u/PossibilityKindly929

"Moreover the consequence, if all the things that come to be follow on some causes that have been laid down beforehand and are definite and exist beforehand, is that men deliberate in vain about the things that they have to do. And if deliberating were in vain, man would have the power of deliberation in vain. (And yet, if nature does nothing of what is primary in vain, and man’s being a living creature with the power of deliberation is a primary product of nature, and not something that merely accompanies and happens along with the primary products, the conclusion would be drawn that men do not have the power of deliberation in vain.)"

reddit.com
u/PossibilityKindly929 — 22 days ago

it goes like this

"

  1. P1) one acts and has an identity which leads to their choices (acting)
  2. C1) then acting differently under the same circumstances would mean they have no fixed identity
  3. P2) PAP (Principle of Alternative Possibilities) means that for free will to be true, one must be capable of acting differently under the same circumstances
  4. P3) either free will is attributed to an actor with identity, or to metaphysical chance.
  5. C2) PAP is incoherent, if PAP is true then there can be no actor with an identity and only to a metaphysical chance."

I ask here because this looks different from the standard luck objection against free will, is there any response to this specific version of the argument?

reddit.com
u/PossibilityKindly929 — 22 days ago

it goes like this

"

  1. P1) one acts and has an identity which leads to their choices (acting)
  2. C1) then acting differently under the same circumstances would mean they have no fixed identity
  3. P2) PAP (Principle of Alternative Possibilities) means that for free will to be true, one must be capable of acting differently under the same circumstances
  4. P3) either free will is attributed to an actor with identity, or to metaphysical chance.
  5. C2) PAP is incoherent, if PAP is true then there can be no actor with an identity and only to a metaphysical chance."

I ask here because this looks different from the standard luck objection against free will, is there any response to this specific version of the argument?

reddit.com
u/PossibilityKindly929 — 24 days ago