
r/infectiousdisease

Ebola in DRC and Uganda: What Is Known So Far (Pathogen Dispatch #4)
The ongoing Ebola outbreak in eastern Democratic Republic of the Congo and Uganda is a regional emergency with public number still catching up to the real picture in the field. The WHO has declared the outbreak a “Public Health Emergency of International Concern” and Africa’s CDC declared a similar public health emergency. Despite both of those declarations, we still are likely well behind the curve in terms of confirmed case counts.
The US CDC’s May 17^(th) update had listed 10 confirmed cases in the DRC, 336 confirmed cases, with 88 deaths and two imported cases confirmed in Uganda. Today’s update from Africa’s CDC had increased the death count to 106 and 395 suspected cases across the affected areas of the DRC like Bunia, Goma, Mongwalu, Butembo, and Nyakunde and Kampala, Uganda. The Associated Press reports that one of the infected is an American doctor and medical missionary in Bunia. The numbers are likely to be higher by morning (I’ll be keeping this post up to date with important new information on the outbreak). None of this is to say this should be treated like a COVID-level threat with the WHO noting it does not yet meet the definition of a pandemic emergency. The threat to the average person outside of the region is low. Heightened risk currently sits with the families, health workers, burial teams, patients, drivers, contact tracers, and whoever else can be pulled into the chain of transmission.
What’s causing the outbreak?
Before getting further into the current outbreak, it is worth remembering how and when Ebola entered the official record in the first place. WHO describes Ebola disease as first appearing in 1976 in two near-simultaneous outbreaks, one of the Sudan virus disease in Nzara, in what is now South Sudan, and the other of Ebola virus disease in Yambuku, in what is now the Democratic Republic of the Congo. The Yambuku outbreak, near the Ebola River, is the one that gave the disease its name. CDC’s outbreak history lists the 1976 DRC outbreak at 318 cases and 280 deaths (a fatality rate of 88%). The index case was treated at Yambuku Mission Hospital with an injection for possible malaria, and subsequent transmission followed through contaminated needles and syringes at the hospital and nearby clinics, as well as close personal contact.
This is Bundibugyo ebolavirus, as opposed to the better-known Zaire ebolavirus. Species is important here; I say that because when most people hear about Ebola, they’re likely to think of the West Africa outbreak or the 2018-2020 outbreak in North Kivu and Ituri. Those were Zaire ebolavirus outbreaks, and thankfully our modern response toolkit to combat Zaire ebolavirus now has a vaccine. Bundibugyo is different, most importantly in that there is no vaccine and no treatment beyond supportive care such as fluids, electrolytes, oxygen, constant monitoring, watching for secondary infections, and clinical hygiene. That puts an added strain on the already lean control machinery like isolation of cases, tracing contacts for 21 days, protecting health care workers with adequate PPE, and crucially, handling burials safely.
Why tracing an outbreak early is difficult
In an early epidemic, we often end up with a denominator problem in that counts of cases often lag behind the actual epidemic curve. This happens for a variety of reasons: people get sick before being tested, families bury someone before samples can be collected, healthcare workers get exposed before a disease even has a name, patients move closer to hospitals, contacts move around before tracing is even known to be needed, and any other reason imaginable for why a case may be missed. With Africa CDC already describing hundreds of suspected cases and over 100 deaths into the public phase of the outbreak, it seems that the response is working to reconstruct something that may have been moving around for quite some time, with late April being thought to be a decent starting point with a healthcare worker being identified as an early case. So while the confirmed numbers are useful, they’re almost always going to be underestimates the day they’re released.
How does this compare to 2014?
The 2014 comparison is useful, but it is not perfect. Seven days after announcement is not the same thing as seven days after spillover. One outbreak can burn quietly for weeks before being recognized, while another can be identified faster because the surveillance system is already primed. So the comparison should not be treated as a clean clock-to-clock match. What we can compare is the early public surveillance snapshot: what officials knew, what they were still chasing, and what kinds of warning signs were already visible.
WHO’s first public notice on March 23, 2014, described 49 cases and 29 deaths in Guinea, a 59% case fatality ratio. By March 27, WHO was reporting 103 suspected and confirmed cases, 66 deaths, four laboratory-confirmed cases in Conakry, four health-worker deaths, and suspected cases with deaths in Liberia and Sierra Leone among people who had traveled from Guinea. ECDC’s March 27 update described the outbreak as rapidly evolving and noted that supplies and logistics were still being mobilized.
So while the variant is different, the early shape of the current epidemic is not exactly more reassuring than previous outbreaks as we see high deaths relative to reported cases, health-worker deaths, funeral exposure, city involvement, border risk, and contact tracing trying to catch up to events that have already happened. That along with the fact that the current outbreak is Bundibugyo, with no licensed vaccine or treatment, makes me more concerned for those in the region.
Politics are not irrelevant
In 2014, the outbreak occurred while USAID and the CDC were still at a working capacity with regards to combating infectious diseases like Ebola. Even then, the response was late, messy, and inadequate. This outbreak is happening after DOGE spent most of 2025 cutting into USAID and US international health response capacity. Obviously that didn’t cause the outbreak, but it certainly changed the response environment for the worse. Especially having nerfed our Ebola research capacity. High-containment labs have incredibly harsh safety standards, and with Bundibugyo having no licensed vaccine and no specific therapeutic, shutting down one of the rare labs capable of doing safe work on Ebola is working in the wrong direction to say the least.
Where the outbreak could be going.
I had seen a story on twitter regarding a case in Kinshasa but I haven’t been able to confirm anything other than a person who tested negative. Goma and Kampala likely matter more at the moment. Goma is a large, mobile city on the Rwandan border, and it is currently under the control of the Rwanda-backed paramilitary group M23 movement. AFP-linked reporting says a confirmed case in Goma involved the wife of a man who died of Ebola in Bunia. She traveled to Goma after his death while already infected leading to the closure of some Goma-Gisenyi border crossings after the case was reported.
Uganda has reported two imported confirmed cases among people who traveled from the DRC, with no local transmission identified at the time of WHO’s report. One imported case is a warning. Two imported cases that do not obviously sit in one neat chain make me wonder what the DRC side has not reconstructed yet.
CDC is now trying to put some of its machinery back in motion as their May 18 briefing, confirmed the American case linked to work in the DRC, evacuation of other American and high-risk contacts to a quarantine facility Germany, enhanced screening and traveler monitoring for arrivals from DRC, Uganda, and South Sudan, and entry restrictions for non-U.S. passport holders who had been in those countries during the previous 21 days. The risk to the American public remains low.
What to watch out for
Over the next few days, I’ll be watching whether cases keep appearing in Goma, Butembo, Bunia, or other cities. Isolated introductions are one thing. Multiple urban chains are different. There’s also a need to keep an eye on Uganda for local transmission. Some imported cases are expected when people move across borders for care, work, or family reasons but any local spread in Kampala would change the story for the worse.
I’ll also be watching out for the gap between suspected cases, deaths, and confirmed cases to either widen or start to narrow depending on how much suspected cases outpace confirmatory testing. The count is supposed to move as testing catches up, but a widening gap would be a bad sign. I’ll be watching to see whether international support moves faster than the virus. Early signs are good with the ECDC having activated the EU Health Task Force, the IRC launched an emergency response in eastern DRC, and Africa CDC says it is working with partners to assess medical countermeasures and accelerate the necessary operational research.
Recent posts regarding medical concerns
Not sure if it’s a new trend or if my algorithm has started showing them to me more often, but I’ve been seeing a lot of posts that appear to be asking for medical advice.
There are several subs where this is appropriate (eg r/medical_advice and r/askdocs), but my understanding is that this sub is intended more for discussion on the topic of ID.
It also concerns me that a poster seeking advice might take what a commenter says at face value, when this sub has no vetting in place to ensure people who provide advice are qualified to do so. (No offence to the kind people who have been trying to offer help in these situations!)
Am I alone, or do others agree we should consider banning posts asking for medical advice? (Maybe adding a sticky with recommended subs for this?)
Pregnant and listeria question
Me - back again - except this time I actually feel like I have had a genuine listeria exposure. I am 21 weeks pregnant and I want god honest truths here no sugar coating
Yesterday morning I had a glass of chocolate milk. After finishing a full glass I saw there was hardened old chocolate milk at the bottom. It was clear this glass was not clean.
Here’s my issue, and a habit we are changing. We soak all our dishes together and usually over night or even a day (pregnant, full time working, it happens). This includes cutting boards with raw chicken and produce, raw chicken knives etc.
I’m starting to think this glass somehow soaked in this sink then missed the dishwasher from how it looked honestly. Don’t ask me how.
Anyway I’m actually concerned about listeria from this as I’m sure the stagnant water with food, raw poultry & produce was a serious grounds for bacteria that has likely been flourishing in that chocolate milk gunk at the bottom.
Help me understand the legitimate risk here because I genuinely feel it’s high.
Suffering from skin ulcers for about a year and unable to find answers. Mites/Fungal/Parasitic/Delusional? I get so sick I can hardly function and it tends to cycle…
Anyone know what this is and if it’s something I should be concerned about. They come out from my shower crease when cleaning with bleach…
Should I get Rabie vaccination?
While walking outside, a tree branch scratched my skin. I’m worried there may have been saliva from a nearby dog/cat on the branch. Also, nearby there are a few cats live nearby inside a house (not homeless cat). I later touched the scratched area and then touched my tongue with the same finger. Could this pose any rabies risk, and would rabies vaccination be necessary?
Previous fungal bloodstream infection (candida parapsilosis) connected to AFB positive wound?
Primary issue: Positive AFB sample ~36 hours out from excision/debridement of chest wound. Wound is located at site of old port; port was removed due to it causing a fungal bloodstream infection that almost killed me. Are these things possibly related?
I’m Day 1 post-surgical excision/debridement of a big fistula/wound on my chest, at the site of my previously-removed port.
Details on what was happening pre-surgery in a former post; I’ll link in comments.
It’s only ~36 hours since surgery and most of the tissue samples/cultures obviously haven’t resulted yet, BUT the Plastics resident just told me that a sample from the fistula is positive on an “acid fast” (?) test. She said “AFB positive,” and that ID is following/will come by tomorrow/soon.
Can anyone explain what that might mean for me? I know that TRUE answers will come from my team/ID/etc. after the cultures grow/show what’s in there… but those can take awhile and I’m so curious. This wound is over the site of my old port, which was removed after it got/gave me a fungal bloodstream infection (Candida parapsilosis) during a hospital stay in 2024. The fungus took up residence in a massive right atrial thrombus I had (thanks to Behçet’s) and the combo very nearly killed me.
Could this positive AFB situation be remnants of that same fungal infection? Or does AFB only show bacteria (not fungus)? Any idea what this will look like for me?
Of note, I have CVID, have taken a variety of biologic meds (currently Rinvoq, Otezla) over the past decade, and rely on high-dose steroids to keep my MAGIC Syndrome in check (aka keep me alive). So I’m essentially the poster child for both primary immunodeficiency and immunosuppression due to medications.
Thank you to anyone who can sketch out even a tiny bit of what this might mean!
- Age: 34 AFAB (NB)
- Height: 5’11”;
- Weight: 180kg
- Nonsmoker
- Complex medical history. MAGIC Syndrome (Behçet’s + Relapsing Polychondritis); CVID (on IgG replacement); HFpEF; CTEPH; steroid-induced DM2; VTE (right atrial thrombus, repeat PE’s).
- Rinvoq, IVIG, long-term/high-dose steroids (methylprednisolone), Warfarin, Azathioprine, Otezla, etc.
The Disease That Came From the Ground: Korean Hemorrhagic Fever, Hantaan Virus, and the Disease Ecology of Warfare
Between Spring of 1951 and the armistice of July 1953, an unnamed disease infected UN soldiers among the ridge lines and rice paddies of central Korea. They’d begin presenting with sudden headaches, high fever, a spreading flush in the face and neck, and then days later having blood seep from the skin. The doctors in the Mobile Army Surgical Hospital (MASH) units had never seen anything like it, resorting to attempts of treatment using the likes of quinine and penicillin but nothing worked. Thankfully the disease wasn’t spreading from patient to patient. But that made the central question more unsettling: where was it coming from? The answer seemed to be the ground itself.
Eventually, the condition became known as Korean hemorrhagic fever, one of the illnesses now grouped under hemorrhagic fever with renal syndrome, or HFRS. Some 3000 UN soldiers were infected during the war with an estimated 150-300 having died of it. Exactly what killed them would remain a mystery for over 25 years until the isolation of the Hantaan virus (named after the river in Korea) in 1978. The first hantavirus outbreak recorded by western doctors is a story of a disease that hid in plain sight. The mouse carrying it likely seen thousands of times by soldiers as they stepped by them or kicked them aside without a second thought.
A Pre-Korean War Timeline
Obviously, the disease had a history before western doctors first encountered it. Since hantaviruses can be found in both New- and Old-World mammal species like mice, shrews, and bats, it is thought the viral family itself traces back millions of years. It’s also thought that Chinese medical literature from the year 960 contains descriptions consistent with hantavirus disease. It’s also been suggested as a possible cause for trench nephritis, a type of renal disorder encountered by soldiers during the American Civil War and during World War I. HFRS was observed in hospital in the Vladivostok region in WWI. There was also epidemic disease consistent with HFRS seen in both Russian and Japanese troops along the Manchurian-Soviet border; the linked citation also lists the incredible amount of names hemorrhagic fevers had attained by publication in 1963. It’s a hell of a list to say the least. They describe hemorrhagic fevers in “the northern belt, extending from the Soviet Far East and Korea, across Manchuria and Mongolia to the Urals, the Upper Volga, and Murrnansk Oblast; and on to the Scandinavian countries, Czechoslovakia, Hungary, and Bulgaria”. It’s fair to say hanta-derived hemorrhagic fevers were uncommon but far from an extreme rarity in Europe and Asia. Japanese Army doctors in WWII Manchuria would describe an epidemic of hemorrhagic fever among their troops with 10,000 said to have been affected and with a death rate up to 30%. Before 1951, Korea hadn’t been a hotbed of cases, with only a few cases described in the extreme northeastern corner of Korea by the Siberian/Manchurian borders with no recognized presence in central Korea.
Hantavirus in the Korean War
The Korean war officially got its start on June 25^(th), 1950, when the North invaded the South. From the summer of 1950 to Spring of 1951, the war would be a highly mobile one, with front lines moving dramatically up and down the peninsula. Until then, there hadn’t been any reports of hemorrhagic fevers in the American forces. By June of 1951 the frontline had stabilized near the 38^(th) parallel, with UN forces constructing bunkers, trenches, and fortifying positions across the central front in what became known as the “Iron Triangle” region (Cheorwon-Kimhwa-Pyonggang). The Yunchon and Cheorwon area seems to have been the center of where the first cases of hemorrhagic fever start popping up, soon spreading to Gimhwa and Pyonggang. It’s been proposed that HFRS may have been accidentally introduced through the Chinese army during the Korean War. A Time magazine article from the time reports at least 25 deaths with hundreds sick since June. In November of the same year, the Associated Press would report on the outbreak:
“A strange illness for which no sure cure has been found has broken out among United Nations forces in Korea, Gen. Ridgway’s headquarters said today. Brig. Gen. William E. Shambora, surgeon of the Far East Command, said the mysterious malady strikes suddenly and is characterized by fever and a headache... Sulfa and antibiotics have failed to stem the disease... The malady is strikingly similar to that reported by the Japanese among their Manchurian troops in 1939.”
By April of 1952 there was an established Hemorrhagic Fever Center near the heavy concentration by the 38^(th) parallel with all suspected cases being evacuated by helicopter. The 8228^(th) MASH unit in Seoul is designated specifically as a medical center for hemorrhagic fever and cold-related injury, receiving over 2000 admissions that year alone, the vast majority of which were from the Army. There patients would undergo strict management of fluids, nursing care in critical phases, special positioning to prevent hypotension, electrolyte monitoring, and later dialysis. The virologist and civilian researcher for the army Dr. Joseph Smadel led a team to Korea to study the outbreak, finding 46 deaths among the 848 diagnosed cases (a case fatality rate of 5.6). The same year would mark the start of the 7^(th) Infantry Division’s formal control program involving the dipping of clothing in miticide, spraying the quarters with lindane, and rodent control. These would be crucial during the seasonal peak periods of May-July and October-December. This is also around the same time that the 11^(th) Evacuation Hospital in Wonju would become notable for their use of “artificial kidney” or dialysis machines, which was one of the earliest uses of dialysis in wartime for combat medicine.
The scientific investigation into its HFRS’s cause would continue through the war, with the Armed Forces Epidemiological Board’s Commission on Hemorrhagic Fever being tasked with investigating the disease. They saved 600 sera samples taken from 245 patients for future analysis. The 1954 medical report by Dr. Sidney Katz formally characterized the disease as “Hemorrhagic Fever of the Far Eastern Type” using what was known from the Russian and Japanese literature of the time to reconcile what he had seen in the Korean War data from UN troops. Katz’s report listed more than 25 diseases that could mimic early KHF, including malaria, scrub typhus, leptospirosis, and other hemorrhagic fevers. Scrub typhus is of particular note because it is actually present in Korea. The suspected vector of transmission changed over time, with early opinions leaning toward chigger mites which carried scrub typhus (thus the miticide dipping of clothes) or airborne transmission from rodent droppings, but they couldn’t isolate an agent of spread. Endemic cases among U.S. would continue to be documented through 1972 by South Korean physician, virologist, and epidemiologist Ho Wang Lee, with over 2800 total cases being observed from 1951 to 1972.
Lee’s team started capturing rodents during the ceasefire line in the 70s, even contracting the disease himself and being arrested by the South Korean military on suspicion of being a spy. In 1976, In 1976, they used sera from Korean hemorrhagic fever patients to show the same antigen is found in the lungs and kidneys of the striped field mouse (Apodemus agrarius). In 1978 the virus would be formally isolated from a sample mouse taken near the Hantan River, naming it the Hantaan virus with the genus subsequently being named after the first isolated sample.
The taxa would be greatly expanded across the next couple of decades, first with Seoul virus (carried by the Norway rat Rattus norvegicus) found to be distributed worldwide. A strain of the Hantaan virus was grown in a cell culture and found via electron microscopy to belong to the Bunyaviridae family, however with a lack of arthropod vector it is unique in that specific family of viruses. Sin Nombre virus would be identified in 1993 as a cause of a severe pulmonary syndrome in the Four Corners region of the American Southwest. The Andes virus, cause of the current outbreak aboard the MV Hondius vessel, was isolated in 1995 and was the first to be found to spread from person-to-person.
Ecology and Transmission: How Warfare Changed Both
As mentioned, the reservoir for the Hantaan virus in Korea and China is the striped field mouse. It also happens to be the most common small mammal in all of Korea, representing over 90% of the captured small mammals at training sites near the DMZ. They’re found throughout rural areas due to the agricultural fields and nearby forests/hilly regions (exactly that of the central Korean front during the war. The fatter, male mice hold significantly higher antibody prevalence than the smaller females. The transmission route is primarily via the inhalation of aerosolized rodent excrement like dried urine, feces, or nesting material which easily make their way into the air during types of cleaning like sweeping. Unlike the New World Andes virus, the variants found in Korea have no person-to-person transmission, a trait that complicated reasoning by early epidemiologists about why the disease wasn’t “catching.”
An aspect of the war itself that seems to have been crucial to an outbreak like was seen is the fact that in summer of 1951 the Korean War shifted from a mobile phase into static trench warfare. Digging into the hillsides to construct bunkers and trenches meant disturbing the soil, creating new rodent habitat, and would’ve produced the aerosolized dust that transmits the viral particles. Veterans recalled rats “nearly as big as cats” having been their “daily companions” through this period of the war. They were so prominent in the fortified positions because of the deforestation that was occurring as a result of bombing and deliberate land clearing which concentrated the mice in the remaining habitats near the bunkers and agricultural areas.
It’s hard to directly quantify the impact relative to other diseases, but in 1953 disease as a whole accounted for over 40% of the hospital admissions among Korean War combatants with hemorrhagic fever being but one component of that broader infectious disease burden that included malaria, dysentery, scrub typhus, and various respiratory illnesses. The course of illness was about five-to-six weeks due to the lengthy recovery which could involve gaining back as much as 50 pounds lost during the illness. Hemorrhagic fever during the Korean War was a nightmare no soldier was prepared for. Command was somewhat lucky it only took as many lives as it did, because a more virulent strain may not have been as kind on the numbers and even less kind on morale.
Biological Warfare?
Public health and germ warfare during the Korean War, author unknown, ca. 1952 https://www.nlm.nih.gov/hmd/topics/chinese-posters/poster-politics_101559945-sm.html
I’ll end with a bit on something that came out of the confusion that goes hand-in-hand with the fog of war. I’m admittedly going to rely heavily on the wiki here as I haven’t read the multiple books on the topic yet. The Chinese and North Korean governments both claimed that in 1951 and 1952 the United States was using biological weapons, citing the hemorrhagic fever and other diseases taking hold in their troops. The Soviet Union even took these claims to the UN. There was a bit of a history to this, as in 1949 the Soviets had put out propaganda claiming the US was testing biological weapons on the Alaskan Inuit populations, with the Chinese even claiming the US was working with Shiro Ishii, a Japanese WWII General who focused on biological warfare in China. North Korea claimed the US was spreading smallpox as a form of biological warfare in North Korea. Mass demonstrations would take place in the USSR and its Eastern Bloc countries
The central evidence during the Korean War was the confession of one Colonel Franke Schwable. The captured Marine pilot stated in February of 1953 that B-29s had flown biological warfare missions based out of Okinawa starting in November of 1951. He was one of a few POWs who made similar statements. The U.S. would declare the statements made as a result of torture and upon release they did take back those claims (although under threat of a treason charge). These claims had an air of credibility to them as the US had concealed some of the atrocities committed by the Japanese Unit 731 led by the aforementioned General Ishii, who was exempted from war crimes and placed on the American payroll in exchange for data (Operation Paperclip wasn’t the only time we used the worst of the worst to work on our behalf). While there wasn’t any confirmatory evidence about Ishii working on Korean War operations on behalf of the US, the years of lying about the Unit 731 arrangement made it hard to deny.
The strongest bit of counter-evidence comes from Soviet and Chinese documents that were released in 1998 by Kathryn Weathersby and Milton Leitenberg who work on the Cold War International History Project. They included hand copied records from the Russian Presidential Archive with a statement from their secret police (NKVD) chief stating “”False plague regions were created, burials … were organized, measures were taken to receive the plague and cholera bacillus. The advisor of the MVD DPRK proposed to infect with the cholera and plague bacilli persons sentenced to execution.” North Korea had literally gotten plague cultures from China and infected a couple of prisoners, then using those tissue samples to claim to the international investigators that the US was engaging in biological warfare. The same documents note the disinformation campaign started to wind down after the death of Stalin in March of 1953. I don’t know enough to judge the claims on their merits, and the U.S. record on Unit 731 makes blanket innocence hard to take on trust. But the available Soviet and Chinese archival evidence strongly suggests that at least part of the Korean War biological warfare campaign was deliberately fabricated. That said, the evidence for and against these specific claims are wrapped up in multiple books, so I don’t quite have the full grasp on the claims. If enough people want a piece on that or US bio-warfare in general, I’d be happy to research further!
Hantavirus
So I will say, before this ship, I honestly hadnt ever heard of the virus. I'm 42. Well in my 42 years I have been around mice, cleaned up after them a few times in my life etc. Fast forward to almost 2 wks ago and one got into our cabin in a Tn campground. It happens almost yearly when weather goes warm then we get that quick cold snap again. Never thought about it bc again, I hadnt heard about it. Well I cleaned up after this stupid mouse and of course not in the correct way as they are now saying. I swept and vacuumed. Now I am terrified. I have like til end of june to be out of that 8 wk window now. Then of course I had to come up on a tik tok of a girl in ky who got it last yr and was the first in the state after cleaning up a bunch in her basement the same way. I'm literally spiraling and have little children. I will never clean up after one again, someone else can! But I cant undo what is done😭😭😭😭
Please help — fungal infection comes back again and again
I have been suffering from a fungal infection for almost 4 years now. I’ve taken medicines from many doctors and whenever I continue treatment for 3–4 months, it gets better, but within 1 month it comes back again. I’m really frustrated and mentally tired of this cycle. Has anyone gone through something similar or found a long-term solution? What helped you prevent it from recurring? Any advice regarding hygiene, treatment, diet, clothes, or lifestyle would really help.
The hantavirus outbreak is a failure of capitalism.
Whether the Hondius cluster becomes the next pandemic cannot yet be known. What is certain is that the capitalist ruling class has demonstrated, over six years and counting, that it is structurally incapable of preventing pandemics.
Read more: The MV Hondius hantavirus outbreak and the threat of another pandemic
Does an infection reset healing?
Hi everyone
I had a 5 week old piercing that got infected. It’s healing up with antibiotics but I was wondering if it’s reset the healing entirely?
It’s my third lobe, titanium, has been upsized because of swelling, stud, cleaning twice a day
How likely am I to die of rabies several years post-exposure?
How likely am I to die of rabies several years post-exposure?
Hey folks!
I'm a 29-year old male from Australia. About 7.5 years ago I went to Vietnam with some friends and late one night, a banh mi stall owner's small dog ran up to my foot and lightly bit my toe.
We couldn't really see a clear bite mark or blood - despite this, I became riddled with anxiety and absolutely convinced that I'd just contracted rabies, especially given the prevalence of the disease in Vietnam. My friends thought I was being absolutely crazy for worrying about it so much, given we there was no clear bite mark or blood drawn - though I've heard the disease can enter our bodies through non-visible micro-punctures of the skin.
They also didn't think the dog had rabies to begin with, although we were all drunk, meaning no one could clearly remember every detail from that night, and I know dogs can have rabies days before showing symptoms. For whatever reason, I didn't see a doctor until about a week afterwards, and he basically just said: if you have it, you're dead, anyway. Super reassuring, right?
I also didn't bother with the vaccine, cause it was going to make the rest of our trip really difficult to navigate, as it requires 5 shots on specific days across the space of a month, and our itinerary meant that we weren't always going to be near a hospital. In retrospect, I really wish I'd just gotten it.
In the weeks following, I started spiraling and becoming increasingly convinced that I was experiencing intermittent tingling in my toe; I even developed a fever, which led me to go to hospital. But then nothing further happened from there, and my friends seemed to think I just stressed myself into those symptoms (possible).
I go very, very long periods without thinking about it. But every now and then, I come across articles or videos that talk about rabies, or show someone in their final days, and I go back down the rabbit hole.
You then read that rabies can have an extraordinarily long incubation period, with there being documented cases of 6, 8, even 25 years post-exposure! I know those are the exceptions to the role - but what if I'm one of them? Maybe the fact that it was my toe where I was bitten could make longer incubation period more probable?
So in short - am I being a hypochondriac or do I have reason to still be concerned?