>Canadian financial institutions and funds have amassed roughly C$500 billion ($360 billion) of exposure to private credit, most of it outside the country, according to new research from the central bank.
>The bulk of the activity is in the US and is driven by pension funds and insurers, the Bank of Canada paper said. The data underscores how the nation’s biggest investors have become increasingly significant players in lending directly to companies abroad, but they haven’t displaced traditional sources of corporate financing at home.
>Large Canadian pension funds held C$215 billion of private credit at the end of last year, or roughly 9% of their invested assets, while the three largest life insurers held just over C$200 billion in the first quarter of this year, equivalent to about 22% of their invested assets, according to authors Wendy Chan, Cameron MacDonald and Geneviève Vallée. They used a broad definition of private credit that includes any loan or similar credit product from non-banks to businesses.
>Non-bank loans account for about 15% of the credit liabilities of Canadian private non-financial companies, the paper said. That percentage that has been roughly stable for a decade and is slightly lower than at the time of the 2008 financial crisis, according to the BOC’s research. Banks and debt markets provide more than three-quarters of the financing for those firms.
>That’s in contrast to the US, where private credit firms have increasingly competed with banks and broadly syndicated loan markets to finance leveraged buyouts and other corporate transactions.
>Canadian investment funds held about C$54 billion of private credit in 2025, an increase of more than 60% since 2020, according to the BOC — though the authors say their estimate is probably too low. More than two-fifths of those holdings were tied to real estate.
>Despite that growth, private credit represents only about 1.5% of Canadian investment funds’ total net assets.
>Banks provide another connection between Canada and global private credit markets. Canadian lenders had at least C$40 billion of loans outstanding to asset managers running private credit funds in the first quarter, with most of that lending going to US-based funds.
>The central bank sees those exposures as relatively well-protected. Banks frequently provide subscription facilities secured by investors’ commitments to private credit funds, and fund investors typically absorb losses before the banks do.
>Still, the scale of Canada’s offshore exposure is drawing increased scrutiny as regulators assess how problems in the fast-growing private credit industry might spread through the financial system. The Bank of Canada warned in its Financial Stability Report earlier this year that private credit’s complex structures, limited transparency and lack of history in severe economic downturns make it difficult to determine where vulnerabilities are building up.
>Stress in private lending in other countries may reach Canada through several channels — including loan losses at pension funds and insurers and, more generally, tighter financial conditions.
>But the BOC sees the direct risks to Canada as manageable. Pension funds and insurers generally have long investment horizons and don’t depend heavily on short-term financing, reducing the likelihood they would be forced to sell assets during periods of market stress. Their direct lending usually gives them greater information about borrowers and more control than investors in private credit funds have.
>For insurers, the 22%-of-assets figure overstates their exposure to the riskier corner of private credit associated with leveraged buyouts. Life insurers have invested in privately placed corporate debt for decades because long-dated loans can be matched against long-term insurance liabilities, while often providing higher yields and stronger covenants than comparable public bonds.
>In the US, private placements had already grown to about 20% of life insurers’ bond portfolios by 2022, according to industry data that cites Federal Reserve estimates.
Reported by Investigative Journalism Foundation. More from the author, Zak Vescera: link
Entire story is behind paywall.
As well, recall from earlier in the year, the move by Doug Ford Conservative Government's taxpayer-backed Building Ontario Fund (BOF):
Almost the entire story behind paywall. More from the author, Zak Vescera: link
>The Financial Transactions and Reports Analysis Centre of Canada, or Fintrac, said in a March 2026 report that it believes many of those businesses are openly flouting rules meant to stop the global flow of dirty money.
Erick Villagomez is the Editor-in-Chief at Spacing Vancouver and teaches at UBC’s School of Community and Regional Planning.
>
For years, policymakers celebrated rising construction as evidence that the housing system was responding to scarcity. The unsold inventory suggests the system was responding to something else—not unmet housing need, but investor demand, speculation, cheap credit, and expectations of future appreciation. When those conditions weakened, thousands of units became difficult to sell, even as housing needs remained acute.
>The most recent details make the proposal more interesting. Acquiring completed homes at a substantial discount could be far cheaper than building equivalent units—and, if governments can do so, there may be a compelling public-interest case. But that judgment depends on answers governments have not yet provided: who they are trying to house, at what income levels, and how affordability will be protected over time.
>These are not technical details to be worked out later. They are the policy itself.
>Programs are easy to announce. Without the principles that establish who is being served, on what terms, and toward what end, it is impossible to know whether this initiative is intended to expand affordable homeownership, stabilize housing production, or respond to the latest market disruption.
>What we have today are programs without a clearly articulated policy.
>The deeper question is no longer simply whether governments should purchase unsold condominiums. It is whether maintaining a continuous pipeline of housing production has quietly become a housing policy objective in its own right.
>The empty condominiums are not the story. The system that created them is.
While the Fed + BC Governments are yet to formally announce details of the program and Liberal MPs shut down a push by Conservative MPs last month to hold summer committee hearings into a proposal to convert vacant condo units in British Columbia into affordable housing, Conservative MP Dan Albas from BC has started a House of Commons petition,
>“We need a lot more non-market housing. But, there’s nothing in this announcement that says this is going to be handed over to non-market providers,” Whitzman said.
>While Whitzman noted there are still few details, the average discount being discussed is $160,000, she said, which means many condos would still cost around $660,000, requiring a large down payment and monthly costs.
>“There’s no way that this will help middle-income people, particularly people who are looking for a family home. And there’s absolutely no way that it will assist lower-income families,” Whitzman said.
>The Canadian economy added a surprise 75,100 jobs last month while the unemployment rate hit its lowest level in two years — the latest evidence the economy is on a recovery path.
>The jobless rate edged down to 6.4% in July from 6.5% the previous month, Statistics Canada reported on Friday.
Also check out the paper published by Johnson Shoyama Graduate School of Public Policy, a public institution in Saskatchewan, which touches upon the state-sponsored ponzi scheme in Canada.
> Ponzi Schemes and Intergenerational Equity - The Challenge of Canada’s Senior Promise: Established in the 1960s to provide old age security through the Canada Pension Plan and other income support programs, Canada's "Senior Promise" is considered a pillar of Canada's social safety net. But its pay-as-you go system of finance, not unlike a Ponzi Scheme, presents Canada with deeply rooted fiscal and demographic challenges.
Authored by Andrew Galbraith and Dexter McMillan, and survey done in partnership with Surviscor, a firm specializing in financial services-based digital experience rankings
Q: Do you think The Globe and Mail's rankings pass the smell test—especially regarding where retail investors are actually moving their money?
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Meanwhile, an established consumer survey company like JD Power,
>Canadian FinTechs Continue to Lead DIY Investor Satisfaction, Closing the Trust Gap with Traditional Banks, JD Power Finds Edward Jones Ranks Highest among Advised Investors, Wealthsimple Ranks Highest among Do-It-Yourself Investors
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Assets Under Administration:
Wealthsimple: *At June 30, 2026, Wealthsimple had 3.6 million clients, excluding tax filers, across the Canadian market with assets under administration of $*155.6 billion, compared with $111.3 billion at December 31, 2025.
TD Canada: $797 billion as of Q2 close (Apr 30 2026), compared with $759 billion as of last year Q4 close (Oct 31 2025)
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Previous rankings by Globe and Mail:
In 2025, Rob Carrick gave the top spot to TD Direct Investing
In 2023 and 2024, Rob Carrick gave the top spot to TD Direct Investing (and Easy Trade)
In 2020, 2021 and 2022, Rob Carrick gave the top spot to Qtrade followed by TD Direct Investing at #2
In 2019, Rob Carrick gave the top spot to TD Direct Investing and Virtual Brokers (now CI Direct Trading).
For the period 2006-2018, title was either held by Qtrade or Virtual Brokers, as per Globe's rankings.
>Ottawa’s answer to this failure is worse than inaction. The Parliamentary Budget Officer projects Build Canada Homes will add just 26,000 units to national supply over five years against billions in earmarked spending—a rounding error beside the government’s target. Meanwhile, the prime minister is defending a $1.45-billion plan to buy roughly 2,200 unsold Vancouver condos from developers who refuse to sell at market prices. That scheme socializes developer losses, blocks the price correction that would let willing buyers purchase those units, and converts would-be owners into subsidized tenants. Housing Minister Gregor Robertson’s office declined to comment on the slowing starts.
Also on Bloomberg.
Bank of Canada Notes: https://www.bankofcanada.ca/2026/07/summary-of-governing-council-deliberations-fixed-announcement-date-of-july-15-2026/
LinkedIn post by Malcolm Kennedy
Task: Compare these two (of 158) neighborhood profiles located right next to each other, in midtown/uptown Toronto:
North Toronto (Neighborhood # 173) and 'Bridle Path-Sunnybrook-York Mill' (Neighbourhood #41). You can see the two neighborhoods ranked 158 (the worst) and 2 (the best) in the interactive map published by the author (Rank is on 'meters of streets per household' basis, and better land access gets better rank).
Note: There is large uninhabited public green space in the latter so the stats are likely to be a bit inaccurate. Boundaries here.
Now look at the Census data (2021) here: Link ( Go to 'At a Glance' tab, select the neighborhoods 41 and 173, and review the 'Households' and 'Housing' sections)
In summary, Toronto City Council has chosen to concentrate disproportionate amounts of new density in select pockets—such as North Toronto (bound by Yonge st/Egl Av E/Mt Pleasant, Keewatin)—yet, it goes to any extreme to please residents of certain other pockets by blocking any kind of density e.g. decades ago, it went so far as to scrap a planned Yonge subway station, between Eglinton and Lawrence stations, near Snider Parkette, after opposition from the local residents' association (LPRO).
Also check out this post on MPAC's four-year-once property value assessment which Ontario Government chose to freeze as of 2016, further amplifying high-rise dwellings' disproportionately high property taxes, when compared to SFHs:
Behind all the rhetoric about equity, inclusion, and tackling the housing crisis, I can't help but wonder: is Canada's class system really this entrenched and visible?
Does any other city in a developed country (which Canada is one, apparently) exceed or come close in terms of the magnitude of scams the working class here in Toronto/Canada end up going through?
We do see some real innovations in our ponzi economy e.g. University of Toronto's note on Rental and Landlord Scams
>Stranded in a city where she knew almost no one, her savings gone, Horvath kept coming back to how convincing it had all been.
>She found the property on Rentals.ca after searching for the right place for months, she said.
>There was a 14-page lease with terms and conditions, signed by the supposed landlord (his details, including a number, email and home address, were attached). Everything appeared to be in order.
>“Up until that point everything had appeared reputable. It was listed on a well-known website with photos, an address,” she said. “I had no reason to doubt it.”
>Horvath, who said she originally provided two months’ rent up front, said the landlord later asked for an additional two months on top after she had signed the lease. It was only after he threatened to give the apartment unit to someone else, and then offered a free month, that she agreed she said.
>Giacomo Ladas, a spokesperson for Rentals.ca, said landlords are asked to verify their identity through an ID check and fraud screening before a listing goes live, and all listings undergo automated and manual review.
>However, he said he could not comment on the account or authorization status of the landlord Horvath paid due to privacy obligations.
>“We’re committed to continuing to reduce opportunities for fraud,” Ladas added.
....
>
Police investigating report
>Four months on, Horvath is still in Toronto, having been supported by her partner.
>She says that a police report has produced nothing thus far. Police confirmed to the Star a report had been “submitted and is being investigated.”
>The March night Horvath was supposed to be moving in, she went anyway with her partner to Redpath Avenue, near Yonge-Eglinton.
>They had no key and no buzzer code, so they sat on a bench outside for 20 minutes until someone came out, then slipped in behind them.
>They checked the mailboxes and walked through the corridors, looking at the numbers on the doors, until a property manager confirmed what she already knew.
>“You look back and realize what the red flags were,” she said, “and how very little can be done.”
Peter Tulip is Chief Economist at Centre for Independent Studies (Australia). Ex-RBA, ex-Fed. https://www.cis.org.au/person/peter-tulip/
Relaxing the zoning rules is a strict no-go in Toronto, almost the epicentre of Canadian state-sponsored housing ponzi scheme.
Olivia Chow's Toronto City Council and Doug Ford's PC Govt and Mark Carney's Liberal Govt will hold hands, sing Kumbaya and shed crocodile tears over affordability rather than doing one meaningful thing: Stop being such bootlickers of these Toronto Resident Associations and relax zoning rules to allow gentle density.
> Toronto resident associations submit open letter opposing sixplexes
>The condo market has crashed and developers, despite pleas and government incentives, have not been able to kick-start new construction, leaving the city headed for a housing supply crunch in just a few years.
>One of the biggest hurdles is the need to sell a majority of the units before a shovel even hits the ground — a model unique to Canada.
>For more than 30 years, lenders have required developers to sell a portion of condos before they’re built in order to obtain construction financing, with the threshold inching higher and higher to today’s standard of 80 per cent of a project’s condos being presold.
>As condos take around five years to build, presales typically attract investors who bet on the value of the unit rising before closing. But with prices falling, those buyers have fled the condo space and presales have hit record lows, making that 80 per cent target near impossible for developers to hit.
>Industry leaders say it doesn’t have to be this way. Most cities around the world — Paris, Tokyo and New York City, to name a few — are able to build condos without preselling them. Toronto just needs to take the first step.
>The transition away from presales will be a gradual process, said Benjamin Tal, managing director and deputy chief economist at CIBC Capital Markets.
>But he firmly believes that in 10 years from now, “the (condo) financing model will be very different than it is now.”
>How we got here
>After the 1990s real estate market crash, lenders began requiring presales for condo developers to protect themselves against financial risk. Buyer deposits acted as secured financing, ensuring there was some cash already in the project on top of a developer’s own capital.
>“The presale requirement is unique to Ontario, post ‘90s. It was just a way to protect banks, to protect their risk,” said Jasmine Young, vice-president at Zonda, a U.S.-based real estate data firm with Canadian operations.
>Young said when she started in real estate in the early 2000s, the presale requirement was around 50 per cent, which would take about 12 months to meet.
>Presales would occur in a phased approach. First, developers would hold a private event for friends and family, who would be offered the biggest discount. Then there would be big catered events for brokers where the bulk of sales would happen, followed by a grand opening for the public. Penthouse sales would typically be saved for the end, Young added.
>But as land costs, interest rates, construction costs and building height kept mounting, the money needed also grew, resulting in lenders seeking a greater portion of the project to be presold, Young said.
>In the mayhem of the pandemic feeding frenzy, hundreds of units would presell in just a few hours, she added, making the current 80 per cent threshold easy to reach. But now, in the condo crash, meeting that target is near impossible.
>Build first, sell later
>Experts say investors aren’t expected to come back any time soon, igniting conversations about alternative financing. The model they most point to is to sell condos after they’re built.
>With investors out of the picture, developers are courting end-users — buyers who want to live in the units. The problem is, they don’t buy preconstruction as on average it takes five years for a condo building to be built, and families can’t wait that long, said CIBC’s Tal.
>“The model will have to change,” he said. “I think you will see more and more developers building on spec — namely, you build and then you sell. The way it is basically in the rest of the world.”
>Pouyan Safapour, president of Toronto-based real estate developer Devron who’s been advocating for switching to the build-first model, said selling units after they’re built ensures the developer is more connected to what an end-user wants.
>Typically, these buyers want bigger apartments, not the shoebox condos favoured by investors due to their lower carrying costs.
>Safapour said catering to end-users’ needs means the quality of the product is more “high value” because the supply is dictated by people who want to live in the unit, not rent it out.
>How to ditch presales
>Transforming the condo financing model requires banks and other lenders to take on more market risk, and for developers to put more equity into the projects, Tal said.
>“Banks or lenders will have to take on a bit more risk, and how much would a lender be comfortable financing? The focus will be on the well-capitalized developers, it will be from relying on deep relationships … the banks will have to make sure that they trust the project,” he said.
>Kari Norman, senior economist at Desjardins, said developers could partner with institutional investors such as pension funds or real estate investment trusts (REITs), which would allow the developer to put more money upfront to satisfy lender requirements.
>“Lenders don’t want to take on all the risks. So if presale condos aren’t mitigating that risk, then developers need to look at other alternatives,” she said.
>The federal government could also offer loans through the Canadian Mortgage and Housing Corp. (CMHC) as it does for purpose-built rental projects, which has been a boon for condo developers pivoting to rental.
>If CMHC guaranteed a portion of construction financing, “it could help mitigate the risk to lenders when there’s a lower share of condo presales,” Norman said, adding that in that case “I could definitely see that being reasonable to have some kind of requirement in terms of more affordable housing within that project.”
>Already, developers are creating more products that people want to live in through bigger units in purpose-built rentals.
>“Quite frankly, if you look at what’s happening in the condo market, it is going through a major shock,” said Tal, “and you cannot have this kind of shock without a change.”
Urban Toronto: https://urbantoronto.ca/forum/threads/toronto-the-vic-towns-16-52m-5s-solotex-gabriel-bodor.27600/
On Toronto Star, Jan 2026: She says she bought a two-bedroom townhouse, they built a one bedroom plus den. Here’s why she’s ‘never going to buy pre-construction again’
On Reddit: Link
>
Justice Myers described the debtor as insolvent and, for practical purposes, out of business, but noted that it still owns 65 completed townhouses requiring realization. The Court found that a stay was needed to allow Findev to develop an orderly procedure for maximizing recoveries, highlighting the lender’s decision to keep the senior mortgagees current rather than seek broad priming charges. The Court did not approve the proposed sale process or transaction structure at the initial hearing, leaving those matters for subsequent hearings.
>The debtor was incorporated in Ontario on August 12, 2013, and is controlled by sole director and officer Paul Goldfischer, also known as Zvi Arie Goldfischer. It developed The Vic Towns, a 147-townhouse condominium project constructed between 1648 and 1682 Victoria Park Avenue, south of Lawrence Avenue. Of the project’s 147 units, 82 have been sold and 65 remain registered to the debtor. The completed development is otherwise operated through its condominium corporation.
From Toronto Star:
>
Tsui’s contract appears to state that both the square footage and the dimensions are “approximate” and may differ from what was shown in marketing materials.
>She provided the Star with a screenshot of the condo fees from marketing materials, listed as $0.24 per square foot. But they turned out to be $0.36.
>Tsui also said the monthly fees for hot water heater rental are unreasonably high, and over the term of the contract add up to more than the stated value of the heater, according to the rental agreement, a cost she says wasn’t disclosed when she agreed to purchase the home.
>Water was also supposed to be included, but has turned out to be extra, she added.
>Goldfischer said their designer recommended not putting in a door on the den.
>But since Tsui wants one they will install it.
>He added that the condo fee increase is due to “typical inflation,” as well as increases for water and hydro. He added fees will be adjusted in 2026 to about $0.28 per square foot, “resulting from the adjustment of water from the previous budget.”
>“HVAC fees are for the cost of the equipment and interest over 12 years. The monthly fee includes maintenance, repair and replacement if required,” Goldfischer added.
>As for the long delay in closing where buyers had to pay occupancy fees — monthly payments during the period before closing — he said the project consists of four blocks and the two facing Victoria Park were completed first. Buyers moved in while construction continued on the rear homes, and registration was only possible once the entire project was finished.
>“The occupancy fees were a combination of the interest on the ‘phantom mortgage,’ which replaces what they would have to pay on their own mortgage, plus common expense fees, which they need to pay before and after closing,” he said.
>“The interest rate on the phantom mortgage was set in accordance with Tarion rules.”
>He blamed the pandemic, as well as “the Fortress issue,” for delays in construction.
>Goldfischer said Fortress Real Developments had agreed to provide interim financing and arrange for construction financing, but did not end up doing so.
>The two developers behind Fortress were found guilty in May 2025 of defrauding investors in Barrie, Ont., and Winnipeg on pre-construction projects that were never built, CBC reported.
>Lawyers for the principals of Fortress said they had no comment.
>Fortress used something called “syndicated mortgages,” where a group of people go in together to take on more of a loan than they otherwise could, according to court documents.
>Court documents related to Fortress projects also state that they were used on the Victoria Park towns. But Goldfischer said there have not been any syndicated mortgages in the past four years.
>“The Fortress principals did not discuss their source of funding with me. After Fortress collapsed, I read articles in the press (including the Toronto Star) which described the methods used by Fortress,” he said.
> The Municipal Property Assessment Corporation (MPAC) used to evaluate properties in Ontario on a four-year cycle. MPAC is publicly funded and operates under regulations set by the provincial government.
>Cities adjust their tax rates based on these assessments. But MPAC hasn’t done one since 2016. As a consequence, for tax purposes, the city still considers the average Toronto home to be worth $692,000. Home prices have gone up nearly 50 per cent since then.
>Normally, when new evaluations come in, properties that have grown disproportionately in value relative others in the same city and class get hit with higher taxes.
>The reverse is also true. If you live in a condo that hasn’t grown in value as much as the average Toronto condo, you should be due for a property tax decrease.
>MPAC has denied these findings, writing in an online statement that the Star investigations used “flawed methodology” to “paint an inaccurate picture.” Property owners “can be confident” in MPAC evaluations because it is “obsessed with getting it right.”
>MPAC did not respond when the Star asked this month if it still disputes the findings in the investigation.
>Since being elected, Chow has said MPAC’s evaluation system should be reviewed. Her office is also wants MPAC to reassess property values.
>“We continue to call on MPAC and the provincial government to update municipal property tax assessments, to reflect the real value of homes,” said Chow’s press secretary Zeus Eden in an email to the Star.
Toronto property assessments are shielded from public scrutiny. This is how we discovered many of us were over-taxed - The Star, Jul-2023:
>In cities across the United States, property assessment and sale data is readily available to the public at large. Elected assessors share it on government websites. It has been used by researchers who have found U.S. assessors, and the methods they use, assign property values that overtax the working class and favour the rich in many cities.
>In Ontario, however, that same kind of data is fiercely protected.
>The agency in charge of valuating Ontario properties, the Municipal Property Assessment Corporation (MPAC), has a long history of successfully arguing that property owners should be denied their requests to see larger volumes of assessment data and details of its calculations on the grounds that releasing such information would harm its economic interests. The corporation, which is funded almost entirely by taxpayers, has been compared to “the Kremlin” by one Toronto city councillor.
A primer on how property tax works: Everything you (still) ever wanted to know about property taxes
PS: Re-assessment doesn't mean property-tax definitely goes up if property-value has gone up. As the linked story says,
> Property taxes works in reverse. Each year municipalities decide how much money they need to bring in, and then set their property tax rates accordingly, to ensure they collect the requisite sum.
> Property taxes are relative, not absolute. It’s only if your property value increases at a greater rate than the average that your property taxes go up. Correspondingly, if your property goes up in value, but goes up less than average, your property taxes will actually go down.
Q: Condo dwellers, do you think your property taxes are equitable with respect to the taxes paid by SFH (single-family home) owners in Toronto?
Q: Who are the Doug Ford government and their quiet accomplice, Olivia Chow's Toronto City Council, serving by intentionally delaying the quadrennial (once every four years) property assessment for longer than a decade now?
Q: With this backdrop, what message is the condo-developer-bailout gang of Mark Carney and Gregor Robertson sending to renting (and high-rise condo-owning) Canadians and newcomers with no generational wealth, when they continue to reward institutionalized NIMBYism e.g. Olivia Chow led Toronto City Council's propping up of the exclusivity of sprawling SFHs—and steering youngsters exclusively toward high-rise ghettos? They offer only a slap-on-the-wrist $30Mn $10Mn penalty on City Council and crocodile tears about affordability.
Truly, “All animals are equal, but some animals are more equal than others.”
>In 2023, Toronto city council voted in support of an agreement signed with Ottawa, pledging a variety of policy changes that included allowing buildings with six housing units on a single lot anywhere in the city. Federal money allocated from the Housing Accelerator Fund started to flow in return and then, during a debate last month, a lot of councillors got cold feet.
>Instead of voting to allow the sixplexes they had pledged to permit everywhere, council watered down the proposal. In fact, they took a fire hose to it. These buildings will be allowed in only nine wards, which together make up less than one-quarter of the city’s area. Councillors for the other 16 wards can opt in later, as if they are mayors of their own area.
> Canadians are witnessing the largest real estate correction in the country’s history. Prices fell 0.8% in Q1 2026, shedding 4.8% since last year. Since peaking in Q1 2022, prices have dropped 20.1% in nominal terms, rolling back to Q1 2021 levels. While Toronto has seen sharper drops, there’s never been anything like this at the national level.
> ...
>Here’s how the current decline stacks up against historic drops in real terms:
>Q1 2022 to Q1 2026: -29.3% (4 years)
>Q1 2008 to Q1 2009: -9.3% (1 year)
>Q1 1989 to Q3 1998: -21.1% (9.5 years)
>Q1 1981 to Q3 1984: -21.5% (3.5 years)
Prompt to Gemini: Summarise in Axios style
>The Big Picture
>British Columbia and the Canadian federal government announced a combined housing package totaling billions of dollars, featuring two major initiatives: a $1.45 billion condo purchase plan and a $3.2 billion development charge subsidy. Critics and market analysts argue both policies resemble developer bailouts and incentivize poor municipal management rather than addressing long-term housing affordability.
>The $1.45 Billion Condo Purchase Plan
>The government plans to buy roughly 2,200 units of unsold, distressed condo inventory across BC (outside of downtown Vancouver) and convert them into "rent-to-own" units [00:40], [06:22].
>The Intent vs. Reality: Buying unsold inventory to turn into permanent social rental housing makes fiscal sense since it bypasses ballooning construction costs [01:33], [02:26]. However, turning them into rent-to-own properties means the government acts as an unnecessary intermediate buyer [03:56].
>The Deficit of Social Housing: To fund this initiative, the BC government suspended its Community Housing Fund [11:51], effectively pulling $1.4 billion away from shovel-ready projects intended for low-income, non-market rental housing [11:56].
>The Bottom Line: By subsidizing middle-income buyers to purchase existing stock while cutting low-income social housing, the policy results in a net reduction of future affordable housing supply [14:21].
>The $3.2 Billion Development Charge Subsidy
>The senior levels of government are injecting billions to directly fund municipal infrastructure, offsetting the development fees typically charged to builders [17:26].
>The Cost Distortion: High development charges heavily impact project viability [18:16]. In cities like Toronto, these fees add upwards of $130,000 per unit, forcing developers to build high-margin luxury condos rather than economy units to absorb the upfront cost [18:25], [18:41].
>Rewarding Bad Policy: Cities originally inflated these fees during the housing boom to fund municipal spending without politically unpopular property tax hikes [19:06].
>The Bottom Line: Federal and provincial bailouts reward irresponsible municipalities (like Vancouver and Toronto) at the expense of cities with historically responsible taxation models (like Calgary or Edmonton) [20:02], [20:09].
>Why It Matters
>Instead of allowing a natural market correction to lower entry prices for young buyers, these policies artificially hold up a price floor for struggling developers [05:10], [10:07]. Capital is diverted from creating permanent affordable housing infrastructure toward shielding municipal governments and builders from their own financial missteps [14:21], [20:18].