Here's a reminder to those standing on the sidelines or in active support or collaboration with PP while Abiy waging his war on Amhara people.

Each drone munition costs between $60k to $100k, and rest assured that's coming straight out of your pockets, not Abiy Ahmed's or PP's.

This does not account for the cost the support personnel rented from foreign countries. Nor does it account for the millions of dollars wasted each day waging this criminal war.

On some estimates, that's $3.3 million dollars - $9.8 million dollars per day. This amounts to more than what's budgeted for their military, which also comes out of your pockets.

For Abiy and PP, the cheapest of all the resources is, the soldiers they send to die on their behalf.

Don't wait until the souls are taken out of your homes to die in the mountains and valley's of Amharas, for Abiy Ahmed. Be assured neither Abiy nor PP care, your loved ones are just cannon fodders. And they WILL die sooner or later if they come waging wear upon Amharas, and be forgotten.

Mind you, during those years, the military's focus was on fighting EPLF, right after fighting off major Somali aggression. The war was in Eritrea. It was only when TPLF waged its war that war eventually came to Tigray.

And you will find that, most of the argument Tigrayans use in support of TPLF is because of war atrocities committed by the military (such as bombing of civilians in Hawzien).

TPLF starts unnecessary war, and moreover, seeking the independence of Tigray (this is how they started out, yes later they changed this aspect in some ways but too late). The military responds, as would in any country, and increasingly became committed towards fighting off TPLF in levels it never wanted to. The focus was EPLF.

Any war atrocities that come from then on cannot be used as legitimate reason to support the very organization that brought about these inevitable war atrocities. It's a feedback loop from that point on.

Notice that, whatever reason you give in support of TPLF waging war, you must ask was it worth the consequences (which we are still feeling to this day)?

He's a Temu Saddam Hussein. Sick sick fuck, just like any of his supporters.

Decades of massacres of our civilians, murders of our leaders and aspiring leaders, en mass torture and imprisonment of our youth, and active genocide, it took us but a few years to rise using the only means the genociders seem to understand. Those who have not learned that it was our collective patience and not our inability to reply in kind, are finding out on the quick. Spilling the blood of our innocents carries with it a heavy debt.

Two words: organize and learn. Strength through knowledge and knowledge sharing, Shed all habits and routines that do not contribute to our duty to survive and triumph as people. Work with objective facts and measures, take positive actions each day, take care of your body and minds, abstain from harmful substances. Exercise. It all adds up.

በርቱ። ጠንክሩ።

The following is as per the most recent AAA report, summarized. Please share.

War updates — Amhara Region, Ethiopia (July 6–12, 2026)

Updated: July 12, 2026

Overview (regional)

• Fighting continued across multiple areas of Amhara Region between Amhara Fano forces and regime forces (ENDF-backed units, including RDF and militias; and in some areas, additional regional support as noted in the source).
• Battle/events recorded: incidents reported in 27+ woreda/city administrations across 11 zonal administrations (North Wollo, South Wollo, North Shewa, East Gojjam, West Gojjam, Awi, North Gojjam, South Gonder, Central Gonder, West Gonder, and North Gonder).
• Civilian casualties: reported in 4 woreda/city administrations (Habru, Tarmaber, Tach-Armachiho, Dabat).
• Arrests/abductions:
  • Arrests/abductions reported in Tach-Armachiho (Central Gonder Zone)
  • Additional abductions reported in Dera (North Shewa Zone)

Northeastern Amhara (Wollo Bete-Amhara Subregion)

Raya territory — recruitment and militia training (as of July 6)

• Regime forces intensified militia recruitment and training in the Raya areas, including (as reported) Alamata City, Korem City, Raya-Alamata, Raya-Bala, Ofla, and Zata Woredas, with training and political orientation before deployment toward Kobo City.
• Reports indicate trainees were initially told deployment would be aimed at TPLF-held territory, but most were assigned to operations against Fano forces instead.
• This training effort reportedly ran in parallel with additional militia/police deployments planned and underway to the Raya territory.

North Wollo Zone

Habru Woreda — intense fighting (July 8)

• Fighting between Fano and regime forces intensified on July 8.
• Reports say the confrontation began after regime forces confiscated ~50 camels from farmers in Mersa City and used them to move supplies (including rations, ammunition, and weapons) toward Abegar-Meda and Tsedot-Mikael.
• Fano units under the 24th and 35th Divisions (AFNM–MC) confronted the regime forces; regime forces failed to advance and retreated to Mersa.
• Extrajudicial killing: During withdrawal, regime forces reportedly killed Solomon Dessiye (described as having mental illness) after encountering him roadside.

Lasta Woreda — offensive and counteroffensive (July 11)

• Fighting began when units of the 90th ENDF Division advanced from Kulmesk and Lalibela toward Gentemariam.
• The advancing force reportedly used ZU-23 anti-aircraft guns and 107-mm rocket systems.
• Fano counteroffensive by units under the 21st Division (AFNM–MC, 303rd Corps) forced the regime forces to retreat after sustaining losses.
• Casualties/effects (as reported):
  • 55+ regime forces killed
  • 30+ wounded
  • Fano captured weapons/equipment, including firearms and other materials
• Defection: An ENDF officer defected from Lalibela and joined units under the 16th Division (AFNM–MC, 303rd Corps).

South Wollo Zone

Mekdela Woreda — shelling and livelihood losses (July 8)

• Indiscriminate artillery shelling by regime forces destroyed civilian property and caused livestock losses.
• Reports say units under the 11th ENDF Command shelled areas around Asol Kebele, hitting residential areas.
• Livestock killed in one case reportedly included: a cow, a bull, and a donkey, reducing household income and farming support.

Werebabu Woreda — fighting in Ejersa Kebele (July 9)

• Fighting occurred between Fano (35th Division, AFNM–MC, 101st Corps) and regime joint forces including RDF/militia.
• Casualties (as reported):
  • 5 regime forces killed
  • 7 wounded

Southeastern Amhara (Shewa Subregion)

North Shewa Zone — regime defections (July 7)

• Multiple regime personnel reportedly defected amid ENDF integration efforts for militia personnel.
• 21 militia personnel reportedly defected from Mida-Woremo, Moretina-Jiru, and Ensaro woredas to the AFNM–SPAC.
  • In Meragna town (Mida-Woremo): 17 defected to the Atse Dawit Division
  • Additional defections: 3 from Enewari (Moretina-Jiru) and 1 from Lemi (Ensaro) to the Ras Abebe Aregay Division

Tarmaber Woreda — extrajudicial killing (July 6)

• Regime forces reportedly extrajudicially killed Ato Wondafrash Niguse (Armenia Kebele).
• Reports say he was taken from his home at night under an allegation of Fano affiliation, detained overnight near a military camp, then killed the next day.
• The report describes severe torture prior to death and that his body was refused for family burial afterward.
• He was described as a farmer and a father of two children; relatives reportedly fled toward forested areas afterward due to fear.

Antsokiyana-Gemza Woreda — Fano operation in Mekoy (July 6)

• Fano reportedly carried out an operation targeting regime forces stationed in the Arbaratu area.
• Units involved: Aste-Guma-Terara Division (AFNM–SPAC, Mohammed Bihonegn Corps).
• Results (as reported):
  • 10 regime forces killed
  • 13+ wounded
  • Remaining personnel reportedly forced to disperse

Menz-Lalo-Midir Woreda — ambush in Tirtira (July 6)

• Fano conducted an ambush targeting regime forces attempting to advance from Wogere toward Tirtira.
• Units involved: Atse Menelik Division (AFNM–SPAC, Atse Amdetsion Corps) targeting the 104th Commando Regiment in Hayadega.
• Results (as reported):
  • 10+ regime forces killed (including a militia commander)
  • Numerous wounded evacuated to Molale Hospital by ambulance and civilian transport
• After-action: regime forces reportedly retaliated against civilians by breaking into a private residence and looting household property.

Ankober Woreda — intensified looting (July 6)

• Regime joint forces (ENDF + RDF + militia, per report) advanced from Debre-Birhan City toward Derefo Kebele and reportedly:
  • confiscated/looted about 10 quintals of fertilizer
  • looted multiple loads of beans from a resident’s home

Merhabete Woreda — major confrontation around Alem-Ketema (July 11)

• Fighting started early morning with a coordinated offensive by Nadew Division (AFNM–SPAC, Atse Zera-Yaqob Corps) against regime positions in the Kolash Mountains and around Alem-Ketema.
• Reports say Fano captured Belay-Bet-Kolash Mountain after intense fighting, overrunning/destroying fortified positions, while other engagements occurred near Zoma and Akaya-Meda.
• Additional reported event: a regime army vehicle near Zeita Kebele was destroyed, killing all occupants.
• Regime attempted reinforcement from Fetira, but the movement was disrupted by another Fano attack near Alem-Ketema.
• Reported outcomes (as stated):
  • 3 regime commando-unit commanders captured
  • significant military equipment/supplies captured
  • at least two Fano personnel confirmed killed

Menz-Mama-Midir Woreda — operations in Molale (July 11)

• Late-night Fano operation in Molale town by units under the Menelik Division (AFNM–SPAC, Atse Amde-Tsion Corps).
• Reported results:
  • Meto-Aleqa-ranked militia commander killed
  • additional militia personnel wounded
• Separate incident: the head of the woreda militia office reportedly killed along with other personnel; wounded admitted to Molale Hospital.

Southwestern Amhara (Gojjam Subregion)

Regime defections across Gojjam (July 8)

• Eight regime personnel defected from various localities including Felege-Berhan, Debre-Werk, Motta, Ginde-Weyn, and Digo-Tsiyon.
• Defectors reportedly included para-commando, police, and militia, joining the 201st Corps (AFNM–TC).

East Gojjam Zone

Gozamin Woreda — Yeboqla (July 9) and Chertekel (July 10)

Yeboqla (July 9)

• Fighting initiated by the 201st Corps and 206th Corps (AFNM–TC) targeting regime units in town.
• Regime reportedly brought reinforcements using 14 additional vehicles and heavy artillery support including BM rocket launchers.
• Casualties were reported on both sides, with significant regime losses (including commanding officers).

Chertekel (July 10)

• Regime forces advanced from Debre-Markos City.
• Fano units under the 14th Division (AFNM–TC, 206th Corps) ambushed the advancing force, leading to an evening firefight.
• Reports say multiple regime personnel were killed/injured, and Fano captured Kalashnikov rifles and ammunition.

Machakel Woreda — Girakidamin (July 9)

• Regime forces reportedly mobilized from neighboring bases to confront Fano units under the 99th Division (AFNM–TC, 109th Corps).
• After fighting, regime forces entered Girakidamin Kebele.

Shebel-Berenta Woreda — Yedwuha firefight (July 9)

• Regime forces initiated a confrontation in the neighborhood of Yedwuha town that lasted several hours.
• 2 Fano personnel killed (regime casualties unconfirmed).

Bibugn Woreda — Girgerad (July 10)

• Regime forces reportedly moved at night from Digo-Tsiyon toward Weyin-Wuha.
• Fano units under the 54th Division (AFNM–TC, 201st Corps) ambushed the moving unit, leading to a prolonged engagement.
• As reported: at least 5 regime soldiers killed and several injured.

War updates — Amhara Region, Ethiopia (July 6–12, 2026)

(This section covers West Gojjam through North Gonder, plus a few “outside Amhara” entries.)
Updated: July 12, 2026

West Gojjam Zone

Dembecha-Zuriya Woreda (July 8)

• Fighting erupted in the neighborhood of Dembecha town.
• Reports say Fano units under the 99th Division (AFNM–TC, 109th Corps) ambushed regime joint forces moving from Dembecha toward Wad-Eyesus Kebele in the Yebuna locality.
• An intense confrontation reportedly caused significant casualties among regime forces.
• Regime forces were reportedly forced to withdraw toward Dembecha, using two patrol vehicles to transport the dead.

Sekela Woreda (July 9)

• Regime forces reportedly evacuated Agut Kebele.
• The withdrawal was described as occurring unexpectedly at night (July 8) and continuing into the early morning of July 9.
• After withdrawal, regime units reportedly entered Jiga and Finote-Selam.

Awi Zone

Guagusa-Shikudad Woreda (July 6)

• Fano offensive around Tilili town.
• Operation reportedly involved units from the 44th Division (AFNM–TC, 105th Corps) targeting a regime army column traveling from Bure to Tilili, carrying military hardware and supplies.
• Reports say the operation inflicted casualties among regime forces.

Dangila Woreda (July 9)

• Fighting occurred in Chara town.
• Reports say an early morning operation by the 55th Division (AFNM–TC, 105th Corps) targeted regime joint forces in Chara.
• Casualties (reported):
  • Fano: 6 fighters killed, others injured
  • Regime: casualties described as numerous
• Reports say Fano captured a substantial cache of military hardware.

North Gojjam Zone

Yilmana-Densa Woreda (July 6–7)

• July 6: Fighting in Keri-Cheru locality.
  • Reports say regime forces departed Koti and moved toward Agta Kebele.
  • Fano units from the 22nd Division (AFNM–TC, 102nd Corps) attacked in Keri-Cheru, leading to a close-quarters firefight from about 6:30 pm into the evening.
  • The attack reportedly disrupted the regime advance and inflicted casualties.
• July 7: Reinforcements arrived from Adet, and units reportedly retrieved dead and wounded from the battlefield.

Northwestern Amhara (Gonder Subregion)

South Gonder Zone

Libo-Kemkem Woreda (July 8)

• Intense fighting between Fano and regime forces.
• Reports say fighting began with Fano units under the Atse Eyasu, Tadilo Birhan, Abba-Maebel, and Tiqur-Anbessa Divisions (AFNM–BC).
• Targets: regime forces moving from Addis-Zemen toward Ibnat in Ambo-Meda Kebele, with clashes later spreading to Shamona.
• Regime reinforcements were dispatched from Addis-Zemen via Chibchiba, but columns were reportedly ambushed by Fano at Chibchiba Kebele, forcing regime withdrawal after heavy casualties.

Fogera Woreda (July 8)

• Fano operation targeting advancing regime columns from Wereta and Hamusit (Dera Woreda) toward Gumara.
• Units involved: Tana-Gelawdewos Division (AFNM–BC).
• Reported results:
  • 12 regime forces killed, including an RDF battalion commander
  • 4 wounded

Central Gonder Zone

West Belessa Woreda (July 7)

• Fighting between Fano and regime forces.
• Reports say regime forces moved at night from Guhala toward Tahla Kebele.
• Fano units under the Nisir-Belessa Division (AFNM–BC) counterattacked.
• Engagement reportedly escalated into close-quarters combat and use of heavy weapons, with regime forces sustaining heavy casualties.

Tach-Armachiho Woreda (July 7–9)

• July 7: Merena Kebele
  • Fighting began after Fano units under the 52nd Division (AFNM–BC, 305th Corps) ambushed a regime column advancing from Sanja and Kurbi Kebele before reaching Merena.
  • Clashes around Berzegto Got; close-quarters combat.
  • Reports say 10+ regime forces killed and 8 critically wounded, including a senior regime officer.
  • After fighting, reports say regime troops detained two civilian farmers and shot another farmer working in his field, leaving him injured.
• July 9: Chubi Kebele
  • Regime joint forces reportedly advanced from multiple directions around Chubi Kebele on the night of July 8.
  • Close fighting reportedly involved units under the 305th Corps (AFNM–GPC) and lasted for several hours.
  • Fano counteroffensive reportedly compelled regime forces to withdraw.

Wegera Woreda (July 7)

• Reports say regime joint forces launched a night-time offensive (night of July 6), followed by fighting on July 7 with Fano units under the Gondere-Begashaw Division (AFNM–BC).
• Regime advance reportedly occurred along three axes toward Weybeyign Kebele.
• Reports say regime forces sustained heavy casualties.

West Dembiya Woreda (July 9–10)

• Fighting between Fano and regime forces during July 9–10.
• Reports say regime forces advanced from Chuahit on three separate axes late night of July 9, leading to intense clashes near Chuahit with units under the Begemidir Division (AFNM–GPC).
• Clashes reportedly continued into the morning of July 10.

West Gonder Zone

West Armachiho Woreda (July 8–9)

• Reports say regime convoys moved from Abrahajira toward Gabisa Kebele on the night of July 8, with fighting continuing into the morning of July 9.
• Fano reportedly ambushed regime forces before they reached Gabisa, inflicting heavy casualties.
• Fighting then spread to Gabra Kebele.

Metemma Woreda (July 9)

• Fano operation targeting an RDF convoy:
  • A heavy military truck and an “Obama bus” traveling from Genda-Wiha to Shimelegara.
• Reports say the attack caused both vehicles to collide and plunge into an abyss.
• Reported outcomes:
  • 47+ regime forces killed
  • 33 critically injured
  • both vehicles rendered inoperable

North Gonder Zone

Dabat Woreda (July 6)

• Heavy fighting between Fano units and regime forces.
• Reports say regime troops mounted a large-scale night-time deployment in Asra-Sost Kebele.
• Fano units under the AFNM–BC coordinated counteroffensives, causing casualties on both sides.
• Also stated: two days earlier (relative to July 6), after military setbacks in Arebur Kebele, regime forces reportedly carried out a reprisal massacre killing 25+ civilians.

Debark Woreda (July 5–8)

• Intense fighting between Fano and regime forces.
• Units involved: Ayalew Birru and Semien Balambaras Divisions (AFNM–BC).
• Clashes began in Boza and Sargona, spread to Qola-Wegera (including Ajire-Janora and the Dabat desert in Central Gonder) and to lowlands of Adarkay and Debark woredas.
• As of July 8, reported outcome was unconfirmed.

Areas Outside Amhara Region

East Wollega Zone (Oromia Region)

Gida-Ayana Woreda (July 6)

• Fano operation in Anger-Mado locality.
• Reports say it targeted a key regime security/intelligence figure.
• Reported results: the figure and two guards were killed near Anger-Gutin town.

North Shewa Zone (Oromia Region)

Dera Woreda (as of July 6; ongoing by July 10)

• Humanitarian situation described as worsening:
  • Families displaced after homes were destroyed by OLA militants across areas from Koro-Gendeberbere to Dengnu-Gebrilala.
  • Displaced people reportedly seek refuge in open areas under trees and face shortages (including shelter and other essential relief items).
  • The woreda administration reportedly denied the presence of IDPs, hindering humanitarian relief.
• OLA abuses described as continuing (as of July 10):
  • house-to-house searches, looting, livestock theft, and forced conscription of youth
  • On July 10, reports say 25+ youths abducted in Mojo Kebele and Menaharia, and additional residents abducted/looted in Mamo Kebele
  • Violence reportedly displaced many residents and partially/completely disrupted transportation routes between Dera and Addis-Ababa, and Dera and Merhabete.

Degem Woreda (July 11)

• Fano operation targeting regime-allied forces in Haro and Abo-Lelisa areas, where militants reportedly conducted robbery and looting.
• Engagement ran from early morning into late morning.
• Reports say it resulted in significant militant losses, capture of the camp, and seizure of:
  • firearms, ammunition, military supplies, and stolen livestock.

Metekel Zone (Benishangul-Gumuz Region)

Metekel (July 9)

• Fano reported graduation of a new batch of personnel:
  • thousands of recruits completed training and joined units under the 66th Division (AFNM–TC, 105th Corps).
  • Graduation included a parade.

 

I read the following in another forum:

>"Karen Wetterhahn. Professor of chemistry, specializing in toxic metal exposure. Was exposed to mercury compound (dimethylmercury), because her protective glove was not enough to stop the metal from being absorbed through the glove into her body. 1–2 drops are already fatal. She died in 1997, less than a year after the exposure."

My question is what chemical properties and what all determine what material gloves are made of make them to handle different chemicals? And how come the danger was not recognized at the time? I'm a layman.

Let's assume this claim is factual. This would mean, there are now 230 more families and their relatives, friends and colleagues that have direct blood feud with the OPP monsters in power and their families. The more the regime kills, the more endangered their cadres and collaborators become. These banda's will be less and less able to perform the dirty work of the regime which is required to control the people.

Genocidal monsters must always choose, between losing and losing more.

Those in active or passive complicity with the genocidal monsters, take heed. Amhara people's side is the right side, and so do your part to stop the active genocide.

Borkena, Toronto — Sources making claims of links to the Amhara Fano National Movement (AFNM) report intense fighting between Fano forces and government forces in Ethiopia’s Amhara region, particularly in the Dega Damot area of Gojjam.

• Fighting duration: Hostilities are reported to have been ongoing from four directions for more than six days.
• Government-side claim: The xthiopian Defense Force reportedly stated that it killed 230 Fano forces within one week; Fano has not publicly responded to this figure.
• AFNM counter-claim: On Thursday, Menelik Command of AFNM responded with a claim that 420 government forces joined Fano in less than a week.

The report also raises the question of what is happening within AFNM militarily and politically. It says that Asres Mare, AFNM’s head of public relations, provides updates on the movement’s recent developments in a recent interview with Anchor Media (in Amharic).

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=kdBedY5wLgs

Tigray did not decide to secede because the damage it was dealt after starting the 2020 war. It's not because "the social contract was broken" between other Ethiopians and Tigrayans. That's was one of the craziest explanation that made its rounds via the words of Tigrayans: that the "social contract was broken" by Ethiopians.

Lies.

From the following, we can be concluded that there was an overall wish for independence in Tigray sooner rather than later. On point, we have the summary of election debate of the main contending parties in Tigray, just before the war.

1. The Tigray Independence Party (TIP) made it clear that Tigray cannot achieve its aspirations of state-led capitalism and being like Israel or China while under Ethiopia. They stated that Tigray is suffocated, choked, and burdened by Ethiopia, and that Ethiopia needs to be finished off. No surprise with this party. TIP also criticized TPLF for not giving the people of Tigray a referendum about independence back in 1991. This historical reference highlights a longstanding desire for independence. It is also a fact that, upon eliminating government control from Tigray during the Derg era, a portion of TPLF fighters refused to fight beyond the boarders of Tigray, because that's what they've been told was the objective.
2. Baytona revealed that their eventual goal after a confederacy is independence. They want separation of party and state and criticized the current agricultural policies as not good enough for industrialization. This shows a clear preference for eventual independence.
3. Sawt advocated for at least an "Iraqi Kurds' style of loose federation" and emphasized independence in urban areas while maintaining state ownership of rural land. Regardless of the dismissal of their position by TIP (not hard core enough I guess), their stance was towards independence.

The debates and positions taken by these parties clearly indicate a strong sentiment for independence in Tigray, and all this was before the war. It is clear that the notion of Ethiopia as a worthy concept has been washed out of the minds of Tegaru, especially those that came of age after TPLF took power. This is the reason why it was so easy to turn on Ethiopia and Ethiopians on a drop of a hat instead of holding accountable the genocidal enterprise called TPLF.

TPLF managed to get elected in the end, of course, but only because they had strategic, operational and logistical control better than any of these parties. Not because there was any allegiance towards Ethiopia.

The irony is just how quick Tegaru flipped on TPLF itself as soon as TPLF started re-introducing the facts of reality Tigray finds itself in.

That said, there's significant amount of Ethiopians now supporting Tigray's aspiration for independence. Pushing for it, even. We've wasted decades denying this reality and now we finally listen.

Below is the summary of the debate in English, as per an Tigray observer.

Sep 8, 2020

Thread: I watched almost 8 hours of 3 more debates on #TigrayElection2020 #Tigrayvotes. As promised, I will cram my observation of debates 2, 3,and 4.
Debate 2 : Economic policy and investment
Debate 3: Rural & Urban Development
Debate 4: Education & Health policy.

Assimba: wants social democracy with free markets, emphasized need for peace with neighboring countries [#Eritrea], regions, and the federal government. Cleaning bureaucracy, building better airport & rail were their priorites. They were attacked by TIP & TPLF.

Sawt: empahsized they too were social democrats. They attacked TPLF for not building Tigray-centric patriotic & nationalist Investors. They also were the ONLY party that want land to be privatized in urbanizing areas while the state keeps on owning rural land. Sawt lamented the existence of 3000 schools that are unwalled sheds & the loss of MIT to the federal government. They advocated the return of health & education policy back to the states. They also said that they are for at least an Iraq-kurds' style of "loose federation*."*

Baytona flexed on building investors that are sufficiently nationalistic Tigrayans. It probably had the longest list of economic institutions & programs it wanted to build. They called for cultural revolution on idea of wealth, i.e. "other Jews" version instead of Jesus'.

Baytons revealed that their eventual goal after confederacy is Independence. They want seperation of party and state and critisized TPLF' agricultural growth as still not good enough to transform the peasant into a sufficient farmer, much less industrialization.

Baytona's economic model is Developmental Assembly/Congress. It was derided by Independence party & TPLF as a dishonest framing of developmental state model. Baytona also claimed Social democracy does not work in Africa as evidenced by South Africa. Baytona does not believe in privatization of land. It wants to change curriculum to "smell like Tigrayan, not Shewan." It wants to resuscitate Tigray inheritances, resources, & knowledge including Ge'ez language to transform Tigray into being "sim card of the horn region."

TPLF, as an incumbent was receiving most of the fire. However, it used its list of economic accomplishments through the Developmental state model to rebut them. It was framer of federal free market policy that allowed for government intervention to fill gaps. TPLF also went on the offense against Social Democracy for having no base community or constituency in #Tigray and called new parties ኣብ ሰማይ ዘሎ ደበና to mean "untested" while it made robust defense of its anti-rent seeking stance.

TPLF also defended EFFORT conglomerate as fillers of investment gap through some of the beloved subsidaries like Sur construction who are renouned road builders in #Tigray. Liya Kassa & the only female debater gave & muscular defense of TPLF.

TPLF also confidently defended land policy given Africa's experiences that made farmers landless. They also bragged about how the speed of urbanization is highest in the horn region with urban economy potentially reaching > 50% within 10 years. TPLF was at its strongest with Education & Health. It bragged about its 4 universities and 45 technical schools. It also showcased its disease prevention policy and increase of health care workers from 600 to 16,000 and increase of life expectancy from 45 to 65.

TPLF's .@hgodefay defended even the credible attack about education focus having been on access instead of quality. He successfully used the line "You all are a product of our successful education policy."

With a big advantage of a world renouned health policy developed during famine years, built on by .@DrTedros who is now serving as global head of WHO, .@hgodefay again cleverly, effortlessly, & effectively defended the home-grown policy with the phrase "ወድ ገዛና እዩ።"

There was a question about the Single payer-like Health insurance system in Tigray for not paying prescription drug cost. However, the head of the health bureau u/hgodefay again addressed it with the fact that patients can get drugs for free if they can not afford it.

Tigray Independence Party (TIP/ውናት): was short on programs, but focused on a vision. They summarized everyones position as wanting to build state-led capitalism and aspiration to be like Israel, China, etc. They said Tigray can not do that while under #Ethiopia.

They said "Tigray is suffocated, choked, and burdened by #Ethiopia. #Ethiopia is an empire that can not build necessary Institutions. In fact #Ethiopia is probably the last empire that should not exist anymore & it needs to be finished off."

While everybody seemed to be somewhat lost in the details and listing of programs. TIP was so focused in dealing with new reality of Tigray without TPLF's supremacy at the federal level. They were the only ones that were not successfuly attacked.

In fact, TIP's attacks against TPLF for not having new policy that recognizes the status of 6% of #Ethiopia's population in the era of "Oro-Mara" was so sharp. The attacks of Mahari Yohannes whose father is a martyr of the 17 yrs armed struggle were impossible to defend.

TIP's Mahari lambasted TPLF for being paternalistic & not giving people of Tigray referendum about independence back in 1991. He also pointed out the federal arrangement has been tried and failed and it will not work.

Other than education & health policy (by statute), "All economic policy and structural policies are under federal jurisdiction by constitution." TIP kept on saying. There fore, none of Sawt, Baytona's, or TPLF visions can be implemented no matter how good they may be.

None of the parties seem immune to withstand TIP's attack.

Sawt had empasized "loose federation & no Article 51, upto independence" position, but they had no answer to TIPs retort that they have no chance of having majority to amend the federal constitution with 38 votes.

Baytona's position of "confederacy with eventual Independence" was simply dismissed as disingenuous and unnecessary complication. TPLF also seemed stagnant, too patient, or in the wait-and-see game while TIP is in the lead & proactive in shaping the future.

Even Assimba (ADP) seemed to recognize and resign to the winds of how TIP was shaping the debate to begin their question with, "you all seem to think Independece is the way to go, ...."

Based on the debates, my take is that the election is between TIP & TPLF. However, I know from experience that field organizing on the ground matters. I am not sure who has the best ground game in all the Zones & Weredas of #Tigray.

Current actions by the federal government are likely to strengthen TIP more. However, I doubt it will bother TPLF. In the words of former TPLF fighter Gebrekidan Desta, TPLF is pleased that it has produced ሓዊ ሓዊ ዝጨንዉ መንእሰያት in the 3 parties.

It is also possible that people go with the tried & true, literally battle and wars-tested & hardened party TPLF in such uncertain times. Whatever the outcome, impact, or validity of the election might be, this was great excercise for people of #Tigray. Happy election Day!

The Black Panther movement can really inspire people who feel oppressed because they proved that you can’t just protest. You have to organize, show up consistently, and put in the work. They focused hard on discipline and self control, and they helped their communities with real actions like feeding people and stepping in where folks needed support. And they weren’t only trying to “win” inside one group; they tried to build bridges with different communities too, reminding people that you can stand together across race when you’re fighting for dignity and justice.

The Black Panther movement had to endure extreme hardships, including relentless pressure from law enforcement using all the dirty tricks in the book, illegal levels of surveillance, harassment, and violence that put leaders and everyday members at serious risk. Many of their leaders were straight up assassinated by the government. They also dealt with poverty and limited resources in the communities they served, on top of the stress of trying to run programs while being targeted and misunderstood. Many members faced constant intimidation, arrest, and long-term consequences that didn’t just affect them personally, but hurt their families and supporters too, as intended. Even with all that, they persisted in their struggle. Truth was on their side.

We can 100% draw lessons and inspiration from their continuous struggles under overwhelming odds.

Tupac Shakur’s father, William “Billy” Garland, matters in these same oppression and resistance themes, in many important and relevant ways.

Edit, thank you for Mods for bringing back the post.

Shout out to our southern peoples standing all along for the truth and that plain green, yellow, red (civil flag of Ethiopia) despite deluge of hate and lie filled brainwashing attempt by Tigrayans and Oromians in power. 💚💛❤️

From the archives, here is a gem. The fierce generation in action in the 70s.