Theory: the reason courts can never be truly fair is that we never demanded fairness from the people who write the laws
▲ 21 r/PoliticalPhilosophy+4 crossposts

Theory: the reason courts can never be truly fair is that we never demanded fairness from the people who write the laws

Think about a judge. We have all these rules to keep judges neutral. They can't meet privately with one side. They can't trade favors. They have to recuse themselves if they're biased. We take this stuff seriously.

Now walk down the hall to Congress (or Parliament, wherever you are). None of those rules apply.

Lawmakers meet privately with the companies and groups a bill will affect all the time. We just gave it a nice name: lobbying. They trade votes constantly ("I'll vote for your bill if you vote for mine") and we call that being a good dealmaker instead of what it actually is. And basically every single one of them belongs to a party whose whole job is to win, not to be neutral.

So here's the theory: a court can only ever be as fair as the law it's enforcing. You can have the most honest, unbiased judge in the world, and she can still be enforcing a law that got written through backroom deals and one-sided lobbying. She's not doing anything wrong. She's just applying an unfair result very carefully.

James Madison basically called this out over 200 years ago: "No man is allowed to be a judge in his own cause, because his interest would certainly bias his judgment." But that's literally what a lawmaker does every day. They write the bill, argue for it, then vote on whether it passes. Same person, both jobs. We'd never let a lawyer also be the jury.

Belgium actually put the fix in their constitution. Article 42 says members of parliament represent the whole nation, not just their district or their voters. Which is a nice goal that basically nobody's system is built to actually deliver.

So what's the fix?

Split the single job of "lawmaker" into two separate jobs, sitting in the same chamber, kind of like how a courtroom splits "advocate" and "judge":

  • Party representatives: their whole job is to openly argue for their group's interest. Beekeepers, a manufacturing sector, a rare disease patient group, whatever. They write proposals and make the case, out in the open, on the record. This is what lawmakers already do when they lobby for their platform, just now it's the entire job instead of something done behind closed doors.
  • People's representatives: they don't represent any faction. Their only job is to vote yes or no on whatever the party reps put forward. No writing bills. No meeting with lobbyists, because there's nothing left for a lobbyist to do.

Once every interest can get its own open representative instead of needing a private backchannel, you can finally ban ex parte meetings (private one-sided access) without shutting anyone out. Nobody needs the backchannel anymore because everyone already has a front door.

And here's the part I think is actually clever: vote-trading structurally can't happen anymore. It only works if one person controls both the "yes" they're offering and the "yes" they want back. Party reps have proposals but no vote. People reps have a vote but nothing to trade it for. Neither side holds both halves of the deal, so there's nothing left to swap.

The two roles even get elected differently, since they're answering different questions. Party reps answer "does this interest deserve a voice," so you'd use something like approval voting, where people can back as many parties as they want and parties aren't fighting over the same voters. People reps answer "does the whole community trust this person to be fair," so you'd need something stricter, like requiring more for-votes than against-votes, not just "most votes." That filters out candidates who are loved by one faction and despised by everyone else, and pushes toward people who are broadly acceptable instead of narrowly beloved.

(Based on ideas from this piece if anyone wants to go deeper - I wrote it as well)

u/kmensaert — 11 days ago

Political parties that are not sufficient fragile make our democracy more fragile

Anti-fragile systems are systems that grow stronger through stress and variation, but only because their subunits are fragile. Consider an organism: cells are programmed to self-destruct when infected. The same logic applies to a healthy economy, where failing companies go bankrupt.

When these mechanisms break down, the results are telling. In the body, we get cancer. In the economy, we get corporations too big to fail, as seen in the 2008 banking crisis. The subunits that should have died were kept alive, and the whole system suffered for it.

Our political parties follow the same pattern. They have become cancerous: shielded from failure, they take on excessive risks that society is ultimately forced to bail out. We can observe them to stay alive despite the many scandals that would kill any normal organisation.

The political parties become oligarchical because of party exclusivity: the inability for people to support/vote for multiple parties symultaniously. This forces them to have opinions on all subjects and hence unable to specialize.
Allowing parties to specialize would make them more fragile and hence would make our society more anti-fragile.

For a summary on this Idea, presented in the book 'The Flaws That Kill Our Democracy': https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=2n8WckKN8k0

u/kmensaert — 3 months ago
▲ 6 r/nassimtaleb+1 crossposts

I need help with my "Talebsian" book on democracy

In 2020 I published a book on democracy in which I applied multiple concepts that I learned from Nassim Taleb. The premise is simple: the democratic system is fragile because political parties are anti-fragile (too big to fail). This allows local risk (e.g. corrupt leaders, etc.) to become systemic.

I attempt to solve this by allowing political parties to become small and specialized. I remove the core principles that prevent them from becoming specialized (via negativa) and show how the current system forces them into becoming these all-issue, ideological parties using the graveyard of failures.

Without the ideas of Taleb, the book would never have been what it is. I thanked him in the acknowledgements and sent a physical copy to the only address I could find: he was a professor at New York University at the time. However, because of COVID and his resignation from that position, I don't think he ever received it. I think the book would be especially interesting to him as it could improve democracy in fractured countries such as Lebanon, which he is very passionate about.

My question: Can someone help me with sending him a physical copy of my book as a token of gratitude? please dm.

youtube.com
u/kmensaert — 3 months ago