▲ 310 r/PathOfExile2
First HCSSF char and I just got to 90. Then this :(
streamable.comu/ExplorerR — 2 days ago
▲ 8 r/DebateReligion
Naturalistic explanation > Theistic explanation: The current inexplicability of consciousness/subjectivity is weak evidence that it lies beyond future naturalistic explanations.
I have decided to make this a post because I've now debated this point several times and despite debating it and showing it to be problematic, it still seems to pesist on this sub.
There are a few theists that argue that the historical replacement of theistic explanations by natural explanations tells us nothing about consciousness because every previous replacement involved mechanistic phenomena, whereas consciousness is fundamentally subjective.
I don't think this conclusion follows.
I argue that the current lack of naturalistic epistemic scope of consciousness provides only weak evidence that consciousness lies beyond future naturalistic explanation. And that is because history repeatedly shows that present epistemic limitations are poor predictors of future investigative capabilities.
To put the above into a syllogism;
P1: Past success is generally good inductive evidence for expecting similar future success unless there is a good reason/argument for something to be considered an exception to that.
P2: Naturalistic inquiry has repeatedly succeeded in explaining phenomena that were once thought as theistic, mysterious or beyond naturalistic epistemic reach.
P3: No compelling reason has yet been given to think consciousness/subjectivity is relevantly different in a way that exempts it from this historical pattern.
C: Therefore, we have good inductive reason to expect that consciousness/subjectivity may eventually receive a naturalistic explanation, and the current inexplicability is weak evidence that no such explanation is possible.
One response I frequently encounter goes something like this:
"Naturalistic explanations have replaced theistic explanations for things like lightning, disease, earthquakes, planetary motion and so on, but that those were all mechanistic phenomena. Consciousness is fundamentally different because it is subjective. Therefore the historical pattern provides no reason to expect naturalistic explanations to make similar progress here."
I think there are several problems with this reasoning. I'll outline those in seperate topics:
Hindsight is 20/20 vision in identifying the history of "mechanistic" explanations
It is easy to look back and say things like disease or lightning were "mechanistic" explanations all along. That however, only becomes obvious after advances in our epistemic reach has established that. But before that is the case, the explanations for those phenomena would have looked so incredibly mysterious to the people at that time.
How incomprehensible would bacteria/virus be before the microscope?
How incomprehensible would lightning, electricity or computers and the internet have been 2000 years ago?
Before neuroscience, many aspects of cognition and behaviour were attributed to souls, spirits or divine agency.
Identifying "mechanistic" post-hoc isn't as impressive or relevant with the benefit of hindsight. As such, the fact that consciousness currently appears resistant to naturalistic investigation does not establish that it belongs to a fundamentally different explanatory category.
People have constantly and mistakingly asserted that "current" epistemic limits are permanent ones
History contains a recurring pattern;
- A phenomenon appears inexplicable/mysterious -> Existing epistemic reach/tools cannot investigate it -> People assert theistic explanation -> New epistemic capabilities developed/discovered -> The phenomena becomes increasingly more accessible to naturalistic inquiry -> Eventual explanation established and previous explanations either replaced or rewritten accordingly.
Microscopes revealed microorganisms.
Telescopes revealed previously invisible astronomical structure.
DNA sequencing transformed biology.
X-rays and brain imaging has already radically changed our understanding of cognition.
None of these investigative methods existed until humans invented them.
There is no good reason we should assume today's inability to fully investigate consciousness/subjectivity represents a permanent boundary, as opposed to it being just another temporary limitation.
Induction DOES give us good reason to expect continued epistemic expansion/reach
To be clear, I am NOT saying there WILL be a naturalistic explanation for consciousness/subjectivity. Let's quickly nip that one in the bud.
More accurately;
- Naturalistic epistemic reach/expansion has repeatedly expanded the range of phenomena it can successfully investigate. Therefore we have prima facie reason to expect further expansion rather than assume we have reached a permanent epistemic boundary.
Uniquely theistic prevalence of this type of argumentation
This is a personal observation but I've never seen anyone but theists raise this type of objection. It very much looks like proponents want consciousness/subjectivity to be the enigma beyond the scope of naturalistic explanations because it is often the "gap" where theistic arguments or concepts are linked in.
For example, consciousness being the conduit for the "soul" or subjectivity being the mechanism for God to "interact with our subjectivity".
So, for as long as we cannot explain it naturally, then there is a gap for theistic explanations.
At least this is just how it looks.
To conclude:
The claim that consciousness/subjectivity is currently largely unexplained is uncontroversial.
The stronger claim, i.e that consciousness therefore lies beyond future scientific explanation, IS controversial.
History repeatedly demonstrates that humans are poor judges of the ultimate limits of naturalistic inquiry. Again and again, phenomena once thought inaccessible have become increasingly tractable through advances in epistemic capabilities.
That doesn't prove consciousness will receive a complete natural explanation. But it does mean that our present inability to explain consciousness is weak evidence that such an explanation is impossible or forever beyond naturalistic explanation.
Given the above, I think the following questions best invite engagement with this topic:
1 - What justifies treating consciousness/subjectivity as an exception rather than another currently unexplained phenomenon?
2 - How have you ruled out the possibility that today's epistemic limitations are simply temporary, as they have been many times throughout history?
3 - What non-question-begging reason is there for thinking consciousness/subjectivity cannot eventually receive a naturalistic explanation?
u/ExplorerR — 1 month ago
Theology's object of inquiry has not been established and remains seriously disputed. It's status as an academic discipline should also be disputed.
I tried to cross-post this from /r/debatereligion but it wouldn't let me so I just made a new post.
Apologies for the length of my OP, but it does require significant substantiating given the charge.
For around a decade now, I've maintained posting a regular thread critical of theology and it's that time again!
The aim of doing so is in line with a history of other general critisms of theology. I believe its a particular criticism of theology, more specifically as an academic discipline (and the associated credence that accompanies that), that is not discussed or debated very much and I think it should be.
I've learned a lot over the years of debating this particular subject, probably to the disagreement of some of those I've engaged fairly deeply with it on and try to refine/correct areas the argument can improve on.
As such...
My thesis:
Theology overwhelmingly defines its primary object of inquiry as God and/or the divine. Since the existence of that defining object remains fundamentally disputed, theology's claim to academic legitimacy should likewise remain disputed.
To be clear, this is not an argument that God does not exist, nor is it an argument that theology has been conclusively shown to be illegitimate.
Rather, it is an argument that the epistemic justification for theology as an academic discipline depends upon the epistemic status of its defining object. If theology defines itself by investigating God and/or the divine, then the unresolved status of that defining object raises a legitimate questions regarding theology's academic foundations.
Expressed as a simple argument:
P1: The academic justification of a discipline is partly dependent upon the epistemic status of its defining object of inquiry.
P2: Theology overwhelmingly defines its primary object of inquiry as God and/or the divine.
P3: The existence of God or the divine remains one of the most fundamentally disputed questions in philosophy and has not achieved broad scholarly consensus.
Conclusion: Therefore, theology's claim to academic legitimacy should itself remain open to philosophical dispute.
Despite having raised this quite a number of times previously and having had lengthy back'n'forths with multiple people, some of those professionals in the field of theology, I genuinely believe that the criticisms and questions I've raised have yet to be answered in an actual sense. I'm sure there will be those who think it has been answered/solved, given how long I've been harping on about this, but I behest anyone to engage directly with my argument and evidence I present here on its merits. I do welcome anyone to review my previous threads on this matter here, here, here and here.
A fairly frequent theme from those who attempt to respond seriously is the discussion often became sidetracked by disagreements over definitions. A common response has been that I misunderstand contemporary academic theology; that "academic theology" no longer primarily concerns God or the divine, but instead concerns the study of religious traditions, beliefs, texts and communities. If that were true, then much of my criticism would require significant revision.
Rather than continuing to argue over competing intuitions on what is and is not theology at its core, I decided to do a more indepth investigation and record how theology actually presents itself. I surveyed a variety of non-cherry-picked the top 15 that gave introductory descriptions from universities, theology departments, university presses, standard theological reference works and practicing theologians. My goal was simply to demonstrate how the discipline overwhelmingly describes its own primary object of inquiry.
To preface the below information; I deliberately selected introductory descriptions because they explain what theology is to prospective students and the general public. I did not survey specialist monographs or journal articles, as those typically assume readers already understand what theology is.
I classified each source into one of three categories.
Category A: Theology primarily studies God, the divine and things like divine revelation, or God's relationship to the world.
Category B: Theology primarily studies religious traditions, beliefs, texts or communities without treating God or the divine as its defining object.
Category C: Mixed definitions, where God remains central but theology is explicitly broadened to include religion more generally.
The results were and apologies for the bloat/length of this but I'll summarize the findings at the top.
Summary:
Category A (CA): 14
Category B (CB): 0
Category C (CC): 1
Representative sources (can easily google each):
CA: University of Alabama - Department of Religious Studies: Religious (theological) forms of study that seek to advance specific religious viewpoints
CA: University of Notre Dame "Theology endeavors to know God and all things in light of God"
CA: University of Notre Dame Core Curriculum: "Theology is talk about God."
CA: University of Otago CHTH111: "Who is God, and what is God up to?"
CA: Harris Manchester College (University of Oxford):“the study of God”
CA: Cambridge University Press "Exploration of the nature of the divine'"
CA: Wiley-Blackwell Companion to the Study of Religion: Page 193: "At least within the academic world, theology is largely confined to an attempt to arrive at a “systematic” account of God and of God’s relations with the world."
CA: New Dictionary of Theology (2nd Edition): "The root meaning of ‘theology’ is ‘speaking about God’."
CA: Theology: The Basics: "Theology is talk about God"
CA: Dr. Scott M. Sullivan is a PhD in philosophy from the University of St. Thomas in Houston, TX and a classical theist, describing the difference between Theology and Philosophy. Theology is distinguished from philosophy by its concern with God and divine revelation.
CA: Khaldoun Sweis, Associate Professor of Philosophy, Olive-Harvey College, and Tutor, Oxford University, describing what assumption Theology operates under and how it differs from mythology. Theology proceeds on the assumption that God exists and differs from mythology on that basis.
CA: Wikipedia: "Theology is the critical study of the nature of the divine.
CA: IVP (InterVarsity Press): "Most simply, the knowledge of God
CA: Dr. Andrew Mark Henry (Religion for Breakfast) Theology investigates God, whereas Religious Studies investigates religion descriptively.
CC: Cambridge dictionary: "The study of religion and religious belief"
I've had it highlighted quite a number of times in previous thread that how I'm portraying theology is simply my version, or my understanding and not one generally found in academia. Despite previous threads also having a few examples of definitions from other sources (some included in the list above), the response of it being "my" version/understanding still occurred. At this point, I do not think it is reasonable/justified to try and handwave this criticism away with it being "my" version/understanding of theology, when it is seems quite clear that just is how theology presents itself.
There is a clear trend and there are even more sources that overwhelmingly support category A in the list above and could be added to it, but I didn't want to over-bloat what is likely already going to be a lengthy thread.
The actual existence of God and/or the divine really is seriously contested
Perhaps due to the historical prominence and power of religion in general affording God and/or the divine the pathway into academia as a justified, today things are very different. Despite having more than 2000 years to answer the question in a way where it would seem rather odd to quetion its truth, what was once clearly taken for granted in God and/or the divine existing, that is not so clear anymore. In fact, there are very many good reasons to doubt truth claims around such an existence, many actively debunked and what is left for arguments arguably remain almost entirely philosophical. This is perhaps most evident within philosophy itself. The principal arguments advanced for God's existence (cosmological arguments, teleological arguments, moral arguments, ontological arguments and related forms of natural theology) are almost entirely philosophical arguments. If these arguments had succeeded in establishing God's existence to anything approaching broad scholarly agreement, we would expect that to be reflected among professional philosophers, whose expertise lies in evaluating precisely these kinds of arguments.
That is not what we observe. Surveys of professional philosophers consistently find substantial disagreement regarding God's and/or the divine's existence, with atheism or non-theism representing the single largest position among respondents. This does not demonstrate that God does not exist, nor does majority opinion determine truth. It does, however, suggest that the philosophical case for God's existence has not achieved the degree of scholarly consensus one might expect if theology's defining object had been firmly established.
A common response to this finding is that philosophers in general cannot be considered "experts" when it comes to specific "God/divine" related arguments and/or subject matter, and that we should be turning to philosophers of religion, who are and the majority of philosophers of religion are theists. Ignoring the question whether trained/professional philosophers are genuinely unable to evaluate philosophical arguments for God/the divine in an expert manner, there is an underlying issue with such representation. Researchers have noted that philosophy of religion appears to exhibit significant selection effects, with many specialists entering the field already committed to theism, and there is published discussion about whether this influences the evaluation of religious arguments. Regardless of how much weight one gives to that explanation, the broader point remains unchanged: there is no broad expert consensus that God's existence has been established. The persistence of deep disagreement among specialists is itself evidence that theology's defining object remains fundamentally contested.
What makes something "Theological"?
One of the most common responses I've received over the years is that theology is defined not by its object of inquiry but by the diverse methods theologians employ.
Theologians engage in philosophy, history, literary criticism, textual analysis, archaeology, linguistics, sociology and psychology, often drawing upon the same methodologies used elsewhere in academia. I agree that they do indeed utilize these methods/tools.
However, I do not think this addresses the issue at all.
Academic disciplines frequently borrow methods from one another. Ecologists routinely use statistics, chemistry, genetics and computer modelling. Historians may employ archaeology, linguistics and quantitative analysis. Literary scholars draw upon philosophy, psychology and history. There is a lot of cross-over between these disciplines and the methods they use, but still there will remain something clear that distinguishes them from each other.
No one argues that statistics becomes ecology simply because an ecologist performs it, or that chemistry becomes biology because a biologist uses it. Methods are transferable.
Disciplines are distinguished by the explanatory purpose toward which those methods are directed.
For example, I regularly perform statistical analyses in my own ecological research. The statistical methods themselves are not "ecology." They are mathematics/statistics. They only become part of ecological inquiry because they are directed toward understanding ecological systems.
Likewise, historical analysis, textual criticism or philosophy do not automatically become theology merely because a theologian performs them.
The important question is not:
- "What methods does theology use?"
The important question is:
- "What makes the use of those methods theological rather than historical, philosophical, literary or sociological?"
This is where my argument returns to theology's own descriptions of itself. If theology overwhelmingly defines its primary object of inquiry as God, the divine or divine revelation, then the feature distinguishing theological inquiry from neighbouring disciplines appears not to be its methods, but its epistemic aim (i.e to understand/gain knowledge of the nature and properties of God/the divine). If, on the other hand, theology is simply the study of theologies, religious traditions, beliefs and texts without any orientation toward trying to learn or understand God or the divine, then it becomes increasingly difficult, I would say almost impossible, to reasonably distinguish it from Religious Studies, the Philosophy of Religion, History, Anthropology or Sociology of Religion.
Appealing to methodology therefore does not resolve the issue. It simply pushes the question back one step to;
- What is the defining feature that makes an otherwise historical, philosophical or literary investigation specifically theological?
To elaborate on something further, it has been said by certain folk here on reddit that "academic theology" is different from "theology proper". Despite having discussed this in detail, it was never made clear where that is true. As the list provided, also includes "academic theology" sources, it would seem that this claim is false. Furthermore, it still begs the questions above. If “Academic Theology” is supposed to be some sanitized, de-confessionalized version of theology that doesn’t require any metaphysical commitments, i.e no assumption of a God/the divine, no faith commitments, no internal normativity... simply just "studying theologies" then what’s left to make it "theological" at all? Because the moment you drop those, what you’re doing isn’t substantially different from things like religious studies, anthropology of religion, literary theory and criticism, history of religious belief or philosophy of religion to give some examples. You’re just calling it “theology” and not providing any specific reason why it should retain a "theological" label.
Conclusion
Theology overwhelmingly presents its primary object of inquiry as God, the divine or divine revelation. This is not merely my definition, but the overwhelming pattern reflected across universities, theology departments, academic publishers, introductory textbooks and practicing theologians.
Unlike the objects of inquiry in most academic disciplines, however, the existence of theology's defining object remains one of the most enduringly disputed questions in philosophy. Even among the professional philosophers whose discipline is devoted to evaluating philosophical arguments, no broad consensus has emerged that those arguments have established their conclusion.
Academic disciplines routinely borrow methods from one another, but borrowed methods alone do not explain what distinguishes one discipline from another. Rather, disciplines are distinguished by the objects they investigate and the epistemic aims toward which those methods are directed. If theology itself overwhelmingly identifies God or the divine as that distinguishing object, then the unresolved epistemic status of that object is directly relevant to theology's own academic standing.
For that reason, I believe theology's claim to academic legitimacy should itself remain open to philosophical dispute. If there is disagreement one what I've presented above, then I invite anyone to address one (or more) of the following:
Demonstrate that my survey of theology's self-descriptions is unrepresentative and provide an equal (or more) number of sources that clearly outline what IS actually representative.
Explain why the disputed status of theology's defining object is not relevant to the discipline's academic justification.
Provide a principled account of what distinguishes theology from neighbouring disciplines if neither its defining object nor its epistemic aim concerns God or the divine.
Those, in my view, are the central philosophical questions raised by theology as an academic discipline, and they are the questions I invite this discussion to address.
u/ExplorerR — 1 month ago
▲ 26 r/DebateReligion
Theology's object of inquiry has not been established and remains seriously disputed. It's status as an academic discipline should also be disputed.
Apologies for the length of my OP, but it does require significant substantiating given the charge.
For around a decade now, I've maintained posting a regular thread critical of theology and it's that time again!
The aim of doing so is in line with a history of other general critisms of theology. I believe its a particular criticism of theology, more specifically as an academic discipline (and the associated credence that accompanies that), that is not discussed or debated very much and I think it should be.
I've learned a lot over the years of debating this particular subject, probably to the disagreement of some of those I've engaged fairly deeply with it on and try to refine/correct areas the argument can improve on.
As such...
My thesis:
Theology overwhelmingly defines its primary object of inquiry as God and/or the divine. Since the existence of that defining object remains fundamentally disputed, theology's claim to academic legitimacy should likewise remain disputed.
To be clear, this is not an argument that God does not exist, nor is it an argument that theology has been conclusively shown to be illegitimate.
Rather, it is an argument that the epistemic justification for theology as an academic discipline depends upon the epistemic status of its defining object. If theology defines itself by investigating God and/or the divine, then the unresolved status of that defining object raises a legitimate questions regarding theology's academic foundations.
Expressed as a simple argument:
P1: The academic justification of a discipline is partly dependent upon the epistemic status of its defining object of inquiry.
P2: Theology overwhelmingly defines its primary object of inquiry as God and/or the divine.
P3: The existence of God or the divine remains one of the most fundamentally disputed questions in philosophy and has not achieved broad scholarly consensus.
Conclusion: Therefore, theology's claim to academic legitimacy should itself remain open to philosophical dispute.
Despite having raised this quite a number of times previously and having had lengthy back'n'forths with multiple people, some of those professionals in the field of theology, I genuinely believe that the criticisms and questions I've raised have yet to be answered in an actual sense. I'm sure there will be those who think it has been answered/solved, given how long I've been harping on about this, but I behest anyone to engage directly with my argument and evidence I present here on its merits. I do welcome anyone to review my previous threads on this matter here, here, here and here.
A fairly frequent theme from those who attempt to respond seriously is the discussion often became sidetracked by disagreements over definitions. A common response has been that I misunderstand contemporary academic theology; that "academic theology" no longer primarily concerns God or the divine, but instead concerns the study of religious traditions, beliefs, texts and communities. If that were true, then much of my criticism would require significant revision.
Rather than continuing to argue over competing intuitions on what is and is not theology at its core, I decided to do a more indepth investigation and record how theology actually presents itself. I surveyed a variety of non-cherry-picked the top 15 that gave introductory descriptions from universities, theology departments, university presses, standard theological reference works and practicing theologians. My goal was simply to demonstrate how the discipline overwhelmingly describes its own primary object of inquiry.
To preface the below information; I deliberately selected introductory descriptions because they explain what theology is to prospective students and the general public. I did not survey specialist monographs or journal articles, as those typically assume readers already understand what theology is.
I classified each source into one of three categories.
Category A: Theology primarily studies God, the divine and things like divine revelation, or God's relationship to the world.
Category B: Theology primarily studies religious traditions, beliefs, texts or communities without treating God or the divine as its defining object.
Category C: Mixed definitions, where God remains central but theology is explicitly broadened to include religion more generally.
The results were and apologies for the bloat/length of this but I'll summarize the findings at the top.
Summary:
Category A (CA): 14
Category B (CB): 0
Category C (CC): 1
Representative sources (can easily google each):
CA: University of Alabama - Department of Religious Studies: Religious (theological) forms of study that seek to advance specific religious viewpoints
CA: University of Notre Dame "Theology endeavors to know God and all things in light of God"
CA: University of Notre Dame Core Curriculum: "Theology is talk about God."
CA: University of Otago CHTH111: "Who is God, and what is God up to?"
CA: Harris Manchester College (University of Oxford):“the study of God”
CA: Cambridge University Press "Exploration of the nature of the divine'"
CA: Wiley-Blackwell Companion to the Study of Religion: Page 193: "At least within the academic world, theology is largely confined to an attempt to arrive at a “systematic” account of God and of God’s relations with the world."
CA: New Dictionary of Theology (2nd Edition): "The root meaning of ‘theology’ is ‘speaking about God’."
CA: Theology: The Basics: "Theology is talk about God"
CA: Dr. Scott M. Sullivan is a PhD in philosophy from the University of St. Thomas in Houston, TX and a classical theist, describing the difference between Theology and Philosophy. Theology is distinguished from philosophy by its concern with God and divine revelation.
CA: Khaldoun Sweis, Associate Professor of Philosophy, Olive-Harvey College, and Tutor, Oxford University, describing what assumption Theology operates under and how it differs from mythology. Theology proceeds on the assumption that God exists and differs from mythology on that basis.
CA: Wikipedia: "Theology is the critical study of the nature of the divine.
CA: IVP (InterVarsity Press): "Most simply, the knowledge of God
CA: Dr. Andrew Mark Henry (Religion for Breakfast) Theology investigates God, whereas Religious Studies investigates religion descriptively.
CC: Cambridge dictionary: "The study of religion and religious belief"
I've had it highlighted quite a number of times in previous thread that how I'm portraying theology is simply my version, or my understanding and not one generally found in academia. Despite previous threads also having a few examples of definitions from other sources (some included in the list above), the response of it being "my" version/understanding still occurred. At this point, I do not think it is reasonable/justified to try and handwave this criticism away with it being "my" version/understanding of theology, when it is seems quite clear that just is how theology presents itself.
There is a clear trend and there are even more sources that overwhelmingly support category A in the list above and could be added to it, but I didn't want to over-bloat what is likely already going to be a lengthy thread.
The actual existence of God and/or the divine really is seriously contested
Perhaps due to the historical prominence and power of religion in general affording God and/or the divine the pathway into academia as a justified, today things are very different. Despite having more than 2000 years to answer the question in a way where it would seem rather odd to quetion its truth, what was once clearly taken for granted in God and/or the divine existing, that is not so clear anymore. In fact, there are very many good reasons to doubt truth claims around such an existence, many actively debunked and what is left for arguments arguably remain almost entirely philosophical. This is perhaps most evident within philosophy itself. The principal arguments advanced for God's existence (cosmological arguments, teleological arguments, moral arguments, ontological arguments and related forms of natural theology) are almost entirely philosophical arguments. If these arguments had succeeded in establishing God's existence to anything approaching broad scholarly agreement, we would expect that to be reflected among professional philosophers, whose expertise lies in evaluating precisely these kinds of arguments.
That is not what we observe. Surveys of professional philosophers consistently find substantial disagreement regarding God's and/or the divine's existence, with atheism or non-theism representing the single largest position among respondents. This does not demonstrate that God does not exist, nor does majority opinion determine truth. It does, however, suggest that the philosophical case for God's existence has not achieved the degree of scholarly consensus one might expect if theology's defining object had been firmly established.
A common response to this finding is that philosophers in general cannot be considered "experts" when it comes to specific "God/divine" related arguments and/or subject matter, and that we should be turning to philosophers of religion, who are and the majority of philosophers of religion are theists. Ignoring the question whether trained/professional philosophers are genuinely unable to evaluate philosophical arguments for God/the divine in an expert manner, there is an underlying issue with such representation. Researchers have noted that philosophy of religion appears to exhibit significant selection effects, with many specialists entering the field already committed to theism, and there is published discussion about whether this influences the evaluation of religious arguments. Regardless of how much weight one gives to that explanation, the broader point remains unchanged: there is no broad expert consensus that God's existence has been established. The persistence of deep disagreement among specialists is itself evidence that theology's defining object remains fundamentally contested.
What makes something "Theological"?
One of the most common responses I've received over the years is that theology is defined not by its object of inquiry but by the diverse methods theologians employ.
Theologians engage in philosophy, history, literary criticism, textual analysis, archaeology, linguistics, sociology and psychology, often drawing upon the same methodologies used elsewhere in academia. I agree that they do indeed utilize these methods/tools.
However, I do not think this addresses the issue at all.
Academic disciplines frequently borrow methods from one another. Ecologists routinely use statistics, chemistry, genetics and computer modelling. Historians may employ archaeology, linguistics and quantitative analysis. Literary scholars draw upon philosophy, psychology and history. There is a lot of cross-over between these disciplines and the methods they use, but still there will remain something clear that distinguishes them from each other.
No one argues that statistics becomes ecology simply because an ecologist performs it, or that chemistry becomes biology because a biologist uses it. Methods are transferable.
Disciplines are distinguished by the explanatory purpose toward which those methods are directed.
For example, I regularly perform statistical analyses in my own ecological research. The statistical methods themselves are not "ecology." They are mathematics/statistics. They only become part of ecological inquiry because they are directed toward understanding ecological systems.
Likewise, historical analysis, textual criticism or philosophy do not automatically become theology merely because a theologian performs them.
The important question is not:
- "What methods does theology use?"
The important question is:
- "What makes the use of those methods theological rather than historical, philosophical, literary or sociological?"
This is where my argument returns to theology's own descriptions of itself. If theology overwhelmingly defines its primary object of inquiry as God, the divine or divine revelation, then the feature distinguishing theological inquiry from neighbouring disciplines appears not to be its methods, but its epistemic aim (i.e to understand/gain knowledge of the nature and properties of God/the divine). If, on the other hand, theology is simply the study of theologies, religious traditions, beliefs and texts without any orientation toward trying to learn or understand God or the divine, then it becomes increasingly difficult, I would say almost impossible, to reasonably distinguish it from Religious Studies, the Philosophy of Religion, History, Anthropology or Sociology of Religion.
Appealing to methodology therefore does not resolve the issue. It simply pushes the question back one step to;
- What is the defining feature that makes an otherwise historical, philosophical or literary investigation specifically theological?
To elaborate on something further, it has been said by certain folk here on reddit that "academic theology" is different from "theology proper". Despite having discussed this in detail, it was never made clear where that is true. As the list provided, also includes "academic theology" sources, it would seem that this claim is false. Furthermore, it still begs the questions above. If “Academic Theology” is supposed to be some sanitized, de-confessionalized version of theology that doesn’t require any metaphysical commitments, i.e no assumption of a God/the divine, no faith commitments, no internal normativity... simply just "studying theologies" then what’s left to make it "theological" at all? Because the moment you drop those, what you’re doing isn’t substantially different from things like religious studies, anthropology of religion, literary theory and criticism, history of religious belief or philosophy of religion to give some examples. You’re just calling it “theology” and not providing any specific reason why it should retain a "theological" label.
Conclusion
Theology overwhelmingly presents its primary object of inquiry as God, the divine or divine revelation. This is not merely my definition, but the overwhelming pattern reflected across universities, theology departments, academic publishers, introductory textbooks and practicing theologians.
Unlike the objects of inquiry in most academic disciplines, however, the existence of theology's defining object remains one of the most enduringly disputed questions in philosophy. Even among the professional philosophers whose discipline is devoted to evaluating philosophical arguments, no broad consensus has emerged that those arguments have established their conclusion.
Academic disciplines routinely borrow methods from one another, but borrowed methods alone do not explain what distinguishes one discipline from another. Rather, disciplines are distinguished by the objects they investigate and the epistemic aims toward which those methods are directed. If theology itself overwhelmingly identifies God or the divine as that distinguishing object, then the unresolved epistemic status of that object is directly relevant to theology's own academic standing.
For that reason, I believe theology's claim to academic legitimacy should itself remain open to philosophical dispute. If there is disagreement one what I've presented above, then I invite anyone to address one (or more) of the following:
Demonstrate that my survey of theology's self-descriptions is unrepresentative and provide an equal (or more) number of sources that clearly outline what IS actually representative.
Explain why the disputed status of theology's defining object is not relevant to the discipline's academic justification.
Provide a principled account of what distinguishes theology from neighbouring disciplines if neither its defining object nor its epistemic aim concerns God or the divine.
Those, in my view, are the central philosophical questions raised by theology as an academic discipline, and they are the questions I invite this discussion to address.
u/ExplorerR — 1 month ago
▲ 11 r/DebateReligion
Christianity has no reliable methods to determine which interpretation/denomination is correct and which is not.
- Introduction
One response that frequently appears whenever Christian denominational fragmentation (or even schisms) is/are discussed is that denominations agree on the "core" doctrines and differ only on secondary matters.
While this may be true in some cases, I think it potentially misses a deeper epistemological issue.
The concern is not simply that Christians disagree. Disagreement exists in many areas of human inquiry. Rather, the concern is that Christianity appears to lack a universally accepted mechanism for determining which interpretations are correct when disagreements arise, which are often the reasons why different denominations exist.
To me, the existence of enduring schisms, competing authorities, and mutually exclusive doctrines raises an important question:
If Christianity contains a true and intended doctrine, how is that doctrine meant to be reliably identified?
- Mutually exclusive doctrines
Christianity has produced numerous denominations, churches, traditions, and schisms throughout its history.
These groups often appeal to the same scriptures, the same God, the same Holy Spirit, and in many cases the same broad theological heritage. Yet they nevertheless arrive at incompatible conclusions regarding doctrine, authority, and practice.
To give a list of non-exhaustive examples of disagreements:
- Whether baptism itself conveys saving grace.
- Whether salvation can be lost.
- Whether infant baptism is valid.
- Whether the Eucharist is literally, really, or merely symbolically the body of Christ.
- Whether any church possesses divinely instituted authority over other churches.
These do not appear to be merely trivial matters of difference and the implications are serious.
Either baptism regenerates believers or it does not.
Either salvation can be lost or it cannot.
Either a particular ecclesiastical authority has been divinely established, or it has not.
Whilst this does not disprove Christianity outright, it does seem to provide good reason for skepticism regarding the basis upon which Christian truth claims are made in that regard.
If competing denominations can appeal to the same sources of authority while reaching incompatible conclusions, and no universally accepted mechanism exists for adjudicating those disagreements, then confidence that any particular denomination has correctly identified doctrinal truth appears difficult to justify.
To me, this makes the proliferation of denominations look less like the discovery of divine truth and more like the consequence of human interpretation operating without a reliable means for arriving at "true" and "not true".
How are these disputes supposed to be resolved?
- The "how to resolve it" problem.
When Christians disagree on mutually exclusive claims, a variety of methods are often invoked to justify one position over another.
These include:
- Scripture.
- Tradition.
- Church authority.
- Personal revelation.
- Guidance of the Holy Spirit.
However, these same mechanisms appear to generate those disagreements in the first place.
Catholics appeal to scripture and tradition.
Protestants appeal to scripture.
Orthodox Christians appeal to scripture and apostolic tradition.
Individual believers frequently appeal to personal revelation/experience or guidance from the Holy Spirit.
Yet all these methods can and do reach different conclusions.
At that point, the disagreement no longer appears to concern doctrine alone.
It becomes a disagreement about the very mechanism by which doctrinal disputes are supposed to be resolved.
This creates what seems to be a circular problem.
One denomination is justified because its interpretive framework is correct.
Its interpretive framework is correct because that denomination says so.
To an outsider, it becomes difficult to identify any non-circular means of determining which framework should be preferred.
- Denominational choice mirrors personal preference
A further concern is that denominational affiliation itself often appears difficult to distinguish from preference formation.
Family tradition, culture, geography, social environment, worship style, theological intuitions, and moral preferences all seem to play substantial roles in determining where individuals ultimately land.
This does not mean people consciously choose denominations based solely on preference.
Rather, it raises a different question:
How does one distinguish discovering the correct denomination from discovering the denomination that best aligns with one's pre-existing commitments and intuitions?
If two individuals are exposed to the same broad Christian tradition and arrive at different denominational conclusions (which is often what happens and why different denominations even exist), then there does not appear to be an obvious method for determining whether either person has tracked truth or simply arrived at the position most compatible with their existing beliefs and preferences.
To me, this further complicates the claim that Christianity possesses a reliable mechanism for identifying doctrinal truth.
- Conclusion
My conclusion is not that denominational disagreement disproves Christianity outright.
Rather, I think the existence of enduring schisms, mutually exclusive doctrines, competing authorities, and denomination selection that often appears indistinguishable from preference formation raises a serious epistemological concern.
The concern is that Christianity appears to lack a universally accepted and demonstrably reliable method for distinguishing correct doctrine from incorrect doctrine.
The resulting picture looks less like a system possessing a clear mechanism for discerning "true" and "not true" and more like a collection of competing human interpretations without any agreed-upon means of determining which interpretation is actually correct.
This leaves me with the following question:
If Christianity contains a true and intended doctrine, what reliable, non-circular method exists for identifying it?
And then;
If that mechanism does not exist, then should this not bring into question the very validity of those truth claims?
Predicted responses below
- Christians agree on the essentials and only disagree on secondary issues.
I do not think this fully addresses the concern.
Many denominational disagreements concern propositions that appear mutually exclusive rather than merely inconsequential/irrelevant disagreements.
Either baptism regenerates believers or it does not.
Either salvation can be lost or it cannot.
Either a particular ecclesiastical authority possesses divine legitimacy or it does not.
Furthermore, Christians themselves frequently disagree about which doctrines should be considered "essential" and which should be considered "secondary."
As a result, the disagreement is often pushed back one level rather than resolved.
- Disagreement exists in science too. Does that mean science is false?
The argument is not that disagreement itself demonstrates falsity.
Scientific disagreements occur within a broadly shared epistemic framework. Scientists generally agree on what counts as evidence, what methods are legitimate, what observations would count against a theory, and what would justify changing one's mind.
Christian disagreements often appear different.
The disagreement extends beyond conclusions and into the mechanisms of adjudication themselves.
Christians frequently disagree about authority, interpretation, tradition, revelation, and what constitutes a legitimate basis for belief.
The issue therefore is not disagreement alone.
The issue is disagreement combined with the apparent absence of a universally accepted method for resolving those disagreements which then ends in something similar to "agree to disagree" and off they go to make their own denomination/schism.
- Human sinfulness causes division
This may explain why disagreements occur.
However, it does not appear to solve the epistemological problem.
If sincere believers using prayer, scripture, church history, and guidance from the Holy Spirit continue to arrive at incompatible conclusions, an outsider is still left without a reliable means of determining which interpretation is actually correct.
The question remains:
How does one objectively determine which denomination has the correct interpretation without appealing to the very authority claims that are themselves disputed?
- God allows disagreement because salvation does not depend on perfect theology.
This may reduce the practical importance of denominational disagreement, but it seems to leave the underlying issue untouched.
If numerous doctrines can be wrong without affecting salvation, then it becomes unclear why believers should have confidence that their particular denomination has correctly identified those doctrines in the first place.
The question is not whether every doctrine is salvifically essential.
The question is how one distinguishes true doctrine from false doctrine when competing denominations claim truth yet arrive at contradictory conclusions.
u/ExplorerR — 2 months ago
▲ 14 r/DebateReligion
Arguments for God’s “actual existence” equivocate on what “exist” means.
This might be somewhat Wittgensteinian but I assure you it's my own thoughts.
A concern that "God exists" arguments can begin to resemble claims about conceptual or abstract existence more than claims about actual existence in the ordinary sense, is a very real concern.
Normally, we distinguish between:
- Things that exist as concepts, abstractions, or objects of thought
and
- Things that exist independently of thought as actual things a part of this reality.
What allows us to make this distinction is usually some combination of causal interaction, empirical/temporal accessibility, explanatory indispensability, or the ability for a thing to constrain experience independently of our conception of it.
However, many apologetic arguments (especially Abrahamic ones) conclude with a God whose existence is said to be:
- Outside space and time,
- Non-material,
- Non-contingent,
- Inaccessible to ordinary empirical investigation.
At that point, the distinction between:
- God exists as an actual being
and
- God exists as a concept or abstract being
Becomes philosophically unclear, because the ordinary criteria by which we separate actual existence from conceptual/abstract existence no longer seem applicable.
This does not prove that God is merely conceptual or that the assertion is that God must be empirically/scientifically accessible. Rather, it raises the question of what modes/methods remain for distinguishing existential claims of actuality from claims about abstract or conceptual entities.
To me things look very similar to a Motte-and-Bailey styled presentation of "exist" at the end of arguments for God. Where the most of common understanding of "exist" is assumed, but when pressed on clarification on this existence, it gets swapped out for a different type of "exist" that doesn't share those same properties and is arguably indistinguishable from abstraction and purely conceptual. Hence the equivocation.
In other words:
To avoid equivocation; If a purportedly actual being lacks the features that ordinarily differentiate actuality from abstraction, then additional justification seems necessary to explain in what sense the being is said to "actually exist" rather than merely conceptually.
u/ExplorerR — 4 months ago
▲ 1 r/Minecraft
Where I can play graphic intensive games like Hell Let Loose on high graphics and it runs fine. It used to be mangeable, but since this latest update. Whenever I look into the distance, my frames just crash. Surely, a game with graphics like this, shouldn't be tressing a modern gaming PC?
u/ExplorerR — 4 months ago
▲ 0 r/askphilosophy
I want to clarify that I’m referring to actual existence as opposed to something being purely hypothetical, fictional, or conceptual.
It seems that our concept of something "existing" is formed through our human experience of reality. In practice, we treat something as existing when it has features like being temporally located, contingent, or in principle observable or interactable. These features appear to be tied to the kind of world we inhabit and the way we have come to understand it.
However, many philosophical arguments for God’s existence conclude that God exists while also attributing properties such as being non-contingent, atemporal, immaterial or outside causal interaction which are features that differ significantly from those that seem to ground our ordinary concept of existence.
For comparison, when we say something like “a narwhal exists,” we rely on well-established ways of demonstrating existence (e.g., observation, physical evidence and it obviously being temporal etc.).
This raises an issue: if to “exist” is brought about and grounded in a human understanding of the reality we are in, namely something in a reality that is combination of contingent, temporal and material. Then how to avoid equivocation when using the term "exist" when arguing for God's existence?
u/ExplorerR — 4 months ago