u/Expensive-Party2116

In other words, have you ever noticed that there are trans women who don't "pass" as cisgender, or at least, not entirely, but who, despite that, turn out to be unexpectedly cute and adorable? You look at them and say, "Yes, she is visibly trans," yet they possess that certain "flaivor" that makes them adorable and charming. They are the ideal type of woman to marry and take home to meet Mom. I think a lot of guys feel tempted to approach us, but they back off out of fear of what others might say. In fact, this happened to me once at work. Specifically, I was working in food prep at a restaurant and had to take the food scraps out of my station every so often. Since the trash cans sometimes overflowed, I found it difficult to haul the waste all the way to the disposal area, so I would end up asking the male staff for help. On one occasion, I asked some random guy to help me take out the trash. At that moment, honestly, I didn't care who he was. Later, I took a good look at him, and it turned out he was exactly my type. When he realized I was trans (I assume a close coworker must have mentioned it to him), he started keeping his distance. He continued to help me, but he would get nervous and avoid making eye contact. And on one occasion, when I tied back my hair and stepped slightly into his personal space (I know, it was a bit bold of me), he recoiled and tried to keep doing what he was doing, but with his head down. I heard one of his coworkers say to him: "Hey, don't be afraid of her!" It’s worth mentioning that the guy in question was super tall, muscular, and sported a light beard that lent his appearance a touch of maturity. Seeing a man of such stature act with so much nervousness and fear in front of a girl who stands barely 1.62 meters tall (5 feet 3.8 inches) is laughable (though I actually found it adorable on his part).

Please share your own experiences.

This is a forum where trans people post content with the specific goal of receiving feedback—both supportive comments and constructive criticism—regarding their appearance. The idea is that they can identify and correct any flaws or obstacles preventing them from passing as an average cis person, right? We agree on that, don't we? So, I can't help but wonder: what is the point of all these photos posted by trans people who don't seem to have the slightest intention of subjecting their content to actual evaluation? They post things like: "Oh, I know perfectly well that I don't pass, but I felt cute... yay!" or "My dress is cute, isn't it?" without showing even the slightest concern or expectation regarding potential constructive criticism. It seems like they couldn't care less; instead of asking for an opinion, they seem content to simply soak up compliments without seeking any real assessment of their appearance. Wait... what exactly are you guys doing here? You understand what the purpose of this forum is, right? Look, I'm not saying it's wrong to want to receive compliments and validation. We're human; we all crave that to some extent at some point in our lives. But there are specific places for that, and this forum doesn't seem to be one of them. There are already plenty of other forums out there, like "transpositive" or "transadorable." Go post there if what you're looking for is compliments and validation.

It would be ideal if the moderators implemented a rule stating that, to be considered a valid post, every submission must include at least some basic context: for example, how long they have been on Hormone Replacement Therapy (HRT), their hormone dosages, their age, or the specific type of cis person the author reasonably aspires to resemble. In other words, they should require the inclusion of specific indicators demonstrating that the person posting here is genuinely interested in having their appearance evaluated. And, if possible, it would also be good to require the submission of material that allows for a reasonable assessment of the trans person's appearance. I mean, there are people who post photos with half their face covered, or wearing super baggy clothes in huge sizes, which makes it difficult to even get an idea of ​​what they actually look like.

Am I being too demanding with my requests?

Obviously, we don't have a "period" if by "period" we mean menstruation; but is the "period" limited solely to that? Doesn't it also include mood swings, changes in skin texture or sensitivity, and a decrease in sex drive? I don't know; there are too many factors that constitute the "period" to reduce it solely to menstruation.

I mean, nowadays there are a lot of trans girls who feel tempted to date guys who, let's be honest, aren't exactly the ideal type of man. Why do we do this? Why not just say: "No, thanks, but you're not my type"? Is it simply because we like a particular guy for reasons unrelated to his physical appearance, or is it because we feel like we have no other choice, given how limited the dating pool is for us, and we simply don't want to be alone? Sure, we could just say: "I like that guy because he's kind and attentive." Fair enough. That's fine. However, would you say the same thing if you could find a physically attractive guy who also met the criteria of being kind and attentive? Even in that scenario, would you still prefer the guy who's a 4 out of 10? You could stand firm in your stance and insist that you would still choose the 4-out-of-10 guy over the one who is attractive in every way. Okay. I guess that's fine. It just strikes me as very strange to keep preferring the 4-out-of-10 guy when the attractive guy I described already offers you kindness and his undivided attention. You know, it seems a bit arbitrary. You know, almost as if you were trying too hard to please everyone. After all, there’s nothing wrong with preferring what we prefer, even if the reasons behind it are things that others might consider superficial.

Come on—both women and men alike: if you don't pass as cis, you simply don't pass. I’ve seen photos of trans women who, by all appearances, do not pass as cis, asking whether they pull it off or not; they post shots where their hair covers half their face, or photos taken from a high angle or a nearly top-down perspective—angles from which, curiously enough, one cannot distinguish their underlying bone structure (their jawline, etc.). For God's sake! If all you’re looking for is flattery and validation—because, in real-world social settings, absolutely no one believes you pass as cis—then that is your problem; a maturity issue that you should be working through with your therapist. Just accept that you don't pass as cis, period. Then, work on it if you can. Don't pressure others to feed your fragile ego just so you can feel like a man or a woman. It’s pathetic, and it makes me embarrassed to be part of the trans community.

I told him that I am a woman and that, consequently, he should treat me as such; this came up after he repeatedly referred to me as his "brother" or "male colleague," and treated me brusquely—as if he were interacting with just any random man. So, I asked him to stop doing that and to treat me like a woman. He replied that he couldn't do that because, quite simply, in his eyes, I am not a woman. He said to me: "Do you have female genitals? No, you have male genitals. You are a man." I replied: "The fact that my genitals are currently—due to the contingencies of life—typically male does not invalidate my identity as a woman; furthermore, I have plans to undergo genital surgery in the future." He simply retorted that a woman with a penis and testicles is nothing more than a man whom we choose to call a "woman." Otherwise—he argued—there would be nothing preventing him from being a "modern woman"—since he, too, has testicles and a penis, just like me—and that would be absurd. So, as far as he was concerned, there was nothing left to discuss. That is why I gave him the example of a person born without arms, pointing out that the vast majority of human beings are born with both arms intact. Now—I asked him—just because that person lacks arms, does that mean they aren't human? No, right? Well, by the same logic, I am no less of a woman simply because I lack certain typically female physical traits. Furthermore—I told him—being a man consists not solely of having testicles and a penis; it consists, above all, of identifying as a man. I—despite finding myself in a situation similar to yours (that is, having typically male genitals)—identify as a woman. "That is where you and I differ," I told him. "Therefore, it is not arbitrary that I am a woman and you are a man, even though we possess basically the same genitals." He ended the conversation by claiming that I was distorting the obvious facts, only to conclude by stating that, quite simply, he would never acknowledge me as a woman. I told him he was being transphobic, but he denied it. He got angry and called me a "faggot".

Why do I even call him a "friend"?

As I said: have you ever tried to get an attractive man's attention in any way? I’m a trans woman—shy and introverted. However, there’s a guy at work whom I see every now and then; whenever I see him pass by, I find myself watching him from a distance... and staring quite intently, at that. He’s masculine, yet cute at the same time. Seeing him makes me feel a little warmth in my heart. On one occasion, I wanted to say something to him, but I ended up just watching him from afar. Apparently, he noticed that I was looking at him. I saw him smile slightly right after our eyes met for a brief instant. I felt absolutely mortified! Do you think he might have thought I was interested in him? Well, I am interested in him, but I certainly don't want him finding out about it *that* way. I want him to come to me, and not the other way around. It’s not a matter of ego; it’s simply because I believe that is the natural order of things. Men court women. And I am a woman, so I deserve that.

I have recently been rereading Kant’s Critique of Pure Reason, and there is a passage that left me astonished due to its potential implications for arguments grounded in experience. Now, it is worth noting that Kant follows a surprisingly scholastic tradition, in which "experience" is not understood—broadly speaking—as all knowledge inherent to the mind, nor merely as something that occurs *within* the mind; rather, it is something much more specific and precisely defined. Therefore, Kant does not interpret "experience" in such broad and loose terms. Instead, what he understands by "knowledge derived from experience" is any knowledge we receive through the sensory channels with which our cognitive apparatus is equipped. This type of knowledge possesses a peculiar characteristic that Kant identifies immediately. To quote Kant himself—from the Critique of Pure Reason, Introduction, Second Section, First Paragraph, Second Sentence—: "Experience teaches us that an object is constituted in a certain way, but it does not tell us that it could not exist in a different way." Why does Kant’s assertion appear to be true? Because—as Kant argues—it simply seems evident that sensory data merely inform us that objects possess a certain nature or disposition; however, on that basis—and solely on that basis—we have no right to logically derive the properties of universality and necessity—properties which, incidentally, a specific type of knowledge does possess: namely, purely a priori knowledge. Consequently, with regard to knowledge derived from experience—which Kant terms a posteriori knowledge—we can, at best, form only probabilistic judgments concerning its truth; It is not possible, however, to attribute to it the necessity, certainty, and universality required by a demonstrative argument.

The problem is straightforward: if Thomas Aquinas’s arguments are grounded in knowledge derived from—and exclusively from—experience (understanding "experience" in the manner we have already described), then his arguments cannot be demonstrative. This is because it is impossible to attribute the modal property of "necessity" to the object of such experience, or to derive "epistemic certainty" from it—precisely because knowledge derived from experience cannot be necessary. Consequently, insofar as the Five Ways ground the knowledge contained in their premises in information received through sensory channels, it follows that they cannot be demonstrative, but merely probabilistic. This appears to condemn Thomas Aquinas’s arguments to probabilism, which, in turn, raises the problem of demarcation: namely, determining when we have accumulated sufficient instances to know—inductively—that we are in possession of robust knowledge.

One possible solution—which Kant himself explores in order to safeguard the knowledge claims of the natural sciences—consists in postulating the existence of certain "forms" or structures of purely a priori knowledge—that is, knowledge antecedent to all possible experience—that are inherent to our own cognitive faculties. These "forms" of purely a priori knowledge constitute the basis upon which the necessity and universality of certain metaphysical structures regarding the objects of experience are grounded. Only in this way is it possible to offer an intelligible explanation for the presence of metaphysical structures within the objects of experience—namely, by recognizing that such structures do not reside within the objects of experience *per se*, but rather reside within the mind as qualities inherent to the knowing subject. This approach enables the acquisition of a priori knowledge—that is, knowledge that is simultaneously necessary and universal—which is, at the same time, neither tautological nor analytic, but rather synthetic or ampliative. Thus, we might arrive at a theory capable of providing a secure foundation for our knowledge of experience; A foundation from which, nonetheless, we may derive necessary and universal metaphysical structures, suitable for supporting demonstrative arguments.

There are two potential problems for Thomism in adopting the proposed solution: first, Thomism would have to embrace Kant’s transcendental idealism—a framework in which, so to speak, we are trapped within a world where the only things we know are strictly mental; while a "thing-in-itself"—something perhaps non-mental—might exist, it would remain unknowable to us. The second problem—and the most pressing one—is that, even with this theory of structures or forms inherent to the cognitive apparatus of the knowing subject, it is not possible to construct demonstrative arguments that situate their conclusion outside the realm of all possible experience (in principle); that is to say, it is not possible to arrive at God, given that the structures of the mind serve solely to structure the objects of experience—or representations—and not that which lies outside of experience. Recall: these structures or forms do not reside in the thing itself, but rather in the mind of the subject knowing that thing. The subject's mind, so to speak, creates the form of the thing. Consequently, we are empowered to make judgments only regarding matters that lie within the realm of possible experience, never regarding anything that lies outside of it.

Thomist Counter-objection: Why not simply postulate that metaphysical forms or structures reside within the things themselves, and that we merely abstract these forms through our intellect? This would constitute a coherent alternative to the Kantian proposal.

Brief Answer: This is absolutely impossible, for we possess no direct access to the "thing-in-itself"; rather, our only access to the thing occurs through a representation or phenomenon, and representations reside in the mind. Consequently, any structure found within a representation—or within the set of objects of experience—actually resides in the mind prior to the very cognition of said objects of experience or representations.

A personal solution that would render Thomas Aquinas’s arguments demonstrative: If the problem lies in our lack of justification for issuing judgments that transcend the realm of all experience—given that the mind’s a priori structures or forms merely enable us to make assertions regarding the objects of experience (insofar as only such objects fall under the dominion of these cognitive structures)—then, quite simply, let us eliminate the *noumenon* as a possible yet inaccessible entity. The core of reality could very well be accessible—just as Schopenhauer suggested—through introspection, once we realize that what underlies every representation or object of experience is a desiderative energy, a volitional force: the Will—that is to say, the impulse to act and to feel. Thus, if all is mental, the a priori cognitive structures are, in effect, legitimized to ground assertoric judgments concerning matters that transcend personal experience, insofar as the conduit connecting the subject to the core of reality is direct introspection. Within us resides a spark of the core of reality. It is for this reason that, through pure introspection, a Thomist—or any other subject—can come to know God through experience, aided by the mind’s a priori structures. The price? That metaphysical idealism be true. Only in this way is it possible to arrive at God in a demonstrative manner—that is, by postulating that the entirety of reality is mental.