
Can an economy reward success without private ownership?
I’m developing a post-capitalist economic model I call Stewardism.
Private ownership clearly performs useful economic functions. It helps allocate resources, fund experiments, reward success, discipline failure, and expand productive projects.
My question is whether private ownership itself is necessary to perform those functions.
Under Stewardism, productive assets are held in stewardship. A person or group can control a factory, improve it, expand it, manage workers, and benefit substantially from running it well.
What they cannot do is turn that control into a privately owned asset that can be accumulated indefinitely, sold for personal wealth, or automatically passed to heirs.
Stewardism tries to separate the useful functions of ownership from ownership itself.
It uses a dense representative structure. At the base, representatives serve small constituencies. Those representatives federate into broader bodies as the scale of decisions grows. Broader bodies control larger resource budgets, but they are not simply higher governments commanding everything below them.
Part of each body’s resources is reserved for experimentation.
A small local body might have enough resources to fund a new boat manufacturer. A semiconductor factory might require a broader body, several bodies working together, or both.
Anyone can propose a project.
Applicants explain what they want to do, what resources they need, who is involved, the risks, and how success should be measured. Representatives can ask questions, bring in independent technical experts, negotiate the proposal, and decide whether to allocate resources.
Once resources are allocated, the people running the project have broad operational authority. The representatives decide whether to entrust them with resources; they do not run the factory themselves.
The strongest objection I’ve encountered is risk.
Under capitalism, an investor can personally lose billions. Under Stewardism, society bears the financial loss through the experimentation budget.
The representatives approving an allocation risk their reputation, political future, and continued authority. The people running the project risk their professional reputation and future opportunities, while also receiving the largest upside from success: higher discretionary income, more autonomy, recognition, continued leadership, and easier access to larger future projects.
And experimentation budgets are specifically meant to fund uncertainty. A committee that only approves nearly guaranteed projects could itself be failing its purpose.
Profit and loss do not disappear as information either. We can still measure resources consumed, output, demand, efficiency, reliability, consumer response, and whether the project met the success criteria negotiated before funding.
Successful projects can receive more resources. Poorly performing projects can lose resources, replace management, or have their assets reassigned to another group. Competing groups can apply to solve the same problem.
So Stewardism still has investment, risk, reward, competition, expansion, failure, and reallocation.
It just does not require successful control over production to become an indefinitely accumulable private property claim.
So the question I’m trying to test is:
What useful function does private ownership of productive assets provide that Stewardism does not already reproduce through other mechanisms?
If anyone wants the longer version with more of the governance, allocation, and accountability details, I’ve written that out separately on Substack.