Under the simulation hypothesis, what properties would justify differential epistemic access to base reality?
This is a question about the simulation hypothesis and epistemology.
Assume for the sake of argument that our reality is a simulation and that some mechanism exists which grants certain inhabitants greater access to, or knowledge of, the nature of the simulation or of base reality.
From a standpoint of system design or philosophical justification, what properties of an agent would be relevant criteria for granting such differential epistemic access?
For example, would a system architect logically privilege:
- Agents with greater computational or material resources?
- Agents occupying positions of social or political control?
- Agents demonstrating superior reasoning or problem-solving ability?
- Agents whose internal states exhibit high coherence between belief, utterance, and action?
- Agents lacking deceptive or ego-centric biases in perception?
Conversely, if a simulation were observed to reward agents who exhibit deception, exploitation, and short-term self-interest, what could be inferred about the purpose or ethics of the system or its designer?
Are there existing philosophical frameworks, for instance in ethics, game theory, or computer science, that address the problem of designing fair or meaningful access conditions within a hierarchical system?
I'm looking for literature or arguments related to this, not personal opinions.