r/SocialEngineering

What makes someone look like an easy target for random requests in public?

As a 20 yo guy, throughout my life I got approached in public, more than you can think.

Whether a homeless men (mostly scammers) asking for help or money, Jehovah witnesses, usually girls asking me for gym club invitations (and getting my contacts eventually) , strangers asking for directions .... I've seen it all

At least once a week I have an event on this matter, and I want to know why...

I sometimes have rants when walking to clear my head, look in other directions and generally I treat walks like a good hobby, it cleanses my emotions , like being detached from my problems and such — so this could be a cause I guess(??I have no words to describe it)

Maybe people judge by posture to deduct the "one who would fold to their demands"? For the record I'm a very nice guy, I tend to help people with anything, to the point where friends/colleagues treat this as an ick/weakness and take me for a fool...

As for looks I look like an average Joe, 179cm (or 5'10" for my burger people) , so I see no reason why I tend to be approached at random...

Maybe the spotlight effect plays a role in this too, I sincerely don't know.

If you tend to "approach" people in public, just let me know what makes someone trusted or rather more able to listen at least with your proposal.

Any kind of help is deeply appreciated:)!

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u/StefanR05 — 11 days ago
▲ 30 r/SocialEngineering+1 crossposts

I mapped U.S. politicians' alliances and feuds from the news, then added co-sponsorship, FEC, lobbying and roll-call data. None of the money or voting measures predicted who feuds with whom.

A few weeks ago I shared POLARIS here: an interactive graph of who in U.S. politics is allied with whom and who is feuding with whom, with a nightly pipeline that reads the political press and tracks how those ties shift. Two comments shaped what I built next:

  1. Could this show who actually influences federal decisions — staffers, donors, lobbying, roll-call votes?

  2. How far can you trust a graph built from biased, clickbait headlines?

Here's what changed, including what didn't work.

Live: https://world-politicians.vercel.app/ (no signup, works on mobile)

Source (MIT): https://github.com/showjihyun/world-politicians

---

What it is

- 101 figures, 266 hand-curated relationships (alliance, feud, bipartisan bridge, political family, mentorship), in 2D or 3D

- A nightly news layer. Articles from 17 outlets are classified by an LLM as ally-leaning, feud-leaning or neutral, and kept in a rolling one-year archive

- A relationship timeline. Pick any two people for month-by-month polarity. Trump × Musk shows the June 2025 blow-up and the January 2026 reconciliation

- An evidence panel on every edge, with direct article links or a plain "no linked source"

  1. Measured data, kept separate from editorial judgment

Co-sponsorship (119th Congress). I added 112 edges from GovInfo's bill-status bulk data, for pairs with 10 or more shared bills. They're drawn differently from the curated edges, because "these two are allies" is a judgment and "they

co-sponsored 78 bills" is a measurement.

- Raw counts mostly re-encode party. 84% of pairs above the threshold are same-party. The 11 cross-caucus pairs are the interesting part: Fitzpatrick × Gluesenkamp Perez (19 bills), Collins × Klobuchar (15), Lawler × Torres (12).

- Cross-party is judged by caucus, not party label. Counting Sanders and King as cross-party inflated the count from 11 to 19.

- Direction is kept. "Kim signs 15 of Warren's bills, Warren signs none of Kim's" is not the same relationship as "Padilla and Sanders, 15 each".

FEC money (2026 cycle), shown on the profile. One FEC file mixes three things that have to be separated:

- direct contributions: $32.0M

- independent expenditures supporting a candidate: $14.4M

- independent expenditures opposing a candidate: $18.1M

Merge them and the $10.1M spent attacking Thomas Massie reads as his funding. On-screen caveat: named PAC money is only about 6% of receipts.

Lobbying revolving door. From the House Clerk's raw LD-1 filings (2022–2026): 295 former staffers of 61 figures are now registered lobbyists. Matching uses full names only, since Congress has had 33 members named Harris.

Party-line defection. From Voteview: the share of party-divided votes (1,279 in the 119th) on which a member broke with their own party's majority. Raw agreement scores just encode party (Cruz × Hawley at 98.6% means "both Republican"); defection holds party constant.

  1. The negative result

I tried six ways to turn these person-level facts into relationship signals:

┌────────────────────────────────────────────────────┬─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────┐

│ Test │ Result │

├────────────────────────────────────────────────────┼─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────┤

│ Shared donors × curated ally/feud │ 27% vs 28% │

├────────────────────────────────────────────────────┼─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────┤

│ Shared donors × heavy co-sponsorship │ 19% vs 17% │

├────────────────────────────────────────────────────┼─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────┤

│ PAC share × bipartisan edges │ 10.3% vs 8.3% │

├────────────────────────────────────────────────────┼─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────┤

│ NOMINATE deviation × intra-party feud │ p = 0.81 │

├────────────────────────────────────────────────────┼─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────┤

│ Party defection × intra-party feud │ p = 0.99 │

├────────────────────────────────────────────────────┼─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────┤

│ Party defection × outside money spent against them │ p = 0.058, no dose-response, confounded by race competitiveness │

└────────────────────────────────────────────────────┴─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────┘

Collins and Fitzpatrick are among the most frequent defectors, and neither has a single intra-party feud. Quiet, steady defection doesn't produce public fights. The feuds in this graph are loud and personal, and they look orthogonal to the voting dimension. So money, lobbying and defection are shown as facts about a person, each with a note on what the number does not mean.

  1. Handling media bias

That critique was fair, and a better prompt can't fix it on its own. Following the literature (D'Alessio & Allen's meta-analysis, Groseclose & Milyo, Gentzkow & Shapiro, Soroka on negativity bias, Vallone et al. on the hostile media effect), I split the problem into three layers:

┌─────────────────────────────────┬─────────────────────────────────────────┬──────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────┐

│ Layer │ What it looked like here (when studied) │ What I did │

├─────────────────────────────────┼─────────────────────────────────────────┼──────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────┤

│ Gatekeeping (what becomes news) │ Feuds were 2/3 of ally/feud headlines │ Changed how votes are counted │

├─────────────────────────────────┼─────────────────────────────────────────┼──────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────┤

│ Visibility (who gets covered) │ Trump appeared in 71% of signals │ Shown on screen, not "corrected" — it's a collection problem │

├─────────────────────────────────┼─────────────────────────────────────────┼──────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────┤

│ Tone (how it's told) │ The LLM's polarity call │ Scored against labels; tested for outlet cues │

└─────────────────────────────────┴─────────────────────────────────────────┴──────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────┘

What changed:

- One vote per pair per day, not per article. Five outlets running one story used to cast five votes. A day now casts one vote, weighted 1 + ln(outlets), and only if two-thirds of that day's coverage agrees. Decisive votes fell from 244 to 175. I tried clustering stories by headline similarity first and dropped it, because it fails both ways: two headlines about the same Walz story scored a Jaccard of only 0.10.

- A month needs a 2:1 margin to flip. Previously the month's first non-neutral headline set its colour, so one feud headline could beat six later ally headlines. Real reversals (Trump × Musk) get covered by many outlets over many days and clear the bar; a single clickbait headline doesn't. Jeffries × Trump in August 2026 had 5 feud signals to 2 ally and had been showing "ally".

- Disagreement is shown, not resolved. When Fox frames Graham × Trump as an alliance and CBS frames it as a feud, the month is hatched rather than one side being picked. Given the hostile media effect, that seemed more honest than adjudicating.

- The source mix is public. The top five outlets carry 63% of the archive, and AP and Reuters together are under 5%.

Tested and dropped: I swapped "Fox News" and "NPR" on the same headlines, with the outlet suffix stripped so it couldn't leak. 0 of 14 polarity calls changed, while plain re-runs of identical input wobbled by up to 13%. So I dropped the planned "outlet-blind" second pass, which would have doubled the cost.

Not done yet, on purpose:

- Wire-service baseline calibration (in the spirit of Groseclose & Milyo). The wires supply only about a dozen articles so far.

- Discounting feud headlines by their measured false-positive rate (neutral → feud is about 30%). Most of the labels are model-seeded, so this would be the model grading itself.

- Signed-triad balance checks. 37 of the 39 triangles the news produces pass through Trump.

How accurate is the classifier? On 118 stratified articles it gets 84.7% on polarity and 87.3% on picking the right pair. Most errors are a neutral article read as a feud; only one was a true ally/feud reversal. Caveat: only 20 of those labels are human-checked so far, so treat this as a floor to beat, not a validated score.

  1. Still open

- Staffer movement between offices

- Individual donors (a huge separate file, where only gifts over $200 are itemised)

- Senate-side lobbying data, which currently blocks automated access

---

Feedback I'd most value:

- Edges you think are wrong (with a source)

- Better ways to validate polarity than headline classification

- Is there a relationship-level measure from voting or co-sponsorship that isn't just party in disguise?

I'd also welcome help hand-labelling the evaluation set. Methodology notes are in the repo under docs/roadmap.md and docs/research/.

u/Impressive-Judge-357 — 11 days ago

polarization technique: Something I saw lately trapping a lot of people.

How the “Decoy Person” Manipulation Tactic Works

Manipulation does not always look like someone directly telling you what to do.

Sometimes the manipulator barely gives you an instruction at all. Instead, they introduce another person into the conversation and make that person the center of the story.

“Sam thinks this.”

“Sam believes that.”

“Sam told me something you probably shouldn't hear.”

Suddenly, Sam becomes the villain, the mystery, or the problem that everyone feels compelled to solve.

The important part is that Sam may never have said any of it.

This creates a social trap where people react to a fictional version of someone while believing they are making their own decisions.

1. The basic mechanism: fabricate the source

The simplest version is fabricated attribution.

A manipulator tells Person A that Person B supposedly believes something extreme.

For example:

>“Sam told me he thinks everyone here is evil.”

If Sam never said that, the statement is a lie. But it can still influence how Person A sees Sam.

The manipulator now has something useful: a story involving a third person.

Instead of saying:

>“Talk to me.”

they create a situation where the other person starts talking about Sam, asking questions, comparing opinions, or defending themselves against something Sam supposedly believes.

The manipulator has created an interaction without openly asking for one.

That's where the tactic becomes particularly deceptive.

2. Triangulation: turning three people into a social triangle

This is closely related to triangulation.

Instead of two people communicating directly, information is passed through a third person.

Person A hears something about Person B from Person C.

Person A reacts.

Person C then interprets or expands on the reaction.

Person B may have no idea what is happening.

The triangle becomes:

Person A → Person C → Person B

rather than:

Person A ↔ Person B

The person in the middle controls what information travels between the other two.

That's a powerful position because the targets are no longer responding to each other. They are responding to the mediator's version of reality.

And that's where the physics gets broken.

The social equivalent of clipping through the floor is that the mediator can quietly change the information before it reaches the next person.

3. The “evil advocate” role

The manipulator may also present themselves as someone who is protecting or helping the supposedly problematic person.

For example:

>“Sam doesn't like talking to people, but I'm trying to help him.”

This creates an interesting contradiction.

The manipulator appears to be:

  • a confidant,
  • a protector,
  • an insider,
  • someone who understands Sam,
  • and someone willing to help others deal with him.

That can make the manipulator appear trustworthy.

The target may think:

>“This person knows Sam better than I do, so maybe I should listen.”

But the supposed insider status is itself part of the deception.

The manipulator has effectively invented credentials.

4. The outrage trigger

Another important component is polarization.

The claim about the third person is made outrageous enough to trigger an emotional response.

For example:

>“Sam thinks eating fruit is evil.”

The actual subject doesn't matter much.

It could be fruit, politics, relationships, religion, gaming, money, safety, or almost anything else.

The important part is that the statement creates a strong reaction.

Someone might think:

>“That's ridiculous. I'll prove him wrong.”

Now the person has been pushed toward an action without being directly instructed to do it.

This is the psychological trick:

The manipulator creates the disagreement, then lets the target choose the response.

The target may feel completely autonomous.

But the situation itself was manufactured.

5. Turning a person into a fictional villain

Repeated claims can gradually build a character.

The first statement might be:

>“Sam thinks fruit is evil.”

Later:

>“Sam is paranoid.”

Then:

>“Sam doesn't trust anyone.”

Then:

>“Sam thinks everyone is against him.”

Eventually, people may have a completely different image of Sam.

They aren't reacting to Sam anymore.

They're reacting to a fictional character assembled from stories.

This is similar to how tabloids can construct public personalities. A person becomes a collection of shocking claims, rumors, and carefully selected anecdotes.

The more stories people hear, the more believable the character can become.

And because each story appears to come from an “insider,” the information can feel unusually credible.

6. The secrecy component

The tactic becomes even stronger when the manipulator asks people not to speak directly to the supposed source.

For example:

>“Don't tell Sam I told you. He would get upset.”

This creates an information firewall.

The target cannot easily verify the claim.

If they confront Sam, the manipulator can potentially explain the contradiction away:

>“He doesn't want you to know.”

Now the absence of evidence becomes part of the story.

This is a major warning sign.

Healthy communication normally becomes more transparent when an important accusation is made.

Manipulation often demands the opposite:

“Keep this between us.”

7. Manufactured intimacy

The manipulator may also share supposedly private information.

That creates the feeling of trust.

Someone might think:

>“Why would they tell me something this personal unless they really trusted me?”

But confidential information can be used as social currency.

The information creates an artificial bond:

“You and I know something that everyone else doesn't.”

That feeling can make the target more willing to accept the rest of the story.

It's basically a social DLC nobody asked to install.

The target thinks they're receiving privileged access.

They may actually be receiving fabricated information designed to influence them.

8. Using the same decoy to approach someone romantically

The same structure can be used in relationships.

For example, someone wants to approach a person but doesn't know how to start a conversation.

Instead of approaching directly, they introduce Sam:

>“Sam thinks you like him.”

If Sam never said that, the statement is fabricated.

But it creates an immediate emotional reaction.

The target might become curious, angry, confused, amused, or defensive.

The manipulator now has an opening.

They can then position themselves as the person who understands the situation:

>“I was just trying to help.”

This creates a particularly ugly form of manipulation because the supposed problem and the supposed solution come from the same person.

The manipulator creates the conflict and then presents themselves as the person capable of resolving it.

9. Why the tactic can work

Several psychological effects can reinforce this behavior.

Authority

People tend to give additional weight to information that supposedly comes from an insider.

Emotional arousal

Outrage, fear, curiosity, and disgust can make people react before checking facts.

Social proof

If several people appear to believe the same story, the target may assume the story must be true.

Confirmation bias

Once someone forms an opinion about Sam, later information may be interpreted in a way that supports that opinion.

Information asymmetry

The manipulator knows the story is fabricated.

Everyone else does not.

That gives the manipulator an enormous informational advantage.

10. The biggest vulnerability: nobody checks the source

The entire structure depends on one simple failure:

People don't ask the person being discussed.

If someone says:

>“Sam told me you are dangerous.”

The natural response should be:

>“Did Sam actually say that? Can I ask him?”

That single question can destroy the entire setup.

This is why manipulators may discourage direct communication.

Once the target and the supposed source start talking directly, the fabricated story becomes much harder to maintain.

11. How to recognize the pattern

There are several warning signs.

Be cautious when someone repeatedly:

  • claims to speak for another person;
  • shares dramatic private information about that person;
  • insists the information must remain secret;
  • discourages you from contacting the supposed source;
  • describes the same person as unusually evil, unstable, dangerous, or irrational;
  • provides information that conveniently makes the storyteller look helpful;
  • encourages you to “prove” the third person's beliefs wrong;
  • creates conflicts that they then offer to resolve;
  • repeatedly positions themselves as the only person who understands everyone involved.

One sign alone does not prove manipulation.

Several appearing together should make you slow down.

12. How to protect yourself

The best defense is boring.

And boring is good.

Verify important claims directly

If somebody supposedly said something important about you, ask them.

Don't build a major decision around second-hand information.

Separate facts from interpretation

Ask:

>“What exactly did they say?”

Then ask:

>“Did you personally hear them say it?”

Those are very different questions.

Don't let outrage make the decision

If a story makes you immediately want to prove someone wrong, stop.

That's often the moment when emotional manipulation is most effective.

Don't reward secrecy

If the information is supposedly important but you're forbidden from checking it, treat that as a warning rather than evidence of its importance.

Watch the messenger

Ask what the person telling you gains from the story.

That doesn't automatically mean they're lying.

But incentives matter.

Talk to the person being discussed

Direct communication is the natural counter to triangulation.

It removes the middleman.

13. The “villain magnet” effect

The most interesting part of this manipulation pattern is that the third person can become a social magnet.

People begin talking about Sam.

They defend themselves against Sam.

They try to help Sam.

They try to prove Sam wrong.

They become curious about Sam.

And all the while, the manipulator remains in the center of the network.

Sam becomes the fictional antagonist.

The manipulator becomes the narrator.

That's why the tactic can resemble a tabloid.

The story doesn't need to be true.

It only needs to be interesting enough to keep people reacting.

14. Where the analogy to a man-in-the-middle breaks down

There is a useful computer-security analogy here, but it should not be taken literally.

A man-in-the-middle attack involves an attacker intercepting communication between two parties and potentially modifying it.

The social version is similar because information passes through an intermediary.

But human relationships are much messier.

The better terms are:

  • triangulation
  • social engineering
  • fabricated attribution
  • rumor manipulation
  • information control
  • polarization
  • manufactured conflict

The important common feature is control over information flow.

15. Why intelligence has little to do with it

One part of this idea deserves correction.

It is tempting to think these tactics only work on people with low intelligence or people who are mentally unstable.

That's not accurate.

Intelligent, educated, emotionally stable people can also be manipulated.

Nobody is immune to misinformation when the information arrives through someone they trust, during an emotional moment, with enough supporting context to make the story appear credible.

The better defense isn't having a high IQ.

It's having good verification habits.

Conclusion

The core manipulation is simple:

Invent what Person B supposedly believes, tell Person A, trigger an emotional reaction, discourage direct verification, and then position yourself as the person who can explain or solve the resulting conflict.

The third person becomes the decoy.

The outrage creates movement.

The secrecy prevents verification.

And the manipulator controls the information flowing between everyone involved.

The safest response is equally simple:

Slow down. Ask what was actually said. Check the source. Talk directly to the person involved.

Because if someone keeps telling you what another person supposedly thinks while making sure you never speak to that person yourself, you've probably encountered something more suspicious than ordinary gossip.

The social hitbox is probably broken.

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u/Smaug117 — 11 days ago