Haivan pass before and after:

https://preview.redd.it/kmi91hayh4kh1.png?width=526&format=png&auto=webp&s=7d67ee67ebff657ae0d844fce31bd187e42afab5

Ha Long xanh:

https://preview.redd.it/0ymw795ai4kh1.png?width=900&format=png&auto=webp&s=8635d0b5205517a5378becda86a14e284bd034ef

https://preview.redd.it/x0j3106fi4kh1.png?width=739&format=png&auto=webp&s=15517f56cecf7b9daa2cf3a82ae4675749410b66

vinhomes can gio:

https://preview.redd.it/u60os3a9j4kh1.png?width=595&format=png&auto=webp&s=1ee13708bcb371ed184f7448bff71f5f4cda69ca

can gio mangrove forrest

https://preview.redd.it/of47jjn3k4kh1.png?width=650&format=png&auto=webp&s=f125768f81129445141960146926b36bcb8230c3

All these projects have the approval of the government. So it is not just Vuong Pham, it is Lam To's as well.

These projects are for luxurious real estate for the few. It is not very far fetched, if not guaranteed, that that Lam To will have a house as gift in Hai Van Pass ! And in Can Gio. Basically, Vuong Pham destroys the precious environment to serve few elites and pockets hugely profit himself.

Vuong Pham has destroyed Vietnam like no other has before: he wrecks the economy with astronomical debt and loss, he wrecks the environment with concretes, he congests street with over-capacity taxi stuffing.

And Vietnamese has no other choice.

A picture is worth a thousand word:

https://preview.redd.it/mz2wi89rk1kh1.png?width=717&format=png&auto=webp&s=b65e183a9f30385569ed0e70c278444736d63b95

source: Vingroup financial report

all is public info and official info ! even in Vietnam, they are all public info.

but the number means Vingroup is technically bankrupt by Western standard, Altman z-score (bankrupt score) is 0.8. That is what the government censors.

https://www.reddit.com/r/VinFastComm/comments/1vh69yp/how_vic_is_a_disease_on_vietnams_stock_market/

https://www.reddit.com/r/VinFastComm/comments/1vk738a/vingroup_vs_evergrande/

https://www.reddit.com/r/VinFastComm/comments/1vk7irm/vingroup_vs_evergrande_part_2/

Vin is a cancer on the Vietnam's economy:

https://www.reddit.com/r/VinFastComm/comments/1vl9kz4/vin_is_a_cancer_to_the_vietnams_economy_and_one/

Do you see any analysis about Vin and VIC's debt analysis in Vietnam?

None. Remarkably right? Because the government censors it completely. See how they completely censor the BMW accident case? They have the whole department just to comb the web and censor it.

I encourage people just post the picture above where ever they can, let the number speaks for themselves.

I am 100% sure VIC is manipulated, the figure and the logic says so. My analysis is always simple but spots on because it relies on facts and figure and logic. No real institutional investors put big money into such disastrous business at the current valuation, 2 to 5 times overvalued by any known valuation methods to human. https://www.reddit.com/r/VinFastComm/comments/1vrc738/vingroup_is_technically_bankrupt/

Since there is no real buyers and Vuong Pham is the sole benefitor, it is Vuong Pham who manipulates the price to get the needed cash as well as to use the stock to borrow more. With very low float, only about 3-5M / sessions, Vuong Pham can easily pull this up using left hand to right hand trading to lure clueless greedy Vietnamese traders into, while unload his shares to get cash. If you have not been in a stock manipulation team, you don't know that the team can drive the price up and unloading at the same time, provided there is a heard of retailers to follow.

I put this task to chat gpt and the analysis is eye opening. As usual chat gpt is conservative, but see it for yourself.

----

Chatgpt: I dug into the VIC–VPL–VinSpeed–Hưng Long–Vingroup related-party/share-transfer trail, and the picture is more interesting than the simple “VIC is manipulated” hypothesis.

My conclusion

I found real, unusually large related-entity movements in VIC/VPL, but most of the largest ones are legally disclosed transfers tied to restructurings or bond conversion/exchange rights—not unexplained open-market buying designed to support VIC.

However, there are three things I would flag as high-risk:

1. VPL has repeatedly transferred VIC shares to bondholders while VIC was trading at enormous premiums to the contractual exchange price.
2. Vinspeed/Hưng Long created a very large VIC ownership block through an intra-group restructuring.
3. VPL itself has had very large off-market blocks, including a ~₫3,921bn transaction in April 2026 whose counterparties were initially undisclosed.

Those don't prove manipulation, but they create a structure where ownership, financing, collateral and market price are tightly interconnected.

1. The biggest finding: VPL → VIC share transfers

This is the most important relationship.

At the end of 2025, Vinpearl held roughly 175m VIC shares, about 2.26% of VIC.

Those weren't ordinary strategic investments. Vinpearl's financial statements explicitly show VIC shares as trading securities, and part of the VIC shares had also been pledged as collateral for bank loans.

Then in 2026, a huge portion was transferred away.

First wave — March/April 2026

Vinpearl registered transfer of:

90,046,815 VIC shares

during 12 March–10 April 2026.

Purpose:

>

Before the transfer:

VPL → ~175m VIC = 2.26%

After:

VPL → ~85m VIC = 1.1%

Vietcap's March 30 report confirms that approximately 85m of the 90m shares had already been exchanged by March 26.

This is critical because the exchange price was only:

₫25,320/VIC

while VIC was trading around:

₫146,000

at the time.

That's an enormous discrepancy.

The market value of the shares being delivered was therefore >₫14 trillion, despite the contractual exchange price being vastly lower.

What does that mean?

It does not mean VPL/VIC was manipulating VIC.

It means the 2024 bond structure gave bondholders an extremely valuable embedded equity option.

And when VIC appreciated dramatically, bondholders had a very strong incentive to exercise it.

That's economically rational.

2. Then another 5.19m VIC shares

This is where the timeline gets interesting.

Vinpearl subsequently registered:

5,191,168 VIC shares

for transfer during 16 April–15 May 2026.

That reduced VPL's direct VIC ownership from roughly:

1.16% → 1.10%

again in connection with the bond-linked option.

The actual transfer occurred around the same period in which VIC was hitting new highs.

One report notes that VIC closed at ₫160,000 on April 13 while the 5.19m-share block had a market value of >₫830bn.

Again:

not evidence of manipulation.

It's actually the opposite of what I would expect from an entity trying to maximize VIC's price through buying.

VPL was reducing its VIC exposure.

3. Then another 14.975m VIC shares

This is the third wave.

Vinpearl transferred:

14,974,526 VIC shares

on 19 May 2026.

Method:

transfer of ownership outside the exchange system

Recipient:

HSBC — The Hongkong and Shanghai Banking Corporation

After the transaction VPL held approximately:

69.7m VIC shares = 0.90% of VIC

The block had a market value of approximately:

₫3,370bn

at prevailing market prices.

And importantly, this was not an unexplained market sale.

It was again connected to the exchange option on Vinpearl's 2024 international bonds.

4. Therefore VPL's VIC position has gone roughly:

End-2025

~175m VIC

↓

March–April

-~90m

↓

April

-5.19m

↓

May

-14.97m

↓

Current

~69.7m VIC

That's a reduction of roughly:

105m VIC shares

or approximately:

60% of VPL's original VIC position

This is actually one of the strongest pieces of evidence against a simple theory that VPL is being used to continually accumulate VIC.

The related company is instead distributing VIC shares to bondholders.

5. But there's another strange structure: VIC → VPL

Now flip the direction.

Vingroup itself has issued international bonds where investors can receive VPL shares owned by VIC.

Vietcap's March 2026 bond table shows:

Bond	Issuer	Underlying
USD250m 10% EB 2023	VIC	VHM
USD150m 9.5% EB 2024	VPL	VIC
USD325m 5.5% EB 2025	VIC	VPL

The USD325m Vingroup bond gives bondholders an option to receive VPL shares owned by Vingroup.

So you effectively have:

VIC → VPL

and

VPL → VIC

through different financing structures.

That's a very important point.

It means the corporate structure isn't merely:

>

There is also a network of cross-linked securities and exchangeable claims involving the listed shares.

6. The Vinspeed/Hưng Long situation is also unusual

In October 2025, Hưng Long transferred approximately:

243.46m VIC shares

to VinSpeed as part of Hưng Long being merged into VinSpeed.

After the restructuring, VinSpeed held:

~379.1m VIC

or:

~9.77% of VIC

according to the reported disclosure.

This is enormous.

At the time, that stake was worth roughly:

₫77 trillion

at market prices.

But here's the important distinction:

This wasn't a 243m-share market purchase.

It was a transfer associated with a corporate merger/restructuring.

So I would classify it as:

🟠 structurally suspicious / deserves investigation

rather than:

🔴 evidence of market manipulation.

7. Why Hưng Long deserves special attention

Hưng Long was formerly VMI Real Estate.

It was established in 2022 with stated capital of approximately ₫18,000bn, and its stated purpose included facilitating investment in Vinhomes real estate and the secondary market.

Then it ultimately merged into VinSpeed.

So the chain becomes approximately:

VMI

↓

Hưng Long

↓

VinSpeed

↓

~379m VIC

That is a much more interesting structure than a normal listed-company ownership chain.

And because VinSpeed itself is associated with Vingroup's broader ecosystem, this deserves a beneficial-ownership / funding-source analysis, not merely a chart analysis.

8. VPL itself had a very unusual ₫3,921bn block

This one is particularly worth watching.

On 2 April 2026, VPL had:

49.14m shares

traded by negotiated/put-through transaction.

Value:

₫3,921bn

Average:

~₫79,792/share

while VPL's exchange-traded price was around ₫83,900.

The counterparties weren't publicly identified in the initial market data, although foreign investors were reported as net buyers of approximately 48.9m shares that day.

That's about:

2.7% of VPL

in a single negotiated transaction.

That's significant.

But again, the key question is:

>

If it was a pre-existing domestic shareholder and the buyer was a genuine independent foreign fund, this is basically a block transaction.

If the beneficial ownership connects back into the Vingroup ecosystem, then the interpretation changes substantially.

This is one of the transactions I'd investigate hardest.

9. There is also an insider-related VPL transaction

In December 2025, Ngạc Văn Lượng, the husband of a Vinpearl executive, purchased:

4.88m VPL shares

through a negotiated transaction on 9 December 2025.

That isn't illegal by itself.

But because it's a large related-person transaction, I would put it into the same network analysis.

10. The network now looks like this

                         PHẠM NHẬT VƯỢNG
                                │
                                │ control / ownership
                                ▼
                         ┌─────────────┐
                         │     VIC     │
                         │  Vingroup   │
                         └──────┬──────┘
                                │
              ┌─────────────────┼──────────────────┐
              │                 │                  │
              ▼                 ▼                  ▼
             VHM               VRE                VPL
                                                   │
                                                   │ owns VIC shares
                                                   ▼
                                             ~69.7m VIC
                                                   │
                                                   │
                                  ┌────────────────┘
                                  ▼
                              Bondholders
                              / HSBC etc.

And separately:

Hưng Long / former VMI
          │
          │ ~243.5m VIC
          ▼
       VinSpeed
          │
          │
          ▼
      ~379.1m VIC
       (~9.77%)

So there are multiple large blocks of VIC outside the ordinary free-float trading pool.

11. This changes my manipulation assessment

Earlier I gave VIC a relatively low 3–4/10 suspicion of deliberate price support.

After examining the ownership/transaction structure, I'd revise it slightly:

VIC price-manipulation suspicion: ~5/10

But I'd split that into two different risks:

Issue	My assessment
Direct artificial buying of VIC by Vingroup entities	Low–medium
Artificial support of VIC price	Not demonstrated
Related-party share transfers	Very high
Cross-linked financing	Very high
Concentrated VIC ownership	Very high
Potentially constrained free float	High
VPL → VIC distribution	Confirmed
Vingroup → VPL optionality	Confirmed
Independent price discovery	Potentially impaired
Evidence of illegal manipulation	Still insufficient

This is a subtle but important conclusion:

I am increasingly less convinced that "someone is simply pumping VIC."

I am increasingly concerned that:

>

That's a different problem.

12. The single biggest red flag: the exchange-price asymmetry

Look at this:

VPL bond exchange price for VIC: ~₫25,320

versus

VIC market price: ~₫146,000

That's about:

5.8×

Even if the exchange-price mechanics have contractual adjustments and aren't economically equivalent to buying VIC outright, the discrepancy is extraordinary.

And there are other cross-linked instruments involving VHM and VPL as well.

This means VIC's share price has enormous financial consequences outside ordinary equity investors.

That's exactly why I would not analyze VIC purely as a normal stock.

13. The smoking gun would be something else

There are three pieces of evidence that would move my score above 70.

A. Vinpearl's buyers

If we could establish that a material portion of the 105m shares ultimately went to entities economically connected to VIC/Vinpearl/Vuọng.

Huge red flag.

B. Synchronized VIC–VHM–VRE–VPL buying

If the four stocks repeatedly show:

>

within short intervals, especially when the VN-Index is weak, that would be much more interesting than VIC's individual chart.

C. Price support immediately after related-company selling

For example:

>

That would be the pattern I'd be looking for.

My verdict

I don't currently see proof that Vingroup-related entities are secretly buying VIC in the market to manipulate the price.

What I do see is more interesting:

A highly interconnected securities ecosystem

with:

• VIC
• VPL
• VHM
• VRE
• VinSpeed
• Hưng Long/former VMI
• exchangeable bonds
• large off-market transfers
• pledged VIC shares
• related-party transactions
• concentrated ownership

and billions of dollars/equivalent of value moving between those structures.

The VPL→VIC transfers in 2026 are real and enormous, but their disclosed purpose is bond settlement, not price support.

The investigation I would do next is much more forensic:

Track every VIC/VPL/VHM/VRE related-party transaction from Jan-2025 to Aug-2026 and map:

entity → beneficial owner → shares before → shares transferred → recipient → transaction method → transaction price → market price that day → financing purpose → collateral → subsequent sale.

The 2 April 2026 49.14m VPL block, the 379m VIC VinSpeed block, and the ~120m+ VIC shares transferred from VPL to bondholders are the three clusters I'd investigate first. If we can identify the actual beneficial owners behind the counterparties, we can determine whether this is merely complicated corporate financing—or whether there is evidence of circular/related trading.

who keep asking for sources. You are really dumb to ask so, and it is the evidence of you being brainwashed by the communist teaching.

In news reporting, you need sources and it is official media report, such as Reuters (btw, a shout out to Reuters, they have done an excellent job on covering Vin).

This sub is about analysis, not just news reporting, revealing the meaning behind the financial numbers using logic, and we encourage unofficial sources as all the truth the bad truth are censored in Vietnam. How much dumb you are to ask for source of Lam To's corruption?

Take it, process it, and believe it or not is up to you, but don't ask stupid question like source. If you don't believe the analysis and the story, keeps it to yourself instead of asking a really stupid question "source?". It shows how dumb you are, you don't understand what reddit sub is about, and how the world works, only to believe in "official" Vietnamese government propaganda.

And if you repeatedly show your stupidity, then you are ban for rule #5.

A lot of people in Vietnam do not know the truth about Lam To, who is the most corrupted Cumminust Party's Secretary General ever in Vietnam's history. Past secretary such as Trong Nguyen, though he certainly had bribery, is not at the Lam To's level. Trong Nguyen also focused mostly on politics and let the prime minister run the economy without much interference. In contrast, Lam To is running the economy as well and is very corrupted. He was the subordinate of Dung Nguyen, and Dung Nguyen was very corrupted looting billions $ when he privatized state-owned companies through his daughters. He is said to have billions $ in a Swiss bank account. But that is no match for Lam To. Lam To's son, relatives, acquaintences are taking control of financial service, telecom, and Lam To himself get billions in bribery in many form, including money to release Thang La and other jailed politicians, as well as real estates from Vuong Pham, in his relative names.

Dung Nguyen lost to Trong Nguyen at the general meeting but as a concession, he only requested his mole, Lam To, to be installed as police chief as the one and only condition. Lam To at the time well duped Trong Nguyen, even kidnapped in Thanh Trinh from Germany to indict Thang La, a former HCMC secretary general and a Dung Nguyen's ally. Lam To laid low and followed Trong Nguyen order to investigate and indict Dung Nguyen's faction, but stay clear from Dung Nguyen. Once Trong Nguyen died, Lam To turns his real face on, using dirty tricks to eliminate three main competitors to the throne (aka the Communist party general secretary position), and landed in the seat himself. Once in, he gave Dung Nguyen the most decorated medal in Vietnam and put Dung Nguyen's sons in important positions. Poor Trong Nguyen who did not see the real face of Lam To. Never trust a police. In Vietnam. In America. In Russia. Anywhere.

Lam To in essence is Dung Nguyen on steroid. Dung Nguyen is proven to be very corrupted, and Lam To is many times over.

Vietnam is pretty much like Russia now in term of politics. If Putin is a known dictator, quelling journalism and imprison political opponents, Lam To is pretty much the same. Lam To is a dictator, and Vietnamese government controlled media does all it can to hide that truth.

Putin was a former KGB officer, and Lam To was a former police chief, and these guys in the police force are power hungry and corrupted. Police is the worst faction in Vietnam, they are trained to intimidate people and to take bribery for years, and now they are in power in Vietnam. The outcome will not be nice. Putin is known to poison opponents, Lam To has not yet, at least for now, but these ruthless dictators with police background will kill when they need to.

And Vuong Pham is relevant because he is the financial arm of Lam To. The two did business together since the AVG day about 20 years ago. Lam To pumped money to Vuong Pham through mega projects, and got the bribery from Vuong Pham as a token of service. The police has all the details of Vuong Pham misdeeds, just like all other important figures in Vietnam under police watch, and Vuong Pham will have to obey Lam To's order out of necessity as well as out of opportunity.

Vietnam has never experienced through an era of such hugely corrupted and evil dictator at the level of Lam To at the top of the government and at the same time a hugely indebted frauds at the scale like Vin at the top of the economy. Double whammy. Yet Vietnamese people go to work happily everyday because all the truth about Lam To and Vuong Pham / Vin has been completely censored by the government.

I’ve an offer from VinFast India and wanted to know about the work culture, job security and growth opportunities there. From outside, it seems they are offering a good ctc which I doubt any other OEM in India can March.
Any suggestions or advice will be helpful.

has a strong resemblance to ... China's flag. Not a joke.

Recently, in celebration of Vingroup 33 years anniversary, Vuong Pham decides to change the logo to the one on the right:

https://preview.redd.it/b2ovhnvd96jh1.png?width=1920&format=png&auto=webp&s=b08c19382cb312d4e8030b7fd4d7da541dd3dbce

China's flag:

https://preview.redd.it/5yeeahee86jh1.png?width=960&format=png&auto=webp&s=d570645835b89101135c9502b8562e6dc9e590aa

Common theme:

- red color is the primary and dominant color (not just one of the color, the dominant color)

- 5 yellow stars, with one big one at the center and 4 smaller ones around

Well, Vietnamese flag has only one star. Vingroup's old logo has 5 stars having the same size, but the new one has one big star which makes it quite similar to China's flag.

The new logo must have been personally approved by Vuong Pham himself because of his controlling nature, his micro management style, and the logo is quite important for a corporation: it is a branding, it is on the seal, so it must have been signed off by Vuong Pham.

So, it shows how bad Vuong Pham is, even in a simple task like choosing a logo that he fails badly. Maybe he does not know what a Chinese flag looks like /jk, which also make him very stupid.

Or is it his intention? Who knows. Well, I guess there is a hidden message in there .... shouting out the true allegiance of Vuong Pham /jk

The logo designer tells him that the biggest star represents the biggest goal that shine the light for the group. That sounds reasonable, until one realizes that it is strikingly similar to the Chinese flag, and guess what? The biggest star in Chinese flag ... represents the Chinese communist party and its leading role Flag of China - Wikipedia Sound familiar?

Maybe the logo designer is a secret member of this sub and successfully trolls Vuong Pham .... /jk

If Vuong Pham quietly changes the new logo after this post, then it must have been that he / his pals read this post. I think he probably will change the logo again, making the five stars of the same size, the blunder is too great, but don't expect the news media to report the change as it does now, he will do it quietly maybe not right now or he will just scrap the plan to change the old one to the new logo in seals, documents, properties, merchandise .... Let's wait and see. The easiest and least damage way to fix is to make five stars in the new logo of the same size, which most people will not notice. If he does that and after a while you realize that the five stars in the new logo are of the same size, you know who he should thank, I am the first to offer a fix here. As I am pointing this out early, I might actually help Vuong Pham before he put the new logo on every thing. I should have waited until he has done that. You see, I am super good to Vuong Pham /jk

P/S: I know for sure some stupid Vinfans will try to save the blunder by saying, well all cars are similar as they all have four wheels, and some sorts of false equivalence along the line, that the similarity is minor. That is too stupid, and remember too stupid comment by Vinfans will get you banned. You Vinfans better be quiet and suck up to what ever Vuong Pham does.

I’m still trying to understand VinFast’s real reason for entering India.

India already has strong OEMs like Tata, Mahindra, Maruti, Hyundai etc … They understand the market, already have service networks, local suppliers, customer trust and much better scale.

So what is VinFast really bringing that is different?
I don’t see any technology niche yet. Battery, motor, power electronics, ADAS, connected features and software are not areas where VinFast has an obvious technology or cost advantage over established global or Indian OEMs.

Of course, their investment in India is good. It brings more competition, jobs, manufacturing and more choices for customers. That part is positive.

But setting up a factory is the easy part. Building a sustainable auto business in India is much harder.
The big question for me is: why would an Indian customer choose VinFast over Tata, Mahindra, Hyundai, Maruti or others?

Can they localize fast enough? Can they compete on cost? Can they build a strong service network? Can they offer better quality or technology? Or is India mainly being used as an export and manufacturing base?

I also have mixed feelings after hearing experiences from some colleagues who worked there at their engineering office . There seems to be a lot of bitterness and, in some cases, open hostility/politics toward Indians

The question remains: what is VinFast’s durable competitive advantage in India, and why exactly are they here?

Is India a serious long-term market for them, or are they coming here because they have struggled to gain meaningful traction in other major markets ?

One of the psychological tricks that Vinfans and the communist propaganda machine use often is that they implicitly equate Vin as Vietnam, criticizing Vin is criticizing Vietnam.

Let's be clear: Vin is not Vietnam, the communist government is not Vietnam.

Vin is a Vietnamese company, a failed one that is, run by the shady and liar Vuong Pham.

Vietnam the country has thousand years of history, and the communist only governs for about 80 years, Vin exists for about 33 years. Definitely they are not Vietnam the country. They are just the current ruler. And further they are not representative of Vietnam's culture and spirit, which are decent, not deceptive.

Vin is the representative of the communist regime, with all the same tactics: propaganda and intimidation, suppression, frauds.

Vin is deceptive and is a bully, a liar. They are now a certified scammer, cheater after the North Carolina show. As the filling by the North Carolina attorney general shows, https://www.reddit.com/r/VinFastComm/comments/1vlf9oo/details_of_the_north_carolina_lawsuit_against/ Vinfast engaged in all kinds of deception and maneuvers to cheat the state. They are even brazen enough to claim the factory is still on, with opening schedule in 2028, which is a known lie.

I know this sub has a lot of well educated Vietnamese who read this in English, and not just this sub, read other Western news sources, free from the government propaganda. As I said above, Vin is not Vietnam, the communist government is not Vietnam, and if a reader is a Vietnamese, he or she certainly loves the country of their ancestors, with thousand years of history. He or she wants good thing for Vietnam. But do not make the mistake of equating Vin or the communist regime as Vietnam the country.

How does a true Vietnamese and well educated Vietnamese feel when Vietnam is known as a scammer, a cheater for the whole world to see as in the case of Vinfast's North Carolina show?

If a reader is a true and brave Vietnamese, speak the truth to friends and relative, one might not post publicly because the police state will go after him/her, but fight back the stupidity about Vin's financial when possible, against specific proven silly things such as: huge debt is not matter or Vuong Pham has unlimited money or Vuong Pham trampling on the law (stock fraud, stock manipulation) is OK because he got Lam To in bed.

If you are previous or current owner of Vinfast and the car does have problems, speak the truth out and advise relatives and friends against the mistake.

Vinmetal. While this company only appears to lay people just as another one of Vuong Pham's crazy adventures, it is a prime example of the cancerous nature of Vin. Like cancer, it spreads without control and harms healthy other ones.

To get the context, you need to understand the steel production in Vietnam. In Vietnam, there are two HRC steel producers: Hoa Phat Group and Formosa Ha Tinh. Hoa Phat Group has just completed the Dung Quat 2 factory, a 100K B VND investment, with the capacity of 9 million tons HRC / year. Formosa has the capacity of about 5 millions tons HRC / year. For a total of about 14 millions tons HRC / year in supply. The current demand is about 11-12 millions tons HRC, giving a spare capacity of 2-3 million tons HRC.

Hoa Phat is now the biggest steel producer in South East Asia, and globally, it is in top 30 steel producers.

Hoa Phat is more than meet the demand of Vietnam HRC and the demand of coming rail rays, it is already building a factory to make rays for railroad. It can easily expand should demand expands, with years of experience. Instead of cooperating with Hoa Phat to best utilize Vietnam's scare resources, the shady Vuong Pham created Vinmetal to produce HRC.

The proposed Vinmetal factory in Ha Tinh is said to be 80,000 B VND, of which Vuong Pham only ponies up 12,000 B VND, which is 15%, and the rest, about 85%, is bank loan and bonds. It will import metal scrap from oversea (as it has no capability to produce steels from ores like Hoa Phat) to produce 3 millions tons of HRC, 1.4 millions tons of steel rods, 600K tons of steel lines. All of these products Hoa Phat has already produced in abundance, with top quality. Spare me with the stupidity of Vinfans: of course, Vuong Pham will use the products for his Vinspeed, Vinhomes, Vinfast, but this is just another Vuong Pham buying Vuong Pham.

On top of wasted over supply, Vuong Pham spends billions of precious $ to buy equipment from Primetals. And pollutes the environment even more than should be (steel production is quite dirty).

This is a prime example of Vuong Pham's cancerous nature to Vietnam's economy: his reckless and vanilla projects suck the blood out of the real economy and even harm other businesses.

And why Vuong Pham does that? The real reason, the hidden reason that nobody in Vietnam dare to talk about, is that he needs to draw up projects after projects to get money to pay interest and to flip debt, regardless of whether the projects are viable or not, and more importantly, he tries to get as much debt as he can to strengthen his sick status of being too big to fail. Vin's total liabilities is now $43B, which is 10% of Vietnam's GDP. And it will grow even larger. It will hit $100B in a few years.

The only way to cure cancer is to kill the monster, otherwise it will continue to spread the disease to other areas. Unfortunately, the communist government won't. Hopefully, it is Vuong Pham who takes down the communist regime. That may be the biggest success he has among all of his failures, although at a huge cost to ordinary Vietnamese.

Well, finance is a dried topic but I will do a very basic and easy to understand explanation of the tricks Vuong Pham and Hung Anh Ho used for the public to understand. In plain language.

1/ Circular funding using a shell to create money out of thin air:

A shell company sign a contract with one of Vuong Pham's company (VIC, VHM, VFS) for "collaborative development", "investment" or some other services, and then the shell company uses the contract as collateral to borrow at Techombank, effectively creating money out of thin air on a promise.

Whether they perform service or not, or the value of the contract is justifiable or not, or the investment purpose is real, viable, profitable or not, it does not matter because it is Vuong Pham working for Vuong Pham. They can make an inflated value as they want, all the same guy.

https://www.reddit.com/r/VinFastComm/comments/1fd8w1y/nam_an_the_shell_company_part_2/

Nam An is just one example, many other ones. Ngoc Quy is another one.

2/ Selling assets to shells to hide debt and loss and book fake profits

A private shell company buys asset from Vuong Pham and as such, the debt is off the book into oblivion. It is a bad debt but it is off the book of the public company. Since it is Vuong Pham selling Vuong Pham, no actually money needed, just adjusting rows in accounting books of both parties. The (fake) buyer can use P-notes or use late payment or use the asset as collateral to borrow to finance the buy (kind of LBO but it is shady because of the valuation and lack of real business plan). In reality, it is just Vuong Pham selling to himself so the valuation and the payment is hogwash.

Vuong Pham has used it many times, with VIG and other entities. He sold the factory to VIG aka Vuong Pham and booked $500M profit few years ago. He sold R&F to Novatech aka himself for $1.5B, see https://www.reddit.com/r/VinFastComm/comments/1mr1a5i/surprise_vuong_pham_is_selling_to_vuong_pham_again/

He did it again very recently, sold VFTP to himself: https://www.reddit.com/r/VinFastComm/comments/1v7phyd/further_analysis_of_vuong_pham_selling_the/

Many other examples.

3/ Create a new company and use VIC as capital to borrow

Vuong Pham has created many new entities and company and he uses VIC (aka toilet paper) as charter capital. He then either sell or put these shares as collateral to borrow money for the supposed new entity and new business, because he cannot continue borrowing for the money losing Vinfast. He can use the raised money to loan back to Vinfast. The business has to be credible juiced with some PR but business plan remains dubious at best, it doesn't matter.

So many of them to name.

Vuong Pham and Hung Anh Ho use the three tricks again and again many times to loot money to the tune of $13B and more (accumulated loss of Vinfast), and to hide the billions of bad debt from the public. This truth is hidden from the Vietnam's public as no media dare to report. This is a top secret that can land you in jail but is displaying in plain sight if you know how to read public financial reports. Techcombank and Vin can silence reporters (with the help of the government police) but they cannot hide the flow of the money without creating a black hole that would not pass the audit. That is why logic and analysis is the most powerful tool to help you see through lies and deception, the powerful invisible tool that the communist government cannot take from you no matter what.

Center to all the tricks are the use of private shells, which are entities directedly 100% controlled by (received direct order from) Vuong Pham and Hung Anh Ho but are in the name of acquaintances and lieutenants, so that on paper, the shells are not related to Techcombank and Vingroup but in reality they belong to Vuong Pham and Hung Anh Ho.

Yearly audited financial report is meaningless because the auditors only check if the items are in the right category and if the arithmetic is correct, but they have no business to check the shells and investigate the shells.

Using private shell companies (aka directly related but appear to be independent) to hide debt, book profit, and borrow money are loopholes that have been used by many crooks around the world, most notably by the now infamous Enron, but in the case of Vuong Pham and Techcombank, fueled by the communist government's protection and green light, the use of shells by Hung Anh Ho and Vuong Pham is rampant and a key instrument in their financial frauds at the level that has not ever seen before in Vietnam, and even in the world: The US bankrupted Enron is a child compared to Vuong Pham Vingroup in their level of shadiness and frauds.

just by reading the headlines. Because the whole country is under government media control so they put out news as they want. There is only one party which is the commie, and they can cook what ever number they want, no check.

For example, the headline reads interest rate is falling because the media is directed to say so, the banks were told to do so, but in reality, banks are using under the table dealing with customers for a much higher interest rate. This is because the economy is in need of much more money for Vin and Lam To mega projects and there is a huge shortage between money needed and money raised and hence the interest must be up.

The inflation figure of 4.7% is also fake. House price has been 30-50% increased and in some place nearly doubled over the past few year, and as such house rent increased greatly too. Gas price is elevated. Food price increased 15-20%.

So the key point is that the whole Vietnam country is run by the communist with total 100% control of the media, and many if not virtually all of the numbers are fake and not reliable. The number they put out look good but the reality is not that good.

Same for Vin and Vuong Pham. They cooked the financial book to make it look better. They hide and censor the bad truth.

Same for Tecombank and other banks.

Vingroup is the huge ticking bomb in plain sight with $43B liabilities and growing but there is zero media coverage.

The whole country lives on lies and deception, from the highest level and the biggest corporation down.

To see through the lies, you need to use logic and common sense.

I know immediately when reading the headline "Vuong Pham selling VFTP to a private buyer" without reading the content that it is Vuong Pham selling to Vuong Pham, because I have covered him for the last 3 years, and I know for sure no real buyer has the financial motive and the money to buy the losing entity except Vuong Pham. That is the logic. And it turns out exactly that.

Sonnie Tran has done an excellent detailed analysis here: https://www.reddit.com/r/VinFastComm/comments/1v7phyd/further_analysis_of_vuong_pham_selling_the/

I used to do more investigative financial analysis like that but after 3 years, it became apparent to me that all Vuong Pham doing is just financial tricks and debt flipping and cooking all the time to support the house of cards. It is so predictable. I have made an easy to understand summary here: https://www.reddit.com/r/VinFastComm/comments/1vmyy81/a_101_beginner_guide_to_dirty_financial_tricks/

Lately, I have tried chat gpt to do the financial analysis and it is pretty impressive. I gave it the task of analyzing the VFTP transaction and its answer is below, very very impressive if not outstanding, it is even better than mine or Sonnie Tran in some aspects.

One thing chat gpt and many official media, such as Reuters, do not dare to say is that they have to say in reporting words and try to appear impartial until there is an investigation and conclusion from the authority (which will never be) or evidence of Vuong Pham interact with the shell's people (which will never be), but we human when reading the evidence can conclude with 100% sure , not 99% sure but 100% sure, that Ngoc Quy is a shell of Vuong Pham and Hung Anh Ho, ie they are 100% controlled by Vuong Pham, and some people with long association to Vuong Pham just gives the name for legal purposes. So the shell is independent legally, but in reality, they are 100% controlled by Vuong Pham and Hung Anh Ho, created and used for nefarious financial purposes.

Read the analysis below, it is very long but worth it.

---

1. The strongest piece of evidence is actually VinFast's own SEC filing

VinFast's May 2026 proxy explicitly says:

• total purchase price: VND13,309.6 billion (~US$530m).

The initial ownership was:

Buyer	Initial VFTP stake
Tương Lai	49.0%
Ngọc Quý	46.5%
Phạm Nhật Vượng	4.4%
Total	99.9%

But the filing then says that after the transaction, transfers among the purchasers and their affiliates are intended to occur so that:

Tương Lai → ~95.5%

Vượng → <5%

This is a very unusual structure if the objective were simply to sell the factories to unrelated third parties.

2. The key sentence about Ngọc Quý

This is probably the most important sentence in the entire filing.

VinFast says:

>

And later, when discussing conflicts of interest, VinFast goes further:

>“The key shareholders of Tuong Lai and Ngoc Quy, the other Purchasers in the Share Transfer, are also long-standing business partners and associates of Mr. Pham.”

The company's own SEC disclosure acknowledges that the key shareholders of both buying entities are long-standing business partners/associates of Vuong.

3. Ngọc Quý's ownership structure is interesting

The SEC filing identifies five Ngọc Quý shareholders:

Person	Ownership
Nguyễn Mạnh Cường	30.00%
Phạm Xuân Đức	26.00%
Phạm Quốc Nhật	20.00%
Nguyễn Văn Thu	19.28%
Ngạc Văn Lượng	4.72%
Total	100%

And the filing says these represent the voting rights as well.

The registered legal representative of Ngọc Quý is Phạm Xuân Đức. Public company-registration databases list the company at the Dream City project in Hưng Yên and identify Đức as legal representative.

So this is not:

Ngọc Quý → unknown institutional fund

It is:

five private individuals → Ngọc Quý → 46.5% VFTP

and VinFast itself tells shareholders that key people in this group are long-standing business partners/associates of Vuong.

4. Now look at the transaction from Vuong's perspective

This is where your “selling to himself” hypothesis becomes economically interesting.

Before transaction:

VinFast/Vingroup ecosystem

owns:

VFTP

which owns/operates the Vietnamese manufacturing assets.

After transaction:

Tương Lai + Ngọc Quý + Vuong

own:

VFTP

But then the planned post-closing reshuffling is:

Tương Lai ~95.5%

Vuong <5%

So the ultimate control moves from:

VinFast → outside buyers

to something closer to:

Tương Lai → 95.5%

where Tương Lai itself has an unusually strong connection to the Vin ecosystem.

Reuters highlighted exactly this concern: Nguyen Hoai Nam took control of Tương Lai only shortly before the factory transaction, while Tương Lai itself had previously been connected to VinFast. Reuters described the transaction as raising governance questions because of the connections between the buyers and Vuong/Vingroup.

5. Tương Lai is arguably even more interesting than Ngọc Quý

The history is quite striking.

Tương Lai was formerly Novatech Research and Development JSC.

According to VinFast's filing, Tương Lai:

• currently engages in real-estate investment;
• licenses certain first-generation EV IP to VinFast.

Reuters reported that Tương Lai was previously carved out from VinFast and that Nguyen Hoai Nam acquired control shortly before the VFTP transaction. Reuters says Nam subsequently controlled approximately 91.99% of contributed capital / 82.58% voting rights in Tương Lai.

6. But there's an important counterargument

VinFast explicitly says:

>Tương Lai and Ngọc Quý are independent third parties and are not related to VinFast's directors.

And Grant Thornton concluded that the VND13.3096T price was fair from a financial perspective and not prejudicial to VinFast/minority shareholders.

The price was negotiated at approximately:

VND13.31T

which was equal to the post-split consolidated net book value at 31 March 2026.

Grant Thornton also used DCF analysis and concluded the consideration was within its valuation framework.

So we cannot simply say:

>“The factory was transferred for a fake price.”

There isn't evidence for that.

7. Where I think the real question lies

The important question isn't actually:

“Was the VND13.3T price fair?”

It's:

“Who ultimately bears the economic risk and who ultimately controls VFTP after the transaction?”

Because if Tương Lai/Ngọc Quý are genuinely independent:

then VinFast has achieved a real:

asset-light disposal

But if Tương Lai + Ngọc Quý are effectively Vuong-controlled or Vuong-aligned vehicles, then the transaction is much different.

It becomes:

VinFast

↓ sells VFTP

Vuong-aligned entities

↓ assume VFTP debt

VinFast removes debt from consolidated balance sheet

while

Vuong/Vin ecosystem retains effective economic control over the manufacturing assets.

That would be much closer to an internal restructuring / liability transfer than a genuine third-party disposal.

8. And there is one extremely important accounting feature

The buyers aren't just buying a clean factory.

The SEC filing says VFTP continues to assume essentially the manufacturing-related financial indebtedness, including:

• foreign-currency loans
• VND bonds/loans from unrelated third-party creditors
• certain lease obligations with Vingroup affiliates.

And the transaction involves approximately:

$530M purchase price

against a business carrying approximately:

$6.9–7B of liabilities/debt

Reuters reported the transaction as transferring roughly $7B of debt along with the manufacturing operations.

That is why I think the debt transfer, not the $530M purchase price, is the economically important part.

9. This is where Techcombank becomes extremely relevant

Now connect this to our previous TCB analysis.

If Tương Lai and Ngọc Quý are genuinely independent:

TCB potentially gets:

VinFast/Vingroup debt → transferred to new independent owners

which is good for TCB/VinFast's balance-sheet risk if the new owners can actually service it.

But if the buyers are effectively Vuong-aligned entities financed/structured through the same ecosystem, then:

VinFast debt

hasn't necessarily disappeared economically.

It has merely moved:

from

VinFast

to

Tương Lai / Ngọc Quý / VFTP

while the ultimate economic ecosystem remains connected to Vuong.

10. My current interpretation

I would not call this proven self-dealing yet.

But I think the evidence is strong enough to say:

This is not a normal third-party factory sale.

There are too many unusual elements:

1. Vuong is simultaneously seller-side CEO and buyer.
2. He personally buys 4.4%.
3. The other buyers' key shareholders are described by VinFast itself as long-standing business partners/associates of Vuong.
4. Ngọc Quý is a newly established entity with a very large capital base relative to its apparent operating history.
5. Tương Lai has a history intertwined with VinFast/IP.
6. Tương Lai only recently changed control before becoming the eventual ~95.5% owner.
7. The transaction transfers roughly $7B of debt along with the manufacturing assets.
8. Ngọc Quý is expected to disappear from the ultimate ownership structure after internal transfers.

That combination is exactly why Reuters described the transaction as raising governance concerns.

---

The five members disclosed for Ngọc Quý are:

Person	Ngọc Quý stake	What I can substantiate
Nguyễn Mạnh Cường	30.00%	🔴 Very strong Vin-network evidence
Phạm Xuân Đức	26.00%	🔴 Very strong Vin-network evidence
Phạm Quốc Nhật	20.00%	🔴 Very strong Vingroup/Vinpearl evidence
Nguyễn Văn Thu	19.28%	🟡 Insufficient public evidence so far
Ngạc Văn Lượng	4.72%	🔴 Strong Vin-network evidence

The ownership percentages and identities come from VinFast's transaction disclosure. VinFast itself says the key shareholders of Ngọc Quý are long-standing business partners and associates of Phạm Nhật Vượng.

1. Nguyễn Mạnh Cường — probably the most important person

30% of Ngọc Quý

The strongest historical link I found is Ánh Sao.

In 2021, Ánh Sao acquired five land plots at Vinhomes Smart City from Thái Sơn, a Vinhomes subsidiary. At the time:

• Nguyễn Mạnh Cường owned 55%
• Phạm Xuân Đức owned 45%
• Đức was General Director/legal representative.

The transaction involved land valued at more than VND7,000 billion.

Then in 2023, Ánh Sao's capital was increased to roughly VND7,555 billion, still with Cường 55% and Đức 45%, before the company was subsequently transferred to a Singapore entity associated with CapitaLand for the Lumi Hanoi development.

So we have:

Nguyễn Mạnh Cường

↓ 55%

Ánh Sao

↓ acquired land from

Vinhomes/Thái Sơn

↓ later

CapitaLand/Lumi Hanoi

That is a very unusual track record for someone who supposedly has nothing to do with the Vin ecosystem.

Even more interesting: NewCo

Public reporting also identifies Cường as having been associated with NewCo, a vehicle later involved in the restructuring involving Nam An.

I would treat the more aggressive claims about NewCo financing VinFast as unverified until we pull the actual bond/merger filings, but the corporate-history connection itself is worth investigating.

My assessment

Cường = very high probability of being a longstanding Vin-network businessman.

I would not call him a “Vingroup employee/subordinate” based on the evidence I have.

But calling him a completely independent stranger to Vingroup would be very difficult to defend.

2. Phạm Xuân Đức — equally important

26% of Ngọc Quý

His connection to Cường is particularly significant because they repeatedly appear together.

They jointly owned Ánh Sao:

Cường 55% + Đức 45%

and Đức was its General Director.

So two of Ngọc Quý's five shareholders are not independent historical actors:

They already operated together in a company that acquired Vinhomes land.

That's important.

Phố Hiến FC connection

This is an even cleaner historical link.

In 2018, Phố Hiến Football JSC was founded with:

• Đinh Ngọc Lân — 51%
• Nguyễn Vũ Hưng — 10%
• Phạm Xuân Đức — 9%
• Ngạc Văn Lượng — 5%
• Trần Kiên Cường — 10%
• Tân Á Đại Thành — 20%.

Vietnamese business press identified Đinh Ngọc Lân as a Vingroup person and described the other individual shareholders as people connected to Vingroup.

That gives us an extremely interesting overlap:

Ngọc Quý

Phạm Xuân Đức 26%

Ngạc Văn Lượng 4.72%

and historically:

Phố Hiến FC

Phạm Xuân Đức 9%

Ngạc Văn Lượng 5%

with the largest shareholder being a Vingroup executive/insider.

That is a real network connection, not speculation.

3. Ngạc Văn Lượng — only 4.72%, but potentially the strongest “people network” signal

This one is particularly interesting.

Lượng was a founding shareholder of Phố Hiến FC with:

5%

alongside Phạm Xuân Đức at 9%.

And the largest shareholder, Đinh Ngọc Lân, was identified by Vietnamese business media as a Vingroup person and a senior person at Vingroup-related companies.

There's another piece of evidence that deserves attention.

An archived Vincom employee directory lists:

“Ngạc Văn Lượng”

among Vincom personnel.

I would be cautious here because the document is an old third-party-hosted copy rather than a current Vingroup corporate filing.

But if the identity is the same person—and the name is quite distinctive—it provides an additional direct link between Lượng and the Vin ecosystem.

This is the strongest preliminary conclusion I can make:

Ngạc Văn Lượng appears to have had a direct historical employment/organizational connection with Vincom, and subsequently became a shareholder alongside other Vingroup-connected individuals.

That makes his presence among Ngọc Quý's shareholders much more interesting.

4. Phạm Quốc Nhật — very strong Vingroup connection, but through a different route

20% of Ngọc Quý

This is probably the most documented person after Cường/Đức.

In Công ty Đầu tư và Phát triển Du lịch Phú Quốc, which was originally established with Vingroup/Vinpearl as the major shareholder:

2014

Vinpearl/Vingroup held:

55%

while Phạm Quốc Nhật held:

10%

alongside other individuals.

Then after subsequent capital changes:

2017

Vinpearl:

30%

Phạm Quốc Nhật:

15%

with other individual shareholders holding the rest.

This company was the owner/operator of major Vin-related assets including:

• Vinpearl Phú Quốc
• VinOasis
• Vinpearl Safari
• Vinpearl Discovery
• related Phú Quốc resort assets.

So Nhật wasn't merely doing business with some random company that happened to be related to Vin.

He was a 15% shareholder in a company originally created by Vingroup/Vinpearl with a 55% founding stake.

That is a very significant historical connection.

5. Nhật also appears in multiple current property vehicles

Current corporate-registration information shows Phạm Quốc Nhật as legal representative of:

• Ngôi Sao Phương Nam – Hanoi branch
• Cuộc Sống Mới
• Cam Hòa Complex Investment
• Phú Quốc International Passenger Port Investment & Construction
• Ban Mai-related entities.

Most interesting is Ngôi Sao Phương Nam.

Its Hanoi branch is currently represented by Nhật.

Historical reporting identifies Ngôi Sao Phương Nam as a Vingroup-linked company and reports that Vingroup originally held a controlling stake in it. This is another piece of the network connecting Nhật to Vingroup-associated SPVs.

So Nhật isn't just:

“20% owner of Ngọc Quý.”

He has a long history of appearing in Vingroup/Vinpearl-related property vehicles.

6. Nguyễn Văn Thu — this is the weak link

19.28%

This is the person for whom I currently cannot find enough reliable public evidence to establish a Vingroup relationship.

And that's important.

I don't want to repeat the claim that all five are Vingroup people when the evidence doesn't support that.

My current classification:

Nguyễn Văn Thu = UNKNOWN

not:

independent

and not:

Vingroup nominee

We need more information.

7. The network is starting to look quite different

Put the people together:

                    PHẠM NHẬT VƯỢNG
                           │
             ┌─────────────┴─────────────┐
             │                           │
          VINGROUP                    VINPEARL
             │                           │
       Đinh Ngọc Lân              Phú Quốc Tourism
             │                           │
             │                     Phạm Quốc Nhật
             │                           │
             └──────────┬────────────────┘
                        │
                PHẠM XUÂN ĐỨC
                        │
                NGẠC VĂN LƯỢNG
                        │
                NGUYỄN MẠNH CƯỜNG
                        │
                        │
                  ÁNH SAO
                        │
                  Vinhomes land
                        │
                   CapitaLand

And separately:

Phạm Quốc Nhật
       │
       ├── Ngôi Sao Phương Nam
       ├── Cuộc Sống Mới
       ├── Cam Hòa
       └── Phú Quốc Tourism

Now put all five into:

              NGỌC QUÝ
                 │
      ┌──────────┼──────────┐
      │          │          │
  Cường 30%   Đức 26%    Nhật 20%
      │          │          │
      └────┬─────┘          │
           │                │
       Ánh Sao       Vingroup/Vinpearl
           │
      Vinhomes land

       Lượng 4.72%
           │
      Phố Hiến FC
           │
      Vingroup people

       Thu 19.28%
           │
         ????

That is not what I would expect from a random consortium formed to buy a $530M factory.

8. The Ánh Sao connection is particularly powerful

This is the part I'd emphasize.

Two of Ngọc Quý's largest shareholders:

Cường — 30%

Đức — 26%

together own:

56% of Ngọc Quý

Those same two people previously owned:

100% of Ánh Sao

with the exact same relationship:

Cường 55% + Đức 45%.

And Ánh Sao was the company that acquired five Vinhomes Smart City land plots worth >VND7T from the Vinhomes ecosystem.

Then that asset was ultimately transferred to CapitaLand and became part of Lumi Hanoi.

That's a much stronger signal than merely saying:

>

9. Now combine Cường + Đức + Lượng

These three collectively own:

30 + 26 + 4.72 = 60.72% of Ngọc Quý.

And all three appear together in the historical Phố Hiến FC shareholder structure:

• Đức 9%
• Lượng 5%
• with Vingroup-connected Đinh Ngọc Lân at 51%.

Meanwhile:

Cường + Đức

were the two owners of Ánh Sao.

So we have two separate historical networks converging inside Ngọc Quý.

That is much more significant than any single person's connection.

10. What this does to the “Vuong sold it to himself” thesis

I would now upgrade the thesis.

Previously I would have said:

>

After investigating the individuals, I would say:

There is substantial evidence that Ngọc Quý is composed largely of longstanding Vingroup-network individuals/business partners rather than an unrelated third-party investor.

But I still would not say:

>

because I have not found the decisive evidence showing:

Vuong → funding → nominee → Ngọc Quý

or:

Vuong → beneficial ownership/control → Ngọc Quý.

That's the missing link.

11. The biggest smoking gun still missing: where did the VND10.65T come from?

This is now the #1 question.

Ngọc Quý:

Before:

VND10.527T charter capital

After:

VND21.1776T

Increase:

~VND10.651T

and this happened immediately before the VFTP transaction.

SBBS independently reports the same doubling of capital in January 2026.

The five shareholders' implied capital contributions after the increase are approximately:

Shareholder	%	Implied capital
Nguyễn Mạnh Cường	30%	6.353T
Phạm Xuân Đức	26%	5.506T
Phạm Quốc Nhật	20%	4.236T
Nguyễn Văn Thu	19.28%	4.082T
Ngạc Văn Lượng	4.72%	0.999T
Total	100%	21.178T

If these are genuinely their own funds, they are extremely wealthy private investors.

If instead the capital was funded by:

• bank loans,
• guarantees,
• shareholder loans,
• Vingroup/VinFast-related entities,
• other SPVs,
• nominee financing,

then the entire interpretation changes.

12. My ranking of the five

🔴 Tier 1 — strongest evidence

Nguyễn Mạnh Cường

Phạm Xuân Đức

Phạm Quốc Nhật

All three have substantial historical connections to the Vingroup/Vinpearl property ecosystem.

🔴 Tier 1.5

Ngạc Văn Lượng

Smaller ownership, but the Phố Hiến + apparent historical Vincom connection makes him particularly interesting.

🟡 Tier 3

Nguyễn Văn Thu

Currently unexplained.

----

1. The actual Technocom veterans

VinFast's own transaction disclosure identifies two people among Tương Lai's shareholders as longstanding associates of Phạm Nhật Vượng dating back to Technocom in Ukraine:

Nguyễn Thúy Hà

• Worked 17 years at Technocom Group in Ukraine
• Rose to General Director of Technocom LLC
• Experience in manufacturing, financing and capital-intensive operations
• Subsequently became an investor in SGC Investment & Construction, involved in Vinhomes developments.

Phạm Khắc Phương

• Started at Technocom in Ukraine in 1994
• Began as an engineer
• Rose to Factory Director
• Has 30+ years of experience in engineering, manufacturing and real estate
• Since 2022, CEO of VinLandscape Development & Investment.

These are genuine Technocom veterans.

And that matters because they are connected to Tương Lai, the entity that ultimately is supposed to hold ~95.5% of VFTP.

2. What about the five Ngọc Quý people?

Here's what I can establish:

Ngọc Quý shareholder	Technocom Ukraine evidence	Vingroup/Vin evidence
Nguyễn Mạnh Cường	❌ None found	🔴 Strong
Phạm Xuân Đức	❌ None found	🔴 Strong
Phạm Quốc Nhật	❌ None found	🔴 Strong
Nguyễn Văn Thu	❌ None found	⚪ Unknown
Ngạc Văn Lượng	❌ None found	🔴 Strong
Nguyễn Thúy Hà (Tương Lai)	🟢 17 years	🟢 Very strong
Phạm Khắc Phương (Tương Lai)	🟢 Since 1994	🟢 Very strong

3. But this actually makes the structure MORE interesting

Look at the two acquisition vehicles separately.

Tương Lai

The ownership network contains:

Nguyễn Thúy Hà

→ former General Director of Technocom Ukraine

and

Phạm Khắc Phương

→ former Technocom factory director

These are people who literally worked with Vuong during the Technocom era. VinFast explicitly says they have been business partners with Vuong since the early Technocom period.

Then:

Ngọc Quý

doesn't appear to contain former Technocom executives.

Instead, it contains people with later Vingroup/Vinhomes/Vinpearl transaction histories.

That looks like two different generations of the same network.

4. The network could therefore be viewed as two layers

Layer 1 — Technocom veterans

PHẠM NHẬT VƯỢNG
       │
   TECHNOCOM
       │
 ┌─────┴─────┐
 │           │
Nguyễn     Phạm Khắc
Thúy Hà    Phương
 │           │
 └─────┬─────┘
       │
    TƯƠNG LAI
       │
      VFTP

The Technocom relationship here is documented, not inferred.

Layer 2 — later Vingroup business network

          VINGROUP
             │
     ┌───────┼────────┐
     │       │        │
   VHM     VPL      VCM
     │       │        │
     │       │        │
 Cường/Đức Nhật     Lượng
     │       │        │
     └───────┼────────┘
             │
         NGỌC QUÝ
             │
           VFTP

This second layer is where the Ngọc Quý shareholders fit.

5. Nguyễn Mạnh Cường is especially interesting

We now have two independent pieces of evidence about Cường.

A. Vingroup share transaction

In January 2020, Nguyễn Mạnh Cường transferred 6,175,256 VIC shares to Công ty CP Tập đoàn Đầu tư Việt Nam, the investment vehicle controlled by Phạm Nhật Vượng.

The shares were worth roughly VND700 billion at the time.

The important detail:

>Contemporary reporting explicitly says the five individuals transferring the shares were not Vingroup executives.

So Cường was apparently an outside shareholder/business associate, not a formal Vingroup employee.

B. Ánh Sao

Cường later owned 55% of Ánh Sao, alongside Phạm Xuân Đức's 45%, and the company acquired Vinhomes Smart City land worth more than VND7T before eventually being sold to CapitaLand.

So Cường looks much more like:

Vingroup business associate / transaction participant

rather than:

Technocom employee.

That's an important distinction.

6. Phạm Xuân Đức

Same story.

I haven't found credible evidence that Đức worked for Technocom Ukraine.

But his later Vingroup-network footprint is substantial:

45% Ánh Sao

General Director Ánh Sao

Vinhomes Smart City land transaction

9% Phố Hiến FC

alongside Vingroup-associated people.

So again:

not proven Technocom employee

but:

strong post-Technocom Vingroup network participant.

7. Ngạc Văn Lượng

This is another person where the later Vingroup connection is much stronger than a Technocom connection.

Lượng held:

3.63%

of VCM when Vingroup created the vehicle to hold VinCommerce/VinMart. Vingroup itself initially held 64.3%.

And in December 2025 he purchased:

4.88 million VPL shares

worth approximately VND500 billion.

Even more interestingly, reporting identified him as the husband of a Vinpearl executive.

So Lượng's relationship is actually quite close to the modern Vinpearl network.

But again:

I have not found evidence that he was a Technocom employee in Ukraine.

8. Phạm Quốc Nhật

Again, no Technocom evidence found.

But his Vingroup/Vinpearl history is substantial.

He was a founding shareholder of the Phú Quốc tourism company alongside Vingroup/Vinpearl.

And he subsequently appeared in Vingroup-linked property vehicles.

So Nhật appears to belong to the later Vietnamese property/Vinpearl network, rather than the original Ukrainian Technocom network.

9. Nguyễn Văn Thu

This is still the mystery.

I cannot establish:

• Technocom employment
• Vingroup employment
• Vinhomes employment
• Vinpearl employment

from sufficiently reliable public sources.

And he owns:

19.28% of Ngọc Quý

which is too large to ignore.

This is one of the biggest unresolved pieces of the puzzle.

10. There is a much more important discovery

The Technocom connection is actually concentrated on Tương Lai, not Ngọc Quý.

VinFast's own filing says Tương Lai's key shareholders include:

Nguyễn Thúy Hà

who spent 17 years at Technocom, becoming General Director;

and

Phạm Khắc Phương

who joined Technocom in 1994 and became factory director.

And VinFast explicitly says these people have been business partners of Phạm Nhật Vượng since the early Technocom period.

That's very significant because Tương Lai is supposed to become the ~95.5% owner of VFTP after the subsequent transfers.

11. So the ownership architecture looks like this

The more complete picture is:

                 PHẠM NHẬT VƯỢNG
                        │
              ┌─────────┴─────────┐
              │                   │
       OLD TECHNOCOM          LATER VIN
       NETWORK                 NETWORK
              │                   │
       ┌──────┴──────┐       ┌────┴──────────┐
       │             │       │               │
 Nguyễn Thúy     Phạm Khắc  Cường          Đức
    Hà             Phương    │               │
       │             │       └─────┬─────────┘
       └──────┬──────┘             │
              │                   Ánh Sao
          TƯƠNG LAI                 │
              │                  Vinhomes
              │
              │       ┌────────────┼────────────┐
              │       │            │            │
              │      Nhật        Lượng         Thu
              │       │            │            ?
              │       └────────────┴────────────┘
              │                  │
              │              NGỌC QUÝ
              │                  │
              └───────────┬──────┘
                          │
                         VFTP

This is not proof of common beneficial ownership.

But it shows why the transaction deserves scrutiny.

12. My revised assessment

After specifically checking the Technocom history, I would classify the evidence as:

Proven

Tương Lai has direct Technocom veterans in its shareholder group.

Strongly supported

Ngọc Quý's major shareholders have extensive later Vingroup/Vinhomes/Vinpearl business relationships.

But highly relevant

VinFast itself describes Ngọc Quý's shareholders as having been business partners with Phạm Nhật Vượng, while separately documenting the explicit Technocom history of the Tương Lai principals.

So I would not use “Technocom employees” as the argument for Ngọc Quý.

The stronger argument is:

>Tương Lai = old Technocom network; Ngọc Quý = later Vingroup transaction network.

And both converge on the same asset:

VFTP + roughly $7B of manufacturing liabilities.

The next investigation I'd do is map every company/directorship/shareholding of Cường, Đức, Nhật, Lượng and Thu from 2000–2026, then cross-reference those companies against Vingroup, Vinhomes, Vinpearl, Vincom, VinFast, Technocom veterans, Masterise and Techcombank. That would give us a proper network graph rather than relying on individual anecdotes.

I went one level deeper and found a materially stronger network than we had before. The biggest new finding is that Nguyễn Văn Thu is not an unknown outsider: he was one of the named selling shareholders of Vinhomes in its 2018 IPO/listing process, alongside Nguyễn Mạnh Cường and Nguyễn Thúy Hà.

That changes the picture substantially.

1. The five Ngọc Quý shareholders — reconstructed network

Ngọc Quý currently has:

Person	Ngọc Quý	Historical Vin/Vingroup connection I can substantiate	Confidence
Nguyễn Mạnh Cường	30.00%	Former Vinhomes shareholder; 55% of Ánh Sao; NewCo legal representative	🔴 Very strong
Phạm Xuân Đức	26.00%	45% of Ánh Sao; Phố Hiến shareholder	🔴 Very strong
Phạm Quốc Nhật	20.00%	15% Phú Quốc Tourism; former 41.35% Phương Đông Hà Nội	🔴 Strong
Nguyễn Văn Thu	19.28%	Vinhomes IPO shareholder: 33.37m shares	🔴 Very strong
Ngạc Văn Lượng	4.72%	VCM/VinMart network; Phố Hiến; Vincom/Vinpearl network	🔴 Strong

The five identities and percentages are explicitly disclosed by VinFast. VinFast also states that some Ngọc Quý shareholders have been business partners with Phạm Nhật Vượng.

So the earlier characterization of Thu as “unknown” was too conservative.

2. Nguyễn Văn Thu — the new important discovery

This is probably the most significant new finding.

In Vinhomes' 7 May 2018 IPO offering circular, Vinhomes explicitly lists:

Nguyễn Văn Thu — 33,372,500 Vinhomes shares

as one of the company's selling shareholders.

The same list includes:

• Nguyễn Mạnh Cường — 6,000,300 shares
• Nguyễn Thúy Hà — 32,765,900
• Hoàng Quốc Thủy — 69,000,000
• Cao Văn Chính — 45,000,000
• Trần Kim Quyền — 126,850,000
• Bùi Hồng Minh — 80,000,000
• etc.

This isn't a vague “associated with Vinhomes” connection.

It is a primary Vinhomes securities disclosure.

Thu therefore had a direct historical equity position in Vinhomes.

And now:

Thu → 19.28% Ngọc Quý

which is approximately:

VND4.08T

of Ngọc Quý's VND21.18T capital.

That's a very different profile from an unknown individual appearing in a newly capitalized company.

3. The really striking overlap: Cường + Thu

The 2018 Vinhomes IPO document shows that:

Nguyễn Mạnh Cường

and

Nguyễn Văn Thu

were both Vinhomes shareholders selling shares in the same IPO.

Now they are:

Cường — 30% Ngọc Quý

Thu — 19.28% Ngọc Quý

Combined:

49.28% of Ngọc Quý

That means nearly half of Ngọc Quý is now controlled by two individuals who were both documented Vinhomes shareholders in 2018.

This is considerably stronger evidence than the earlier “Dream City address” argument.

4. Cường's history is even deeper

Cường has at least three distinct historical links.

A. Vinhomes shareholder

2018:

6,000,300 Vinhomes shares

as a named selling shareholder.

B. Ánh Sao

Cường owned:

55%

of Ánh Sao.

Phạm Xuân Đức owned:

45%

Together they controlled 100%.

Ánh Sao acquired five Vinhomes Smart City plots from Thái Sơn, a Vinhomes subsidiary, with the project investment value reported at VND7.075T.

Then in 2023:

Ánh Sao capital → ~VND7.555T

still:

Cường 55% / Đức 45%

before the company was transferred to CapitaLand.

C. NewCo

This one connects Cường to Techcombank/TCBS, although we should be careful about identity matching.

NewCo Service was established in 2017 and its registered legal representative was Nguyễn Mạnh Cường.

In 2019:

NewCo issued VND1.5T bonds

and Techcombank was the sole investor; TCBS was the arranger/custodian. NewCo also borrowed several thousand billion from Techcombank, with total reported Techcombank exposure approaching VND6T.

The security package included:

• 26 million shares in a large real-estate group
• NewCo's rights under its Grand World Phú Quốc arrangements.

This is extremely relevant to our TCB analysis.

It establishes that the person now holding 30% of Ngọc Quý has a documented corporate history involving:

Vinhomes + Vingroup ecosystem + Techcombank financing.

I would still avoid asserting that every NewCo transaction is directly attributable to this same Cường without a stronger biographical identifier, but the corporate registry does name Nguyễn Mạnh Cường as NewCo's legal representative.

5. Phạm Xuân Đức — Cường's long-term partner

This is another very strong connection.

Ánh Sao

Cường:

55%

Đức:

45%

They jointly accumulated the Vinhomes Smart City assets and subsequently sold the vehicle to CapitaLand.

Phố Hiến FC

In 2018, Đức owned:

9%

of Phố Hiến FC.

The largest shareholder was:

Đinh Ngọc Lân — 51%

and the contemporary reporting identifies Lân as a Vingroup supervisory-board member and as holding supervisory positions at other Vingroup subsidiaries.

The other shareholders included:

• Ngạc Văn Lượng — 5%
• Nguyễn Vũ Hưng — 10%
• Trần Kiên Cường — 10%.

So:

Đức + Lượng

were already partners in a company controlled by a Vingroup insider.

6. Ngạc Văn Lượng — the Vincom/VinMart connection is now very strong

The 2019 reporting on Phố Hiến FC gives us a useful historical chain.

It explicitly identifies Lượng as:

a founding shareholder of VCM

the company that received the VinMart/VinMart+ retail chain from Vingroup.

And Lượng simultaneously held:

5% of Phố Hiến FC

alongside Đức and Vingroup-linked Đinh Ngọc Lân.

There is also a 2018 Vincom AGM document in which Ngạc Văn Lượng is identified as a supervisory shareholder/member of the vote-counting committee, providing another direct Vincom corporate record.

So I am now comfortable classifying Lượng as:

documented Vingroup/Vincom-network participant

rather than merely “possibly associated.”

7. Phạm Quốc Nhật — different network, but still highly relevant

Japan's history is more connected to the Vinpearl/property side.

Phú Quốc Tourism

Phạm Quốc Nhật was a shareholder in:

CTCP Đầu tư và Phát triển Du lịch Phú Quốc

with:

15%

while the company was heavily associated with Vingroup/Vinpearl. Contemporary reporting identifies him as a 15% shareholder.

Phương Đông Hà Nội

More interestingly, Nhật was:

50% shareholder

and:

General Director/legal representative

of BĐS Phương Đông Hà Nội when it was founded in 2011.

By 2019 his ownership had fallen to:

41.347%

before eventually leaving the direct shareholder structure.

That company subsequently became central to the restructuring of the The Spirit of Saigon/Saigon Glory project.

This is where the TCB connection becomes interesting, although we should distinguish documented facts from secondary reporting about the financing chain.

8. Now the network has a very obvious pattern

We can divide the five people into three overlapping historical networks.

Network A — Vinhomes shareholders

Nguyễn Mạnh Cường

Nguyễn Văn Thu

Both were named Vinhomes selling shareholders in 2018.

Combined Ngọc Quý ownership:

49.28%

Network B — Vinhomes land / Vingroup individuals

Nguyễn Mạnh Cường

Phạm Xuân Đức

→ Ánh Sao

→ Vinhomes Smart City

→ VND7T+ development

→ CapitaLand/Lumi Hanoi.

Combined Ngọc Quý ownership:

56%

Network C — Vingroup/Vincom/Vinpearl

Ngạc Văn Lượng

→ VCM/VinMart

→ Phố Hiến

→ Vingroup-linked shareholders.

Phạm Quốc Nhật

→ Phú Quốc Tourism

→ 15%

→ Vinpearl ecosystem.

Combined:

24.72%

9. The overlap is the important part

This isn't three unrelated groups.

They overlap:

                    VINGROUP
                       │
        ┌──────────────┼───────────────┐
        │              │               │
      VHM            VINCOM          VINPEARL
        │              │               │
        │              │               │
   Cường ──────┐     Lượng          Nhật
        │       │
      Thu       │
        │       │
        └─── Đức┘
             │
          Ánh Sao
             │
       Vinhomes land
             │
        CapitaLand

And separately:

        Cường
          │
        NewCo
          │
      Techcombank
          │
        TCBS

This is the piece that makes your original hypothesis much more interesting.

10. And there is another important Ngọc Quý fact

Ngọc Quý isn't just a newly created company sitting at a Dream City address.

Its corporate registration shows:

Established:

9 August 2023

Original registered office:

Dream City

Legal representative:

Phạm Xuân Đức

And it subsequently established branches in:

• Hải Phòng — inside Vincom Plaza Lê Thánh Tông
• Nha Trang
• HCMC.

The Hải Phòng branch is particularly interesting:

>Ngọc Quý's branch is registered inside Vincom Plaza Hải Phòng.

And Đức is its legal representative.

That doesn't prove ownership by Vingroup — a company can rent space in a Vincom mall.

But when combined with the shareholder histories, it becomes another network indicator.

11. The Hoàng Long connection is also now confirmed at the legal-representative level

This is another important update.

Công ty TNHH Đầu tư và Phát triển Bất động sản Hoàng Long

was established in July 2025.

Its legal representative is:

Phạm Xuân Đức

The same person who is:

• 26% Ngọc Quý shareholder
• Ngọc Quý legal representative
• Ánh Sao's former 45% shareholder/General Director
• Phố Hiến shareholder.

That gives us:

Ngọc Quý → Phạm Xuân Đức → Hoàng Long

rather than Hoàng Long being some completely separate unknown entity.

I would not yet call the reported VND3.125T gain “fake profit.” We need Vingroup/Vinhomes's actual transaction note and Hoàng Long's acquisition accounting before making that accusation.

But the legal connection is now clear enough to warrant deeper examination.

12. Here's the most important table

Historical overlap by person

Person	Vinhomes shareholder	Vinhomes land	Vincom/VCM	Vinpearl	Vingroup SPV	TCB/TCBS link
Cường	🔴	🔴	—	—	🔴	🔴 NewCo
Đức	—	🔴	—	—	🔴	🟡 indirect
Nhật	—	🟡	—	🔴	🔴	🔴/🟡
Thu	🔴	—	—	—	?	?
Lượng	—	—	🔴	🔴	🔴	🟡
Total Ngọc Quý ownership	49.28%	56%	4.72%	20%+	>80%	meaningful

The last column needs caution because not every connection is a direct TCB relationship.

13. The most important new finding for your “Vuong sold it to himself” thesis

I would now describe the evidence this way:

Before this investigation:

Hypothesis:

>Ngọc Quý might be a Vuong-aligned shell.

After the investigation:

We can substantiate that:

1. 49.28% of Ngọc Quý is held by two former Vinhomes shareholders — Cường and Thu.
2. 56% is held by Cường + Đức, who previously jointly owned the Vinhomes Smart City-linked Ánh Sao.
3. 60.72% is held by Cường + Đức + Lượng, who had already appeared together in the Vingroup-linked Phố Hiến network.
4. Nhật has a documented 15% historical position in the Vingroup/Vinpearl-linked Phú Quốc Tourism company.
5. Cường is the legal representative of NewCo, and NewCo had a VND1.5T bond entirely bought by Techcombank, with TCBS as arranger.
6. Đức is Ngọc Quý's legal representative and also the legal representative of Hoàng Long.
7. Ngọc Quý itself is headquartered at Dream City, and its Hải Phòng branch is in Vincom Plaza Hải Phòng.
8. VinFast itself says some Ngọc Quý shareholders have been business partners with Phạm Nhật Vượng.

That's a very dense network.

Ngọc Quý is almost certainly not a random newly formed third-party buyer.

The public record now shows multiple independent historical intersections with Vinhomes, Vingroup, Vincom, Vinpearl and Techcombank, including two shareholders who were directly disclosed Vinhomes shareholders in 2018.

but they hide it.

The trick is to use shells that appear to be unrelated so that the debt does not show up on the balance sheet, but in reality, these shells are directly controlled by Hung Anh Ho and Vuong Pham. Some name: Nam An, Ngoc Quy, and many other shells.

These shenanigans are not reflected on financial report as they are designed so, but it is absolutely the truth that Tech and Vin uses shells to hide debt and that has been analyzed by me and Sonnie Tran many times.

I ask chat gpt to do an analysis for "analyze techcombank risk on vingroup" and its answer is below. Certainly, it only reads the financial report and does not know about the shells. Still the analysis is pretty spot on with publicly available information.

Chat gpt does not know about TCB tricks. Another example is that TCB actually helped Vuong Pham spun off VFTP to avoid billions $ in bad debt, which is the reality. See the analysis here: https://www.reddit.com/r/VinFastComm/comments/1v7phyd/further_analysis_of_vuong_pham_selling_the/

TCB is hiding a huge debt related to the failed Vingroup, Vinhomes, Vinfast from the public using various trick.

----

Yes. I would separate Techcombank’s Vingroup risk into 4 layers, because simply looking for “Vingroup” in TCB’s related-party note materially understates the economic exposure.

Bottom line

My assessment: TCB has meaningful Vingroup/Vin ecosystem risk, but I do not see evidence from the 2Q26 financial statements that Vingroup alone is large enough to threaten TCB’s solvency under a normal stress scenario.

The bigger risk is concentration + collateral correlation + refinancing, rather than one giant direct VinFast loan.

I would rate the current risk:

Risk	My assessment
Direct TCB loan to VIC/VHM/VinFast	🟡 Medium / not fully disclosed
Vinhomes project + homebuyer exposure	🟠 High
VinFast exposure	🟡 Medium, but potentially nonlinear
Vin-related bonds through TCB/TCBS	🟠 High ecosystem exposure, lower direct bank exposure
Real-estate concentration generally	🔴 High
Ability of TCB to absorb a Vin shock	🟢 Strong
Risk of TCB becoming insolvent from Vin alone	🟢 Low under reasonable scenarios
Risk of meaningful earnings/BVPS hit	🟠 Real

1. The first important point: TCB's “related party” note does not capture all Vingroup exposure

This is critical.

TCB's 2Q26 financial statements define related parties based on accounting relationships such as common control, significant influence, directors/management relationships, etc.

In the actual 2Q26 related-party loan table, the disclosed corporate borrowers include:

• Eurowindow
• Nui Phao
• Masan Tungsten
• WinEco
• One Mount Distribution

but Vingroup, Vinhomes and VinFast do not appear in that table.

That does not mean TCB has zero economic exposure to Vin.

It means that Vingroup is not an accounting “related party” of TCB under the definition used in the financial statements.

This distinction is extremely important.

2. TCB's biggest Vin exposure is probably the real-estate ecosystem

TCB explicitly partners with Vinhomes and offers financing on numerous Vinhomes projects.

For example, TCB currently advertises financing for:

• Vinhomes Ocean Park
• Vinhomes Grand Park
• Vinhomes Smart City
• Vinhomes Royal Island
• Vinhomes Greenbay
• Vinhomes Golden River
• Vinhomes Ocean Park 3
• Vinhomes Grand Park, etc.

Loan-to-value can reach 70–80% on various projects.

This creates two different exposures:

A. Corporate/project loans

TCB lends directly or indirectly to developers/project entities.

B. Retail mortgages

A buyer purchases a Vinhomes apartment/house and borrows from TCB.

The second exposure is much safer than a pure unsecured corporate loan because the bank has the property as collateral.

But there is a catch:

>

That is the correlation risk.

3. TCB is already a highly real-estate-heavy bank

This is probably the most important risk statistic.

At the end of 2025, Vietcap estimated TCB's loans to real-estate developers at 30.7% of the entire loan portfolio, down from 33.3% a year earlier. TCB's stated objective was to reduce this to 20–25% over the next 3–5 years.

So if TCB has, say:

30.7% × ~850T loans ≈ ~261T

of developer exposure, that is already enormous.

But this is not Vingroup exposure.

It includes multiple developers.

That's why I would not use “30% real estate = 30% Vingroup.”

That would be a major analytical error.

4. Vingroup itself has a huge debt requirement

This is where the risk becomes interesting.

Vinhomes alone had more than VND162T of debt at the end of Q1/2026, including approximately VND99T of bank debt and VND59.6T of bonds.

That is obviously not TCB's exposure.

But it tells you something important:

Vingroup/Vinhomes is structurally dependent on continuous access to capital.

For TCB, the risk is therefore not simply:

>

It is:

>

That is a much more realistic stress scenario.

5. VinFast is a different risk

I would distinguish VinFast from Vinhomes.

TCB's 2025 annual report confirms that the TCB ecosystem participated in a VND5T VinFast bond issuance.

But:

Bond arranger ≠ bond holder ≠ lender.

This distinction is often lost in online discussions.

If TCBS arranges a VND5T VinFast bond:

• TCBS earns advisory/placement fees.
• Investors may own the bonds.
• TCB itself may have little or no direct credit exposure.

So you cannot automatically add the entire bond issuance to TCB's loan exposure.

6. But TCBS creates an additional ecosystem risk

TCB owns 79.8% of TCBS.

And TCBS is a major corporate-bond arranger.

KIS estimates that in 2025, Vingroup issued approximately:

• VND31T Vingroup bonds
• VND19.5T Vinhomes bonds
• VND12.5T VinFast Production & Trading bonds

with Vingroup-related issuers accounting for a substantial amount of the corporate-bond market.

But again:

This is not equivalent to VND63T of TCB bank loans.

It is better thought of as:

Vingroup → bond market → TCBS distribution/advisory → investors

rather than:

Vingroup → VND63T loan → TCB

That distinction materially reduces the direct solvency risk to TCB.

7. What happens if Vingroup actually defaults?

Let's do the exercise you really care about.

TCB's 2Q26 equity was approximately:

VND189.0T.

6M26 net profit attributable to shareholders was:

VND14.0T.

NPL was:

1.15%

and loan-loss coverage:

125.5%.

Basel II CAR:

15.0%.

So TCB has a substantial capital buffer.

8. Stress test

Because TCB does not disclose a single “Vingroup exposure” number, I would stress-test hypothetical exposure rather than pretend we know the exact figure.

Assume TCB economic Vin exposure:

Vin exposure	10% loss	30% loss	50% loss	100% loss
20T	2T	6T	10T	20T
30T	3T	9T	15T	30T
50T	5T	15T	25T	50T
70T	7T	21T	35T	70T
100T	10T	30T	50T	100T

Compare this with TCB's ~189T equity.

Example: 50T exposure

If TCB has an economic exposure of 50T and ultimately loses:

30% = 15T

That is approximately:

15 / 189 = 7.9% of equity

Painful, but very manageable.

Even:

50% loss = 25T

is about:

13.2% of equity.

Still not a solvency event by itself.

9. The dangerous scenario is much worse than a simple Vin default

The real nightmare is:

Vingroup problem

↓
Vinhomes sales slow
↓
property prices fall
↓
Vinhomes refinancing becomes harder
↓
project companies delay payments
↓
homebuyer defaults increase
↓
collateral values decline
↓
TCB's corporate RE loans deteriorate
↓
TCB's retail mortgage book deteriorates
↓
bond market weakens
↓
TCBS loses fees / faces mark-to-market and liquidity stress
↓
other developers also weaken

That is the scenario I would worry about.

Not “VinFast misses one payment.”

10. Why I don't think TCB is currently in a dangerous position

There are several substantial buffers.

Capital

CAR is 15.0%, which is strong.

Profitability

6M26:

PBT = 18.54T

and attributable net profit:

14.02T.

Annualized shareholder profit is therefore around:

28T/year

at the current run rate.

Asset quality

NPL:

1.15%

LLCR:

125.5%.

Diversification

Corporate credit reached 542.4T, while retail + SME was 407T at June 2026.

And corporate growth is increasingly coming from infrastructure, FMCG, retail, logistics, utilities and other sectors rather than only real estate.

11. There is actually a positive development

TCB is actively trying to reduce developer concentration.

Vietcap says developer exposure fell from:

33.3% → 30.7%

during 2025, with a long-term target of:

20–25%.

And in 2026, infrastructure financing has become an increasingly important growth area.

That is exactly what I would want to see if I were a TCB shareholder.

12. But I would not dismiss the Vin risk

There are three reasons.

① Concentration

Even if only a fraction of TCB's developer book is Vin-related, the absolute amount can still be tens of trillions.

② Collateral correlation

A lot of exposure is ultimately linked to Vietnamese real estate.

So diversification by legal borrower does not necessarily equal diversification by economic risk.

③ Refinancing

Vingroup's structure requires continuous access to:

• bank loans
• bonds
• property sales
• asset sales
• equity capital
• intra-group funding.

If several channels close simultaneously, credit risk can increase very quickly.

13. My estimated TCB/Vin risk matrix

I'd rank it like this:

Scenario	Impact on TCB
VinFast remains loss-making but continues funding	🟢 Low–medium
Vingroup refinancing becomes more expensive	🟡 Medium
Vinhomes sales fall 20–30%	🟡 Medium
Vinhomes property prices fall 20%	🟠 Medium–high
Major Vin entity restructures debt	🟠 High
Vin-related borrowers generate 10% credit loss	🟠 High but manageable
30–50T TCB economic exposure suffers 50% loss	🔴 Significant earnings/BVPS hit
100T+ correlated Vin/RE exposure suffers major losses	🔴 Very serious
Vin + broad Vietnamese RE crisis simultaneously	🔴 Systemic risk

14. The number I would watch most

Not VinFast debt.

Not VIC debt.

Not TCBS bond issuance.

I would watch:

TCB's developer-credit exposure + Vinhomes project exposure + mortgage exposure to Vinhomes collateral

because that is where the hidden correlation sits.

TCB's own 2Q26 data shows total loans to customers around 847T, while its total assets are 1,273T.

Against that balance sheet, a genuine 30–50T loss is painful but survivable.

A 100T loss, however, would be a fundamentally different event.

My conclusion for TCB valuation

I would not apply a huge “Vingroup bankruptcy discount” to TCB today.

Instead I'd use:

Base case

TCB fair P/B ~1.2–1.4x

because the bank has:

• ~15% CAR
• ~125% NPL coverage
• 1.15% NPL
• strong ROE/profit generation
• declining developer concentration.

Moderate Vin stress

P/B ~1.0–1.2x

if we assume a meaningful deterioration in Vin/RE credit quality.

Severe Vin + property crisis

P/B ~0.7–0.9x

would become reasonable if we discovered that TCB's true economic Vin/RE concentration was substantially larger than disclosed and collateral recovery values were deteriorating.

The key point: based on the publicly disclosed 2Q26 numbers, I don't see a case where a Vingroup failure automatically makes TCB insolvent. The much more credible risk is that Vingroup becomes the catalyst that exposes TCB's broader real-estate concentration, causing a multi-year increase in credit costs and forcing the market to rerate TCB from ~1.3–1.5x book toward ~1x or below.

I reconstructed it from the TCB 2Q26 financial statements/2025 annual report, Vingroup/Vinhomes disclosures, and VinFast’s 2025 20-F. The result is more interesting than simply adding “Vingroup loans” in TCB’s related-party note.

Bottom line first

I would currently estimate TCB's identifiable direct/contingent Vingroup ecosystem exposure at roughly VND 15–25T, with a much larger economic exposure of perhaps VND 50–100T+ once you include Vinhomes project/homebuyer financing, Vin ecosystem SPVs and collateralized transactions.

But there is an important distinction:

>

And I would not count all Vingroup/Vinhomes/VinFast debt as TCB exposure.

1. Start with VinFast — this is the cleanest evidence

VinFast's 2025 20-F gives us unusually good visibility into TCB's involvement.

At 31 December 2025:

• VinFast external interest-bearing debt: VND82.16T
• VinFast related-party borrowings: VND40.93T
• Vingroup loans outstanding: VND10.38T
• Bank guarantees: VND26.41T
• 2026 debt-service obligations: VND34.62T.

TCB-guaranteed facilities

The 2025 filing identifies at least two facilities explicitly guaranteed by TCB:

VinFast facility	Maximum facility	TCB role
Deutsche Bank facility	US$230M	TCB guarantee
Barclays facility	US$150M	TCB guarantee
Total identifiable TCB guarantee capacity	US$380M

At ~VND26,000/USD, that's approximately:

VND9.9T

of potential TCB guarantee exposure.

The Deutsche Bank facility was amended from the previous US$300M facility to US$230M in May 2025, and the Barclays US$150M facility was established in September 2025.

Important: these are facility limits, not necessarily amounts drawn at 31/12/25.

So I would use ~VND10T as the upper-bound identifiable TCB-guarantee exposure, not VND10T of current bad loans.

2. There is additional TCB exposure through VinFast's factory ecosystem

This is where things get more complicated.

VinFast's filing shows several other facilities:

• US$170M → guaranteed by MBB
• US$115M → guaranteed by SHB
• US$95M → guaranteed by VietinBank + Vingroup
• US$100M green loan → guaranteed by VietinBank
• VND3.1T Ha Tinh facility → HDBank, guaranteed by Vingroup/Pham Nhat Vuong
• VND2.5T 2025 bonds → VPBank Securities, guaranteed by Vingroup.

So we must not attribute all of these to TCB.

That's one reason I think previous estimates of “TCB has $2–3B of VinFast debt” are too aggressive if presented as current direct exposure.

3. But the guarantee exposure is more important than the loan number

Suppose TCB guarantees approximately:

VND9.9T

of VinFast borrowing.

If VinFast defaults and the collateral recovery is:

90%

TCB's gross loss:

~1T

70%

Loss:

~3T

50%

Loss:

~5T

20%

Loss:

~8T

So even a very severe VinFast default doesn't automatically destroy TCB.

The real danger is when the guarantee is combined with other Vin-related exposure.

4. VinFast itself has VND40.93T of related-party borrowings

This is extremely important.

VinFast's subsidiaries borrowed from:

• Vingroup
• Vinhomes
• Vincom Retail
• Vinpearl
• Vinmec
• Gia Lam Urban
• Thai Son
• VinBus
• VinSmart/SADO and other Vingroup affiliates.

Total outstanding at 31/12/25:

VND40.93T.

But this is NOT TCB exposure.

It's actually the opposite:

Vin ecosystem → lends to VinFast

rather than:

TCB → lends to VinFast

This matters because if VinFast collapses, Vingroup's subsidiaries can suffer large losses, which can then weaken the parent group and indirectly hurt TCB.

5. Vingroup has effectively become VinFast's funding backstop

VinFast's 2025 filing says Vingroup committed to provide up to:

VND35T

of additional loans to VinFast/VinFast subsidiaries over 24 months from November 2024.

At 31/12/25:

VND10.38T had already been drawn.

Pham Nhat Vuong separately committed up to:

VND50T

of grants through 2026.

By year-end 2025:

VND28T had been granted.

This tells us something important about the structure:

>

That's where TCB's indirect risk becomes much more important.

6. Vinhomes is the second major TCB connection

Here we have much better evidence than many people realize.

A Vinhomes financial statement disclosed a Techcombank loan of VND1.399T at the end of 2024.

That's direct VHM → TCB borrowing.

But this is only one disclosed facility and clearly doesn't represent the entire relationship.

TCB's own 2025 annual report shows repeated board approvals involving Vinhomes, including:

>

That demonstrates an active material banking relationship, even though TCB's related-party accounting table does not classify Vinhomes as a related party.

And this distinction is critical.

7. Why the Vinhomes number is much bigger than VHM's direct TCB loan

TCB finances Vinhomes customers and Vinhomes projects, not merely Vinhomes corporate borrowing.

TCB's own project-financing products cover Vinhomes developments.

That creates:

Layer 1

VHM → TCB corporate borrowing

Layer 2

Vinhomes SPVs/project companies → TCB borrowing

Layer 3

Homebuyers → TCB mortgages secured by Vinhomes properties

Layer 4

Vinhomes/Vin ecosystem entities → TCB guarantees / collateralized transactions

Layer 5

Masterise/other buyers → TCB financing to acquire Vinhomes-related assets

The fifth layer is particularly important because it can economically connect TCB to Vingroup even when the borrower isn't a Vingroup company.

8. There is hard evidence of this collateral relationship

TCB's 2025 annual report records a board resolution approving acquisition of assets worth more than 10% of TCB's charter capital:

>

and another resolution:

>

This is important.

It proves that TCB's relationship with the Vin ecosystem includes collateral transactions, not merely ordinary corporate lending.

9. Vincom Retail is another identifiable exposure

VRE's financial statements show a long-running Techcom Securities relationship.

At 2024 year-end, VRE had a:

VND1.988T

bond arranged/handled by TCBS.

The bond was secured by land use rights and land-attached assets of a shopping mall subsidiary.

But again:

TCBS arranging a VRE bond ≠ TCB owning VND1.988T of VRE bonds.

This is why I would not add it directly to TCB credit exposure.

However, TCB owns ~80% of TCBS, so Vingroup-related capital-market activity produces an additional earnings/ecosystem exposure for TCB.

10. TCBS is a huge part of the Vingroup relationship

TCBS's 2025 annual report specifically highlights:

VND5T VinFast bond issuance

as one of its major bond transactions.

Again, the correct interpretation is:

VinFast → bond issuance → TCBS

rather than:

VinFast → VND5T loan → TCB

TCBS earns:

• underwriting fees
• placement fees
• advisory fees
• brokerage/wealth-management revenue.

The credit ultimately sits largely with the bond investors.

So I would assign this:

Low direct TCB solvency exposure

but

Medium ecosystem/reputation/liquidity exposure.

11. The most interesting piece: Vingroup itself

This is where public disclosure becomes frustrating.

Vingroup's consolidated debt is huge, but its consolidated financial statements don't give us a clean:

>

number for the entire group.

And because Vingroup consolidates VHM, VinFast-related entities and numerous subsidiaries, you cannot take Vingroup total bank debt and multiply it by TCB's market share.

That would be statistically meaningless.

What we can say with confidence is:

TCB is a major Vingroup creditor.

Reuters explicitly described TCB as one of Vingroup's largest creditors.

And TCB's own resolutions show repeated material transactions involving:

• VinFast
• Vinhomes
• Vincom Retail
• Vingroup ecosystem entities.

12. My reconstructed exposure table

This is how I would build the model.

Exposure	Estimated TCB economic exposure	Confidence
VinFast TCB-guaranteed loans	~10T maximum	🟢 High
Vingroup/Vin corporate direct loans	~3–8T	🟡 Medium/low
Vinhomes corporate/project loans	~5–15T	🟡 Medium
Vincom Retail direct/secured exposure	~1–3T	🟡 Medium
Vin ecosystem SPVs / project financing	~10–25T	🟠 Low/medium
Vinhomes-related homebuyer mortgages	~15–30T+	🟠 Low
TCBS Vin bonds held/financed by TCB	0–5T	🟠 Low
Total identifiable/economic exposure	~50–100T+

I would not use the upper end as a fact.

I'd use:

~VND50–70T as my working central estimate

for TCB's broader economic exposure to the Vingroup ecosystem.

And:

~VND10–20T

for the portion where I have much stronger evidence of direct/contingent bank exposure.

13. This changes the stress test from my previous answer

TCB 2Q26 equity:

~VND189T

Total assets:

~VND1,273T

and loans to customers roughly:

~VND847T.

Now suppose our central exposure estimate is:

VND60T

Then:

Loss on Vin exposure	TCB loss	% of TCB equity
10%	6T	3.2%
20%	12T	6.3%
30%	18T	9.5%
40%	24T	12.7%
50%	30T	15.9%
70%	42T	22.2%
100%	60T	31.7%

That is far more significant than just looking at the VND10T VinFast guarantee.

14. But there's a huge caveat: mortgage collateral

You cannot apply a 50% loss to the entire VND60T.

A Vinhomes mortgage is fundamentally different from an unsecured VinFast loan.

For example:

TCB lends VND7T

to homebuyers against:

VND10T property

If property values decline 20%:

collateral = ~8T

The bank may still recover the principal.

So I would apply different LGDs:

Exposure	Stress LGD
VinFast unsecured/guaranteed	50–100%
Vingroup corporate	30–70%
Vinhomes corporate	20–50%
Vinhomes project loans	20–40%
Homebuyer mortgage	5–25%
High-quality secured Vin bonds	10–30%

This is a much more realistic model.

15. My severe-but-plausible stress scenario

Let's assume:

VinFast

TCB exposure:

10T

LGD:

70%

Loss:

7T

Vingroup corporate

Exposure:

5T

LGD:

50%

Loss:

2.5T

Vinhomes/project

Exposure:

20T

LGD:

30%

Loss:

6T

Vinhomes mortgages

Exposure:

25T

LGD:

15%

Loss:

3.75T

Other Vin ecosystem

Exposure:

10T

LGD:

30%

Loss:

3T

Total

~22.25T

That's roughly:

11.8% of TCB's ~189T equity

before considering:

• future earnings
• existing loan-loss reserves
• recoveries
• tax effects
• additional provisioning over several years.

So this is serious but survivable.

16. The true tail risk is a simultaneous real-estate crash

This is the scenario I'd pay attention to.

Imagine:

VinFast burns cash

↓

Vingroup has to provide more support

↓

Vingroup raises more debt

↓

Vinhomes becomes the cash generator

↓

Vinhomes accelerates project sales

↓

TCB finances buyers/project SPVs

↓

property prices weaken

↓

Vingroup/Vinhomes refinancing becomes more expensive

↓

collateral values fall

↓

TCB's corporate + mortgage + project exposure deteriorates simultaneously.

That's much more dangerous than VinFast itself.

17. One very important positive: Vinhomes is currently performing strongly

We shouldn't model a collapse using 2025 numbers alone.

As of 2Q26:

• VHM assets: VND1,110.7T
• VHM equity: VND274.0T
• 1H26 revenue: VND116.6T
• 1H26 net profit: VND52.1T
• 1H26 presales: VND148.1T
• unbilled revenue: VND196.8T.

So Vinhomes itself is currently generating substantial earnings and sales.

This is why I would not treat the entire Vingroup ecosystem as distressed today.

18. The biggest red flag is actually VinFast

VinFast is still the weak link.

2025:

Net loss = VND99.6T

Operating cash burn = VND44.5T

External debt = VND82.2T

Current liabilities exceeded current assets by VND79.3T.

That is a very different credit profile from Vinhomes.

So I would divide the Vin risk into:

Vinhomes = collateral/real-estate risk

VinFast = credit/cash-burn risk

Vingroup = transmission mechanism between the two

19. My revised TCB risk assessment

After doing this reconstruction, I'd change my previous assessment slightly.

Direct VinFast risk

🟠 Moderate

Not catastrophic because the clearly identifiable TCB guarantee exposure is around VND10T maximum.

Vingroup corporate risk

🟠 Moderate–high

Because TCB is one of the group's major creditors and the exact exposure is not fully transparent.

Vinhomes/project risk

🟠 High

Not because VHM is currently weak, but because TCB has enormous structural exposure to Vietnamese real estate.

Overall Vingroup ecosystem risk to TCB

🟠 6/10

Not a “TCB goes bankrupt if VinFast fails” situation.

But definitely large enough that:

>

The number I would use for TCB valuation

For your TCB fair-value work, I'd now model three separate cases:

Scenario	Estimated Vin ecosystem credit loss	Impact on TCB equity
Normal	3–5T	~2%
Moderate stress	10–15T	~5–8%
Severe stress	20–30T	~11–16%
Extreme systemic Vin/RE crisis	40–60T	~21–32%

And importantly, I would not subtract these losses dollar-for-dollar from today's BVPS, because TCB continues to generate profits and already carries provisions.

My current conclusion:

TCB is not a disguised Vingroup bond.

But it is also not accurate to say “Vingroup isn't a related party, therefore TCB has little Vin exposure.”

The economically relevant exposure is spread across corporate credit + guarantees + project SPVs + mortgages + collateral + TCBS capital-market activity.

That is why the ~VND50–70T central economic-exposure estimate is, in my view, much more useful for stress testing than the small number appearing in TCB's formal related-party disclosure.

Full document: NC Department of Justice - ShareFile

They redacts the names from this chart, for what?

https://preview.redd.it/usijnsv2fqih1.png?width=668&format=png&auto=webp&s=3e8843beaf456edae4270cad230d594e8ddeeed5

Let's me fill in for you: the name in the three bottom black boxes is Pham Nhat Vuong, who is the ultimate Beneficial Owner of VIC, VIG, Asian star trading.

Vuong Pham is so scare that he ordered his lawyers to request the redaction the name from the document while we in this sub know it is him, the scammer in chief.

$4B in total investment? The North Carolina state is so easily be duped by the scammer in chief. At the time of the project, Vinfast did not have the money, did not secure a finance for the money (citigroup quit), and it did not have the demand in the US.

https://preview.redd.it/pgqb1tskgqih1.png?width=574&format=png&auto=webp&s=1ee74c50a9af493c2825337c6a1ab9ba30eb8048

Deception on purpose:

https://preview.redd.it/ovnrjsuaiqih1.png?width=596&format=png&auto=webp&s=37c38b8badbe2c469f815cb08c221b08dddfb3c2

The state can now take the land for zero from Vinfast:

https://preview.redd.it/ihzdn4b1iqih1.png?width=659&format=png&auto=webp&s=2a905ee258f15223f1904d3811b3612c39465f2a

As I have analyzed in this sub, the shady Vuong Pham has used very little money and was able to milk the North Carolina state for site preparation work. In other words, the scammer staged the North Carolina show with little money up front. Vietnamese people thought he had to spend some big money there doing the construction back then, but in fact, he didn't. All are just lies and deceptions, for the photo ops.

https://preview.redd.it/6svtaiy8hqih1.png?width=651&format=png&auto=webp&s=d11c33c1f437fd4391ff98787ee31e0cf03f5ef0

Well, pay up, Vuong Pham:

https://preview.redd.it/dlhmdjbxgqih1.png?width=650&format=png&auto=webp&s=d906085a4259c1359588d60ed5e9eaf15ffc5465

Stress test analysis, by chatgpt, not mine.

My analysis is that VIC is a huge scam, a fraud, a ponzi, a technically bankrupt zombie with manipulated stock price by no other than Vuong Pham, and that even the terrible financial figure has been made better with many billions $ more debt hidden in private shells that are controlled by Vuong Pham and Hung Anh Ho. That is what chatgpt does not know.

Chatgpt assumes VIC can easily liquidate its assets in VIC, VHM, VPL stocks and Vinhomes real estate projects. The truth is no buyer other than Techombank. Chatgpt does not know this.

Chatgpt assumes Vinfast can reduce its cash burn when in realty, Vuong Pham is just selling to Vuong Pham the 3B$ debt of VFTP to cook the book. So the cash burn might show improvement but in reality it is not. Chatgpt does not know this.

And there is no serious institutional investors in VIC. Just Vuong Pham left hand to right hand manipulation to prop up the price, to dump it and to use it as collateral to borrow more.

---

I ran the stress test using the Q2/2026 VIC balance sheet, rather than the older 2025 numbers. The result is more concerning than my previous comparison.

Vingroup's own disclosures confirm that its 2026 financial statements are available, while VinFast's SEC filing confirms its continuing large losses and cash burn.

1. Starting point: VIC Q2/2026

The Q2 figures are approximately:

VND trillion	Q2/26
Total liabilities	1,128
Short-term liabilities	788
Cash & equivalents	~76
Equity	~200
Liabilities / assets	~85%
Cash / short-term liabilities	~9.6%

The reported Q2 profit was very strong, but a significant portion came through financial/project-related items rather than recurring operating earnings. I therefore don't want to use Q2 net income as the main stress-test input.

For reference, VIC had 7.87bn shares outstanding around July 2026.

At roughly VND217,000/share, current equity-market value is about:

7.866bn × 217,000 = VND1,707tn

So the market is currently valuing VIC at roughly:

1,707 / 200 ≈ 8.5× book value

That is an enormous premium to book.

2. Stress scenario

I'll use exactly the scenario you requested:

A. Property values: −20%

This affects the economic value of VHM/VIC's property assets.

B. VHM equity value: −20%

This is particularly important because VHM is one of VIC's biggest sources of underlying value.

C. VinFast requires another $2–3bn/year

Using approximately VND26,000/USD:

• $2bn = VND52tn
• $3bn = VND78tn

I'll use VND65tn/year as the midpoint.

This isn't an unreasonable stress assumption. VinFast burned VND44.5tn from operating activities in 2025, while reporting a VND99.6tn net loss. It also explicitly warned that negative operating cash flow was expected to continue in the near term.

D. Refinancing capacity: −30%

This is the Evergrande-style shock.

Instead of assuming VIC suddenly loses all financing, we assume lenders/markets roll over only 70% of what normally would have been refinanced.

3. First shock: VHM −20%

This is the biggest hidden sensitivity.

VHM is extremely valuable relative to VIC's book equity.

If the economic value attributable to VIC from its VHM position falls by 20%, the loss in VIC's economic NAV is roughly VND200tn+, depending on the exact valuation base used.

That's approximately equal to VIC's entire reported equity.

So:

Starting economic equity ≈ VND200tn

VHM/property shock ≈ −VND200–230tn

Result:

Economic equity ≈ −VND0–30tn

That is the first major warning.

It does not mean VIC becomes legally insolvent immediately—the accounting balance sheet doesn't automatically mark all VHM assets to market.

It means that using market/economic values rather than historical accounting values, the equity cushion becomes extremely thin.

4. Then add VinFast

Now assume VinFast needs another:

VND65tn/year

If VIC has to fund this for two years:

65 × 2 = VND130tn

Starting from approximately zero economic equity after the property shock:

−VND130tn

That produces a very large economic deficit.

But there is an important mitigating factor.

VinFast is restructuring toward an asset-light model. Reuters reported that its Vietnamese manufacturing assets are being transferred in a transaction in which buyers assume nearly $6.9bn of debt, which could substantially reduce the burden on VinFast/VIC if executed as planned.

So the $2–3bn annual funding assumption is deliberately a severe downside scenario, not the current base case.

5. Refinancing shock

This is the part that makes the Evergrande comparison dangerous.

Suppose VIC normally needs to refinance, say, VND140tn of debt/obligations over the next period.

If refinancing falls 30%:

140 × 30% = VND42tn

VIC has to find another:

~VND42tn cash

And that's before the additional VinFast funding.

So the approximate liquidity requirement becomes:

Stress item	VND tn
VHM/property economic loss	−200 to −230
1 year VinFast funding	−65
Refinancing shortfall	−42
Total economic/liquidity shock	~−307 to −337

Against only about VND200tn reported equity.

6. Three stress cases

This is how I'd frame it rather than pretending there is one precise number.

Mild stress	Severe stress	Evergrande stress
Property/VHM	−10%	−20%
VinFast funding	$1bn	$2.5bn
Refinancing reduction	−10%	−30%
Project-sale profit	−30%	−70%
Economic equity	Positive	Near zero/negative
Liquidity	Tight	Severe
Need asset sales	Moderate	Large
Risk of debt spiral	Low/moderate	High

My interpretation:

Mild stress: VIC survives comfortably.

Severe stress: VIC becomes highly dependent on asset monetization and refinancing.

Evergrande stress: the capital structure becomes unsustainable.

7. The really important calculation: how much asset selling is required?

Suppose severe stress creates a VND100tn cash funding gap after operating cash flow and available refinancing.

VIC could theoretically solve this by selling:

• VHM shares
• VPL shares
• VRE
• property projects
• other investments

But selling assets when the market is stressed creates a vicious cycle.

For example:

VHM −20%

↓

VIC needs cash

↓

VIC sells VHM

↓

VHM price falls further

↓

VIC's collateral value falls

↓

banks reduce lending

↓

VIC sells more assets

↓

asset prices fall further

That's essentially the Evergrande feedback mechanism.

8. And this is where VIC is potentially more dangerous than the headline numbers suggest

Look at the ratio:

Cash

~VND76tn

Short-term liabilities

~VND788tn

Cash coverage:

76 / 788 = 9.6%

This is extremely low.

But again, 788tn is not all debt.

For example, customer advances and trade payables can be rolled through the operating cycle.

So the proper question isn't:

>"Can VIC pay VND788tn tomorrow?"

It obviously doesn't need to.

The question is:

>"How much of that VND788tn ultimately requires external refinancing or fresh cash?"

That is the number I would watch.

9. Compare this directly with Evergrande

Evergrande's failure wasn't caused by having a high debt ratio alone.

It was:

high leverage + declining asset liquidity + insufficient cash + refinancing dependence

VIC now has:

high leverage + potentially volatile property values + very low cash/current-liability coverage + refinancing dependence

That's why the comparison is meaningful.

But VIC has one enormous advantage:

VHM/VPL/VRE are monetizable listed assets.

Evergrande didn't have the same ability to sell large stakes in highly liquid publicly traded subsidiaries.

That gives VIC a much bigger escape route.

10. What happens to VIC's share price?

This is where today's ~VND217k price becomes interesting.

Current market cap:

~VND1,707tn

Against reported equity:

~VND200tn

So investors are effectively saying:

>VIC's subsidiaries and future cash flows are worth enormously more than its accounting book value.

That can work if VHM/VinFast/Vinpearl generate large future value.

But in an Evergrande-type stress, that premium can disappear very quickly.

Stress valuation

I would use a sum-of-the-parts / stressed P/B approach, rather than P/E.

Scenario	Approx. VIC value
Bull / normal execution	250–300k
Moderate stress	130–170k
Severe stress	60–100k
Evergrande-type liquidity crisis	20–50k
Full restructuring / equity wipeout	~0–20k

These aren't price targets in the conventional sense. They're balance-sheet stress values.

11. The most interesting number: ~80k

My central severe-stress estimate would be around:

VIC ≈ VND80,000

Why?

At 80k:

80,000 × 7.866bn = VND629tn market cap

That would still leave VIC with a substantial equity-market value despite a severe deterioration in its economic NAV.

Compared with ~217k today:

Downside ≈ −63%

This is approximately the type of repricing I'd expect if the market moved from:

>"Vingroup can refinance indefinitely and VinFast eventually works"

to:

>"Vingroup has a serious liquidity problem and must sell assets."

12. But I don't think the base case is 80k

This distinction is important.

The stress test says:

80k is a plausible crisis value.

It does not say:

80k is VIC's fair value today.

For VIC to actually enter the Evergrande pathway, several things would have to happen simultaneously:

1. VHM/property values deteriorate materially
2. VinFast continues burning ~$2–3bn/year
3. Project monetization slows sharply
4. Banks/bondholders reduce refinancing
5. VIC cannot sell subsidiaries at reasonable prices
6. New external capital becomes unavailable

If one or two of these happen, VIC can probably restructure.

If all six happen simultaneously, the equity becomes extremely dangerous.

13. The biggest thing I'd monitor from now on

Forget EPS for a moment.

For VIC, I would track these five numbers every quarter:

① Cash / current debt

I want to see:

>20–25% = improving

10–20% = tight

<10% = danger

VIC is currently around the danger boundary if we use total current liabilities.

② Net debt/equity

<100%: acceptable

100–150%: high

150–200%: dangerous

>200%: Evergrande territory

③ VinFast cash burn

This is probably the single most important operating variable.

If it falls from ~VND45tn/year toward:

<VND20tn → major positive

If it remains:

VND40–80tn → major risk

VinFast's 2025 operating cash burn was VND44.5tn.

④ Project-transfer/financial income

If VIC's reported profit is increasingly dependent on project transfers and financial transactions, I would assign a much lower multiple to earnings.

⑤ Related-party / ecosystem financing

This is the Evergrande trigger.

If external banks and bond investors provide less funding and the ecosystem increasingly has to finance itself through related parties, that's a major warning.

My conclusion

After doing the actual stress exercise, I would upgrade my concern from "VIC has some Evergrande-like metrics" to "VIC has an Evergrande-like tail risk."

But I still wouldn't call VIC Evergrande.

The key distinction is:

Evergrande:
high leverage → property downturn → refinancing stops → forced sales → insolvency.

VIC:
high leverage → potentially weak cash generation → VinFast funding requirement → but VHM/VPL/VRE and project assets provide an escape route.

So the crucial question is not whether VIC has enough assets.

It clearly does.

The crucial question is:

>Can VIC turn those assets into cash fast enough without destroying their value?

If yes, VIC survives even with very high leverage.

If no, the balance sheet can deteriorate frighteningly quickly.

And at ~VND217k, the market is pricing in a lot of successful execution.

My risk map today:

Normal case → 180–280k
Stress case → 80–150k
Evergrande-style crisis → 20–60k

The next useful step would be to go one level deeper and build a VIC "liquidity runway" month-by-month for 2026–2028, using actual debt maturities, cash, VinFast funding, VHM project cash inflows and refinancing assumptions. That would tell us the approximate month VIC would actually run out of liquidity under the Evergrande scenario, rather than just estimating a stressed share price.