If a bank verifies you can repay, why do you carry 100% of the downside?
Had a debate here recently I can't stop thinking about, so I want to throw it to a wider group.
The setup: a bank checks your income, employment, and history, decides you can repay, then structures the loan so that if things go wrong you eat 100% of the loss and the bank is fully protected by collateral. My question: if the bank is that confident, why does it need zero downside? And if it needs zero downside, how confident was it really? A rigorous affordability check that still dumps the entire risk on the borrower feels less like risk management and more like risk dumping.
The pushback I got was: "risk-sharing only works for startups, because a startup makes a profit the investor shares in. A house or a car doesn't return a profit, so it doesn't apply."
I think that's backwards:
- The point of risk-sharing was never the profit, it's the loss structure. Debt is designed so the borrower bears the first losses. Buy a $100k home with an $80k mortgage; a 20% price drop wipes out your entire $20k while the lender is untouched (Mian & Sufi call this "levered losses").
- Risk-sharing home finance already exists. Islamic diminishing musharaka has the bank co-own the home and share the downside. And mainstream economists proposed the same thing to prevent 2008: Mian & Sufi's "shared-responsibility mortgage" and Robert Shiller's "continuous workout mortgage" both cut the borrower's balance when local prices fall.
- The real payoff is incentives. A lender that shares your downside actually wants you to succeed and will restructure instead of foreclosing, exactly how a VC behaves.
Genuine questions:
- Does the "a house doesn't profit, so risk-sharing can't apply" objection hold, or does it miss the point?
- Would banks underwrite better and foreclose less if they had skin in your outcome?
- Why haven't risk-sharing mortgages gone mainstream despite top economists pushing them?