u/cookieisgiven

[1] nonsenses are only in language.

[2] roughly speaking, "x is y" presupposes an x that is y.

[3] "x is" means "x is itself", "an x that is not itself" is nonsense.

[3.1] while "x is itself" means no more than x - or, in language, means "x" is not nonsense.

[3.2] "x is not at all while x is itself" is one of the nonsenses (there is a certain absurdity in saying "x does not subsist at all while x is itself").

[3.3] "x happens to be" and "x could be not x" (x could be otherwise) are some of the nonsenses, as it means "x happens to be x".

[3.4] "there is no x" means "x" is nonsense.

[4] "x is y" when it is not is thus nonsense, as "an x that is y" is nonsense here.

So "Being" and "false but not nonsense" and "possible" are some of the nonsenses.

[5] there is no deduction from nonsense.

[5.1] we do not posit an arbitrary "x is y" as brute then deduce from it, for it has not been shown to not be nonsense.

[6] so brute facts name the world.

[7] there is thus no philosophical rejection that is not of the form "this is nonsense", because otherwise one is rejecting a name.

We start with a formal characterization:

[1] Only x is only x, thus no one else answers why x is - we name x a simple.

The monistic intuition thus follows in these cases:

[2] Say there is only two simples, we then ask why there is only two simples? - thus they are not simples (so as any number of simples)

[3] Say these are all the simples, we ask why there is only these? - thus they are not simples.

[4] Say each simple is simply there, thus a priori these are all the simples - thus they are not simples

The monistic demand is based on a failed conception of simples (a conception of simples that is not simple enough), that there can somehow be "all the simples" to be asked with the question "why only these" to force an answer (which concedes monism because if so they are unified under this answer).

But this only assumes that simples are thus as conceived. We pure pluralist thus should simply reject that, we should say:

[5] 'All the simples' is nonsense.

Because implicitly they are just rejections of more simples. Any only claim is a rejection of more simples that have no one else that answers why they are.

So a simple is not simply there, this is not simple enough.

[6] So each simple is only the when it is (no one else answer when it is), a pure gain, an utterly new.

[7] The substance of a simple at all is the when it is. It is a when, not a where that is simply there.

[8] So there is simply more simples - which is strictly more than any sense of all.

This is pure pluralism.

[additions]

Monism without qualification simply means if there is two beings, there is one further unifying reason for why there is two. While pluralism (in the sense intended) say that there is no further reason but each of them.

Most of the times monists attack pluralists by the question "why is there only these?" Which, tbh, the pluralists can't answer.

If I say there is only two simples, then they would ask "why there is only two?" and this seems to require ONE further reason for thus (aka monism), else it is arbitrary.

This extends to even an unqualified "these", they would ask "why there is only these?"

The point in the post is that this question only make sense if the conception of simples is as they have thought. But we can conceive simples newly, where each simple is so simple that simples share nothing at all.

And the content of this formal characterization is the when. A simple is an utterly new when. It is its own when. Roughly speaking, it is only the first time it is at all. It is so "this" that the normal "this" is not indexical enough. It is so "this" that it is a "when" not a "where" that is simply there.

The act and potential model does not answer this question at all.

If A is to give B, nothing in A tells you when to give.

If B requires other conditions, nothing prevents them to be actual instantly and thus actualizing B instantly.

The whole model thus exhausts instantly all at once. One big static complex that has ended and is no world at all.

It need not be simultaneous as all is actual but reaching finality in no time at all.

This of course extends without qualifications, so emanations, derivations, ... still are suspects.

> 'nothing at all'

Means 'nothing at all as default', 'firstly, nothing at all', 'literally nothing at all from the very start', 'literally nothing', 'there was nothing at all'.

And hence 'there was nothing at all to do anything', 'there was nothing at all to be understood', 'there was literally nothing' and so 'whatsoever at all in anysense a priori is (intransitively) 'newer' [than it]'.

It does not mean, presumptuously, 'now, nothing at all', 'nothing at all always', 'there will be nothing at all', 'a principle', or 'the elimination of the world itself', 'the ceasation of the world'.

For these expressions and understandings themselves, are obviously in being, but they do not say anything at all in the sense that 'nothing at all' presumes 'being' - for no one in the world say that the understanding of an apple is literally the apple in itself - the expression 'nothing at all' and the understanding of such expression are in being, and say about being only, and they say:

> For if the world is 'being as default' (timeless being, being only, being always), how could there be understandings such as 'nothing at all'?

For this understanding is beyond 'being as default' which also means that it is beyond this world, and hence this world cannot have such understanding else it is meaningless nonsense.

For 'nothing at all' does not suggest 'now, nothing at all', so on what authority does one insist that 'nothing at all' rejects utterly 'being'?

For this understanding only shows that the true understanding of being is not 'being as default' at all.

As 'nothing at all' means 'nothing at all as default', on what authority does one insist that 'nothing at all as default' rejects 'now, being' (as seen)?

Futher more, in the same manner, if the world is 'being as default' then what do you try to mean when you try to insist that 'nothing at all' must mean 'the elimination of the world itself'?

For this is obvious nonsense, for when the world is, 'where is' the elimination?

For the world is all there is, is the elimination in any sense in the world? And in what sense exactly? Is it identical to the world itself? Or is it a potential?

What do you try to mean with it? What do you try to result in with it? Result in 'nothing at all'? Or are you trying to result in some 'non-being' which actually does not mean 'nothing at all'?

But the later case just means that this 'non-being' is just the world as disguised, so you have not eliminated the world after all

Again, we ask, what do you mean when you insist that it must be understood as 'the elimination of the world itself'? For this is meaningless nonsense, in any sense of the world at all.

Hence the understanding of 'nothing at all' is the understanding of being about itself that it is not 'default' (in the old sense of 'being as default'). That is to say the old sense of 'default' is still derivative on the barest sense of it.

It is that we have not understood this bare sense that its derivative sense 'being as default' (being in its default) is understood as 'final' or 'at all, all there is, that's about it', and the sense of 'default' of nothing at all is not 'default' in the same sense of being, but simply because 'there was nothing at all to be even default'. That is to say the understanding of 'nothing at all' is the understanding of being itself in itself in the sense that 'being is newest'.

Its 'default' is its own most intimacy. Its 'default' must not mean more than 'itself', for it means 'it firstly itself' (default) (default in itself).

> When being itself has firstly been itself, being itself is in its default.

The understanding of 'being as default' (being itself in its default) is to have meant, being has firstly been itself.

So the finding is that:

> nothing at all

> now, being

Have we understood being?

> It is simply the when it is.

Its when is the most intimate term for it. It is more intimate than the term 'it' or 'itself' or 'this' (it is more this than 'this' itself). Being is understood according to 'when it is', and this 'when' is its barest sense.

> When being is, here it is.

Only when it is does it firstly be itself.

Being itself means when it is firstly itself.

And can anything stop this? No, they are already too late, it is already here.

And when it is not, it is not in anywhere in any sense at all. Its only sense is when it is. Its only sense is when it firstly be itself, so what are they stopping?

And so 'when it is not' is nonsense (and is only used pedagogically), since this already refers to it.

> It is the when it is - and that's about it

So it is not contingent, nor necessary.

But timely, not temporal (for this is just some nonsense model of timely).

> when being [firstly] is

Is what is meant with being.

And this does not mean 'there is only one 'when being is'' (there is only one being/simple) else it just is a timeless principle

It means that it does not matter what is already there (even if there is nothing at all)

> when a new being is, it firstly is

Prevention is thus nonsense.

When 'when it is' is understood, there is simply no rejection of it at all (authority over it). By meaning alone (as it is not incoherent) and without presuming anything, there is no rejection.

> when it is, it firstly is absolutely

And hence we have mistaken this for 'being always' itself. But we have now understood that 'being always' itself is nonsense, as we have now understood what 'always' means - for it means 'where it is at'.

The task is to have understood what is meant, and in having understood, we ask no more questions.

For this is the only sense that obviously gives sense/being to any being/understanding/sense at all. It is the sense that all sense cannot fail to mean.

Let us deconstruct this claim:

>the many are from the one

First question:

>why there is suddenly the many to be from the one at all rather than none?

Since:

>is there no many at all, there is no many to be from anyone, so there is only the one

A further question to focus to what is being asked for:

>why there is the many at all 'to be from thus'? - for this already means the many

Since:

>without the many there is no one to be from another

Conclusion:

>so the many are prior and no one is from only another

[A]

We don't ask why x and y are not identical, we ask why there is them at all.

Having seen that there is x does not mean having seen that there is y also.

Why x is not others cannot be the reason why y is not others.

Why x is itself is not why y is itself.

When we know why there is each, there is no further question.

[B]

x and y are only different when they interdepend [1].

When they do not any more they return to a blob [2].

We ask why suddenly this happens, and suddenly why two states [1] [2] are not the same.

If these two state are not the same when they interdepend, then we can ask when they do not, but then these are two higher order states, so why they are not the same? So on.

If there is no [2] at all then there is a brute difference.

So there is always a difference before any of those - which is not explained.

[B.1]

The demand to ask why x and y are not identical means there is a point when they are identical.

But when they are identical and when they are not are not the same, so by the same demand there is a point when these are identical. So on.

If there is no point when they are identical, then they are not - brutely.

So there is always a brute difference before any of those.

[C]

There is x and y that are not identical - why?

Because of z that not identical to them - why?

Because of another w!

At finality, there is simply those that are not identical - simples

Obviously, that there is only one simple is thus nonsense.

[1] any 'there is only these' claim is a brute rejection, else 'only these are correct' can be taken as brute and philosophy ends

[2] simples are self grounding, each has exclusive authority over itself

[2.1] a derivative simple is not a simple at all

[2.1.1] which is a rejection of simples

[2.2] anyone that is self grounding needs no ones else for itself, it is only itself

[3] there is simples is not there is only simples

[3.1] each simple grounds itself does not mean no ones else ground themselves

[4] wholes are prior means there is only those that are not simples (there is only those that are grounded by the big whole which is the only one with exclusive authority over itself)

[4.1] this is a brute rejection of simples a priori

[4.1.1] wholes are prior only has sense after simples are rejected

[1] facts zz about x and y are about x and y

[1.1] when there is y and there is no x at all there is no zz

[1.2] when there is x and there is no y at all there is no zz

[1.3] facts at all are after (not without) their subjects

---

[1.4] 'x is not y' or 'x and y is not indentical' are facts about x and y

[1.4.1] monistic priority (that there is no beings that are not identical without those facts that they are not identical) is hence absurd

---

[2] simples are only themselves

[2.1] simples are not identical - a priori

[2.1.1] rejecting this is brutely rejecting simples thus

---

[3] there is simples and complexes

[3.1] those complexes yy and those simples (and or simpler complexes) xx that yy are not without are not identical

[3.1.1] wholes and parts are senseless

[3.1.1.1] as there is only one whole from only x and y

[3.1.1.2] while zz are additions from only x and y

---

[4] zz are not wihout x and y

[4.1] there is only x y zz

[4.1.1] for zz are our 'relations' (facts, complexes)

---

[5] simples are not arranged (or rearranged)

[5.1] else they are modified and thus are not simples

[5.2] no ones are arranged (or rearranged)

[5.2.1] else they are not themselves

---

This means that the monistic demand only arrises when its proponents have not (failed to) conceive[d] simples.

There is no x.

Why?

Because there is only y.

---

There is only these.

Only to what?

The world - the world is only these.

There is a world to be said that it is only these (assume monism).

Thus monism cannot establish itself using rejections else it is circular.

---

Plurality presuppose unity

Why?

Because pluralities are modes within unity.

>Only unity explains - circular.

Because unity emanates derivatives.

>Only unity emanates - circular.

Because anyone is one (itself, a unit) - non-sequitur.

Because wholes are prior to parts.

>There is only wholes and parts that are thus.

>Unclear and why? - brute and unclear and circular.

Because all things are relational, and without relationality, there are no determinations.

>Only these are to be relational thus - circular.

Because there cannot be multiple fundamental realities as nothing explains why they are distinct rather than one.

>But each simple is only itself, a priori they are not identical.

>Why they are not identical?

>(Because only x is x, only y is y, if they are identical then the case is not that only x is x (contradiction).)

>Rejecting this explanation is simply rejecting the conception of simples thus. Which is an only claim, namely, there is only those that are not simples thus, or simply put 'there is no simples thus' or 'there is only other beings'.

>The intent that they are to be identical in why they are not identical depends on an only, namely, only these are not to be identical (or only this [one] is the why that they are not identical).

---

We thus can't say only without monism:

>The world (totality) is only these - unity.

>The many are only these - forcing unity.

When truly many, the only cannot scope over them as if they are one or in a unity, as if each somehow all agrees on that scope.

The unity at all in saying the only is the unity to say the only, else the only cannot be said.

Why suddenly all of them have this one only in common?

>Because they are in unity under this only.

Why each of them is to agree to this?

>Suddenly there is a unity, namely the unity to agree to this.

---

'There is simples' does not mean 'there is only simples'.

Each is itself is not a common, so as each is only itself - for this is the minimum. Beyond each is itself, saying an only to them means they have a common - which is circular.

'These are simples' and 'only these are simples' do not mean the same.

'Only these are only themselves' implies a static 'these' (in 'only these') that each agrees to (contradiction).

---

Each simple is only itself.

If there is a number of simples, then each simple agree to that (contradiction).

Thus however many simples we say there is, there is simply 'more'.

---

A circular denial (rejection) is not a position at all, compare: >There is simples.

>There is no simples (there is only other beings).

'There is no simples' cannot be a brute fact, else all rejections can be said to be brute and philosophy ends.

There is no x.

Why?

Because there is only y.

---

There is only these.

Only to what?

The world - the world is only these.

There is a world to be said that it is only these (assume monism).

Thus monism cannot establish itself using rejections else it is circular.

---

Plurality presuppose unity

Why?

Because pluralities are modes within unity.

>Only unity explains - circular.

Because unity emanates derivatives.

>Only unity emanates - circular.

Because anyone is one (itself, a unit) - non-sequitur.

Because wholes are prior to parts.

>There is only wholes and parts that are thus.

>Unclear and why? - brute and unclear and circular.

Because all things are relational, and without relationality, there are no determinations.

>Only these are to be relational thus - circular.

Because there cannot be multiple fundamental realities as nothing explains why they are distinct rather than one.

>But each simple is only itself, a priori they are not identical.

>Why they are not identical?

>(Because only x is x, only y is y, if they are identical then the case is not that only x is x (contradiction).)

>Rejecting this explanation is simply rejecting the conception of simples thus. Which is an only claim, namely, there is only those that are not simples thus, or simply put 'there is no simples thus' or 'there is only other beings'.

>The intent that they are to be identical in why they are not identical depends on an only, namely, only these are not to be identical (or only this [one] is the why that they are not identical).

---

We thus can't say only without monism:

>The world (totality) is only these - unity.

>The many are only these - forcing unity.

When truly many, the only cannot scope over them as if they are one or in a unity, as if each somehow all agrees on that scope.

The unity at all in saying the only is the unity to say the only, else the only cannot be said.

Why suddenly all of them have this one only in common?

>Because they are in unity under this only.

Why each of them is to agree to this?

>Suddenly there is a unity, namely the unity to agree to this.

---

'There is simples' does not mean 'there is only simples'.

Each is itself is not a common, so as each is only itself - for this is the minimum. Beyond each is itself, saying an only to them means they have a common - which is circular.

'These are simples' and 'only these are simples' do not mean the same.

'Only these are only themselves' implies a static 'these' (in 'only these') that each agrees to (contradiction).

---

Each simple is only itself.

If there is a number of simples, then each simple agree to that (contradiction).

Thus however many simples we say there is, there is simply 'more'.

---

A circular denial (rejection) is not a position at all, compare: >There is simples.

>There is no simples (there is only other beings).

'There is no simples' cannot be a brute fact, else all rejections can be said to be brute and philosophy ends.

>Have beings ever understood the world?

For 'the world' here is used in the barest sense, it does not simply mean 'the earth' - for that is just an old model of the world - so as the universe, the multiverse, and the one, and the dao, and emptiness, the sorts ...

Those models are only attempts to answer the meaning of 'the world' (the canonical sense of the world).

The world just mean the world, what can be 'beyond' it?

And hence a priori the world as such currently is 'newest'.

>And we ask has this world ended (stopped)?

One should wish to say no, otherwise it is then some utter nonsense that does not mean anything in our world at all.

And it does not matter what your answer is, the world is to mean 'whatever at all, in whatever sense it is in at all, currently', and we ask 'has this world ended?'

And whoever say no should then face the question:

>'where is 'those newer' when your world is newer?' ('those newer' that are those 'newly' in your would when it is newer at all)

That is to say it (the world) is currently newest, but it have not ended so we should ask for 'when it is newer' (this is then the newest since it is now current, and the old world is newest when it was the current).

As long as this newer world is not literally the same as the old world (in all sense) then it has succeeded in not having ended.

There is only one sense of 'the world' here, the most 'worldly' sense, to read any world here in some sense that is not utterly 'worldly' is to misread.

---

Back then, the world was 'the world as it currently was'. That is to say, the world was newest and that was all there was. Denying this is exactly like saying 'the world back then was not the world back then at all' which is utter nonsense. Let us call this w1.

Now, the world is 'the world currently', which is the world as newest. Let us call the this w2.

Some 'newer' are in w2, else w2 is just strictly w1 with nothing 'newer' at all in any sense.

We then ask:

>where are those 'newer'?

In w1?

So when w1, those newer are as potential.

And when w2, those newer are as act.

>But where is 'those newer as act' itself?

In w1 as meta-potential again? For if it wholy in w2, then has anything been explained?

One, one could say yes, and we can keep repeat the question, or say 'it is nowhere at all back then'. One can even incist that the regress exhaust by fiat, but again what we have after that is still 'the world currently', for it seems that one's world have ended here. That is to say the world is strictly static (which is obvious nonsense).

Or two, those newer in the current world are literal 'm a g i c s' that are their own 'whens' - which only 'when they are' do they 'firstly be' at all - which do not come from any hidden principle at all (obviously, since this would already have been counted in 'the world'). Nor that w1 should then cease for them at all, since they have nothing to do with w1 (and otherwise we also would just ask 'where' the act of ceasing all over again).

Or three, we can answer:

>'why are w1 and w2 in a way where w1 actualizes its potential at all and result in w2?'

With 'they just do', which is literal m a g i c, and static, since it apply to all of them at once. If we then wish also that this m a g i c is not static, then the appealing of m a g i c itself is appealed timely 'somehow'.

What I mean by aesthetic, I mean by adequacy, I mean by the dignity and worthiness of those in questions.

Which failure can obviously be seen in monism where all are just pale shadows, mere derivatives of the One, and so in other reductive accounts.

Roughly, when we ask "why there is anything at all" we expect more than just "all there is, is grounded by this" - a monistic principle which turns all into pale derivatives, a realm of eternal forms where all then are mere emanations, a reductive account to mere rules and mechanism, ...

For we have asked not for arbitrary accounts or settings up of ultimate authority, but for "those that are worthy of why there is anything at all".

We have asked for the true name of the world, not to assume an answer to any idol.

Thus we then should expect the answer to bare the weight of the world itself and all its worth, that the answer when seen should be obviously it and there is no more question.

We are to measure disclosures (theories) by aesthetic and worth alone, to see whether they are our world at all.

---

The point about monism can be made a little more rigour.

When we say "x is explained solely by y" or "x depends on solely y" or "x is dual to y", we have said "x is nothing but y". But this is senseless, as it would mean there is no them to begin with, there is only one thing in question, we have not explained anything.

As "x is nothing but y" is shown to be senseless, grounding at all is not monistic in any step. Grounding is at least "x is y and z" where each is not each other.

'Asdsjooas' is senseless as it names no one.
'Time' has sense because it has that which it names.
When we see another we can simply name it as 'asdsjooas', thus asdsjooas now is not senseless.
We do not first give a name that names no one and afterwards pretend that it has thereby named.
A name at all names, else it is senseless.
When a name has named there is that which it has named, when a name is senseless there is no one that has been named thus.
'Asdsjooas is time' is senseless as it names no one.
'Numbers are cats' is senseless as it names no one (fact).
'Time is a dimension' is likewise senseless until the world is disclosed thus.

The point is not that these sentences are true or false. The point is that they say nothing at all. Whether 'x is y' names at all is not settled via its form, nor by stipulation, nor by any arbitrary fiat.

It is settled only by the world itself. Only when the world is disclosed thus do we name thus. For we do not first name no one and afterwards pretend that the name has named.

To say that a sentence is senseless is not to say what it means, for it means nothing - and we say that it is thus.

What does 'time is a dimension' mean (when the world does not disclose thus at all)?
It must have meant that they have thrown away 'time' and smuggle in some x that is a dimension, namely 'spacetime' or any x they would have liked to smuggle.

Is a number a cat? No it is not.
Why we see that they are thus? Because they are thus that we see them together thus.
When we attend to them, whether one is another is seen instantly as they are thus.
When we say that it is a no whether a number a cat, we do not say that a number is a cat because it is senseless (there is no thus), while that a number is not a cat says that they are seen together thus.

When asked why a number is not a cat, people would just say that it is obvious - so should time is not a dimension.

We see them together (x, y, z ...), and in seeing them together we see that they are thus to each other (x is y, z is not x, ...), because they are thus to each other.

That "djasojfioaj" is senseless is obvious.

That "aiojdsaj is time" is senseless is obvious.

That "if x and y have sense, then xy has sense" is senseless is obvious.

That "numbers are cats" is senseless is obvious.

That "time is a dimension" is likewise senseless until the world is disclosed thus, is obvious. Before such disclosure, it is no more sense-bearing than "numbers are cats."

The point is not that these sentences are true or false. The point is that they say nothing at all. Whether "x is y" says anything is not settled by its form, nor by stipulation, nor by arbitrary fiat. It is settled only by the world itself. Only when the world is disclosed thus do we name what is there.

We do not first name nothing and afterwards pretend that something has thereby been named.

To say that a sentence is senseless is to say something about the sentence, not to say what the sentence means. Thus saying, "I see that 'sijofdjasoifdjoasi' is senseless," commits one to nothing about what "sijofdjasoifdjoasi" means, for it means nothing.

---

That formal logic is senseless is obvious.

Let us proceed with an example:

> let time be x, dimension be y, and 'x is y' be p

But now what should it means when in reality time is not a dimension? What have p meant? It should mean that p have meant no one, even though each of its term does name one, there is no such p. While otherwise it has sense, namely, the fact that time is truly a dimension.

But p is said before we have seen whether time is truly a dimension, thus formal logic concerns no sense at all.

What in question here cannot be answered from those stipulations nor any further stipulations or derivations from them at all. Whether 'time is a dimension' has sense at all is decided by the world before we can even utter it in any way. It is that all 'x is y' beforehand is senseless as stipulated, it requires zero sense or zero seeing at all to set the terms up and then derive. Even the tautological x=x is only after there is x at all (without qualifications).

That which gives the whether is not dead logic but the world itself in its disclosure. The authority of the world is the world itself as seen.

Most of those in questions have no meaning more than our direct and obvious seeing of them, not of those that they are not without (as we have not seen them).

What is the meaning of 'time'? We should say that we know 'which' is time - it is 'this', that which is indicated when we refer to that which makes the world lively - but we should not, by this and by mere stipulations, say that we have seen those behind it also. We simply indicate time is which by pointing to its effects to expect the other person to see it also. Only when the other person manages to know which is in question, inquiries then proceed at all.

It is that we see which in question first not by defining it but by a disclosure of it as itself immediately, only then do we dare to attend to it genuinely at all to see what it is qua what it is.

All metaphysical questions at all are to be answered qua attending and conforming to the authority of that which in question itself. Thus we have no right to reject anyone beforehand or subsume anyone beforehand. Only in attending them can we see which are their authority or that they are the sole authority of themselves or not.

Any premature senseless stipulation is to face the question 'why there is thus at all?' and any so tried answer to that face the same question along with another 'why such answer has authority at all?'

Authority comes from the world itself not from some fiat appeals. All masqueradings of fiats qua brutes are to be exposed as failures to attend to the world.

That we see those that we see is obvious.

That they are themselves and that they also are others or not, are obvious.

That 'we see them' itself also is them is obvious.

That those that are others are not without them and that they are thus simpler than those that are not without them, are obvious.

That those that we see, at finality, are not without simples and that simples are only themselves, are obvious.

That each simple in being itself do not have anything to do with other simples in being themselves is obvious.

Thus each simple is an utterly new, and we see an utterly new as also a pure gain that gains itself.

As simples are gained more and more, 'they' are gained also at once as complexes. So as anyone at all are gained more and more, 'they' are gained also at once as their complexes.

> Why there is anyone at all?

> Why anyone at all gives others?

Ask for simples.

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For x that is y and z, x is not without y and z, as without y or z there is no x, while without x there is y or z.

Multual depedence means x is nothing but y, but this only means that x and y are synonymous.

> The point is that they imagine this 'synthesis' to spring out a higher unity, but the logic itself is senseless.

> Saying 'difference needs identity' is having answered the question: does it need anyone else?

> When the answer is no then it is senseless.

> When the answer is yes, then there is no multual dependence after all.

Thus no one is [to be] only another.

T k muốn có "người nói chuyện cùng chủ đề" đâu, t muốn có bạn luôn. Bạn mà t nói gì cũng engage và nó nói gì t cũng engage. Một người nghiêm túc quá với mấy chuyện không nghiêm túc và cợt nhả quá với mấy chuyện hệ trọng nặng trịch trên đời.

Thôi nào, mấy cái nặng trịch hệ trọng đó không đáng đâu. Bỏ chúng xuống và làm bạn với t đi, nan nỉ đó. T sẽ đưa cho bây ... chính mình - người bạn đích thực này, và như vậy thì bây phải ... hứa nhe ... đưa lại cho t "chính tụi bây". Để mà tụi mình có "tụi mình".

Không phải là cái xác sống để rượt đuổi mô phỏng hay hình tượng nào, không phải là kẻ có mục tiêu, mà là chỉ chính bây thôi đó! Hãy đưa chính bây cho t! Tại t là kẻ tham lam nhất thế gian.

I'm asking for those that are obvious, those that we do not reject from the start.

Obviously (pun intended), it should be qualia, and then that things are other things also (in some sense). Is there more than this?

Có tốc để đua

Mình làm để thấy

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Mình muốn thấy tất thảy chúng nó từ đầu tới cuối tại đây sao mới lại như vậy

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Tại đâu cậu lại chạy?

Tại đích đến cậu thấy hết cả quãng đường đã qua

Mình đua đặng thấy mình đã đua

Mình có làm cái nào đặng không thấy?

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Thế gian đưa mình ra để được ngắm

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