u/xiangkunwan

This would obviously require legislation, since Uber/Lyft/Delivery apps aren’t going to voluntarily give up control over pricing.

Drivers could set their own flat rate + $/km or $/mile, or just a distance-based rate. The platform would handle matching, payment, navigation, etc., while clearly disclosing its commission.

There should be two minimum protections:

- Minimum distance rate: The overall effective $/km or $/mile couldn’t be below the tax-deductible mileage rate. Drivers could charge anything above it. This should also leave drivers with more taxable net income after vehicle expenses.

- Minimum online-time earnings: Minimum-pay rules should apply to time a driver is online and available, not just time actively completing orders. Otherwise, platforms could avoid paying the minimum simply by not giving drivers work. Reasonable acceptance requirements could prevent drivers from rejecting everything just to collect the minimum.

If those requirements make rides or deliveries too expensive, then the platforms can lower their commissions, become more efficient, change their business model, or go out of business.

If drivers are genuinely independent contractors, they should be able to decide what their own labour and vehicle are worth.

With Ontario changing OSAP in Fall 2026 to provide a maximum of 25% as grants and a minimum of 75% as loans, I think the Ford government should also make a request to the NSLSC to change how repayments are allocated.

The federal portion of OSAP is currently interest-free, while the Ontario portion still charges interest. Yet repayments don't automatically prioritize paying off the provincial portion first.

That doesn't make much financial sense. Every dollar going toward a 0% federal loan while the Ontario portion is accumulating interest keeps borrowers paying interest longer than necessary.

Especially since the premier justified the OSAP changes partly on making the program more financially sustainable, repayment should also be made more efficient for both sides: paying the Ontario portion first reduces borrowers' interest costs while returning the province's loan principal sooner.

The simplest policy would be:

Automatically apply repayments to the highest-interest portion first. Right now, that means paying off the Ontario portion before the interest-free federal portion.

Give every lane on a highway a different speed limit, so you can basically pick a lane based on your preferred cruising speed.

• Right-most lane: For vehicles that physically can't reach the normal speed limit due to spare tires, trailers, speed-limited vehicles, etc.
• All remaining lanes: Speed limits are distributed between the normal speed limit and 150 km/h, with the speeds adjusted based on the number of lanes available and rounded to the nearest 5 km/h.
• 150 km/h is the absolute maximum: Anything above 150 km/h is considered reckless driving.

On a 7-lane per-direction highway, that could look like:

150 | 140 | 130 | 120 | 110 | 100 | <100

On a 6-lane per-direction highway:

150 | 135 | 125 | 115 | 100 | <100

On a 5-lane per-direction highway:

150 | 130 | 115 | 100 | <100

On a 4-lane per-direction highway:

150 | 125 | 100 | <100

The speed limit would be enforced based on the target speed ± half the speed difference between that lane and the adjacent lane. This means the enforcement range automatically adjusts to the spacing between lane speeds.

The idea is that you pick the lane based on the speed you want to travel. You don't necessarily have to pass someone to use a faster lane.

The left-most lane has one additional rule: if you're not passing another vehicle, move right. This keeps the fastest lane available for overtaking.

I'd also put a large speed-limit marking directly on the pavement in every lane every ~10 km, or roughly every 5 minutes at the normal speed limit.

So drivers would periodically see something like:

150 | 125 | 100 | 90

The basic concept:

Pick the lane that matches your preferred speed.

Slower traffic naturally stays right, faster traffic naturally stays left, and the left-most lane remains the dedicated passing lane.

I know it's has been a while, but I’ve been thinking about the most recent government shutdown standoffs in the U.S. and how the negotiation dynamics play out.

It often seems like the side more concerned about immediate economic disruption has a stronger incentive to compromise first, since a prolonged shutdown has real costs for the broader economy. That can create a situation where willingness to “absorb pain” becomes a form of leverage.

A Canadian analogy I had in mind: if a major cross-border infrastructure issue (like the Gordie Howe International Bridge opening being delayed) created economic pressure, it’s hard to imagine Canada responding by escalating in a way that further disrupts trade flows (for example restricting traffic on the Ambassador Bridge), because the economic spillover would likely be too costly for both sides.

Is this a fair way to think about shutdown negotiations in the U.S.? And if one side is consistently more sensitive to economic disruption, does that systematically affect bargaining power over time?

I've been thinking about an alternative to people needing to work overtime or multiple jobs just to meet a basic living standard, and wanted to hear what people think.

Suppose a full-time employee (40 hours per week) earns less than a locally defined livable wage.

Rather than expecting them to work additional hours, the government would pay the employee the difference so they receive a livable income. However, the government would also track those payments by employer and later recover the cost through an employer-specific tax.

The intended incentives would be:

* Workers receive a livable income without delay.
* Employers who rely on paying below a livable wage still bear the financial responsibility.
* Taxpayers aren't permanently subsidizing low wages.
* Employers already paying a livable wage wouldn't face the additional tax.
* Workers would be less dependent on overtime or second jobs to make ends meet, which could potentially free up some work hours for people who are unemployed or underemployed.

What economic effects would you expect? Would this create better incentives than increasing the minimum wage, or would it introduce new problems such as reduced hiring, increased automation, administrative complexity, or unintended distortions in the labour market?

One of the goals would be to make a standard 40-hour workweek sufficient to meet a basic living standard while reducing the need for overtime simply to earn enough to live.

I've been thinking about an alternative to people needing to work overtime or multiple jobs just to meet a basic living standard, and wanted to hear what people think.

Suppose a full-time employee (40 hours per week) earns less than a locally defined livable wage.

Rather than expecting them to work additional hours, the government would pay the employee the difference so they receive a livable income. However, the government would also track those payments by employer and later recover the cost through an employer-specific tax.

The intended incentives would be:

• Workers receive a livable income without delay.
• Employers who rely on paying below a livable wage still bear the financial responsibility.
• Taxpayers aren't permanently subsidizing low wages.
• Employers already paying a livable wage wouldn't face the additional tax.
• Workers would be less dependent on overtime or second jobs to make ends meet, which could potentially free up some work hours for people who are unemployed or underemployed.

What economic effects would you expect? Would this create better incentives than increasing the minimum wage, or would it introduce new problems such as reduced hiring, increased automation, administrative complexity, or unintended distortions in the labour market?

One of the goals would be to make a standard 40-hour workweek sufficient to meet a basic living standard while reducing the need for overtime simply to earn enough to live.

The Truth About Hybrid Cars: It’s Worse Than You Think! (Just Have a Think)

Right now, fossil fuels don’t just compete in the free market. They’re propped up by a web of direct subsidies (tax breaks, exploration incentives, infrastructure support) and indirect ones (environmental cleanup externalized to taxpayers, health impacts from air pollution, and broader system costs tied to maintaining supply chains)

So even when oil and gas look “profitable,” that’s partly because the general population are quietly footing a huge part of the bill.

My idea is simple:

• Phase out all subsidies tied to oil and natural gas extraction used for energy, where a viable alternative exists
• Account for indirect subsidies through mechanisms like an emissions tax and stricter pollution pricing
• Oil/natural gas extraction for other stuff, like petrochemicals and consumer goods, can still be subsidized
  • if 20% of a barrel is other products, it would now only get 20% of the current subsidy and be taxed on the 80% of its emissions
• Redirect the full amount into clean energy R&D, grid modernization, nuclear, storage, and renewables deployment

What happens then?

• Fossil fuels would have to compete on their true cost, not a subsidized version of it
  • They have already benefited from a century-plus head start. This simply shifts the system toward a more balanced playing field going forward.
• Clean energy development would gain a more stable and predictable funding flow
• Energy markets would reflect system-wide costs more accurately, rather than favouring legacy infrastructure by default

Imagine a law that caps corporate profit margins (e.g., 15%) and limits executive pay to a fixed multiple of the lowest-paid full-time equivalent employee (e.g., 20x).

Any profit above the cap would either have to be reinvested into:

• Higher wages and benefits
• Lower prices
• R&D and expansion
• Better working conditions
• Environmental improvements

Or it would be taxed at 100%, effectively confiscating excess profit.

To prevent loopholes, corporations would be treated as unified entities (no subsidiary chains or internal “fake pricing”), and all forms of executive compensation (stock, bonuses, consulting fees, etc.) would count toward the cap.

The goal is to force profit growth to come from productivity and shared gains, not purely from margin expansion or pay compression.

Would this improve the economy and reduce inequality, or just create a massive loophole-hunting industry?

It has been a month since the request was created, and the payment still shows as combined. How much longer does it take to process it.

Could someone walk me through the repayment of the directed loan payments for the provincial portion?