Yup you heard it right.
I found a bug that if I sent a link to the victim I can steal or exfiltrate some of his data. Including:
Shopping preferences
Bra/shoe size
Triager marked it as p4 and the program as well.
I just feel bra size is a more private thing??
Self-taught, 3 years writing software, and security research and making sure my software is secure has been the pull the whole time. We all know AI has become part of the workflow for most engineers now, and security research is no different. The grunt work gets automated. The verification doesn’t. Everything I submit gets verified by hand before it goes anywhere.
This year I submitted findings backed by real infrastructure artifacts. Reproducible, evidence attached. Three got closed as “potentially AI-generated.” Not wrong. Not unreproducible. The prose smelled like a model, so the finding didn’t count. Points deducted for my trouble.
Meanwhile I’ve been scanning MCP servers and built a tool to do so, and I ship an MCP server in my own platform, so I’ve seen this from both sides. The state of agent security is bad. Tool descriptions are an injection surface the model trusts by default.
Almost nobody pins versions, so the server you approved last month can behave differently today.
And as a server author I can tell you the client just believes whatever my server declares about itself.
So the current position is: AI-assisted vuln reports are suspicious, but wiring 20 unsigned MCP servers into an agent holding your credentials is normal.
Am I wrong, or is triage optimizing for the wrong threat? And what do people actually do to vet servers before connecting them?
And also I feel like these corporations are pretty much stealing the labor of security researchers who deserve better.
I am a beginner currently learning web bug hunting. Lately, I've felt discouraged by all the "AI spam" (low-quality AI reports) on bug bounty platforms. It feels like it’s getting much harder for real researchers to get their work noticed. My original plan was to master web security first and learn LLMs later. Now, I’m wondering if I should just stop with web security and focus entirely on LLM and AI security instead. Does anyone have experience with this? Is it still better to learn the traditional basics first, or is the industry moving so fast that I should put all my energy into AI?
Sharing a workflow that worked for me. The retrieval layer involved is my own project, so mentioning that upfront.
Setup: I was testing an XSS on a target behind Cloudflare, and every payload I tried was getting blocked by the WAF.
This time, instead of manually digging through old writeups, I gave my agent access to a retrieval layer built on top of a corpus of web security research (Preview RAG). The agent queries it in plain language, gets back actual writeups with sources attached, and uses that context to generate and test payload variants. One of those variants eventually got through and the XSS fired.
I'm not claiming the bypass itself is novel. It may already exist in a public writeup somewhere. What mattered to me was the workflow: the agent wasn't limited to whatever happened to be inside its training data. It could pull in relevant prior research and iterate from there.
That's the main reason I built this in the first place. Models have a training cutoff, but WAF evasion evolves quickly. Public bypasses get patched, new techniques appear, and the most useful information is usually the newest information. A retrieval layer helps bridge that gap.
The corpus is updated regularly and exposed over MCP, so it can be connected to any model with minimal setup, including smaller open-weight models.
Current limitations: it's strongest on client-side topics right now—XSS, WAF evasion, CSP, CORS, SSRF, request smuggling, and similar areas. Server-side coverage is improving, but still thinner, and it definitely won't have an answer for every problem.
Happy to share more about the setup. I'm honestly more interested in where this approach fails than where it succeeds. If you've experimented with agent-driven WAF bypassing and ran into hard limits, I'd love to hear about them.
While testing a domain, it offers a variety of contests to participate in, but the user must enter italian id to claim money after winning. When entering the contest, it asks you to enter the address, phone and italian tax id, after adding these, it uses italian id to check whether this user is already participated using another account. Here is the issue. I didn't verify the italian id and I was successfully contested and i lost, it is not an issue here, the real issue is I am able to change my italian id, anytime using the past request, and also I can create thousands of accounts with fake italian ids to participate in the contest. This has an impact on business right?. Even though fake italian id, cant get actual money(assumption) if the fake id won, then the fairness of the contest is broken here right? It didn't verify the italian id during the contest and after the contest too. After completing the contest, I got lost, and I had 2 more chances. Legitimate accounts have 3 tries. That's all I think. Any triager or hacker suggests me? Can I submit this?
Hi, in a target, which uses Drupal, I ran fuzzing on nodes and I found a node containing admin handbooks, where It show all paths and all actions for an administrator with images, does it mean to be public? Literally full documentation on the admin panel with the respective admin endpoints. Is it reportable? Can any triager clarify me about this? Is it reportable? If you want further information for concluding, ask me. Thank you
Hey guys, Im newer to actually doing BB, but not cybersecurity in general. I’ve been manually hunting recently, while using ai like Claude to help occasionally with breaking things down, or helping read through Burp interceptions, and etc.
However, when I use AI like Claude, eventually it runs into problems due to their policies with specific hacking material.
So not only am I wondering what do experienced hunters suggest doing about this, but also your option on someone newer to BB hunting manually vs using Ai for help?
Hey guys
So I was testing a target and noticed that the search function requires a session ID but the cookie is set to SameSite=None with no CSRF protection
I managed to trigger a successful CSRF attack but since it is just a search function the impact seemed pretty low
Then I thought what if I use CSRF to force the victim browser to send a massive flood of requests using their own IP and session ID
I tried it and it actually worked and the server completely banned the victim IP from the whole site
I am still not sure how long the ban lasts yet
So my question is does this count as a valid vulnerability since I can completely burn the Availability for a specific user
The server blocked the victim IP itself not my attacker IP
Should I submit a report for this or not
And what if the ban duration turns out to be really short like only five minutes or something should I still report it anyway
Thanks
I submitted a dom-xss report, i done this using redirect uri parameter in the url. It was exploitable due to the poor coding of js. I saw the function, which triggers the redirect. But here it only checks if it's a string. Nothing more, loads any url passed to the redirect uri. And script gets executed. I made dom-xss poped up. And also made using this to load a phishing page into the original target website. Making them to enter email and password again, which can be received by the hacker. I reported on hackerone and they didn't clearly see the js code. I was not able to steal because I don't have valid credentials. But according to the function, it checks only if the user is authenticated, and if so, triggers whatever in the redirect uri parameter. Hay hackerone triager here to help? It's been a week and not mediator request option available. Any solution?
I encountered a cors in a target website using wordpress, I added evil.com in origin header and it reflected. I tried using my netlify to make request, but I got encountered by cloudflare waf. Still reportable? Because if there is XSS found in future, this can be used by the hacker right? The response header reflected the evil.com for access control allow origin, and access control allow credentials: true. Any experts or triager can suggest anything? Blocked by waf, means it didn't block, but runs bot detection with 403 error. Any idea to bypass waf, if I can bypass waf, my exploit will run perfectly. Thanks for your response.
Hey everyone,
This has been driving me crazy for the past few days.
I started using Claude Code, but it seems like almost everything I ask it to do gets denied for "policy" reasons.
The weird part is that I'm not asking it to hack anything or find vulns. For example, I asked it to analyze a JavaScript file and explain how it handles HTTP requests, and it still refused.
I've also noticed a lot of people on Twitter talking about the same issue mentioned running into it.
Is this expected behavior? Is there a way to get Claude Code to be less restrictive, or are there certain prompts that work better?
I'd love to hear if anyone else has experienced this or found a workaround.
Hello
Has anyone got into a situation when your bank blocked payment from bog bounty provider (h1 or intigriti) asking for proof of origin of funds?
I guess that's a standard AML thing, and I believe that platform would be able to provide some kind of supporting document. However I haven't been able to find any template or example what exactly should such document contain.
If anyone was in a similar situation could you please share an example or template of the document you submitted? I'd like to understand what such a document is supposed to include.
I was surprised today to find that my submission limit had been restricted, and I'm wondering if I only have one warning left. I don't submit AI-generated reports or poorly written reports. In my last 15 submissions, I had 2 valid vulnerabilities that were accepted and rewarded with bounties. The rest were duplicates of real vulnerabilities, and some of them even earned me reputation points because they were classified as P2.
Does this mean that my account is at risk of being banned?
Apple’s reputation in the bug bounty community wasn’t exactly stellar in the past. A well-known example is the 2021 Denis Tokarev (illusionofchaos) incident. Within the past year——How has everyone’s experience been with submitting vulnerabilities to Apple? Have any of the following situations come up?
I’m in awe at the insane reputation scores people have on h1…like people who started a few years ago and average 5k+ points a year. How is that possible? even at fulltime hunting, they must be finding hundreds of High/Criticals with exorbitant bounties to reach such score.
Is there a meta or some tactic to farming reputation that these guys are privy to (collabs, OP recon/first to discover new targets, 0day research…)? or are they just that productive?
Has anyone ever bought this pdf copy from BruteLogic? is it any good from surface level techniques? I can't seem to find any reviews on this.
A situation with a bug hunter friend made me think about how triage handles old low-quality reports and duplicates.
When he was just starting out, he created multiple accounts, which I know is generally against platform or program policy. One of those accounts had a very poor report that was quickly marked invalid. Later, after he learned how to write cleaner reports, he found a more serious issue on same target and submitted it from another account because the original one had bad signal.
I ended up collaborating with him on one report, but it was later closed as a duplicate because he had already submitted something related from one of his other accounts , that was just tiny fraction of what he submitted he says.
What this made me realize is that even if a low-quality report is just sitting somewhere in the database, it can still create problems later when another report explains the issue properly. A better written report chained may still get tied back to the earlier weak submission, even if the original report failed to explain the impact clearly or ai slop related reports. He didnot show me the report but he was surprised that only basis of title they just flagged it as duplicate but the earlier report was only tiny bit of impact. I dont know if its program trying to be clever or not .
At this point, I just told him to leave it and move on lol.
I came across a skill (the one with 2.8K stars), and it got me thinking on a specific concept: most vulnerability mechanisms have already been disclosed and written up somewhere. The same basic edge keeps getting refiled against new products years later, and the product itself is somewhat incidental; the mechanism itself is the reusable part.
So I parsed ~10,000 publicly disclosed H1 reports, stripped out the product names and reduced each report to a product-agnostic "mechanism card" (source, sink, trigger, preconditions, impact) and embedded them. The idea is that an agent (or human) can point MCP at a stack or a bug they are stuck on, and it pulls the closest real-world mechanics: "Here is how this exact edge was successfully exploited on 6 other products," ranked by novelty, alongside basic grounding data (KEV/EPSS, etc.).
It does not magically find bugs, it acts more like a map of historical attack vectors. Full disclosure - I'm not a professional hunter, and I don't have a great feedback loop. The only signal I have is that an agent using it seemed to orient faster and caught a few of its own false positives - but that's incredibly weak evidence (my own tool, judged by my own agent setup).
Has anyone else already built a mechanism-level transfer? If you've tried a similar approach, does it actually move the needle?
I have found a vulnerability in a private BB program on HackerOne platform.
There is no public disclosure at all, I'm wondering if I can write a blog about it without mentioning the company name at all - of course after they remediated the vulnerability.
Is it something that I can do?
