Ukraine’s foreign minister, Andrii Sybiha, says he has proposed an “anti-crisis package” to Poland following a meeting in Warsaw with his Polish counterpart, Radosław Sikorski.

The measures are intended to resolve an ongoing diplomatic dispute sparked by President Volodymyr Zelensky’s decision to name a military unit after a group that led massacres of Poles during World War Two.

Polish Prime Minister Donald Tusk welcomed the move towards de-escalation, but one of his deputy foreign ministers made clear that Poland wants to see concrete action, including a “correction” of the decision to name the unit.

In a statement following his meeting with Sikorski, Sybiha declared that Poland and Ukraine are “vital” for one another, especially as they “share a common enemy, Russia”. He expressed gratitude for the “unprecedented support” Warsaw provided to Kyiv after the full-scale Russian invasion in 2022.

Referring to the current diplomatic crisis, Sybiha said that “Ukraine remains open to an equal and honest dialogue” and that he had “proposed a package of anti-crisis steps” to the Polish side.

The measures include consultations between foreign ministries, organising a meeting of historians, and “reaching out to the religious leaders of both nations to leverage their authority in our bilateral dialogue”.

Sybiha reiterated that “the Ukrainian military’s choice of unit name carried no anti-Polish intent”. However, he offered no suggestion it would be changed, instead saying “we respect the history of others, and we expect the same approach toward our own history and independence from our partners.”

In late May, Zelensky named a military unit after the “heroes of the Ukrainian Insurgent Army (UPA)”. In Ukraine, the UPA is remembered primarily for its role in fighting for Ukrainian independence from Moscow-imposed Soviet rule during and after World War Two.

In Poland, however, it is associated with the Volhynia massacres, in which the UPA led the slaughter of around 100,000 ethnic Polish civilians, mostly women and children. Poland has officially recognised the massacres as a genocide, but Ukraine rejects that label.

In response to Zelensky’s decision to name a unit after the UPA, Polish President Karol Nawrocki – who is aligned with the right-wing opposition – stripped Zelensky of Poland’s highest honour. In response, Zelensky cancelled plans to attend the Ukraine Recovery Conference that took place in Poland last week.

Speaking after Sikorski’s meeting with Sybiha, Polish Prime Minister Donald Tusk welcomed the fact that there are now “signals that Ukrainian politicians have realised that the escalation of tension caused by Kyiv sparked this conflict, which is detrimental to the interests of Poland and Ukraine”.

He added that he now “expects a de-escalation resulting from a change in attitude on the part of some Ukrainian politicians”, among whom it has “finally dawned…that it’s worth seeking ways to have an honest conversation about the past, and not to escalate this tension”.

Sikorski himself, speaking at a press conference, refused to divulge what specific measures were being discussed with Ukraine, saying that “diplomacy prefers silence…and requires that emotions subside”.

In a further statement, the Polish foreign ministry said that Sikorski and Sybiha had “emphasised their shared commitment to developing tools for historical dialogue based on truth and mutual respect for the past”.

“The ministers agreed that de-escalating tensions and building lasting mechanisms based on mutual understanding of history and the development of economic cooperation are crucial for fully utilising the potential of the Polish-Ukrainian partnership,” added the ministry.

However, speaking later to broadcaster Polsat, deputy foreign minister Marcin Bosacki, who took part in the talks, made clear that the Polish side “expects a correction of the decision” to name a military unit after the UPA.

“The Ukrainians keep telling us that there was no intentional aim to annoy Poland,” added Bosacki. “[But] for now, there are only declarations…We are waiting for action.”

Daniel Tilles

Daniel Tilles is editor-in-chief of Notes from Poland. He has written on Polish affairs for a wide range of publications, including Foreign Policy, POLITICO Europe, EUobserver and Dziennik Gazeta Prawna.

A local politician in Poland has been charged with insulting the president – a crime that carries up to three years in prison – for sharing an image on social media that prosecutors believe likened President Karol Nawrocki to the animated ogre Shrek.

However, the suspect in the case, Wojciech Ślusarczyk, denies that his post referred to Nawrocki. He also argues that it would, in any case, not be insulting to be compared to Shrek, who is a positive character.

The case began in August last year, when Ślusarczyk, who sits on the council of Radomsko county in central Poland and represents the centre-right Polish People’s Party (PSL), shared a meme (shown above) on his personal Facebook profile.

The image depicted an animated version of Nawrocki’s wife, Marta Nawrocka, dressed up in the style of a historical royal. The picture was at the time being shared widely on social media by supporters of Nawrocki.

But when he posted it, Ślusarczyk added the question “And where’s Shrek?”, in an apparent suggestion that Nawrocka looked like Shrek’s partner, Princess Fiona. 

A local newspaper, Gazeta Radomszczańska, noted at the time that Ślusarczyk’s post had caused controversy and that, soon after, a member of OdNowa, a conservative political association led by Law and Justice (PiS) MP Marcin Ociepa, had submitted a notification to prosecutors.

PSL is a member of Poland’s ruling coalition, while the national-conservative PiS is the main opposition party. Nawrocki is aligned with the opposition and was elected as president last year with the support of PiS.

On Wednesday this week, Gazeta Radomszczańska reported that prosecutors last month charged Ślusarczyk with the crime of insulting the president.

The newspaper said the decision had been made after prosecutors hired an expert in linguistics, at a cost of over 5,000 zloty (€1,166), “to answer the question of whether the word ‘Shrek’ can be considered an insult to the president”.

Ślusarczyk is additionally charged with criminal insult of Marta Nawrocka (as a natural person, not a public official) through use of mass media, a separate crime that is punishable with up to one year in prison.

Subsequently, broadcaster TVN reported that, since being charged, Ślusarczyk has now been indicted, meaning he will stand trial.

They quoted the indictment as saying that the suspect had “insulted by intentionally posting content that, in the context of a questioning form of expression combined with the sharing of a graphic, was deemed to devalue the president of Poland and his wife”.

Speaking to Gazeta Radomszczańska, Ślusarczyk’s lawyer, Michał Spólnicki, said that the charges had “no substantive justification” and that his client’s post “was directed at the authors of the image, not Marta Nawrocka or President Nawrocki”.

Positing on social media on Thursday, Ślusarczyk himself argued that, in any case, Shrek is actually a character with positive traits. “I really like Shrek. [He is] a pleasant creature,” wrote the councillor.

Ślusarczyk noted that the linguistic expert hired by prosecutors appeared to agree with him. In a 72-page opinion, she had found that Shrek is associated with “honesty, loyalty, hidden sensitivity, rebellion and authenticity” and “is used in Polish schools to teach tolerance, acceptance and critical thinking”.

The councillor then finished his post by asking: “Does the Polish prosecutor’s office really have nothing better to do than deal with this type of nonsense?”

Under article 135 of Poland’s criminal code, it is a crime to “publicly insult the president of Poland”, punishable by imprisonment of up to three years. The law has been invoked a number of times in recent years.

In June 2021, three high-school students were sentenced to community service for destroying one of the election posters of then-President Andrzej Duda and shouting “Fuck Duda” at a party.

The same month, an evangelical pastor was found guilty of insulting the president for calling him, among other things, a “traitor”, “coward” and “agent” working on behalf “of Moscow and Berlin”. In 2020, a man was sentenced to community service for drawing a penis on one of Duda’s election posters while drunk.

However, in 2023, the Supreme Court ruled that a well-known writer, Jakub Żulczyk, was not guilty of insulting the president for calling Duda a “moron” in a Facebook post.

Poland has a wide range of so-called “insult laws”. It is also illegal, among other things, to insult the Polish nation or state (punishable by up to three years in prison), state emblems (up to one year), and even monuments (community service), as well as to offend religious feelings (up to two years).

Human rights groups have often criticised such laws as a threat to free speech, and warned that they can be used for political purposes.

Speaking to Gazeta Radomszczańska, Konrad Siemaszko from the Helsinki Foundation for Human Rights, a Warsaw-based NGO, said that the case against Ślusarczyk is “absurd”.

“I don’t see any insult in this graphic at all. Insult is behaviour expressing contempt in an offensive form, and I don’t see any such behaviour here. Not to mention issues like protecting freedom of speech or satire,” said Siemaszko.

Daniel Tilles

Daniel Tilles is editor-in-chief of Notes from Poland. He has written on Polish affairs for a wide range of publications, including Foreign Policy, POLITICO Europe, EUobserver and Dziennik Gazeta Prawna.

A detailed look at how the UK and Germany economies compare in 2026, years after Brexit.

Covers GDP, growth, trade balances, inflation, unemployment, and more.

Full article with charts: https://metricshour.com/blog/uk-vs-germany-economy-2026-post-brexit-performance-compared/

Thoughts on post-Brexit economic performance?

Supplementary article: Court upholds request to detain Polish ex justice minister, paving way for US extradition application

Poland’s government says it has received confirmation that Hungary has revoked the refugee status that was granted to fugitive ex-justice minister Zbigniew Ziobro by the former Hungarian government of Viktor Orbán. Ziobro’s associated travel documents have also been invalidated.

The news was welcomed by the current justice minister, Waldemar Żurek, who says that Poland will now ask the United States, where Ziobro fled after Orbán was ousted from power in Hungary, to determine whether Ziobro is allowed to remain on US territory without travel documents.

Ziobro, who served as justice minister from 2015 to 2023 under the former national-conservative Law and Justice (PiS) government, is wanted in Poland on suspicion of 26 crimes, including leading a criminal group and approving the unlawful purchase of Pegasus spyware.

However, he has evaded justice by fleeing first to Hungary – where he was granted asylum in December 2025 – and then to the US. Although Ziobro’s Polish passport had been invalidated, he was able to fly to the US using a so-called “Geneva passport” that can be granted to someone with refugee status.

Ziobro’s departure from Hungary came just as the new prime minister, Péter Magyar, was being sworn in. Magyar is an ally of Polish Prime Minister Donald Tusk and had pledged to begin the process of extraditing Ziobro on his first day in office.

On Thursday afternoon, Poland’s foreign minister, Radosław Sikorski, confirmed that he had “received written confirmation that Hungary has revoked refugee status for Marcin Romanowski, Zbigniew Ziobro and Patrycja Kotecka-Ziobro”, and had also annulled their travel documents.

Romanowski is a former deputy minister who served under Ziobro and was also granted asylum in Hungary after fleeing criminal charges in Poland. His current whereabouts are unknown. Patrycja Kotecka-Ziobro is Ziobro’s wife.

Later on Thursday, Polish interior minister Marcin Kierwiński announced that he too had received information from his Hungarian counterpart, Gábor Pósfai, that the refugee status and travel documents of Romanowski, Ziobro and Kotecka-Ziobro had been revoked.

In response to the news, Żurek, the justice minister, said that Poland would now “reach out to the relevant institutions in the United States with a question about whether individuals deprived of valid travel documents may continue to stay on US territory”.

He also noted that, just a day earlier, a Polish court had upheld a request by prosecutors for Ziobro to be detained. That decision helps pave the way for Poland to request Ziobro’s extradition from the US.

Last week, Żurek had already told broadcaster TVN that he would contact the US Immigration and Customs Enforcement Agency (ICE) “if it turns out that the Hungarian documents on the basis of which Zbigniew Ziobro entered the United States were issued illegally”.

Speaking on Thursday to Polsat News before news had emerged of his refugee status being withdrawn, Ziobro claimed that the Polish government want ICE to deport him so that they can “bypass the extradition court procedure”.

That is because a court case would “risk exposing all their wrongdoing”, including how they have “used courts and prosecutors for political purposes”.

Ziobro also repeated his argument that he cannot currently return to Poland because he would not receive a fair trial while the justice system remains under the influence of the “lawless” current government.

During his time as justice minister, Ziobro was the architect of a series of controversial and contested judicial reforms, which Polish and European courts have repeatedly found to have violated the law and brought the justice system under political influence.

After PiS lost power in December 2023, the new, more liberal government led by Tusk began a series of investigations into alleged corruption and abuses of power under the former administration.

However, while charges have been brought against a number of former PiS officials – including former Prime Minister Mateusz Morawiecki – none have yet gone on trial.

Daniel Tilles

Daniel Tilles is editor-in-chief of Notes from Poland. He has written on Polish affairs for a wide range of publications, including Foreign Policy, POLITICO Europe, EUobserver and Dziennik Gazeta Prawna.

By Bartłomiej Orzeł

Poland’s right-wing parties face a strategic dilemma: how to reconcile the race to out-radicalise each other with the need to win back centrist voters. The energy transition is becoming a. key battleground in this fight.

Poland’s right-wing opposition is at a crossroads. On one side, an internal dispute is playing out between Law and Justice (PiS), the Confederation (Konfederacja) of Krzysztof Bosak and Sławomir Mentzen, and Grzegorz Braun’s Confederation of the Polish Crown (KKP).

On the other, Poland’s right is competing for power not just among itself, but against the ruling coalition, made up of Civic Coalition (KO), The Left (Lewica), the Polish People’s Party (PSL), Poland 2050 (Polska 2050) and Centre (Centrum).

This situation forces the opposition, on one hand, to hold a right-wing course, while, on the other, to seek an electorate in the centre. Even with a very good campaign and sharp messaging, these two objectives cannot be simultaneously achieved in the long term.

The Green Deal is a political corpse in Poland

The obvious asset for a right-wing fishing in centrist waters should be the energy transition, which is crying out for a new narrative. The EU’s flagship Green Deal programme has become a bogeyman on Poland’s political scene.

The government and the opposition trade blame for the current situation, while Poland’s largest trade union, Solidarity, gathered tens of thousands of people in Warsaw in the middle of the working week under the banner of fighting the “Green Deal”.

It has to be said plainly – the Green Deal label as a concept is dead in Poland today and there is no going back. Research from the think tank Project Tempo, where I act as Poland lead, shows that only 19% of Poles believe the “Green Deal” (understood as a whole) is good for the European economy. Contrary to appearances, we do not stand out markedly from the EU average of 25% here.

At the same time, however, Poles generally do not oppose cleaner energy sources. In fact, they strongly support certain transition policies, such as the construction of nuclear power plants and photovoltaics. What they are primarily opposed to are the bans and mandates that the Green Deal is associated with. The name itself is toxic, but the problems the Green Deal was meant to solve are not.

At the same time, the Green Deal is so broad today that Poles feel restricted. Energy, industry, transport, buildings, agriculture: the Green Deal touches every single one of these areas, creating a sense of encirclement. This is further magnified by the fact that the Green Deal originated in Brussels. Poles do not want any further expansion of the EU’s competences at the expense of nation-states.

It is hard to deny, however, that in recent years the global economic and geopolitical challenges have posed Europe – Poland included – a very concrete problem: how to free ourselves from dependence on fossil fuel imports in order to protect households and businesses from the blackmail of dictatorships? How do you build on that foundation a new economic model capable of competing globally?

The conflict in the Strait of Hormuz has reminded us how vulnerable we are to global conflicts and the fossil fuel market. According to estimates by the Instrat think tank, that conflict alone cost us 10 billion zloty (€2.33 billion) in just two and a half months.

PiS is ashamed of its own successes

The rivalry on the right means that PiS is trying to win back those voters who have drifted to one Confederation or the other. It is doing so, however, by executing a complete U-turn on its own energy policy and adopting a far more conservative tone in a debate whose symbol has become coal.

Yet it was during the years of PiS rule from 2015 to 2023 that Poland’s biggest transformational projects got under way. Over eight years in government, starting essentially from scratch, PiS policy led to 1.38 million solar panel users in Poland.

Over that period, installed capacity in Poland rose from 71 MW to over 17,000 MW. The vast majority of those people are satisfied with their solar panels, which reduce their electricity bills.

Meanwhile, heating and insulation systems in hundreds of thousands of homes were modernised, with old solid-fuel boilers – the notorious kopciuchy that generated smog – replaced in the process. The phrase “in the process” is not accidental here: the Clean Air programme, launched under PiS, became a widely accessible modernisation scheme that went well beyond the fight against smog.

Thermal retrofitting is not just a bit of polystyrene and a new window – it is a real improvement in quality of life and savings on bills, and for Poland’s economy – a powerhouse in building materials production – it represents a powerful internal stimulus.

Finally, it was in the years 2015–2023 that a revolution began in Polish energy. The Baltic Pipe, bringing Norwegian gas to Poland, was built and the liquefied natural gas (LNG) terminal expanded, while state energy giant Orlen began betting on gas extraction in the North Sea.

Investments connected with building a nuclear power station and several gas-fired plants – intended to replace coal capacity – also got under way. Roadmaps for phasing out coal across individual regions were drawn up, with particular attention to Bełchatów, Europe’s biggest coal-fired plant. 

I am not citing these facts to remind anyone of past achievements, but because this legacy of PiS policy is today not merely forgotten by the party, it is disowned entirely. Hence the numerous positive references to coal in recent statements by, among others, Przemysław Czarnek, the party’s prime ministerial candidate. There has even been talk of opening new hard-coal mines.

These references bring to mind, in some ways, 2015, when coal was talked up as “black gold” at every turn and mining was one of the most burning issues in public debate.

Next year’s parliamentary elections will take place 12 years after those events, however. The world around us has changed enormously, and the old prescriptions are not answers to today’s questions.

The falling cost of technologies such as solar panels, heat pumps and energy storage has laid the groundwork for a new energy revolution that, a decade ago, we simply could not have anticipated. This revolution – based on efficiency and flexibility – is indicated by reports from Ember, an energy think tank.

An anti-modernisation PiS is a weak PiS

In the last parliamentary elections three years ago, PiS, buoyed by a modernisation narrative, emerged from eight years in government through an exceptionally difficult period – war, the COVID-19 pandemic, global inflation and an energy crisis – with around 35% of the vote, more than any other party.

Today’s polls show the party clearly below that threshold. In this situation – even allowing for modest increases in support – it is hard to see Jarosław Kaczyński’s party securing an electoral victory.

The Confederation of Bosak and Mentzen has grown in the meantime, stepping into the role of “moderate centre” – not squeezing PiS from the right, contrary to what Kaczyński’s party imagined. The Confederates seem to have a better read on the public mood.

Research we conduct at Project Tempo shows that Poles are attached above all to two values. The first is economic growth, which Poland has recorded almost uninterruptedly since the fall of communism; the second is security in the broad sense, including energy security.

Support for coal is thin across the board. A clear minority of respondents believe that either growth or security can be delivered by coal from Polish hard-coal mines. As an energy source in general, coal is supported by 22% of the public, while support for “black gold” as a guarantor of energy autonomy stands at 38%.

By comparison: 70% of the public believes nuclear power will secure our autonomy. That gap widens further when we asked about costs to the end user: 74% of Poles view nuclear positively, while the figure for coal is 31%. To be clear: these data reflect coal’s standing against the full range of alternatives – nuclear, gas, renewables.

Awareness of the cost of coal extraction in Poland has grown significantly in recent years and – in light of successive crises, above all the outbreak of war in Ukraine, when coal was flowing into Poland from across the globe – has cast serious question marks over the safety and viability of a sector that costs us billions of zloty in subsidies each year.

The debate about domestic coal is not the same as solving the problem of rising living costs. Voters – drawing on their own lived experience, which included buying imported coal at very high prices – do not have short memories, and it would serve Poland’s right wing well to internalise that.

I would go one step further: the emotional attachment to one’s own solar panels on the roof – for many people a symbol of independence and freedom in the broadest sense – is today politically more significant than any attachment to coal.

Bosak picked up on these sentiments well; asked about it recently, he touched on precisely the freedom aspect of owning that energy source. By contrast, the coal sector now employs fewer than 70,000 people.

Poland is the most pro-nuclear nation in Europe

Individualism in decision-making is also visible in our research across political divides – both PiS and KO voters oppose the ban on gas boilers and the ban on producing combustion-engined cars after 2035. There is, by contrast, broad public support for nuclear power stations in Poland – from the left to the far right.

Project Tempo’s research shows that Poles are the most pro-nuclear nation in Europe across every dimension – autonomy, security, end-user costs, industrial competitiveness and environmental aspects, and even local job creation.

Nuclear power enjoys the highest support in the segment we have labelled “the climatically engaged”, but in second place come “conservative sceptics” – who as a rule oppose the energy transition and mostly do not believe climate change is man-made. This shows that the debate about transformation has long since moved beyond the climate field. Support exceeds 70% in both groups.

The right has the credibility to speak to this sentiment – nuclear as a pillar of development and security. PiS, which governed for eight years and put nuclear policy in motion, has clear standing on the subject.

There is a great deal to draw on across political divides in transformation policy, and across different areas – geothermal energy and hydropower are valued just as highly as nuclear, and Poles want localism in the form of energy communities.

The issue is all the more important because the risks are considerable. I share the concerns of PiS’s former European affairs minister Konrad Szymański, who wrote in March that Poland’s right wing must not allow itself to be herded into a “Polexit” narrative, as that is a harbinger of certain defeat. Diving headlong into calls for a unilateral exit from the EU’s Emissions Trading System (ETS), as PiS has done this year, is moving precisely in that direction.

The role and effectiveness of the ETS – and its genuine reform in a way that does not constrain European industry – is a conversation worth having, but not in that fashion. Such a debate ought to be sensibly constructed and should direct attention towards speculation and global financial institutions rather than the EU.

Meanwhile, over 80% of KO voters support building more wind turbines. Even among PiS voters, support is not insignificant, at around 47%. The same data points to an opening on the governing side too: a programme built around the specific parts of the transition that voters actually want.

The parties making up the governing majority have the potential to seek support from groups that are not entirely opposed to the transformation, but have doubts and difficulties associated with it, particularly of an economic nature. Whichever side speaks to those voters first – the centre, and those who have tuned out – will have the stronger hand going into 2027.

It is worth bearing in mind that, according to Project Tempo’s research, Poles have no doubt that European industry will sooner or later have to absorb green technologies in order to remain competitive – 73% of respondents hold this view.

Poland’s right has abandoned its own modernisation story

The next year and a half leading up to the parliamentary elections will be an enormous challenge for the right, with particular emphasis on constructing a vision of Poland’s future. This is not a debate about climate, not even strictly about energy, but about the economy, jobs, industry and prices – and about security, independence and freedom.

This story must be credible to a broader electorate – it cannot rest purely on negation. A strong right wing was previously able to impose its own modernisation narrative and tell the story of Poland’s future. Today it is not only incapable of doing that – it is actively ashamed of its own successes.

Bartłomiej Orzeł is an economist and leads Project Tempo’s Poland programme. He is a former government plenipotentiary for the Clean Air programme.

This article draws on Project Tempo research and is adapted from a piece first published in Polish by Klub Jagielloński.

About Project Tempo

Project Tempo is a European non-profit research organisation headquartered in London. It produces detailed public opinion data on energy and climate policy to help policymakers, businesses and civil society design policies that earn durable public support. Project Tempo’s flagship EuroPulse programme surveys more than 50,000 voters a year across 25 countries. It has country programmes in France, Germany, Italy, Poland and the UK. Research is published openly at projecttempo.com.

Hi everyone, I hope it's OK to share this here. I wrote a blog post about my assessment on how Europe would react if Russia ever tried to invade the Baltics.

“Don’t poke the bear!” Russians and their Western supporters - and fearers - liked to repeat it even before the full-scale invasion. After more than four years of war and crossing every imaginary “red line” without consequences, it has become a meme at this point. The line implies that Russia is a deadly beast that has the power to lash out violently if threatened, capable of killing whoever “pokes” it.

If Russia is a bear, then Europe is a sleeping dragon. It started dozing off after 1945 and militarily and geopolitically speaking went into deep sleep after the collapse of the Soviet Union. 2022 took the dragon totally off-guard, but the dangers weren’t grave enough to make it wake up, it merely entered its REM sleep phase.

I already shared my long take about a possible Russian invasion of the Baltics, but as the topic has the habit of re- and resurfacing, I felt the urge to expand on it.

Most public debate on the topic envisions Moscow pressuring the region in order to force Europe to stop further aid to Ukraine. Despite it being understandably a more concrete and pressing threat, this - in my opinion - is much less likely than the scenario I will outline.

A limited incursion or bombing campaign against EU and NATO territories would have a much less decisive benefit for Russia, while it would still mobilize increased European support for Ukraine. The lesson the continent would learn from it wouldn’t be that Russia is strong and we should just give in, but that Russia is a threat that needs to be dealt with, and the best way to do so is by arming Ukraine and boosting defence spending.

Let’s imagine a scenario that puts Russia in the best realistic position.

US President Trump or Vance manages to cut a deal with Putin. Russia agrees to a ceasefire on the current line in exchange for US withdrawal from the Baltics and Poland, easing of sanctions, and the normalisation of relations. While this would create widespread anxieties in Eastern Europe, a renewed crisis in EU-US relationships, and further weaken NATO by decisively putting Washington’s security guarantees in question, the continent can finally breathe a sigh of relief. The war is over, Russia managed to accept that they cannot take Ukraine, and has no more reason to threaten Europe, right?

But what if Putin didn’t see it that way? What if instead of demobilizing he would rapidly reconstitute his forces from Ukraine to Belarus and Russia’s north-western borders with the Baltics? He might conclude that with NATO castrated, a friendly administration in Washington, and a Europe still in its early phase of rearmament, this is the right moment to strike and change European security architecture favourable to Moscow.

What would be his goal? The pretext might be something between the good old “protection of Russian minorities”, and the “creation of a humanitarian corridor” to Kaliningrad. His true objective would likely be to force NATO troops to fully withdraw from the region, giving the organisation a final blow, while also weakening EU unity and cohesion, creating a divided continent. This would create a reality where Russia is the de facto “security guarantor” of Eastern Europe, and use this as leverage to influence its politics. Basically, the return of the Eastern Bloc as a buffer.

Putin’s base thesis is that the “West” and its democracies are in inevitable decline. Europeans are not ready for war, and there is little to no societal resolve to defend the Baltics. Sort of “he only needs to kick the door in, and the whole system would collapse”.

How would this play out?

Let’s assume Moscow gave an ultimatum for European capitals to withdraw their forces from the Baltics while amassing its troops near the border. How would these countries react? It is possible that they might start negotiations with Russia, but it’s extremely unlikely that they would comply. The best Putin could achieve would be the status quo, and the blocking of extra troops fearing escalation. 

Then day one comes, Russian forces cross the EU border in a full-scale invasion of all three Baltic states. Putin gives another long speech watched by the entire world where he threatens to use nukes and immediate long-range strikes on Berlin, Paris, London, and anyone who is willing to engage the Russian military.

This might cause an immediate political crisis in European capitals. Perhaps many would call for an urgent troop withdrawal from the Baltics, and assuming that Russia manages to avoid killing their soldiers already stationed there, it could avoid creating an immediate rally around the flag effect. Fear might override the resolve in the vast majority of European societies. It is already a big if, but dangerously plausible enough to run with the assumption.

However, there are nations that would not be deterred, and immediately treat any kind of incursion or attack on the Baltics as an attack on themselves. This would certainly include Poland, Finland, Sweden, and crucially Ukraine. No matter what other countries do, they would do everything possible to make sure that Russia cannot reach its objectives. It would be an existential issue for them from day one.

Similarly, EU institutions would unavoidably treat it as an attack on the whole Union. Brussels cannot accept a hostile country invading any part of its territory. It would create a deadly precedent that delegitimises its entire raison d'être as a guarantor of peace.

Estonian, Latvian, Lithuanian, Polish, Finnish, and Swedish officials occupy key positions in Brussels, and they would do everything in their power to push for a collective response. Let’s not forget that an Estonian, Kaja Kallas serves as the EU's chief diplomat. She guides the Union's common foreign and security policy and external action. She would immediately use her full political capital to make sure the EU will be mobilized to protect her country.

All in all, there would be enormous pressure from multiple directions that pushes EU institutions and member states to respond decisively.

As the days and weeks pass, it will become clear to everyone that the Baltics are not going to surrender, its population is ready to fight, and Finland, Sweden, and Poland will not back down either. Europeans would start seeing Russian bombardments and killings in EU territory. They couldn’t just ignore that nations they share decades long alliances and a common Union with are getting murdered.

These nations have not only been friendly for as long as they can remember, but essentially family. In Germany alone there are two million Poles. Many of them already have German family members, and all of them have German colleagues and acquaintances. This is true for other parts of Western Europe as well and other nations involved. 

The citizens alone would put a massive pressure on European capitals, but probably not the main one. I find it certain that Denmark, Norway, and the UK would shortly join the war as well. Geography and national identities would pull them in if NATO Article 5 wasn’t binding enough. This would create another wave of pressure on individual Europe states. As more and more countries join unilaterally, they would also start pushing everyone else for support. It would create a domino effect that couldn’t stop in Copenhagen or London.

The EU proved it time and time again that it can pull itself together to find money and political will to deal with a crisis. This was showcased clearly during the pandemic and then the full-scale invasion of Ukraine. It’s impossible to imagine that Brussels would not treat this at the very least as seriously as those two instances. 

Just for the pandemic recovery fund the Union managed to come up with €750 billion, and provided $226 billion in financial, military, humanitarian, and refugee assistance to Ukraine. €100s of billions would immediately be allocated for the war and eventually it would likely reach into the trillions mark. Russia’s roughly €165 billion military spending would immediately be put to shame.

This is where the dragon would awaken. The only reason Europe was sleeping on defence was due to its conviction that the US would protect it, and Russia would not be a threat anyway. Both of these assumptions would collapse immediately.

There would be arguments, disagreements, and not everybody would provide the same level of support. Perhaps Spain, Portugal, or Greece would not be willing to send troops (they did participate in the war in Afghanistan though, one might assume that the Baltics would be a more important cause), but they would certainly send other assistance, and would not be able to justify inaction.

History teaches us that an external attack often leads to centralization and unification. The European identity’s foundation myth is based on a story like this. The Battle of Thermopylae that united the Greeks against the Persians. More than two millennia later Bismarck showed us that a talented political operator can even provoke an external attack to create a push for unification. Europe already has the pieces scattered for this unification to happen.

Ukraine

In this situation, it would be foolish to imagine them sitting on their hands. The first place the EU would turn to would be Kyiv. They have the experience, the will to fight, and they are the only ones capable of fighting the drone war of the 21st century. Ukraine would be flooded with orders for drones and demand to train European drone pilots.

Kyiv would also eagerly take the opportunity to reopen the frontline to take back its territory. Since Russia is threatening the entire continent, now Europe would be incentivised to encourage them to do so to distract Moscow.

Eventually, Ukraine would be the real winner of this war. It would lock in European support like nothing else could, and retaking its full territories would become a likely prospect. It would clearly showcase that the continent needs them, and would give a giant boost to its EU membership aspirations.

A European Army

A European Army already enjoys popular support across the EU. All it needs is a final push.

The European Union (without Norway and the UK) has 450 million people. More than three times as many as Russia, and an economy ten times larger. Even if we are pessimistic, this would mean millions - but more likely tens of millions - of people who are ready to take up arms to defend the continent, and an economic base that can easily support them.

Perhaps the initial phases might go poorly - however knowing how the Russian army fared in Ukraine and how prepared the immediately involved countries are, this is at least doubtful -, but Europe could sustain a war much longer than Russia can, simply by the size of its economy and population.

The longer the war would go on the worse the outcome would be for Moscow. Europe would eventually organise its defence, train and equip the millions of people ready to fight, create a coherent fighting force, and learn how to wage war.

At the same time this would create an emotionally powerful story for Europe. We fight and bleed together to defend our continent and our democracies against tyranny and barbarism. This civilisational founding myth would make the EU a potential global superpower akin to the US and China. What we lack in comparison to these giants is unity. The economy and potential already exists, and a clear external threat would create that urgency for unity.

Summary

Moscow cannot just attack the Baltics and get away with it, but Putin might see it very differently. Just like Saddam Hussein didn’t learn from his disastrous war against Iran and still started another disastrous war against Kuwait in just two years, we cannot rule out Putin doing the same.

Similar incentives might be at play as well: more than one million men at arms need a purpose or they might become a domestic threat. He might think it is better to wage another war than to demobilize and face the economic and societal consequences.

Europe’s most important task for the coming years is to make sure that the Kremlin understand what would happen if they invaded. We must prepare for war so we never have to fight it. We must do everything to deter Russia regardless of what the US is doing. Moscow must hear the message clearly: don’t wake up the dragon!

A group of senior Polish and Ukrainian church figures have written a joint appeal for Poles and Ukrainians to “extend a hand of reconciliation”, “courageously forgive” one another for historical wrongs, and “not remain enslaved by the past”.

Their intervention comes amid ongoing tensions between the two countries over massacres that took place during World War Two. The crisis has resulted in Polish President Karol Nawrocki stripping his Ukrainian counterpart, Volodymyr Zelensky, of Poland’s highest honour.

While there have long been tensions between Poland and Ukraine over their conflicting national narratives of World War Two, the current dispute began in late May, when Zelensky named a military unit after the “heroes of the Ukrainian Insurgent Army (UPA)”.

In Ukraine, the UPA is remembered primarily for its role in fighting for Ukrainian independence from Moscow-imposed Soviet rule. In Poland, however, it is associated with the Volhynia massacres, in which the UPA led the slaughter of around 100,000 ethnic Polish civilians, mostly women and children.

Poland has officially recognised the massacres as a genocide. But Ukraine rejects that label. It also argues that the massacres took place in the context of long-standing anti-Ukrainian policies by the prewar Polish state and points out that Polish partisan units massacred Ukrainian civilians during the war.

In response to Zelensky’s decision to name a unit after the UPA, Nawrocki stripped him of the Order of the White Eagle, which had been awarded to the Ukrainian president in 2023. In response, Zelensky cancelled plans to attend the Ukraine Recovery Conference that took place in Poland last week.

Now, a group of three Polish prelates – Cardinal Grzegorz Ryś, Cardinal Konrad Krajewski, and Cardinal Kazimierz Nycz – and two from Ukraine – Sviatoslav Shevchuk, the primate of the Ukrainian Greek Catholic Church, and Cardinal Mykola Bychok – have responded to the crisis with a joint appeal.

The bishops said that they “are saddened to observe the growing tensions and resurgent hostility between Poles and Ukrainians”.

“It is even more painful that this is happening at a time when Ukraine continues to experience the horrors of war, and Poland has shown great solidarity with millions of Ukrainian brothers and sisters in recent years,” they added.

While they acknowledged that “remembering the past is an incredibly important element of the identity of every human community”, they warned that “the issue of reconciliation between Poles and Ukrainians concerns not only the relations between the two nations but also the credibility of our shared Christian testimony”.

The bishops recalled the words of former Polish Pope John Paul II in 2003, on the 60th anniversary of the Volhynia massacres, in which he called for “Ukrainians and Poles not [to] remain enslaved by their sad memories of the past”.

However, the pontiff also noted that “Christians…are called to acknowledge the errors of the past” and to “ask forgiveness for their own shortcomings” as well as to “forgive one another for the wrongs they have suffered”.

In that spirit, the five Polish and Ukrainian bishops now called on Poles and Ukrainians to “humbly ask for forgiveness and to courageously forgive, extending a hand of reconciliation despite still-unhealed and painful wounds”.

Moreover, they must “strive to think in terms of the common good, not just particular interests”, because “by imposing on others a particular vision of the past and future, we succumb to the dominant culture of violence and power today”.

The dispute between Poland and Ukraine shows no sign of abating. On Sunday, Zelensky declared that “no one will dictate” to Ukraine which heroes the country honours as he announced plans to establish a new national pantheon celebrating outstanding Ukrainians.

That was widely interpreted in Poland as an escalation of the dispute, with politicians from across the political spectrum in turn warning that the issue could lead Poland to hinder Ukraine’s efforts to join the European Union.

However, Poland’s government – which is regularly in conflict with the opposition-aligned Nawrocki – has sought to calm tensions. Prime Minister Donald Tusk has called the conflict between the two presidents a “strategic mistake” that will only benefit Russia.

Daniel Tilles

Daniel Tilles is editor-in-chief of Notes from Poland. He has written on Polish affairs for a wide range of publications, including Foreign Policy, POLITICO Europe, EUobserver and Dziennik Gazeta Prawna.

Polish prosecutors have launched a criminal investigation into Supreme Court chief justice Zbigniew Kapiński after he was accused by fellow judges on the court of abusing his powers. Kapiński, however, claims that the move is part of a “coordinated political action” against him.

The dispute marks the latest stage of a broader conflict that has often set judges and other officials, such as Kapiński, who were appointed under the former national-conservative Law and Justice (PiS) government against those who regard PiS’s actions as a violation of the rule of law.

At the heart of the dispute is the National Council of the Judiciary (KRS), the body responsible for nominating judges to positions on courts. Before 2017, most of its members were chosen by judges themselves, but PiS passed that power to politicians, framing it as a move to increase democratic legitimacy

However, according to multiple Polish and European court rulings, PiS’s reforms rendered the KRS illegitimate by bringing it under political influence. As a consequence, the legality of the thousands of judges appointed since then, and all the rulings issued by them, has also been called into question.

Kapiński is one such so-called “neo-judge”, having been nominated to the Supreme Court in 2022 by the KRS.

Now prosecutors are investigating whether he abused his power between May 2024 and May 2026 while serving as head of the Supreme Court’s criminal chamber by blocking motions to exclude other “neo-judges” from cases due to doubts over their legal status.

In a statement announcing the launching of proceedings, the National Prosecutor’s Office said that the case had begun with a notification against Kapiński by fellow Supreme Court judges, who were not named.

The notification was made on 28 May 2026, just three days after PiS-aligned President Karol Nawrocki had chosen Kapiński as the new chief justice of the Supreme Court in a process that had been boycotted by many of the “old” judges appointed before the overhaul of the KRS.

Prosecutors say that, after gathering initial evidence – including witness statements and documents – there is a “reasonable suspicion of a crime”, meaning a formal investigation has been initiated.

If Kapiński is found guilty of abuse of power, he could face a prison sentence of up to three years. However, as chief justice he is protected by immunity from prosecution that can only be removed by the State Tribunal, a body he would head ex officio.

That immunity also prevented prosecutors from bringing abuse-of-power charges against Kapiński’s predecessor, Małgorzata Manowska. She was another “neo-judge” who regularly clashed with the current government, a more liberal coalition that replaced PiS in December 2023.

Speaking to broadcaster TVN on Monday evening, after the prosecutors had made their announcement, Kapiński said that he “treats [the claims against me] as a coordinated political action”.

He explained that, when heading the criminal chamber, he had issued the order to reject motions to exclude judges based on how they were appointed because such efforts were often intended to “prolong proceedings for months or even years”. He said he “cared only about the efficiency of proceedings”.

Kapiński also noted that, on the same day he was informed about the prosecutors’ decision to open proceedings, he was told by the Supreme Court’s disciplinary commissioner that a separate case against him had been sent to a Supreme Court body that reviews judges’ alleged misconduct.

He said that the disciplinary case relates to proceedings involving former PiS government ministers Maciej Wąsik and Mariusz Kamiński, both convicted in a high-profile case concerning abuses in the use of the state security services and later pardoned by PiS-aligned President Andrzej Duda.

After their conviction in December 2023, they were barred from taking part in parliamentary work. Both politicians appealed the decision, which was initially set to be heard by the Supreme Court’s labour chamber.

However, Kapiński, who was acting chief justice at the time, decided to transfer one of the cases to the Supreme Court’s chamber of extraordinary review and public affairs, a body created by PiS and filled with judges nominated by the reformed KRS.

Speaking to TVN, Kapiński also responded to criticism from justice minister Waldemar Żurek, who has questioned the legality of his appointment as chief justice. Kapiński said that the minister “has some difficulty understanding the law properly”.

Responding to accusations of political bias, Kapiński noted that he had ruled in many high-profile cases involving politicians from across the political spectrum and that no evidence had ever been presented of political motivation in his decisions, even in cases that drew criticism from PiS, including the party’s chairman.

The current government has sought to reverse many of the judicial reforms introduced by PiS, including the overhaul of the KRS, but has found its efforts stymied by the veto power of PiS-aligned President Duda and his successor Nawrocki.

Alicja Ptak

Alicja Ptak is deputy editor-in-chief of Notes from Poland and a multimedia journalist. She has written for Clean Energy Wire and The Times, and she hosts her own podcast, The Warsaw Wire, on Poland’s economy and energy sector. She previously worked for Reuters.

Poland has detained and deported nine Ukrainians and two Belarusians it says were involved in a Russian operation that paid Ukrainian refugees to hold demonstrations.

The aim was to “stoke tensions” and “break down social trust”, says the Internal Security Agency (ABW).

In a statement on Monday, the ABW said that the 11 individuals have, since autumn 2025, “been recruiting and paying participants for demonstrations organised among Ukrainian refugees residing in Poland”.

“Protest participants received remuneration for their participation and, according to the ABW’s knowledge, the funds for this purpose came from Russia,” added the agency.

“The organisers aimed to gradually influence the Ukrainian refugee community in Poland and use this group to promote political slogans. Emotional topics, including corruption scandals and current events in Ukrainian domestic politics, were used to initiate protests.”

The ABW said that the operation was another example of how Moscow uses “actions below the threshold of classic aggression” that are intended to “break down social trust, stoke tensions, and use people fleeing war as tools of Russian influence operations”.

Poland has been a primary target of such Russian “hybrid actions”, which include sabotage, disinformation, espionage and cyberwarfare.

In many cases, members of Poland’s Ukrainian and Belarusian communities – which are by far the country’s largest foreign national groups – have been hired to carry out such operations. Almost a million Ukrainian refugees remain in Poland, as well as hundreds of thousands of other Ukrainian migrants.

In the latest incident, the suspects were detained in five cities – Warsaw, Wrocław, Kraków, Zakopane and Bydgoszcz – spread across Poland. Jacek Dobrzyński, the spokesman for Poland’s security services, wrote on social media that the arrests had taken place “in recent days”.

“The detainees have already been expelled from Poland,” he added, noting that the suspects included five Ukrainian men, four Ukrainian women, and two Belarusian men.

Earlier this month, Poland’s foreign minister, Radosław Sikorski, warned that Russia is “waging a full-scale cognitive war against us”, including “hiring groups and individuals operating under multiple layers of camouflage in operationally difficult-to-access spaces that we still do not recognise as classic theatres of war”.

Moscow’s aim is to “weaken the will to resist” by “undermining democratic values” and “keeping us in a constant state of polarisation”, said Sikorski, who also claimed that there is “a Russian fifth column here in Poland”.

Last week, Ukraine’s Centre for Countering Disinformation warned that Russia’s foreign military intelligence agency, the GRU, had been tasked with “preparing provocations” intended to exploit and exacerbate current tensions between Poland and Ukraine.

Russia has long sought to aggravate tensions between Poland and Ukraine. It stepped up those efforts in 2022, when Poland became one of Ukraine’s strongest supporters in its defence against Russian aggression and welcomed millions of Ukrainian refugees.

Last year, a Ukrainian teenager was arrested on suspicion of working on behalf of Russia to vandalise a memorial to Poles massacred by Ukrainians.

Last month, Poland charged three of its own citizens with working on behalf of Russian intelligence to spread disinformation intended to evoke support for Russia’s war in Ukraine.

Daniel Tilles

Daniel Tilles is editor-in-chief of Notes from Poland. He has written on Polish affairs for a wide range of publications, including Foreign Policy, POLITICO Europe, EUobserver and Dziennik Gazeta Prawna.

Poland has signed an agreement worth around €4.5 billion to buy three A26 submarines from Swedish manufacturer Saab as part of efforts to modernise its navy.

The deal was among a number signed during intergovernmental consultations between Sweden and Poland today, as the two countries further strengthened an increasingly important alliance.

Last year, Poland announced that it had chosen Sweden as the preferred supplier of submarines under its Orka programme, which aims to modernise the Polish naval fleet.

Poland currently only has one submarine, a 40-year-old Soviet-era vessel that is in need of constant repair. It wants to replace that with three of the A26 Blekinge-class submarines that are being developed by Saab but have not yet gone into service.

Today, a purchase agreement for the vessels was signed in the Polish Baltic coast city of Gdynia amid talks between the two countries’ prime ministers, Donald Tusk and Ulf Kristersson, and delegations that included their foreign, finance, infrastructure and culture ministers.

Speaking at a press conference alongside Tusk, Kristersson said that the agreement was worth around 50 billion Swedish kronor (19.3 billion zloty, €4.5 billion) and that the first submarine would be delivered in 2031 (though many Polish media outlets have reported a date of 2030).

In a separate statement, Saab valued the deal at around 47 billion kronor. It noted that delivery of the submarines was scheduled to take place by 2038.

When the plans were first announced last year, the Polish government emphasised that the deal would also involve major Swedish investment in Poland’s shipbuilding industry as well as knowledge transfer.

Today, Polish state defence group PGZ announced that, alongside the submarine purchase agreement, it had signed a memorandum of understanding with Saab “paving the way for building competencies in Poland in the area of servicing and maintaining submarines”.

Kristersson said that “hundreds of Polish companies will be subcontractors to this important project”, with “our two countries sharing technology and techniques in this crucial strategic area”.

“This cooperation with Sweden is a further impetus for the development of our arms industry,” added Tusk. “This isn’t a simple matter of one side or the other purchasing, but a genuine, truly collaborative partnership that benefits both industries.”

Both leaders also emphasised that the deal was a signal of growing security and trade ties between their two countries, which in 2024 signed a strategic partnership agreement to enhance cooperation on defence, economic development and support for Ukraine.

“Our cooperation in the Baltic Sea has fundamentally changed the security situation,” declared Tusk. “We do all this also so that our region, our two countries and the Baltic Sea are an area of ​​peace and security, and not, as is the case today, an area of ​​anxiety and threat.”

“Relations between Poland and Sweden are the best they’ve ever been, deeper and stronger than ever before,” added Kristersson. “We face exactly the same challenges and share the same perspective on what’s happening now.”

In recent years, Poland has increasingly oriented itself towards the Baltic region, forming closer economic, energy and military ties with the Baltic and Nordic states.

Poland’s defence minister, Władysław Kosiniak-Kamysz, today noted that the A26 submarines are specifically designed to operate in the Baltic Sea, including with stealth systems making them difficult to detect in shallow waters and tools to protect underwater infrastructure such as cables and pipelines.

There have been growing concerns in recent years over Russian actions in the Baltic, including threats to infrastructure. In response, NATO has launched a new operation to patrol the sea while Poland and Sweden last year held their first bilateral military drills in the Baltic.

Polish security news and analysis service Defence24, however, notes that there is an element of risk attached to Poland’s decision to order submarines from a programme that has been repeatedly delayed and faced ever-rising costs.

Meanwhile, it was also announced today that Poland has signed an agreement to lease an A17 *Västergötland-*class submarine, the HMS Södermanland, from Sweden as a so-called “gap filler” until the first A26 is delivered, reports industry news service WNP.

Daniel Tilles

Daniel Tilles is editor-in-chief of Notes from Poland. He has written on Polish affairs for a wide range of publications, including Foreign Policy, POLITICO Europe, EUobserver and Dziennik Gazeta Prawna.

Ukraine’s Centre for Countering Disinformation has warned that Russia may be planning to exploit current tensions between Poland and Ukraine by “preparing provocations using Polish symbols…on the territory of Ukraine”.

It says that Russia’s foreign military intelligence agency, the GRU, has been tasked with carrying out the operation during the Ukraine Recovery Conference (URC) that began in Poland today.

Poland and Ukraine have been locked in a diplomatic dispute since the end of May, when President Volodymyr Zelensky named a military unit after the “heroes of the Ukrainian Insurgent Army (UPA)”.

In Ukraine, the UPA is remembered primarily for its role in fighting for Ukrainian independence from Moscow-imposed Soviet rule during and after World War Two.

However, in Poland, it is associated with the Volhynia massacres, in which the UPA led the slaughter of around 100,000 ethnic Polish civilians, mostly women and children. Poland regards those events as a genocide, though Ukraine has rejected that label.

On Friday last week, after efforts to reach a diplomatic solution to the situation had failed, Poland’s president, Karol Nawrocki, followed through on his earlier pledge to strip Zelensky of the Order of the White Eagle, Poland’s highest honour.

That in turn prompted an angry response in Ukraine, including Zelensky cancelling plans to attend the URC, which is being jointly organised by the Polish and Ukrainian governments. Ukraine’s prime minister, Yulia Svyrydenko, is instead leading the country’s delegation at the event.

Nawrocki’s decision was, however, met with delight in Russia, where Dmitry Medvedev, the former president and current chairman of Vladimir Putin’s United Russia party, celebrated that “Poland’s president has finally stripped the Nazi-worshipping Kiev degenerate of the Order of the White Eagle”.

In a statement published early on Thursday, Ukraine’s Centre for Countering Disinformation, a state body, warned that “Russia may be preparing provocations using Polish symbols, and intends to carry them out on the territory of Ukraine” while the URC is taking place.

“According to available information, the GRU of Russia has been tasked with this mission,” they added. “The main goal of the enemy is political destabilisation, creating tension and a rift between Poland and Ukraine.”

The centre’s warning comes just two days after it reported that Russia has “launched a series of fake stories to fuel hostility between Ukraine and Poland”, falsely presenting them as coming from well-known Western media outlets.

They included false claims that the director of the Auschwitz Museum, a Polish state institution, had called for Zelensky not to be invited to commemorative events because of his “glorification of Nazis”, and that Zelensky would name more military units after the UPA “to spite Poland”.

Russia has long sought to exacerbate tensions between Poland and Ukraine, especially regarding historical issues. It stepped up those efforts in 2022, when Poland became one of Ukraine’s strongest supporters in its defence against Russian aggression and welcomed millions of Ukrainian refugees.

Last year, a Ukrainian teenager was arrested on suspicion of working on behalf of Russia to vandalise a memorial to Poles massacred by Ukrainians. Last month, Poland charged three of its own citizens with working on behalf of Russian intelligence to spread disinformation intended to evoke support for Russia’s war in Ukraine.

Earlier this month, Poland’s foreign minister, Radosław Sikorski, warned that “Russia is waging a full-scale cognitive war against us”, including efforts to “keep us in a constant state of polarisation”.

Daniel Tilles

Daniel Tilles is editor-in-chief of Notes from Poland. He has written on Polish affairs for a wide range of publications, including Foreign Policy, POLITICO Europe, EUobserver and Dziennik Gazeta Prawna.