On the use of “doli incapax”
I’ve been thinking about the doctrine of doli incapax (the presumption that children lack the capacity to form criminal intent unless proven otherwise), and I’m curious about its philosophical justification.
The doctrine seems to rely on the idea that minors lack sufficient moral understanding to be held fully responsible. However, in practice, there appear to be cases where minors are aware that this presumption exists and can be used in their favour. There are heavy media coverage where I live regarding the use of this under law (Victoria, Australia).
This raises a question that feels more philosophical than legal: if a minor can knowingly take advantage of a doctrine like this, does that suggest they possess the kind of understanding that the doctrine assumes they lack?
More broadly:
- Does awareness of legal consequences (or even “loopholes”) indicate moral responsibility, or just instrumental reasoning?
- Is the relevant threshold here moral understanding, rational capacity, or something else?
- Are there established philosophical accounts of responsibility that help clarify whether this kind of case is a genuine counterexample to doctrines like doli incapax?
I’d be interested in perspectives that connect this to broader theories of moral responsibility or moral development.