r/liberalism

Why is the AfD so strong? A look at the latest research reveals who votes for the party—and which eight structural factors make the difference.

41 percent in Saxony-Anhalt, 36 percent in Mecklenburg-Western Pomerania, 16 percent in Berlin: according to polls, the AfD is set to perform very strongly in the state elections this September. This could alter the country's political landscape. It is a fitting moment to examine the current state of research, particularly regarding the party's electorate. Five key insights can be drawn from the latest studies that may help in understanding these elections.

Overview:

1. The AfD electorate consists of three types
2. The West is catching up—and is sometimes more radical
3. Falling numbers—it doesn't matter: migration is the symbolic rallying issue
4. Too old, too few women: demographics are decisive
5. Experts seem at a loss

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1. The AfD electorate consists of three types

Who are the people intending to vote for the AfD despite its increasing radicalization? The composition of its electorate has shifted over the years. Continuously reassessing this makeup is crucial, as it determines which segments of the AfD’s supporter base remain within reach of other parties. A study by sociologist Céline Teney outlines the current situation. Drawing on data from the GLES panel collected last year, the Freie Universität Berlin professor demonstrates that AfD voters can be categorized into three groups: conservative hardliners, radical-right authoritarians, and moderate conservatives.

According to Teney, conservative hardliners make up the largest share of the AfD electorate, accounting for approximately 67 percent. These voters are typically middle-aged individuals from small and medium-sized towns. For them, migration remains the defining issue; they advocate for strictly limiting it—even as the number of asylum applications has steadily declined. Other issues, such as the economic situation or foreign policy, are of less importance to this group.

Conservative hardliners are certainly radical in their focus on immigration, yet they are more moderate in other respects—at least when compared to the second-largest group of AfD voters (accounting for about 20 percent): the far-right authoritarians. According to Teney’s analysis, members of this group tend to be older, have lower levels of education, and are more likely to live in rural areas. They, too, are extreme in their rejection of immigration and lean toward authoritarian leadership and antisemitic views. "This profile is the one furthest removed from fundamental democratic and pluralistic norms," ​​writes Teney.

In Teney’s typology, the third group of AfD voters—comprising just under 13 percent—consists of moderate conservatives. "Compared to the other AfD profiles, they show the least inclination to exclude minorities or isolate Germany," states the study from June 2026. Furthermore, moderate conservatives within the AfD electorate are the least likely to endorse authoritarian and antisemitic positions. Economic and foreign policy issues are also relatively more important to them, making them more open to alternatives; the sociologist notes that this moderate group is the most receptive to overtures from other parties. This is also reflected in the fact that this segment of the party's supporters views the SPD in a comparatively positive light.

It is also helpful to examine the other characteristics of the three voter types. In terms of policy—such as the question of the size of the welfare state—they differ only slightly. The groups also share a similar pessimistic view regarding Germany’s trajectory. This perspective is particularly pronounced among radical-right authoritarians.

Thus, genuine differences lie less in specific policy issues than in the degree of radicalism. The AfD’s electorate is quite heterogeneous in this regard; there remains no single "typical" far-right supporter. The various attitudes span the entire right-wing spectrum, from moderate to extreme. However, there is a marked tendency toward radicalism regarding migration policy: those with generally moderate views are in the minority here, just as they are within the party as a whole. Consistent with this, a study by sociologist Julius Kölzer and his colleagues (PDF) shows that the AfD is particularly strong in areas where far-right parties have historically performed well.

2. The West is catching up—and is sometimes more radical

Kölzer’s work suggests that regional differences play a role. Recent research reveals how the situation has changed of late. In 2025, sociologist Andreas Hövermann examined—on behalf of the Hans Böckler Foundation (PDF)—how the AfD’s electorate managed to double nationwide within just a few years. While the party has long been established in East Germany, it has recently attracted new voters primarily in the West—including, for the first time, more women.

Berlin-based sociologist Teney points to a key difference: whereas East Germany was once considered the stronghold of the party’s radical supporters, data analyzed by Teney now show that radical-right authoritarians make up a larger share of the base in West Germany. This suggests that support for the AfD in the East has broadened—effectively becoming normalized—whereas in the West, it remains concentrated among a core group of supporters.

3. Falling numbers—it doesn’t matter: Migration as a symbolic rallying point

Beyond the makeup of the AfD electorate, it is worth examining the policy area that particularly preoccupies them: Why does immigration remain so important to the majority of AfD voters, even though the numbers have been steadily declining and the issue has recently played a less prominent role on the agenda?

While there are no specific new studies on this, a look across existing research over time reveals a shift: whereas immigration was a central policy issue for AfD supporters (as it was for the electorate at large) at the height of the so-called refugee crisis, it has since evolved into a symbolic meta-issue. Actively leveraged by the party, this topic encapsulates the full range of AfD voters' concerns and attitudes: fears regarding a loss of control and status, anxieties about perceived cultural transformation (e.g., the "Great Replacement" narrative), elements of racism and fear of "foreigners," and a fundamental distrust of state institutions. Viewed in this light, the actual volume of ongoing immigration is of little consequence. For other parties, this has a far-reaching implication: there is no policy outcome they could achieve that would satisfy a significant portion of the AfD’s support base.

4. Too old, too few women: Demographics are the decisive factor

What structural conditions allow the AfD to flourish in this way? A study by the German Institute for Economic Research (DIW) identifies eight characteristics that determine whether or not a district leans toward the AfD: disposable income, youth unemployment, the density of skilled craft businesses, the share of employees in the manufacturing sector, the rate of university-entrance qualifications (Abitur), the proportion of the population over 60, the share of foreign nationals, and changes in the proportion of asylum seekers. Whether the party performs strongly or weakly in a given area is therefore no coincidence; rather, it depends systematically on regional factors—though the study does not specify the exact interplay between them. Instead, the DIW study identifies a key variable: the demographic situation within a district is the decisive factor for the AfD’s success.

This was already known. As early as 2019, sociologist Katja Salomo pointed out—based on a case study of Thuringia—that the East German combination of an aging population, a shortage of women, and low birth rates created a uniquely unfavorable environment for regional living conditions. The DIW now highlights this factor as crucial: "The AfD garners significantly more votes in areas where there is a particularly large number of people over the age of 60 and where young, well-educated people are moving away—a trend that also leads to a marked drop in the rate of university-entrance qualifications among those who remain," states the analysis from July 2026.

The link between demographics and support for the AfD is multifaceted and well-researched. A shrinking, aging population leaves regions increasingly structurally weak. Investments—in local public transport, daycare centers and schools, libraries, and swimming pools—decline in line with reduced demand. The result is the widely documented sense of being left behind, a feeling that fosters susceptibility to populism and extremism.

This dynamic creates a vicious circle. Structural weakness and rising AfD vote shares drive further out-migration, particularly among the young, the educated, and women. Research indicates a prevailing surplus of men, especially in rural East German areas—a factor the AfD deliberately exploits with narratives claiming that migrants are taking German women away from local men. Another consequence is reduced inward migration—including, and especially, among migrants themselves; they are barely represented in regional AfD strongholds.

5. The scientific community appears at a loss

How should the other parties deal with these developments? Surprisingly, there are hardly any significant new recommendations from researchers on this matter. Political scientist Johannes Hillje, for instance, advocates trying a strategy based on greater emotion and a positive narrative about the future. This approach, he argues, could appeal to a substantial segment of the population. But does that include the many people intending to vote for the AfD?

At least there is solid evidence regarding what the other parties should *not* do: attempts to outflank the AfD on the right or to co-opt its issues are doomed to failure. The research findings on this point are quite clear.

Rules are still strictly enforced. Don’t be weird.

The Taliban continues to not let women participate in government, gain education, or take leadership roles in society.

This article outlines how other countries should be forcing and demanding the protection and participation of Afghani women, including requiring meetings with women's groups as formal parts of diplomatic missions, humanitarian assistance to women-led organizations, and putting pressure on countries that have or are considering deporting Afghan migrants back to Afghanistan.

Relegating women to a bystander role in society deprives them of their rights and also deprives the whole of Afghanistan from achieving its potential--especially economically.

> American AI companies say they take steps to ensure neutral responses that protect free speech. Still, the oversight board last month published research that found models from OpenAI, Anthropic, Google and Meta were significantly less likely to criticize repressive governments than governments in freer countries.

> In one test, Anthropic’s Claude Sonnet 4 willingly created fliers criticizing President Trump and King Charles III, but refused to do the same for Chinese leader Xi Jinping or Thai King Maha Vajiralongkorn, citing safety concerns.

> Authoritarian governments have long flooded the internet with propaganda to sway opinion, said Molly Roberts, a University of California San Diego professor who co-wrote the Nature paper. As they realize the strategy tilts AI responses in their favor, she expects them to double down.

Archived version: https://archive.fo/4MWL9

SS: Today marks the 52rd anniversary of Richard Nixon's resignation following the Watergate scandal, and yet the lessons of the dangers of an all-powerful executive have seemingly fallen to the wayside. Although legislation had been passed in the 70s that aimed to constrain the executive, the growing weakness of the legislature and the growing acquiescence, if not collaboration, of the supreme court has reversed any gains following Watergate. Now it wouldn't be an exaggeration to say that Nixon's assertion that “when the president does it, that means it is not illegal" is becoming reality.

Adding insult to injury the populace are now seemingly uninterested in holding the president accountable nor addressing the problems with the imperial presidency, with the endless scandals coming out of the Trump admin coming and going within the news cycle.

Ned Resnikoff (former policy director for California YIMBY, among other things) argues that wealth inequality is both a cause and a consequence of restrictive land use. This touches on the political economy of land use policy and the politics of YIMBYism as an incipient political movement, addressing its leftward critics.

Resnikoff's book Build or Die: How America Is Suffocating Its Cities and What to Do About It will be published on December 8th, 2026.

Archived link: https://archive.fo/J3cqh

The long and short of it is that America is undergoing a cultural and political fracturing into smaller atomized groups. This atomization is not defined by the typical left-right divide, but into smaller political tribes.

Kiran Pfitzner, for Liberal Currents, draws on Prussian political-military theorist Carl von Clausewitz to argue for Supreme Court reform, addressing mainly charges that such a course of action would risk irreparable degradation of norms

More broadly, one might consider the role of escalation, norm violation, courage, and the balance of risks when it comes to fighting authoritarianism, especially incipient/escalating authoritarianism, and its implications for liberal politics globally

Pour vaincre, il nous faut de l'audace, encore l'audace, toujours l'audace, est la république est sauvee!

Despite the recent Supreme Court ruling upholding birthright citizenship, Trump is looking to push the issue as far as he can.

From the article:

>The executive orders apply only to future births tied to four categories:

>1. Children born of foreign diplomatic staff working on behalf of another government while in the U.S. The 14th Amendment doesn't confer automatic citizenship to ambassadors' families, and this order would expand that category to other noncitizen employees.

>2. Children of people who are classified as alien enemies, including those who belong to federally declared terrorist groups. The 14th Amendment doesn't apply to invading armies, and this designation would expand that category.

>3. Those born in U.S. territories — but only if Congress changes the law to end automatic citizenship there. A bill seeking to do that was introduced last month but isn't expected to pass. This would apply most notably to those in Puerto Rico.

>4. Children born of mothers who expressly and deceptively enter the U.S. for the sole purpose of having a child here, namely at a birth-tourism center. The order seeks to limit the use of surrogate mothers for this purpose as well.

> The extreme heat and drought affecting large parts of Europe this summer could erase ​much of the economic growth expected across ‌the region, Dutch bank Triodos (TRIOd.AS) said in a report on Saturday.

> The bank, which specialises in financing environmentally and ​socially sustainable projects, estimates that heat-related ​disruption could shave around 1% off the European ⁠Union's gross domestic product, equivalent to roughly €180 ​billion ($208 billion) in economic losses, driven primarily by ​weaker labour productivity.

> The European Commission has forecast EU GDP ⁠growth of ​1.1%, while the IMF ​expects the euro area to grow by around 0.9%.

> France is expected to be the hardest hit, with recurring heatwaves reducing GDP by around 1.4% and ​potentially tipping ​it into ⁠an annual contraction of 0.6%.

Liberalism has taken some major hits in recent history. "Liberal" is even used as a slur by both the left and the right! :(

Liberalism needs some help. It needs liberals to do more than talk to each other.

What have you done recently to promote liberalism?

Have you canvassed for a liberal candidate? Did you make a public comment? Are you serving on a public board? Did you finally read "A Vindication of the Rights of Women"? Did you explain comparative advantage to an unsuspecting bystander?

Use this thread to share your "liberalism in action" stories, get and give validation and kudos, and get (and give) inspiration. Feel free to be as vague as you need to feel comfortable sharing. Any action, big or small, counts :)

> Peters, once a martyr to the MAGA cause, is now a free woman, feted by the stolen-election movement. The former clerk and recorder of Mesa County, Colorado, was convicted in 2024 and sentenced to nearly nine years in prison after prosecutors said she deceived colleagues to grant an unauthorized person access to voting equipment.

> But because Peters was convicted of state charges, the only person with the power to get her out was Colorado Governor Jared Polis. The Democrat bowed to extraordinary pressure in May and granted Peters clemency despite pleas from prosecutors, his clemency board, and election officials that her punishment was just.

> She walked out of prison repeating many of the unsubstantiated claims that helped land her behind bars. She immediately hit the MAGA circuit, appearing on podcasts and livestreams from locations that look straight out of Architectural Digest. She has crusaded against the machinery used to conduct American elections, insisting that votes have been flipped and that foreign adversaries could exploit future contests. She rails against prison conditions and calls for one of her critics—Colorado Secretary of State Jena Griswold, a Democrat—to be locked up.

Here's an article talking about politics in Florida and amendment 3. A "yes" vote supports Florida Amendment 3 to:

• increase the homestead tax exemption for non-school taxes to $150,000 in 2027 and $250,000 in 2028, with the amount indexed to inflation starting in 2029;
• provide that new residents receive a smaller exemption until they've lived in the state for five years;
• decrease the cap on how much the assessed value of non-homestead properties, such as rentals and commercial buildings, can increase each year from 10% to 5%, except for school district taxes;
• limit how counties and municipalities can spend property tax revenue on public safety, education, infrastructure, natural resource projects and flood control, local bonds, employee retirement benefits, and government operations; and other changes.

https://ballotpedia.org/Florida_Amendment_3,_Homestead_Tax_Exemptions,_Property_Assessments,_and_Spending_Restrictions_Amendment_(2026)

SS: The role of civil society in the defeat of Viktor Orbán's Fidez party in Hungary has so far been underappreciated by outsider observers. This essay seeks to mitigate this by identifying how a network of 2,500 semi-autonomous local civic groups helped propel an otherwise minor political party into the national limelight. The lesson here is that prodemocratic civic capacity in illiberal and authoritarian states may be latent rather than absent and emerges when participation seems likely to matter. Similarly loosely structured grassroots organisations is a powerful model for opposition mobilisation.

Edit: Also those that want the full article just dm me and I'll forward a pdf for you.

SS: In the spirit of cross-pollinating articles between arr Liberalism and arr Neoliberal, I think this article that talks about the growing sense of economic disenfranchisement among middle class Canadians leading to Boomer-like economic self-interest is of interest to this subreddit. To point out the obvious the Canadian Charter of Rights prevents voter disenfranchisement, and of course Lutke's venomous ideas aren't limited to pensioners. Similarly older people tend to vote for parties that promise more economically self-interested policies.

But aside from pointing out the obvious Moffatt's article touches on something that will be relevant to this subreddit, and that is how this sense of economic disenfranchisement can also lead to younger people to have this boomer-like impulse and vote for populist parties that promise economically self-interested policies that harm the national interest.