u/liamblank

Alternative AA, also known as the "Penn Station-Grand Central Through Operation," was a central proposal in the Access to the Region's Core (ARC) project designed to enable shared commuter rail facilities between NJ Transit, LIRR, and Metro-North. While initially selected for its ability to increase capacity and connect Penn Station to Grand Central, the project underwent significant modifications and evaluation of variants before its eventual cancellation (by that time, it was known as Alternative G).

###### Commentary by Liam Blank:

Why were Alternative AA and Alternative G (it's successor) ultimately disqualified?

The official record cites lowest peak-hour capacity (36 vs. 40/52 trains), unresolved GCT construction risks, slow inter-terminal operating speeds, bi-directional operational conflicts, and the West Side development factor. But the unofficial record (also documented in my research) makes clear that Metro-North's institutional unwillingness to share operational control — whether driven by Howard Permut's leadership philosophy, the MTA's bureaucratic autonomy, or genuine concern about reliability — removed the essential inter-agency cooperation that Alt G required. The technical and the political were inseparable. By definition, through-running can't succeed if one of the two required railroads refuses to cooperate.

At an NJT board meeting in June 2003, when cancellation of Alt G was announced, a senior NJT manager reportedly explained the decision by saying "We don't have a dancing partner" — apparently a direct reference to the Long Island Rail Road and Metro-North's unwillingness to cooperate.

Alternative AA, also known as the "Penn Station-Grand Central Through Operation," was a central proposal in the Access to the Region's Core (ARC) project designed to enable shared commuter rail facilities between NJ Transit, LIRR, and Metro-North. While initially selected for its ability to increase capacity and connect Penn Station to Grand Central, the project underwent significant modifications and evaluation of variants before its eventual cancellation (by that time, it was known as Alternative G).

Why was it cancelled?

The official record cites lowest peak-hour capacity (36 vs. 40/52 trains), unresolved GCT construction risks, slow inter-terminal operating speeds, bi-directional operational conflicts, and the West Side development factor. But the unofficial record (also documented in my research) makes clear that Metro-North's institutional unwillingness to share operational control — whether driven by Howard Permut's leadership philosophy, the MTA's bureaucratic autonomy, or genuine concern about reliability — removed the essential inter-agency cooperation that Alt G required. The technical and the political were inseparable. By definition, through-running can't succeed if one of the two required railroads refuses to cooperate.

At an NJT board meeting in June 2003, when cancellation of Alt G was announced, a senior NJT manager reportedly explained the decision by saying "We don't have a dancing partner" — apparently a direct reference to the Long Island Rail Road and Metro-North's unwillingness to cooperate.

Buried in today’s Amtrak/USDOT announcement selecting Penn Transformation Partners is a major line: the Penn Station transformation will “expand track capacity, including the introduction of at least limited through-running on the regional rail network.”

That does not yet answer the hard questions: which services, which partner railroads, which platforms, which tunnels, what dwell assumptions, what fleet compatibility, and when the FRA-led Service Optimization Study becomes public.

But it does change the baseline. Through-running is no longer just an outside advocacy proposal. Amtrak is now describing it as part of the official Penn Station transformation program.

FYI -- Those future tunnels you see there under West 30th St. out to Queens are basically there as decoration since they'll likely never be built.

Even if all went according to plan, the railroads estimate through-running service would be operational by roughly 2080 (not kidding).

So, since all the things they claim are impossible would have to be solved for regardless, the choice we're facing right now is either do Penn Station through-running now with less disruption and for lower cost.... or do the obviously wrong choice.

Happy to elaborate on any of these points for those who are curious/enjoy stirring the pot.

>Schematic produced by WSP