I feel like I’m more convinced by ontological apophasis of the soul than purely epistemological apophasis? Questions about metaphysical guardrails in Pseudo-Dionysius the Areopagite and how anéantissement in Marguerite Porete makes more sense to me
First, I’m wondering why the ascent in Pseudo-Dionysius does not dissolve the ontological boundary between God and human when epistemological apophasis functions as a prerequisite for henosis. I understand that this requires an extra metaphysical step that he probably does not technically have to take (?), but if apophasis strips away the mind’s positive concepts of God, what specifically is the reason for asserting that ecstasis is the absolute highest capability of the soul? If all other positive determinations of God must eventually be discarded and dissolved, what principled answer prevents the ontological structure of human/divine duality itself from being discarded? I’ve been reading The Mirror of Simple Souls by Marguerite Porete and her assertion that the soul can achieve deification through anéantissement seems more compelling than if you were to stop short of breaking the distinction between soul and creator. Like truly how can deification even proceed if the creature remains a creature at the highest point of union? Maybe I’m just more convinced because Porete is theologically and historically extreme and marginal, which I am attracted to, but it is genuinely hard for me to understand why Neoplatonic and Neoplatonic-influenced Christian writers generally preserved such strong ontological distinctions between the soul and God. Ecclesial constraints could be part of it? Idk. Maybe I’m misunderstanding something