Following Gandhi's pressure on Ambedkar to abandon his demand for separate electorates for Dalits in British India, through a fast that carried an implicit threat of mass violence against Dalits should the fast prove fatal. Ambedkar relented as violence against Dalits gripped the nation. Three years after the demand's defeat, on October 13, 1935, at the Yeola conference of the depressed classes, he made a solemn declaration: though he had been born a Hindu untouchable, he would not die one:

>"I solemnly assure you that I will not die a Hindu"

This rightly came as 'a thunderbolt', for it rocked political parties and social institutions in India. It was not simply a question of Ambedkar's personal choice for spiritual or religious reasons. He exhorted his followers to change their religion en masse:

>"You have nothing to lose except your chains, and everything to gain by changing your religion"

This made it a political question. Leading figures from other religions approached Ambedkar separately, inviting him to convert to their religion and promising different rewards. After serious thought and consultations with many people, Ambedkar decided in June 1936 to embrace Sikhism along with his followers. The leaders of the Hindu Mahasabha and Shankracharya Kurtakoti approved. Ambedkar argued that conversion to Sikhism was the best choice from the Hindus' standpoint. After participating in the Sikh Missionary conference at Amritsar in April, Ambedkar sent his son, Yashwant Rao, and nephew to the Golden Temple in May, where they stayed for one and a half months to observe the situation and meet with community leaders. On September 18, a group of 13 followers was deputed to visit Amritsar to meet the 'Sikh Mission'. There was already an understanding that the Sikh Mission would start a college in Bombay in the interest of those Depressed Classes who would convert to Sikhism.

The Historical Reasons Explaining Why This Failed:

1. The Resistance of the Political Establishment: The first involved a rethinking of, and opposition to, the move among the Sikh political class. It was inevitable that the leading men of the Sikh political parties would consider their own fate and position in the Shiromani Gurdwara Parbandhak Committee (SGPC) and Gurdwaras after six crore (60 million) untouchables became Sikhs. Sardar Kapur Singh offers this evidence in his well-known but controversial book, Saachi Sakhi. According to him, there was an apprehension that once Ambedkar became a Sikh with all his followers, no one from the existing Sikh leaders like Baldev Singh would be nominated to the Viceroy's executive council as a representative of the Sikh community. Master Tara Singh and his supporters had to consider their position, as well as that of other leaders in the Sikh community, the Shiromani Akali Dal, the SGPC, and control of gurdwaras. Kapur Singh recounted a story Sardar Inder Singh Karwal, an advocate and Akali leader, told to a small gathering of advocates in the bar room of the Punjab High Court at Chandigarh in September 1964. He stated that, because of differences between Akali leaders and Ambedkar, the six crore untouchables publicly dropped the idea of adopting the Sikh religion. He asked his neighbor in Lahore, Sardar Harnam Singh Jhalla, MA, LLB, advocate (judge of the High Court), who was then a prominent Akali leader, the real reason for this 'tragedy'. Sardar Harnam Singh then replied, "Oh, you don't have an understanding of these matters. By making six crore of untouchables, Sikhs, should we hand over the Darbar Sahib to Chuhras?" 'This way,' says Kapur Singh, 'six crore of Rangretas - Guru Ka-Betas - who had come to the door of the Guru were pushed out; the same way as Guru Tegh Bahadur was not allowed to enter Harimandir Sahib (Golden Temple).' But, according to him, the actual truth of the matter is even "more crude and despicable". His argument is that when the 'Akali party' understood the full implications of six crores untouchables entering the Sikh community, they unanimously devised a strategy to deal with this 'emergency'. Then "they unanimously decided that Ambedkar and his follower untouchables must be dissuaded and stopped from becoming Sikhs for all time". Master Tara Singh, whose leadership of the Sikh community was threatened by Ambedkar's entry, sent Sardar Sujan Singh to Bombay 'with specific instructions' to tell Ambedkar 'clearly' the mind of the Akali leaders, so that he would drop the idea.
2. Allies in the Babbar Akalis and Red Akalis: The second involved the British. Ambedkar considered converting to Sikhism for a few reasons. Primarily, it was Sikhism's theological abolition of caste. Now, in practice, there was plenty of caste discrimination in the Sikh community, but theologically Sikhism was the most anti-caste religion, and theologically it was completely forbidden and abolished. Moreover, in pre-1947 Punjab, endogamy between castes was much more fluid in the Sikh community and was more class-based compared to the rest of Hindu and even Muslim/Christian India (though it was still plenty caste-based and the discrimination of untouchable castes was very real). Furthermore, within the SGPC, a fierce battle raged over this issue and many others. The more radical left (Kirti Akalis, also known as the "Red Akalis") and the more religiously zealous men in the Akali Dal and SGPC, who were much more militant and much more committed to the Caste-abolition goals of Sikhi, saw this as an opportunity to dislodge Sikhi of the "Heresy" of the mahant-backed administration of the gurdwaras and the capture of the party by "Landlord Raj"; as was stated by Master Mota Singh, the leader of the Babbar Akali faction of the SGPC. These Babbar Akalis grew skeptical of the Sikh community's reigning leaders. They were much closer to the radical socialist Ghadar tradition floating around at the time, with many of these "Babbar Akalis" either joining or associating with Kirti Communists (the Ghadar Party's successor in Punjab), such as Master Mota Singh (who joined the Kisan Movement), Teja Singh Suatantra, Bhuja Singh, etc. Some also opposed Congress's methods; most were radically left-wing on property and democracy in the Gurdwaras, etc. Ambedkar wanted to ally with these elements and possibly move towards their emancipatory goals, and they sought an ally in Ambedkar who would bring more Sikhs to the fold to help dislodge the reigning elites. The British ofc, were petrified of this. The Kirti Akalis and Babbar Akalis were among the most militant elements in Punjab. These groups had tried to stage an insurgency many times before and were still trying to in 1936: the Ghadar Revolt in 1914 & 1915, led by the Red Akalis and the Bowring attempt by the Babbar Akalis. As such, the British often detained leaders who could move such a resolution within the SGPC and force the issue into a theological conflict which the established leaders were bound to lose on religious grounds. Visit: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=ksWZZyVgUt0, to see what I mean.
3. Exclusion from the Poona Pact: The third reason was the separate electorate, and this was the most important reason. To explain (please note this is incredibly simplified), in British India, Muslims, Sikhs, and Christians had separate electorates from what was deemed the "General Category" in Provincial elections in British India. This meant separate constituencies were created where only members of one of those groups could vote for a representative. So, for example, Muslims had 29 seats out of the 175 seats in the Bombay Provincial legislature. Only Muslims could stand in these seats, and only muslims would vote in these constituencies. The same thing applies to Sikhs and Christians for their seats, with all others voting in the general seat. The reasons for this are complex; for one, these weren't elected via universal suffrage, and the landed suffrage granted to each community meant that, in some provinces, the voter base didn't reflect the demographic base. For example, in Bengal, Muslims were the majority, but more Hindus held land and thus were given a larger share of the vote if the pure suffrage rules applied. So, instead of introducing universal suffrage, the British weighted the seats to "communal groups" while introducing separate electorates. So even though fewer muslims were enfranchised, for instance, they would get a larger share of the seats. Again, it's a lot more complicated, but this is a simplification. In this scheme, Sikhs, who were largely concentrated in Punjab and the North-West Frontier Province, were also given a separate electorate. They didn't have a high enough population in any of the other provinces, so they didn't qualify anywhere else. Ambedkar banked on the idea that if enough Dalits converted to Sikhism, they would be granted a separate electorate, and this was technically true. This was a reaction to Gandhi's fast, which used the threat of a Dalit genocide to force Ambedkar to abandon the Dalit separate electorate. But the results of this conversion would take much longer to materialize. In the meantime, Ambedkar hoped the British would still allow Dalit Sikhs to qualify for the Poona Pact, where Dalit Sikhs would be given reserved seats under a joint electorate (basically, everyone who didn't qualify for a separate electorate voted in the joint electorate, called the general electorate). The British denied this request, and thus Ambedkar's idea died. Eventually, he converted to Buddhism but that is another story.

The Alt-Hist Question:

The question thus is simple. What if the British allowed the Non-Khalsa Sikh formula to qualify for the Poona Pact (until enough Dalits had converted to Sikhism, allowing them to qualify for a separate electorate) to stand?

What if Ambedkar, and crores of dalits, followed him into Sikhi. What would be the consequence? What would its implications be for the SGPC, the Akali Dal, caste relations, and the 1946 Provincial elections? What about the All-India SGPC Act and its implications? What about the partition?

Sources:

[1]: Scheduled Castes in Sikh Community: A Historical Perspective: https://www.jstor.org/stable/4413731?seq=1

Original reel made by Neetu Syngh (@NESY.ALFAAZ on Instagram)

Description:
In 1967 Bengal, the village of Naxalbari became the birthplace of a revolution. Who owns the land? Who does the Labour? And who deserves the rights? The echoes of this revolution gradually reached Punjab. During this time a young poet was emerging: Avtar Singh Sandhu (Better known as 'Pash'). Pash himself came from a farming family and remained a controversial figure. Many people were inspired by his ideas but many questions were also raised about him. Around 1970, at just 18 or 19 years old, his first book "the iron tale" had already been published. The tone of this book was rebellious:

>Transliterated: "Main ticket kharch karke tuhadda Jamhooriyat da naatak dekhya hai. Hun taan mera naatak hall ch beh ke, haay haaye aakhan, te cheekan maaran da haqq banda hai"

>Translated: "I paid for a ticket to watch your drama of democracy. Now I have earned the right to sit in the theatre, cry out, and raise my voice"

After this book was released he was charged with murder and spent two years in prison. He continued writing there as well. In 1975, under Indira Gandhi, India entered the Emergency. State censorship and injustice began to increase. By the 1980s, the atmosphere in Punjab had become even heavier. On one side there was state repression and on the other Khalistani militancy was gaining momentum. Pash urged people to wake-up:

>Transliterated: "Sab toh katarnak hunda ae murda shanti naal bhar jaana. Na hona tadap da, sab sehan kar jaana. Gharan ton nikalna kam te, te kam toh ghar jaana. Sab toh khatarnak hinda ae supnian da mar jaana"

>Translated: "The most dangerous thing is to be filled with lifeless peace. To lose all restlessness and silently endure everything. To leave home from work and return home from work. The most dangerous thing is for the dreams to die"

During the Bhindranwale era, as Khalistani ideology and religious extremism were rising, Pash openly spoke against them. On 23 March, 1988 Pash was shot dead (by Khalistani militants).

So I've recently been reading "The Dravidian Movement" by Robert L. Hardgrave. He is the Louann and Larry Temple Centennial Professor Emeritus in the Humanities, Departments of Government and Asian Studies at the University of Texas at Austin. 

In his book, he outlines the inception, growth, and transformation of the Dravidian Movement from its inception to right after the Second Indian General Election in 1957.

I haven't finished reading it (I'm about half-way through) and its focus isn't on the ways in which the Dravidar Kazhagam or the Dravida Munnetra Kazhagam envisioned a future independent Dravidian State. But, in the text, it does give us some details about the beliefs and statements of Periyar and the Dravidar Kazhagam. One of those things was Periyar's (Naicker) view of democracy, central planning (he was against it), and federalism (he supported it).

Given that Annadurai had a much clearer vision (or at least a much readily written-down/recorded vision), I do want to specifically focus on the Dravidar Kazhagam and understand, what specifically they envisioned for their independent state .

If Periyar (Naicker) had no faith in democracy, then what did he envision the future Dravidian State would look like?

This isn't to invite a political conversation so much as a conversation regarding the history of the dravidian movement.