Fifth and Sixth Armies would commence mutually supporting offensives toward Kragujevac in the forested central Serbian heartland, where the main body of enemy’s field forces, weakened by successive blows on multiple axes of advance, would be annihilated.
The plan was to be executed quickly, not merely to provide units for the Eastern Front as soon as feasible, but also to persuade Romania to stay neutral and to destroy Serbia before Bosnian Serbs had any chance to stage a major anti-Habsburg revolt.3 This scheme, which looked superficially pleasing to any graduate of Vienna’s War College, promised a quick, decisive outcome. But it neglected important factors, above all Serbia’s tricky terrain, with its many mountains and few decent roads, which promised to offer the defender significant advantages and make logistical support difficult throughout the operation
Besides, the Fifth andSixth Armies, separated by over a hundred kilometers at the outset, were too far apart to support each other; the necessarily limited role given to the powerful Second Army, which Potiorek wanted to seize Belgrade, a hopeless task given its imminent departure for Galicia, only worsened the odds.4 Such topographical blindness is difficult to explain, since Potiorek, as a young General Staff officer, had grappled with war plans against Serbia as far back as the 1880s, yet a will to win, without reference to crucial facts, took over at an early point in Potiorek’s planning for revenge on the “murder-boys” (Mordbuben) in Belgrade.
The rail and road network in Bosnia and southern Hungary, which the troops would abandon as soon as they crossed into Serbia, was barely adequate, and the Serbs, closer to their supply depots and less road-bound than the invader, would inevitably find it easier to keep their troops provisioned than the Austro-Hungarians would. The logistical problems facing the Fifth Army, which would make the key push across the Drina river into mountainous terrain, were daunting. Especially puzzling was the absence of a powerful drive on Belgrade, for centuries the gateway to the Balkans for invading Habsburg soldiers, most famously Prince Eugene, whose seizure of the city in 1717 broke Ottoman power in the region for good."
These description doesn't seem that far off from Napoleon plan for crossing the Alps in 1800,So what made his Marengo campaign such a brilliant victory while the Austrian failed miserably in Serbia?
If the Austrian had succeed would we call Potiorek a Great captain like Napoleon?
Count Montecuccoli.One of the greatest general of his time and possibly the finest Austrian/Holy Roman general ever and also was the Clausewitz before Clausewitz
The generals of Napoleon time would be well acquaintance with his writings
Comparatively little seem to be written about him in English(or any languages actually) compare to his two rivals(the great Conde and Turenne) or the generals from later Seven years and Revolutionary/Napoleonic war
He was said to be the only Imperial general that could match Napoleon idol Viscount Turenne
He also beat the Turks at decisively at Battle of Saint Gotthard(Although the description of the battle almost made it seem like he just got lucky)
Ps. What with his performance on the Battle of Altenheim? How could he fail to finish off an army that lost it general and still failed to establish a clear chain of command?
Through the course of the Seven years war Frederick won 7 battles and lost 3
And those against horrible(Charles of Lorraine etc..) to mid commander(Daun,Laudon)
Archduke Charles went against much tougher foes from Jourdan,Moreau(Already better than Daun and Laudon),Massena and Napoleon himself and snag victories from them
The most militarily talented Royals of his time
He was apparently a decent Corp commander under Radetzky in 1848-49
He is most well known for his role as commander of Southern army during the Austro-Prussian war in which he defeated the larger Italian army in battle of custoza
The battle of Custoza itself seem rather enigmatic for me. Some give credits more to his chief of staff Franz Freiherr von John,Some said it is a clumsy battle while others painted it as decisive battle worthy of Napoleon, Some criticized the Archduke for not exploiting the aftermath and win a more decisive victory while others praised him for preserving the army for later showdown with Prussia
Eminence figure no less than Alfred von Schlieffen himself praised the Archduke as Radetzkian thruster
More likely than not though. Custoza was a mediocre victory that own as much to the Italians incompetence as the Archduke military acumen(Radetzky victpries in 1848-49 wasn't much different in that regards but the Count did display more finesse and energy)
After 1866 he becomes one of the main pillar of Austria-Hungarian army alongside Friedrich von Beck-Rzikowsky
All in all,He display less military skills than many of the Austrian generals that was crushed by Napoleon(like Wurmser,Alvinczi,Melas) and was still obviously much inferior to his father(and he also inherited the indecisiveness of his father worst moments)
He was rightly judge better than his contemporary and the commander of Northen army Ludwig von Benedek(Who was utter bum,Do not ever make excuse for this guy) by displaying superior grasp at strategy and would have performed much better against the Prussian(since the bar was in hell with Benedek) but whether the result would ended in favor of the Archduke is a different story...
His performance also compare somewhat favorably against the generals of Napoleon III(much better than Bazaine and not far behind Macmahon)
People critizised his battle plan at Austrelitz but it is basicslly the same as Frederick the great at Leuthen!
Twice Von Weyrother triumph over Napoleon at Second Bassano and Caldiero! Not to mention his part in the victory at Magnano and Legnano
What if.Instead of the Austro-Russian army, the French army were the one that carry out his plan?
What if.Instead of Archduke John,Another commander stood beside him at Hohenlinden
Did the victor of Arcole,Rivoli,Marengo,Ulm and Austerlitz truly envious of the Victor of Auerstedt?
Why did the QF-18 Pounder went with 84mm caliber?
A question that bug me for a long time now is the rationale behind the British adopting 84mm caliber for their field gun in contrast to others contemporary armies who went with 75-77mm
I'm aware if the following
-The requirement for new british field(and horse artillery) gun was drafted following the debacle of Second Anglo-Boer war by commission of experts
How did this commision of experts arrived at magical number of 20lbs shell weight for field gun and 12 lbs for horse artillery though?
-Unlike the French,German and Austrian who still used 87-90mm field gun from the aftermath of Franco-Prussian war till the mid 1890s and then only replace those with new generations of 75-77mm field gun(Although only the French ones were quick firing) the British already adopt 76.2mm caliber breech loading gun for their field and horse artillery from mid 1880s
-They found out during these period that It is a bad idea to give field gun to horse artillery since those are to heavy,So there is impetus to develop seperate design,So perhaps they decided to give bigger caliber to field gun on principle?
-They first obtain 76.2mm Ehrhardt/QF-15 Pounder artillery in 1900 to get a feel for Quick firing guns
-They develop QF-18 Pounder that weight between French 75mm and German/Austrian/Ehrhardt gun for field artillery and QF-13 Pounder for Horse artillery that are equivalent in spec to German/Austrian/Ehrhardt gun
-After this period there are great debates about how QF-18 Pounder are superfluous and not enough of a significant improvement over QF-13 Pounder to warrant a seperate weapon class(especially since 13 Pounder are more accurate) this debate went on till the PM side with 18 Pounder
(I can't find these Debate content though)
Most of these information are from THE HISTORY OF THE ROYAL ARTILLERY FROM THE INDIAN MUTINY TO THE GREAT WAR vol.2
But they still did not give me the answer,Why did they chose 84mm caliber/20lbs shell for 18 Pounder,Only some conjecture on my part