so it goes like

My system: System Leader, Council, Superior Council, Parliament, Superior Parliament.

Leader: Controls normal/basic laws and minor administrative tasks.

Council: 10 members voted every 5 years. They check the leader. If the leader wants to change a medium-importance law, at least 6 of the council and the leader must agree.

Superior Council: 40 members. Members last for 5 years.If the Leader and the Council disagree, it goes to the Superior Council. They vote, and the winner is final. They are the only body authorized to change important, foundational laws (Constitution, Taxes, War).

Parliament/Superior Parliament: Parliament handles flexible, everyday laws that can be changed anytime. Superior Parliament handles permanent laws; if a law becomes deeply unpopular, a national vote is triggered to change it.

Opposition Committee: The losing parties from elections are legally appointed as "Official Watchdogs." They are given government resources to investigate and audit state spending to keep the government in check.

Army: Tied to the state

Trust Votes: Every 5 years, the Superior Council holds a trust vote. If the leader receives under 20% support, a new election starts.

War: The leader gains full power, but the Superior Council haves authority. If the leader goes mad or abuses power during wartime, the Superior Council can remove or reduce their power.

Corruption (Internal): Superior Council or Council members can bring others to trial if suspected of corruption. All members must submit to 100% financial transparency any attempt to exploit legal loopholes for personal gain triggers an automatic public scandal and investigation.

Economic Ideology: social market economy

Succession: If a leader dies, the Superior Council takes power 

temporarily to stabilize the nation, then a national vote begins.

Corruption Trials: If a leader tries to bribe the council, any member can take the suspect to trial. A random, anonymous citizen judge whose own finances are under audit during the trial reviews the proof. If there is no proof, it is denied. If they are guilty, they are immediately removed from office, and a vote starts to fill the spot.

Healthcare: Tiered access based on national GDP. Life threatening emergencies are always FREE to protect human capital. Nonemergency care (like dental) is partially covered (e.g., 30%), scaling up as the national wealth increases.

For instance, there was a lot of controversy last year when a representative in the US lower house was not given the oath of office for weeks. People made all kinds of remarks about it then.

The approach I have is different. I look at what conditions make it possible to pull a stunt like that. For one, the speaker seems to have a monopoly in law on swearing in legislators. You could add to that list people like judges. There only was a special election because the US does not have alternates for Reps to be replaced with, contrast with France where alternates are also elected with their deputy, or the Netherlands where if someone vacates their seat, it goes to the next person on the party list (accounting for preference votes cast for candidates) immediately, without even really having the opportunity for a gap.

Why should the president or AG or the Solicitor General even have the power to decide things the Epstein bill was about? Why not a separate board that has nothing to do with the president which decides in cases in general of whether to release them? Why have a system in the legislature where a discharge petition is even needed vs something like a motion to discharge that is simply made by say a tenth of representatives and voted upon immediately without debate with a majority vote being able to put the bill on the agenda vs needing the rules committee to propose a rule for it? Or divide up the slots on the calendar so that if there are say ten slots they can use to debate and vote on things in the next week, they can vote by proportional representation how to divide up the slots among all the representatives.

When people get into complaints about negligence, courts ask whether it is foreseeable that a problem could occur with major consequences and if the problem could have been mitigated or avoided in the first place. The idea of a bill being restricted by leadership or a president not wanting information which could be damaging to them is one that applies in general, not over Epstein alone. You don't have to have fresh outrage every time something bad happens.

In the spirit of patriotism I drafted some amendments that would address what I view as threats to American democracy. Particularly Super PAC's and corruption. They aren't perfect or legally written but I did my best and wanted to hear others opinions on them. I'll just share the first one for now.

Amendment: For-Profit Corporations, limited liability companies, partnerships, or other for-profit artificial legal entity are prohibited from using money in an attempt to influence federal elections, except for bona fide press, news, commentary, editorial, documentary, or publishing activity not coordinated with a candidate, campaign, party, or their agents. Congress shall have power to enforce this provision and prevent circumvention.

This would work to reverse Citizens United v. FEC.

I've spent the last several months thinking about a question:

Do America's biggest political problems come from politicians, or from the institutions themselves?

This isn't intended as a left-wing or right-wing proposal.

It isn't about socialism, conservatism, or any particular economic model.

It's about constitutional design.

The United States Constitution remains one of the greatest constitutional documents ever written, but no institution should be considered beyond improvement. The Constitution was designed to endure, yet its institutions should continue to reflect the principles upon which the Republic was founded.

The purpose of this proposal is not to replace the American Republic.

It is to renew it.

The central philosophy is simple:

«The Government serves the People. The Constitution governs the Government.»

Everything else follows from that principle.

Some of the proposed reforms include:

- Direct election of the President by popular vote.

- Requiring Presidents to have demonstrated public service in elected office before becoming eligible to run.

- Cabinet appointments drawn primarily from elected Members of the House of Representatives, with limited constitutional exceptions for specialist offices.

- Greater congressional oversight of the executive.

- An independent Constitutional Council to review legislation before it becomes law.

- Constitutional amendments requiring both congressional approval and direct approval by the American people through a national referendum.

- Leadership renewal through a mandatory retirement age for federal elected office while preserving experienced public servants in advisory roles.

The proposal doesn't tell Americans what policies they should adopt.

Whether the country chooses lower taxes or higher taxes, universal healthcare or private healthcare, stronger regulation or weaker regulation should remain the decision of the American people through democratic elections.

This proposal changes how power is exercised, not which policies should prevail.

The goal is to create institutions that are:

- More accountable.

- Less susceptible to patronage.

- More resistant to personality politics.

- More reflective of the constitutional principle of "We the People."

The Presidency should become the culmination of public service, not the beginning of political ambition.

The Constitution should belong to the people—not merely in theory, but in practice.

This is not a finished document. It is a constitutional thought experiment intended to invite discussion and criticism.

If you disagree, I'd genuinely like to know why.

If you think something would fail, tell me where.

If you think something is worth keeping, tell me why.

The best constitutions are not written by people who believe they are right.

They are written by people willing to have their ideas challenged.

Looking at the Great Revolution of the modern era I got to thinking about how things turned out in terms of the goals for the people _who actually fought and lead them_.

The American Revolution, judged this way, is INSANELY successful. Imagine being an ordinary Patriot soldier in 1805, thirty years after Lexington and Concord. You are older now. Your hands hurt. Your teeth are probably bad because this is still 1805 and history is disgusting. You remember hunger, mud, smallpox fear, unpaid wages, worthless paper, officers yelling, Congress promising things it did not always deliver, and the basic fact that “liberty” in practice often meant “please keep freezing in this field while rich men argue about finance.” And yet! The British are gone. The republic exists. Washington did not become king. Washington did not become dictator. Washington did not even try for a third term, which is one of those facts we repeat so often that we forget how weird it is. Adams loses power. Jefferson takes power. Nobody storms the capital with an army. Nobody guillotines Adams. Nobody declares Jefferson the Great Helmsman of Virginia Thought. The newspapers are insane, the parties hate each other, but the basic soldier’s promise has held, we fought to become independent republicans, and thirty years later we are still an independent republic. The American revolutionary elite have pretty much THE best results in the history of serious revolutions? Washington dies revered. Adams becomes president. Jefferson becomes president. Madison and Monroe are waiting their turns. Hamilton dies stupidly but he is not killed by the revolution. He is killed by Burr being Burr and Hamilton being Hamilton. So the American Revolution being judged by “did the people who fought for it like the outcome thirty years later?” America is freakishly good.

Europeans often don’t take the American Revolution that seriously because they always look at the French Revolution. Well if you are an ordinary revolutionary soldier in 1819, thirty years after 1789, your answer is not simple (because the French Revolution did accomplish huge things!). Feudal privilege is gone. The Napoleonic Code survives the Bourbon Restoration in large part, which means the old France cannot simply climb out of the grave, dust off its lace cuffs, and pretend nothing happened. So the soldier can say, honestly, “We changed the world.” But then he has to keep talking. Because he has also spent most of his adult life marching across Europe. He has fought Austrians, Prussians, Russians, British, Spanish guerrillas, maybe half the continent depending on where his regiment got thrown. Napoleon rose, crowned himself emperor, conquered, bled France white, invaded Russia, lost, came back, lost again, and now the Bourbons are back. So what does the average pro-revolutionary soldier think in 1819? Probably something like: “We destroyed the old social order, but we did not get the political freedom we thought we were getting. We got glory, law, promotion, exhaustion, and graves.” The revolutionary elites? Mostly a murder chart. Robespierre dead. Danton dead. Desmoulins dead. Saint-Just dead. Hébert dead. Brissot dead. Napoleon alive but caged on Saint Helena. France is a revolution that partly succeeds for institutions and fails for almost everyone who personally tried to_help_ the Revolution.

The Russians fought for “Peace, Land, Bread,” and thirty years later the ex-Revoutionary soldier has found himself living through famine, collectivization, terror, purges, forced labor camps, and the memory of a world war that killed on a scale almost beyond human comprehension. Imagine being an ordinary Red soldier or revolutionary worker in 1947. Yes, the Tsar is gone. Yes, the Soviet Union survived. Yes, Nazi Germany was defeated. But if you were there in 1917 thinking the revolution meant ordinary people would finally stop being crushed by autocracy and war, 1947 is a very hard place to be happy with. The land did NOT become yours in the simple peasant sense. It became collectivized. Political disagreement did NOT become freedom. It became death. The party did NOT become the people. The party became the state, and then Stalin became the party. The revolutionary elites are almost comically doomed; Lenin dies from a stroke but that probably wasn’t helped by him being shot in 1918, Trotsky is expelled and murdered in Mexico. Bukharin is executed. Zinoviev is executed. Kamenev is executed. Rykov is executed. Russia is the revolution that most perfectly demonstrates the terrifying possibility that winning the revolution can be one of the worst things that ever happens to the _revolutionaries_ themselves

China in 1975 is more complicated than Russia because the revolutionary state is still led by Mao, and for many Communist elites that matters. But if you are an ordinary Communist soldier who fought through the final phase of the Chinese Civil War and you look around thirty years after 1945, you can point to real achievements. China is unified. Foreign domination has been broken. The People’s Republic exists. Literacy, public health, state capacity, and national sovereignty all look different from the chaos of warlordism, Japanese invasion, and civil war. That is the pro-revolutionary case, and it is not nothing. But then comes the rest of the ledger which is a horrible god awful nightmare. The Great Leap Forward produces catastrophic famine ( death toll above 20 million or higher). The Cultural Revolution then gives a huge wide spread death or imprisonment to teachers, officials, intellectuals, old cadres, local leaders, even loyal Communists can suddenly find themselves denounced, humiliated, beaten, exiled to labor, or politically erased. The Communist elite scorecard is mixed in a very Chinese-Communist-revolution way: Mao remains the towering figure, Zhou survives near the center, Deng has been purged and rehabilitated and purged again, Liu Shaoqi dies after persecution.. So yea, unless you were Mao, the results ain’t that great.

Iran . . . A lot of people talk as if the Iranian Revolution was just “the Islamists overthrow the Shah.” That is not really right. The revolution that brought down the Shah was a coalition, and coalitions are dangerous because everyone thinks they are using everyone else. The clerics thought they were using the liberals, the liberals thought they were using the clerics, the Marxists thought history was using everyone, the bazaaris wanted the Shah and his modernizing state off their backs, students wanted freedom, workers wanted dignity, nationalists wanted sovereignty, religious radicals wanted Islamic justice, secular leftists wanted anti-imperial revolution, and ordinary people wanted the SAVAK state and royal arrogance gone. In 1979, that could all fit under one enormous anti-Shah tent. By 2009, thirty years later, the tent is gone and only the Islamists matter. And that really really _matters_ because DURING the revolution the non-Islamic elements were not minor decorative accessories. Liberals around the National Front and Freedom Movement mattered to the success of the revolution. Marxists and leftist guerrillas mattered to the success of the revolution. Secular students mattered. Oil workers and bazaar networks mattered. The anti-Shah coalition was genuinely broad. But after the revolution, the Islamic Republic consolidates power and pushes aside, suppresses, bans, imprisons, exiles, or destroys pretty much every other revolutionary partners. So if you are an ordinary non-Islamist revolutionary in 2009, watching the Green Movement protests after the disputed election, your thirty-year answer may be bitter: “We helped overthrow a dictatorship and got a worse kind of authoritarian state.” If you are an ordinary Islamist revolutionary, your answer may be more satisfied, the Shah is gone, American influence is reduced, the Islamic Republic survives, and clerical power holds. But the most interesting scorecard is the revolutionary elite. Khomeini’s clerical faction wins enormously. The secular left loses. The National Front loses. So yea, the elite of one faction does alright but the every other elite in the Iran revolutionary coalition gets eaten for lunch.

So my ranking changes depending on whose eyes I borrow, which is probably the whole point.

For the average soldier or ordinary fighter FOR the revolution, I would rank them, America, because the republic actually resembles the promised republic. Next France, because the social/legal revolution survives even though the political dream mutates into empire and restoration. Next, Iran, but only if we separate Islamist revolutionaries from the broader coalition. Next China, because national unity and sovereignty are real but the Maoist campaigns are god-awful. Next Russia, because “Peace, Land, Bread” turns into one-party terror, famine, WWII and Stalinism.

For revolutionary elites, America is first by a mile, then Iran (But ONLY for the clerical faction), then China, then France and Russia dead (literally) last.

All in all the American Revolution still looks shockingly unusual because thirty years later, most of the people involved could look at the result and say, “I’m happy with this.”

That is pretty damn rare in revolutions.

There’s something strange about how the modern world decides what counts as “unforgivable.”

We’re taught to recognize certain historical regimes as the peak of human evil. That judgment is repeated so often it feels like a moral law of nature. But what interests me is not whether those judgments are wrong it’s what happens when we compare them to how we treat other powerful states with far longer records of violence.

Because when you step back from the narratives, you start noticing a pattern.

Violence is not judged equally. It is filtered.

The United States is often presented as a defender of order and stability in the modern world. At the same time, its history contains episodes of mass displacement, industrial warfare, prolonged foreign interventions, and structural systems that produced large scale human suffering.

The removal and destruction of Indigenous societies across North America unfolded over centuries through war, forced relocation, and systemic collapse. Combined with disease and conflict, the scale of death is widely understood by historians to reach into the millions.

Also the transatlantic slave trade forcibly transported an estimated 12.5 million Africans, with many dying during capture, transport, and enslavement conditions.

We see this pattern more clearly especially in the 20th century, the Vietnam War produced an estimated 2 to 3 million deaths, while the Iraq war after 2003 produced over a million in human casualties making it one of the most destructive modern conflicts in terms of human cost.

This does not even include other conflicts where the USA played indirect or supporting roles.

And yet these numbers do not occupy the same symbolic space in global moral memory as other historical atrocities of comparable or smaller scale. They are treated as separate events, spread across time, context, and justification rather than as part of a continuous pattern of state power producing mass human cost.

Even modern forms of coercion have evolved beyond direct warfare.

Economic sanctions, for example, are often described as a non violent tool of diplomacy. In practice, they can reshape entire economies, restrict access to food and medicine, and contribute to severe humanitarian crises. Their impact is massive with It estimates about 564,000 excess deaths per year globally in sanctioned countries according to the lancet .

This is where the real contradiction appears.

If mass civilian suffering is morally unacceptable in war, why is it more tolerable when it is produced indirectly through blockades, economic pressure, or systemic collapse?

From here, the question is unavoidable:

Why does one system become the universal reference point for ultimate historical evil, while others with extensive records of large-scale violence are treated as complex or context-dependent?

The answer is not simple.

Part of it is defeat. History is written most aggressively about those who lose. Part of it is narrative control powerful states are not just actors in history, they are editors of it. And part of it is psychological: societies prefer clear symbols of evil rather than uncomfortable continuums of responsibility.

The United States is not unique in this. It is simply one of the clearest examples of a modern power whose history contains both foundational ideals and repeated episodes of large scale violence, while still maintaining a central position in defining global moral language.

The question is not whether the United States has done good or bad throughout its history .

The question is whether any state should be powerful enough to shape the rules of accountability while remaining largely beyond their reach.

That is the empire we do not put on trial.

For the love of God Democrats embrace the U.S. flag and patriotism. You've let Trump co-opt these federal symbols and need to take it back. Flying the American flag is not a bad thing. Saying you're a patriot is not a bad thing. We need elected Democrat officials to reclaim patriotism. The battle is against fascism and Christian nationalism, not against the Red, White and Blue.

Putting your nation and country first is good. It's senseless to sacrifice your national interests for the sake of the so-called lofty human rights international principles when they are applied selectively anyway.

Only when, nationalism becomes chauvinism, aka our people are superior to everyone else, instead of a pragmatic and transactional mindset, it becomes a problem.

Many individuals especially from Western and European countries don't like this fact but the Global South doesn't really care to play by dishonest hypocritical rules anymore.

Makes sense to protect your sovereignty especially from domestic interference by extremely dishonest and hypocritical superpowers.

So yesterday I listened to a bit of the Clay & Travis Show. A guy calls in and talks about how the younger guys he works with in his blue-collar job are stressed about the future economy. They're tired of paying rent, Medicare, and Social Security, and they can’t afford housing. He points out that Democrats are letting in immigrants and giving them government money (ok...), while Republicans do nothing because it's cheap labor for their businesses.

Clay completely dismisses him and pivots to some stats he saw in the Wall Street Journal: apparently, 440,000 Americans became millionaires last year. "That’s 12,000 a day," he kept repeating, noting there are now 26 million millionaires in the U.S. Then he goes into that "pie" analogy conservative pundits have been pushing lately, mixed with the usual fear-mongering that socialism is just communism in disguise.

A few issues with that: What do those new millionaires have to do with everyone else struggling? He’s citing less than 10% of the population to dismiss the reality for the other 90%. Also, a million dollars today isn't the same as a million dollars was when he was growing up—he says he's on the cusp of Gen X and Millennial, and I can tell the difference. It’s the typical, out-of-touch conservative take.

As for this whole "pie" analogy, the idea that the best way to improve everyone's lives is just to keep growing the economic out, they claim that Democrats, especially the Democratic Socialists, believe the pie size is fixed and just want to redistribute pieces from the rich. I don't disagree that the pie should keep growing, but the problem is that as it grows, the rich keep taking larger pieces, leaving everyone else to fight for scraps. They're being so disingenuous with that analogy, and unfortunately for them, their base keeps eating it up, or licking the plate since there’s barely anything left.

From 1944 to 1963, the U.S. top marginal tax rate was 91–94%. It stayed at 70% until 1981. That's not a typo. Eisenhower-era America — the guy who built the interstate highway system and warned about the military-industrial complex — ran tax rates that would make today's pundits combust on live TV.

And before anyone types "nobody actually paid 91%" — correct, and the real number is worse for your argument. The 91% bracket kicked in above $200,000 in 1950s dollars — roughly $2.4 million today, about 45x the median household income. It wasn't a tax on workers; it was aimed squarely at the top few hundredths of a percent. The ultra-rich paid an effective rate of roughly 55% in the 1950s, all taxes combined. Today that same group pays about 41%. That's a 14-point cut for the wealthiest people in America over seven decades. And that 41% only counts reported income — measured against actual wealth growth, ProPublica's IRS data showed the 25 richest Americans paying a 3.4% true tax rate, with several paying $0 in specific years. All legal. Buy, borrow, die. Meanwhile that 55% from the 1950s still beats Norway's top rate today (~40%), matches Switzerland's, and sits right in Denmark's range (~52–60.5%). The "loopholes" defense doesn't rescue the modern tax code — it indicts it twice.

And before anyone types "the rich just used the 25% capital gains rate" — that only covered realized gains, one slice of the pie. Dividends were taxed as ordinary income back then, straight up the ladder toward 91% — and dividends were how wealth paid out, because stock buybacks were effectively illegal until 1982. Now trace what changed: buybacks became legal and replaced dividends (deliberately — they convert taxable payouts into untaxed unrealized gains, about a trillion dollars a year now). In 2003, dividends got moved to capital gains rates. Today the top rate on both is 23.8% — below the 1950s 25% cap. The rate that was the floor of privilege then is above the ceiling now. Every path in the 1950s code led to high ordinary rates; every path today leads to capital gains treatment — with stepped-up basis at death as a legal exit ramp to zero.

Here's the detail that gives the whole game away: "socialism" accusations were everywhere in the 1950s. Eisenhower railed against "creeping socialism." The AMA branded Medicare "socialized medicine." McCarthyism was at full boil. And through all of it, the 91% top bracket sat there — under a Republican president — and was never the target. Every government program was "socialism." The tax rate on the rich never was. The word has never been about tax rates.

It's a panic button, and it gets pushed the second any policy would move money from corporate profits back to workers — universal healthcare, higher wages, stronger unions, you name it. Why does it work? Because fear gets clicks, clicks get ad revenue, and cable news is in the attention business, not the accuracy business. "They want higher effective tax rates on income over $10 million" doesn't trend. "They want to turn America into Venezuela" does.

Meanwhile, the actual numbers:

U.S. productivity is up roughly 80% since the 1970s — wages didn't come close to keeping pace

Corporate tax rates were slashed from 46% to 21% since 1980, and U.S. corporate tax revenue as a share of GDP now sits below the OECD average — 88 profitable corporations paid $0 in federal income tax in 2025 on a combined $105 billion in profit

The top 10% now hold 72% of U.S. wealth — Gilded Age concentration, versus a far flatter 1950s

The U.S. spends more per person on healthcare than any country on Earth (~$14,900/year), still leaves tens of millions uninsured, and dies younger for it — 79.0 years vs. 82.7 in peer countries that spend a third less

And the part that really breaks the narrative: who's actually fiscally reckless? Denmark — the go-to "socialist boogeyman" — is running a budget surplus with debt around 27% of GDP and falling. Norway's $1.7 trillion sovereign wealth fund dwarfs its entire gross debt; its net fiscal position is deeply positive. Switzerland sits at 38%.

The U.S. — the one lecturing everyone about big government spending — sits at roughly 125% debt-to-GDP with CBO projecting a continued climb for a decade, the steepest fiscal deterioration among major advanced economies. The single biggest legislated driver: the 2025 tax cut extension, which CBO scores at $4.7 trillion added to deficits through 2035.

So the "reckless socialist experiments" are running surpluses and stockpiling trillion-dollar wealth funds. The country cutting taxes on top earners and calling it fiscal responsibility is the one with the fastest-deteriorating debt position in the developed world. Make it make sense.

Next time someone yells "sOciAliSm," ask them which countries actually have their fiscal house in order — while also delivering greater economic mobility, lower income inequality, universal healthcare, stronger safety nets, and higher measured levels of personal freedom and life satisfaction.

"Hitler Ate Sugar"

Up until the 1930s, the Swastika (also called Gammadion or Fylfot) was universally seen as a positive symbol, representing prosperity and good luck; indeed, many early aviators such as Matilde Moisant wore Swastika pins on their flight suits as good luck charms. It is an ancient symbol going back at least 4,500 years, remaining in wide use in the East, and rediscovered by the West in the 18th century.

It was first used as a symbol of anti-Semitism about 1912, by Romanian fascist politician Alexandru Cuza... and now that is all that it means. One group of people decided to suborn its meaning for political purposes, and now no one can use it without being associated with them.

Is that all it takes? Then why aren't we all claiming membership or association with some group we dislike, and then twisting it out of shape to discredit them?

What's In A Name?

The fascists did exactly that, with the whole, "National Socialist," thing, as if that ever made sense in the first place; the ultimate goal of left-wing thought is the utter destruction of national distinctions, a world solidarity that transcends such divisive notions.

Nevertheless, though, for 80 years, reactionaries have been able to say, "The Nazis were Socialist, it's right there in the name!"

We have "Democrats" who oppose democracy, "Republicans" who reject republican governance, "Greens" who deny the scientific consensus on environmental policy, "Libertarians" who only believe in freedom for themselves, "Progressives" trying to stifle political discourse...

Well, Yes, But Also No, And Then Again, Yes...

The "Confederate Flag" is an especially odd one.

First, the actual flag of the Confederacy was very similar to the US flag, just with fewer stripes and a different number of stars.

The "Confederate Flag" that most people think of was the Battle Flag, which was developed in order to avoid confusion on the battlefield; the original design used a Palmetto and Crescent with an upright St George's Cross, but due to complaints from Jewish members of the Confederate government, it was changed to a diagonal St Andrew's Cross, and the Palmetto and Crescent were removed to avoid confusion with the South Carolina state flag.

Even then, for over 80 years after the Civil War, it was not viewed as a symbol of racism or hatred; most people would not even recognize the official flags of the Confederacy. It was the third incarnation of the Ku Klux Klan which adopted it as a symbol in the 1950s, after which it became associated with racism and bigotry. Note that, historically, there were far more KKK members in the North than in the South...

Today, polls are nearly evenly split on viewing it as a symbol of regional pride as opposed to a symbol of hatred.

What To Expect When You Are Expecting Associative Delegitimization

Ironically, this only works on communities that operate on an in-group preference; this is why Capitalism is easier to criticize than Socialism (without putting a value judgement on that statement one way or another...). Every group is propagandized to be afraid of the group "below" them trying to climb ahead, so they are focused on punching down instead of building up.

Socialists open themselves up to attack, though, when they start trying to favor one group or another for historical or political reasons, or worse, try to oppress groups they view as undeserving. That way lies the darker history of left-wing movements, not intrinsic to left-wing philosophy, but nor is that philosophy any more immune to excessive zeal than any other.

The only path to success is to include everyone, to address the concerns even of people you don't like, and to come to reasonable compromises that you actually intend to honor into the future.

All of us, or none of us.

This isn't meant to be a partisan rant. It's something I've been thinking about for a while, and I'm curious whether others see it the same way.
The Founders gave Supreme Court justices lifetime appointments because they wanted judges to be independent from politics. That made sense in the late 1700s when life expectancy was much shorter, but today it's common for justices to serve 30–40 years. One election can influence constitutional law for an entire generation.
Ironically, I think lifetime appointments have made the Court more political, not less.
Presidents now intentionally nominate younger justices because they know those appointments can shape the Court for decades. Every vacancy turns into a political war because the stakes are so high. That doesn't seem healthy for an institution that's supposed to be above politics.
An 18-year nonrenewable term would still protect judicial independence while making appointments predictable and reducing the incentive to politicize every confirmation battle.
The second issue is judicial activism.
I know that term gets thrown around by both conservatives and liberals, and I don't think either side has a monopoly on it. But looking at the current Court, I believe several justices have shown a willingness to reshape constitutional law rather than simply interpret it.
The three that stand out to me are Clarence Thomas, Samuel Alito, and Neil Gorsuch.
Thomas has repeatedly argued that long-settled precedents should be reconsidered. Alito authored the Dobbs opinion that overturned nearly 50 years of abortion precedent. Gorsuch consistently applies an originalist and textualist philosophy that often leads to major shifts in constitutional interpretation.
To be clear, I'm not saying they vote this way because they're conservatives. Every justice has a judicial philosophy, and disagreement is part of the Court's job. My concern is that the outcomes have become remarkably consistent in one ideological direction, and in several cases the Court has been willing to overturn or significantly reshape established precedent.
Supporters would argue they're simply interpreting the Constitution according to its original meaning. That's a legitimate argument, even if I don't always agree with the conclusions.
But from my perspective, when the Court repeatedly makes decisions that dramatically change decades of constitutional law, it starts looking less like judicial restraint and more like judicial policymaking.
I would say the same thing if a liberal majority consistently rewrote constitutional doctrine to match its preferred outcomes.
The Supreme Court's legitimacy depends on the public believing that justices are interpreting the law rather than advancing a political agenda. Whether the ideology is conservative or liberal shouldn't matter.
That's why I think term limits would help.
They wouldn't eliminate ideological disagreements, but they would prevent any one group of justices from shaping constitutional law for 30 or 40 years simply because of timing. Regular turnover would better reflect the evolution of the country while preserving judicial independence.
I'm genuinely interested in hearing counterarguments. Do you think lifetime appointments still make sense in 2026, or would fixed terms strengthen the Court?

Everyone, I came across an article arguing that China's rise is incompatible with democracy or liberalism.

I find myself unable to propose a solution for China to address these issues within a democratic framework. Consequently, I cannot continue to support democracy and liberalism if doing so implies that the Chinese people might end up worse off, I am unwilling to interfere with another country's path to improvement simply to serve my own ideology.

What are your thoughts on this article?

The main text of the article follows below.

---

Had China democratized in the 1990s, it absolutely would not have been able to rise.

In the eyes of many Westerners, the process of China's rise in the 1990s might look like this.

"Reform and opening up → learning from capitalism → rise"

For the past thirty years, mainstream Western media (such as CNN, BBC, or early newspapers) have repeatedly reinforced a simplified formula↓

-

Mao era: closed, poor, dogmatic (dark age and so on).

Deng era: discovered the "universal key" of market economy (age of enlightenment).

Result: as long as China imitates the West in trade and opening factories, it naturally rose by relying on the single advantage of "cheap labor."

-

However, in reality, the China of the 1990s faced very complex problems, or rather very difficult ones.

Or rather... forget it, let me describe and summarize it for you.

After the Tiananmen incident, Zhao Ziyang was deposed, and Jiang Zemin took office in a crisis.

When Jiang Zemin just came to power, what he faced was a country with depleted finances, financial chaos, paralyzed industry, and diplomatic isolation.

The whole of China was facing malignant inflation, hollowed-out central finances, local separatism, tens of millions of potential unemployed people, and a hostile international environment.

Seeing this, you must be thinking, "Ha, so severe, it seems the great market economy saved them!"

Quite the opposite: quite a few of the difficulties were caused by the market economy. Without the subsequent actions of the CCP, what awaited China would be Soviet-style disintegration and Russian-style economic shock therapy.

First, we need to introduce what reform and opening up turned China into.

...

First is corruption. In the late 1980s, China encountered the toughest hurdle in the transition from planned economy to market economy: prices.

Officials' children with approval documents could get goods at low prices and resell them at high prices. This triggered nationwide anger against corruption in the late 1980s.

At that time, the same commodity had one price in the plan and another outside the plan. This led to serious "official profiteering" (officials reselling approved materials), where officials' children with approval documents could get goods at low prices and resell them at high prices. This triggered nationwide anger against corruption in the late 1980s.

Without canceling the plan, the market could not truly be established; canceling the plan would cause prices to soar. This dilemma completely stalled reforms after 1989—nobody dared to move. The 1988 attempt at "price breakthrough," trying to liberalize prices all at once, resulted in nationwide panic buying and bank runs.

The inflation rate in 1988 reached 18.5%, and it directly triggered the 1989 Tiananmen incident.

Okay, corruption is an inevitable problem, but it's easy to solve: just cancel the mandatory planning for means of production, let commodity prices be determined by the market, and the approval documents in officials' hands would become scrap paper.

This is the only thing market economy solved, but also the smallest thing.

The next four issues, each one is something market economy could not solve.

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Second issue: the central government was so poor it was almost begging.

In the early 1990s, China faced an extremely embarrassing situation: strong localities, weak center. At that time, local and central finances were calculated separately. Local governments earned money, kept enough for themselves first, and remitted the rest to the center. Local governments concealed income through various means, causing the central government's fiscal revenue share of the national total to decline year after year. The central government even had to "borrow money" from local governments to get by. A penniless central government could not conduct macroeconomic regulation, could not build nationwide infrastructure, and could not even guarantee military spending and key scientific research. In any country, this is a signal of turmoil.

How did the CCP solve it?

In many developing countries (like India or Brazil), when advancing national unified tax system reforms (such as GST reform), it often takes decades or longer of bargaining, and the final version is usually a product of compromise among all parties.

At that time, Chinese Premier Zhu Rongji claimed he would "carry the coffin to carry out reform." In 1993, Zhu Rongji, with a large entourage, visited 17 provinces in just over two months. The most intense confrontation happened in Guangdong. At that time, Guangdong was the vanguard of reform and opening up, with strong local finances and extreme resistance to remitting profits. Zhu Rongji's words at the time were extremely tough, and he ultimately forcibly completed the centralization of power. The tax-sharing system instantly raised the central government's fiscal share of the national total from 22% to around 55%. With this money, the center later had the capital to carry out "Western Development," the "Three Gorges Project," the "high-speed rail network," and to respond to the 1997 financial crisis.

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Third issue: market opening turned each province almost into an independent economy.

With money in hand, local governments began operating administrative regions like companies. Since taxes stayed local, every province wanted to develop the most profitable industries. At that time, hundreds of color TV production lines and dozens of auto factories emerged nationwide. Macroscopically, this was huge waste, but locally it was a fat tax base. To protect their own brands, local governments even set up checkpoints to intercept goods from other provinces. At that time in China, there were serious "economic Berlin walls" between provinces. The center's macroeconomic orders did not leave Zhongnanhai, because localities simply did not listen—they had their own revenue sources and did not need to look at the center's face.

Local governments forcibly ordered banks to lend. Local bank branches became ATMs for local bureaucrats. In 1992-1993, places like Hainan saw crazy real estate bubbles. Funds idled within the financial system, prices soared. By 1994, the inflation rate reached a staggering 24.1%. The people's money was depreciating every day, directly threatening the legitimacy of the regime.

How did the CCP solve it?

Zhu Rongji concurrently served as PBOC governor and directly ordered: all irregular interbank borrowings must be recovered within the deadline; if not recovered, the bank head would be dismissed on the spot, or even go to prison. China miraculously pressed inflation from 24% back to single digits without triggering an economic collapse. This created an extremely stable domestic micro-environment for the subsequent WTO accession. This administrative high pressure quickly burst the real estate bubbles in Hainan and Beihai, allowing funds to flow back from speculative fields.

In 1998, the center abolished provincial branches and established nine cross-provincial regional branches, cutting off the connection between provincial governors and bank heads. Mayors could no longer slam tables to force loans, because the personnel and financial power of bank heads were all in the regional branches, not local. The center regained control of the financial gates.

And to appease the people amid depreciation, the center launched "inflation-protected savings with interest subsidies."

If inflation was 20%, bank interest would be over 20%, ensuring people's deposits did not shrink.

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Fourth issue: China had previously been a socialist country, with a large number of state-owned enterprises and lifetime employed workers.

SOEs in the planned economy era were extremely inefficient. By the mid-1990s, more than 2/3 of SOEs were in loss-making status. Without reform, the national finances would be drained dry.

You have to know that Mao-era SOEs were not just factories; they were miniature societies. A large steel mill had its own hospital, kindergarten, primary school, barbershop, even crematorium. A worker could be supported by the factory for life.

This model became a fatal weakness in market competition. A private or foreign enterprise only needed to pay wages to young people, while SOEs had to support tens of thousands of retirees, maintain kindergartens and hospitals. All these costs were loaded into the products.

SOEs were running with a whole community on their backs—how could they outrun lightly equipped private bosses?

How did the CCP solve it?

At that time, SOE losses were severe; without change, the country would be dragged to death.

If changed, tens of millions would lose their jobs.

The government made an extremely cold and rational decision: choose one-time excision. This was a decision impossible to pass in any democratic country. Without the constraints of unions and opposition parties, the government directly privatized, bankrupted, or merged tens of thousands of small SOEs. This event, known as the "The Great Layoffs" (da xiagang), led to about 30-40 million workers directly unemployed. The state retained strategic heavy industries (energy, military, communications) and completely pushed light industry and competitive sectors to the market—either close or restructure.

This released enormous private productive forces and prepared lightly equipped enterprise entities for the "world factory" era after joining the WTO.

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Fifth issue: as if fate felt China was not difficult enough, it decided to add insult to injury.

While the internal economy was burning, the external environment also dropped to freezing point. After the 1989 Tiananmen incident, Western countries imposed long-term sanctions on China. In addition, from 1989 to 1991, the world situation collapsed. The former "big brother" Soviet Union suddenly fell, which was a huge shock to the CCP elite. At that time, a large part of the party believed that if Gorbachev-style reforms continued, China would also disintegrate. In addition, foreign capital withdrew, technology was blocked. China at that time looked like a ruin beset by internal and external troubles; some even predicted the CCP regime would not survive three years.

In addition, Western humiliations pushed Chinese nationalism to its peak. From the 1993 "Yinhe" cargo ship being forcibly intercepted and boarded by the U.S. military on the high seas for unwarranted search, to the 1996 Taiwan Strait crisis where U.S. aircraft carriers sailed directly into the strait for military deterrence; from the 1999 bombing of the Chinese embassy in Yugoslavia killing three journalists, with the West lightly dismissing it as "accidental bombing," to the 2001 South China Sea collision where martyr Wang Wei died and the U.S. plane was forced to land. Nationwide large-scale anti-American demonstrations erupted.

How did the CCP solve it?

The answer is: using methods only an authoritarian government can do.

Facing the West: endure. Facing domestic nationalism: ignore.

GATT to WTO transition—if it followed public opinion and clashed with the U.S., China would not be able to join and would be excluded from the global industrial chain, completely marginalized in the world. To seize this opportunity, China kept a low profile, the elite withstood huge domestic pressure, resolutely avoided direct armed conflict with the U.S., and appeared very compliant in the face of a series of Western provocations and humiliations.

Finally, under extremely harsh conditions (even cursed domestically as "treason"), China persisted in completing WTO accession negotiations.

The West (especially the Clinton administration) at that time pushed for China's WTO entry with this calculation: "Look, the CCP doesn't respond to a series of provocations—must be beset by troubles inside and out, the regime can't hold on much longer. We can try to change China through trade."

But they forgot: authoritarian governments do not need to follow public opinion. As long as it benefits national development, authoritarian governments can use any means.

Their script: rise of the middle class → demand political rights → color revolution → China becomes a follower of the West.

However, China quickly became the world's factory, with electricity generation equal to the sum of the U.S. and Russia, industrial output equal to the G7 combined, steel production equal to the rest of the world combined.

Of course, such rapid development was built on the premise that the previous few problems were all resolved at the end of the last century.

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If China had really followed the suggestions of Western "experts" at that time—full privatization, no tax-sharing system, allowing local warlords to divide and armies to engage in business—today's China would absolutely not be the "world factory," but most likely a nuclear-armed, enlarged version of Yugoslavia or Ukraine: central government unable to collect taxes, local warlords enriching themselves, people struggling in hyperinflation.

If China had really become a multi-party democracy in 1989, could it have solved these problems?

① Under democracy, tax-sharing reform would be almost impossible to complete. Zhu Rongji didn't have to face votes, so he could slam tables at local big shots. But under democracy, if there was local autonomy or strong parliamentary system, representatives (parliamentarians) from provinces would desperately guard local fiscal rights. Elected representatives from rich provinces like Guangdong and Jiangsu would fight to the death in parliament against remitting fiscal power to Beijing.

Local governments would refuse to remit money to the center to please local voters. The central government would remain anemic, unable to build a nationwide high-speed rail network or carry out Western Development. China would degenerate into a loose federation, ultimately leading to political tearing between regions due to excessive wealth gaps.

Ultimately, continuous shrinkage of central finances could lead the country, like Yugoslavia or the Soviet Union, to substantial disintegration because the center lost fiscal allocation ability.

② No democratic government could achieve the "The Great Layoffs."

Compared to one-time layoffs of 40 million people, Macron's pension reform is like inviting guests to dinner, but he couldn't do it.

Under democratic systems, 40 million laid-off workers are not just laborers but voters. Any party that causes 40 million unemployment would be political suicide. Opposition parties would quickly promise "guaranteed lifetime employment" to harvest tens of millions of votes.

This would become a fiscal black hole; to maintain votes, the government would have to continuously print money or borrow to "transfuse" inefficient, loss-making SOEs. This would lead to the vicious cycle of "Latin Americanization": soaring inflation → currency depreciation → zero industrial competitiveness.

The country would be unable to complete the most basic primitive capital accumulation, instead consuming all resources in "social welfare" to maintain the status quo.

③ In a wave of nationalism, a democratic government could not fail to respond to U.S. bombings.

Under democracy, facing an event like "embassy bombing" that extremely provokes public anger, politicians would often be forced to make radical responses to show "toughness" and gain approval ratings. Rational and restrained "Hide your brightness, bide your time" would be denounced as "treason." The country might be dragged into an unwinnable cold war or even hot war before its wings were fully grown, completely losing the globalization dividends of the next twenty years.

If the decision-makers at that time had followed populism and confronted the U.S. head-on, China would have lost the WTO opportunity, foreign capital would have completely withdrawn due to war risks. China might have fallen into economic collapse due to isolation right before 2000.

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After reading this, you probably understand how shallow that narrative of "China's rise all thanks to the market" is.

What truly achieved this miracle, rapidly rising China from desperate straits to a strong country that can stand up to the U.S., was the CCP with iron fists and wisdom.

If China had been a democratic government, it would have been doomed in the 1990s.

Whether it be fish in the open ocean, breathable air in the atmosphere, or pigs and trees in natural lands, markets already solve issues related to scarcity of these resources.

People generally overconsume or deplete the natural resource until it reaches a point of scarcity and value that it justifies containing and reproducing it.

For instance, when it comes to cattle, fish, and trees, people were generally free to just deplete what nature brought them, and then once their actions made those resources scarce, they found it more profitable to tame the cattle, fish, and trees and farm it at an efficient level of production.

Nature initially oversupplies the resource, but we rationally deplete it until it becomes more cost-effective to artificially supply it for ourselves.

The way portuguese government fails to consider the significant impact Brazil has on portuguese politics is careless.

One of the most glaring examples is the generalization of language—practically all portuguese productions once they get to Brazil are dubbed to brazilian-portuguese to cater to the Brazilian market, further reinforcing language differences.

Other critical factors include the Porto Seguro Treaty between Portugal and Brazil and how it’s used to benefit Brazilian interests. Brazilians get exceptions for immigration, access to public healthcare (SNS), educational equivalence, public services, political offices, voting rights, etc. This treaty isn’t just numerically unfair due to population disparity—it creates EU-level exceptions for Brazilians under "reciprocity." However, since Brazil’s population (214 million) is 18 times larger than Portugal’s (11 million), that "reciprocity" disproportionately favors Brazilians.

This means while Portugal receives a significant influx of Brazilian visitors and immigrants pressuring our public services and infrastructure, the country can’t exert equivalent influence in Brazil. The population difference makes real reciprocity impossible.

Another key issue is the unified orthographic reform through Portuguese Language Orthographic Agreements. Though presented as promoting linguistic unity among 'Lusophone' countries, it set us further from european languages, and it practically serves Brazilian editorial and media interests by treating Brazilian-Portuguese as part of a singular "Portuguese" label. This allows Brazilian companies to export books and films without significant adaptations for international markets, that are not Portuguese from Portugal.

The Portuguese government must recognize these structural asymmetries and defend national interests by fully repealing the Porto Seguro Treaty and Orthographic Agreements which give away concessions that compromise the country. Otherwise how can a nation effectively balance a long-standing diplomacy with the unpractical and unfairness of these policies?

This is based on somewhat anecdotal experience but something I noticed seemingly out of the blue is right-libertarians, such as classical liberals or even ancaps, support internet privacy laws that restrict what platforms and businesses are able to do with an individual’s data. This is rather bafflingly inconsistent to me and fundamentally undermines a lot of their thinking on the role of government and law in the economy. Maybe I'm missing something or some of you could better explain why these laws are so popular beyond what I suspect to be the case?

One of the main differences I've seen from several cultures, old and current, when compared to WWII era~ political philosophy, or more specifically, current American political expression, is that a lot of the former cultures use politics as an actual administrative question and exploration. Where as in current day US, which I think has its influences from the WWII era~, people are very idealist. Most of the time without even realising it.

To use Republican Rome, Persia, and China, as examples of the former, while each of these cultures have political troubles, often relating to power and corruption. Do not get the impression that I am saying these cultures are somehow superior. They were (and in the cause of China, still are), very matter of fact about the politics of their time. The systems and answers they built with regard to the political questions of their time were based on how much they would function, not how much one identifies with an idea. As mentioned, while there were political factions, while one might have identified with these power blocs, you were not a "CaoCaoist" or a "Ceasarist". One had beliefs and convictions, but one did not swear to a political ideology.

This is in contrast to today, especially clearly seen with the way people talk about Liberals and Conservatives, or of Communists. Where we treat these not as political philosophical answers to real questions being proposed, but rather as sets of ideas in their entirety to be judged as worthy or not. To identify with or not. One is a Communist before they start talking philosophy and administration. The same as one is a Liberal or a Conservative or a Progressive or Fascist, or even Anarchist. This is very idealist in the sense that we treat these Ideas as reality first of all. These ideas are identified with first and then they shape reality. As opposed to a materialist understanding that sees the functions and processes of a reality independent of political ideas, in fact, this material reality should be used to then inform those political ideas! The former progresses from Idea > Reality. The latter progresses from Reality > Idea.

The communist assumes a communist idealist reality and projects it onto the world. The conservative assumes a conservative idealist reality and projects it onto the world. Etc.

~ ~

This stunts political growth because if we assume an independent political reality with regard to physical reality, then there is nothing else to be done but assert and proselytise about your chosen reality in hopes that everyone else becomes persuaded. How well that often works..

We get stuck in this lock of Ideology vs Ideology without ever breaking from it and looking at the actual processes we are concerned with and measuring them up to see what answers truly work and what don't. And indeed! A knowledgeable person might object here to say that some answers are Ethical! And these ethical questions are personal preferences, not scientific measurements. However, we can still apply a philosophical exploration of ethical ideas to think about what ethics are truly worthwhile for us. Again, as opposed to simply asserting an ethics is good before it has any interaction with reality. We can not simply say "Communism is good", we have to argue why those ethical answers, with regard to reality, make communism good. And it is the strength of that argument with regard to reality that should be compelling. (The same for all other political ethical answers).

What I want people to recognise the most here is how much movement can be had when we first of all recognise how much Idealism, as a philosophical metaphysics, influences our political interactions. And then make an effort to ground our ideas, to test them with a more materialist approach to reality. Now we can, as mentioned, measure the extent of which policies truly achieve waht they aim to achieve. We can see precisely why policy fails and adapt from there. We can treat each other as human beings with biases towards ethics and particular answers, yet fall back onto arguments of material worth, rather than idealist absolutes.

A conservative can have a question of poverty presented to them and they can consider a communist answer and see if it has worth or not. They can keep their conservative bias, but they should admit to any merit the argument has. Or else you deny gravity. And vice versa, of course.

Here, I believe, is where REAL political philosophy lies. And it is something we should be doing our best to cultivate and encourage. Or else we remain stunted proselytising our idealist views.

This plan fixed our healthcare costs, healthcare education costs, and overhauls federal income tax to help pay for a restructuring of how the government and business is interacting. Now the businesses would not need to worry about healthcare nor worry about high payroll taxes instead they focus on labor benefits on break times, vacation times and sick times being properly allocated. Here's the structure.

Federal income tax shifted to 20% flat no caps and no exemptions to raise trillions of extra capital balancing the federal budget.

Current Medicare and Medicaid abolished.

2 Trillion fixed annual budget for Medicare for All.

Americans have to pay for their own drugs capped based on the average price worldwide of the bottom 50% costing nations for the drug.

Increasing supply of medical personnel which solves shortages by cost reduction by debt reduction and good labor benefits.

Salaries in the Medicare for All.

Voluntary overtime and 2% raise each year you serve in the program. A private market still exists.

$50,000 for less than a bachelors degree.

$100,000 for a bachelors degree.

$200,000 for a doctor's degree.

$300,000 for a doctor's degree and being a surgeon.

Bachelors degrees that cost less than $150,000 get a 75% write-off when completed and you sign up to work in the Medicare for All program for 10 or more years.

Doctor's degrees that cost less than $400,000 get a 75% write-off when completed and you sign up to work in the Medicare for All program for at least 10 years.

Drugs are price capped based on average price of bottom 50% of pricing for nations worldwide. 

Through this we have the deficit eliminated, the debt going down, Medicare for all implemented, people paying for their own drugs at fair prices and a fiscally restrained cost of the program.

$200 a month Universal Basic Income for all American citizens. Requires proof of citizenship to the federal government directly.

SNAP abolished.

All Americans jobs new labor minimum standards.

All overtime is voluntary.

10% of work time is paid breaktime

8% of worktime earns you equal paid vacation time

6% of worktime earns you equal unpaid sick time.

Payroll tax employers 2% and employees 0%.

Federal government injects $500 Billion into the program each year. Age lowered to 60 and work and earnings have no impact on eligibility. Operates on a no debt model where checks automatically reduce in size based on revenue collected from the prior year + the 500 Billion baseline. Payouts determined by age.

Payout from social security pool by age.

Above 60 is 1 portion.

Above 80 is 2 portions.

Above 100 is 3 portions.

Those above 100 are verified to continue to be alive every 5 years. If verification cannot be confirmed they are removed from the program after 5 years of trying. Those above 100 do not have to wait they can personally go in and verify themselves to get their 5 year clock reset or checks restored with back pay.