1. The Procurement System is Officially "Broken", By Its Own Admission

Even Defence Secretary Rajesh Kumar Singh publicly conceded that the MoD's procurement system was "broken" and chronically delayed. Air Chief Marshal A.P. Singh acknowledged that when signing contracts, the IAF was aware the systems would never meet delivery schedules - he could not recall a single IAF project being completed on time. The Wire

Not a single major military acquisition over the past several decades has ever been concluded within its own self-imposed deadlines. Delay, not delivery, has been the only constant - under every government, including the current BJP administration which prides itself on efficiency. The Wire

2. The 12-Stage Procurement Maze, Death by Process

India's Ministry of Defence follows a 12-stage Defence Acquisition Procedure (DAP) designed to ensure transparency, but in reality it has become a roadblock to efficiency. South Asia Times

The procurement process can, and often does, take two to three times as long as the 74–118 weeks mandated in successive Defence Procurement manuals. Former Army Chief Gen. V.K. Singh aptly compared all domestic procurement to a game of Snakes and Ladders, files dealing with military purchases slip back to the start just as the end appears imminent. The Wire

3. Fear of Corruption Allegations Has Paralysed Decision-Making

This is the most insidious problem and rarely discussed openly.

India's defence procurement system is paralysed by fear, fear of allegations, fear of inquiry by investigative agencies, parliamentary committees, or the media, and for many officials, a lingering fear of retrospective judgment, where decisions taken in office can be revisited years after retirement when the individuals are professionally unprotected. The lesson internalised by civil servants and senior military officers alike has been brutally simple: taking decisions is risky; avoiding them is safe. The Wire

As one three-star Indian Army veteran put it: "Across the entire spectrum of India's materiel procurement establishment, corruption is feared more than conflict, and suspicion outweighs urgency." The Wire

4. Major Corruption Scandals, The Hall of Shame

The AgustaWestland VVIP helicopter scam (₹3,600 crore), the Rafale deal controversy (₹59,000 crore), and the Adarsh Housing Scam, where war veterans were denied homes in favour of bureaucrats, expose the deep-seated rot in India's defence establishment. South Asia Times

Bofors (1986): The Bofors case remains active even today. In 2025, the CBI issued a judicial request to the US seeking information nearly four decades after the alleged kickbacks were made to Swiss bank accounts, and 14 years after the case was formally closed. Several "unopened boxes" of Swiss documents reportedly remain in the CBI's possession. The Wire

Barak Missile Scam: The Barak missile scandal involved allegations of corruption and bribery in connection with the purchase of Barak missile systems by the Indian Navy from Israeli defence contractors for a total cost of $268.63 million. The BJP accused the CBI of fabricating false evidence, and after more than seven years of investigation, the case was closed without any conviction. Cornellia

The Pattern: Across several cases, arrests have been made including that of a former IAF chief of staff, but convictions have seldom followed, with most proceedings ending in acquittals or being quietly dropped due to insufficient evidence. The outcome is a system where accountability is routinely invoked but resolution is seldom, if ever, delivered. The Wire

5. IAS Bureaucrats Running Military Procurement , Fundamentally Broken

Several retired defence secretaries reported that it was not until their second or third postings in the ministry that they had acquired a sense of competence in the field. The thought of lateral entry into the civil service, or a defence cadre within the IAS, remains unthinkable. Brookings

DRDO has not enjoyed the autonomy it requires to excel because of the domination of civilian bureaucracy in the entire decision-making process in the Ministry of Defence. Whereas the political leadership of successive governments since independence has been changing, the bureaucracy is the only element with continuity dating back to pre-independence days. EURASIAN TIMES

6. DRDO - India's Biggest Defence Disappointment

DRDO has been unable to successfully complete a single major project except for a few missile systems and the nuclear-powered submarine. India's mission to increase self-dependency for defence equipment to 70% remains a dream. Sundayguardianlive

DRDO's growth was hampered by bureaucratic apathy and politico-bureaucratic aims which often resulted in the organisation's innovative projects being dumped so that the required weapon or system could be imported with large kickbacks. South Asia Monitor

Right from the outset, DRDO has been buffeted by a lack of vision and motivation, interference from bureaucracy and the military establishment, wrong and distorted policies, and the devious and all-pervasive influence of a powerful import lobby. IPCS

DRDO's R&D budget is not even 6% of India's defence budget, whereas the US spends approximately 12% and China approximately 20% of their respective, and much larger, defence budgets on R&D. EURASIAN TIMES

7. The "Stopgap Purchase" Addiction

For decades, the MoD and its military relied on "interim" purchases to bridge operational gaps due to bureaucratic paralysis, unrealistic equipment specifications, developmental delays, and corruption scandals blocking long-term solutions. These stopgap purchases have created a patchwork arsenal sourced from multiple overseas vendors that further complicates training, logistics, and equipment maintenance. The Wire

Real example: In 2019, the Army rushed through the purchase of 72,400 SIG Sauer 716i rifles from the US under a fast-track programme to replace the maligned INSAS rifles. It was billed as a mere interim induction, but like other stopgap purchases bought to bridge a gap, it ended up becoming the main road itself. The Wire

8. Fighter Jet Crisis - 25 Years of Inaction

The IAF is operating at just 31 fighter squadrons against a sanctioned strength of 42. The AMCA project is still in the design phase with the first prototype expected no sooner than 2028. Meanwhile China has unveiled its 6th-generation fighter. South Asia Times

Fighter aircraft procurements initiated nearly a quarter-century ago continue to drag on. The 114 Multi-Role Fighter Aircraft tender, along with additional MRTTs, AEW&C platforms, light utility and heavy-lift helicopters, all acknowledged requirements for ages, remain unresolved. The Wire

9. Import Dependency - The Self-Reliance Lie

India's overreliance on foreign defence imports directly contradicts its self-reliance goal. Around 70% of India's defence equipment is imported, with Russia accounting for 45%, followed by France and the US. The delay in domestic programmes forces India to consider additional orders for Rafale jets or even the F-35, undermining the "Atmanirbhar Bharat" initiative. South Asia Times

10. The Budget vs. China Gap

With China's defence budget at $230 billion, nearly four times India's $73 billion - India cannot afford inefficiency in military modernisation. If the country does not reform its procurement process, streamline HAL's manufacturing capabilities, and enforce accountability, its military edge will continue to erode. South Asia Times

The Core Disease

The system has one fatal design flaw: bureaucrats who rotate every 2-3 years control procurement of weapons they don't understand, face no consequences for delays, but face career-ending consequences if a deal is later investigated. The rational choice for every official is to do nothing. And that is exactly what happens, for decades.

Until India separates military procurement from generalist IAS control, funds DRDO properly, and builds accountability into the system, this cycle will continue regardless of which party is in power.

Sources: The Wire, Brookings Institution, South Asia Times, Vivekananda International Foundation, CAG reports, and statements by serving/retired military and civil officials.