I started looking at OCL when the indicators from my deep dive scoring system and side by side comparison all went green. You can see the comparison in the link below on the website.

This is by no means a buy signal. It is simply a filtering tool that helps me decide which companies deserve further research. The first pass told me the financials looked attractive. The model obviously uses assumed growth rates, but it was enough to justify moving to the next stage.

The management side of the story is actually very interesting. The CEO has been with the company for 38 years and is also the founder. He owns a significant stake in the business which, in my opinion, is a positive because he has real skin in the game. He has also bought back shares when the stock has tanked, which suggests he believes in the business. After all, this is the company he founded.

The company has been compounding for a long time, but more recently the stock tanked after the Department of Defence decided not to renew an agreement related to Objective's software. This is where things started getting interesting.

We have a founder led company that has consistently created value for shareholders over many years. Looking at the dividends tab on the website, the company appears to have created more than 20x of shareholder value for every dollar retained over the last 10 years. Management has clearly demonstrated an ability to allocate capital effectively. Naturally, that led me to ask a few questions. Is the Defence issue really a big deal? What is the moat? Who are the competitors? And where is the future growth going to come from?

I am still only halfway through the research because I have been spending most of my spare time finishing the website, but so far the findings have been quite interesting.

One challenge when researching Objective is that the company operates across three business segments: Content Solutions, Regulatory Solutions and Planning & Building. At first glance, Content Solutions appears to be the crown jewel of the business and the segment contributing most of the revenue.

The products responsible for most of the revenue in this segment appear to be Objective Nexus, Objective ECM and Objective Connect. These are essentially records management and information governance platforms used by government departments, councils, regulators, justice agencies and healthcare organisations across Australia, New Zealand and the UK. Their job is to organise, secure, govern and share information while maintaining a clear auditable trail. The main competitor appears to be OpenText, a much larger company operating in the same space with broadly similar products.

This is where the moat starts becoming visible to me. These systems manage millions of documents, compliance records, regulatory records and governance workflows. Once all that information is embedded inside a platform, migrating away becomes incredibly difficult, expensive and risky. Every workflow, permission structure, retention policy and audit trail needs to be recreated somewhere else. The switching costs can be enormous.

That naturally led me to look more closely at the Department of Defence issue because initially I assumed Defence had decided to replace Objective. That does not appear to be what happened.

From what I could find, Defence did not renew the Objective ECM Upgrade & Support Program agreement. At the same time, Defence confirmed it remains committed to the widespread use of Objective ECM across approximately 140,000 users. Objective also stated that the parties have not yet reached agreement on ongoing licence entitlements for those users. In other words, Defence is still running Objective ECM, but the commercial arrangements around support, upgrades and licensing remain unresolved, and the public announcements do not explain why the agreement was not renewed.

To me, that distinction matters. Defence did not announce a migration away from Objective and did not announce a replacement vendor. Defence continues to use the software. That alone suggests the software is deeply embedded within Defence operations, reinforcing the switching cost argument. The way I see it, Defence appears willing to keep using what is effectively a 1990s version of the software rather than undertake the complexity, cost and risk of migrating such a massive volume of information to a new provider. It is a bit like continuing to run Windows XP because replacing it across an organisation of that size is harder than living with the limitations of the existing system. Whether that changes in the future remains to be seen, but to me it highlights how powerful the moat can become once a platform is embedded across an organisation with 140,000 users.

The market reacted badly to the news, which is not surprising….. ARR expectations effectively flatlined following the announcement and investors immediately started questioning the future growth outlook.

This takes me to the next question: how does this business actually grow?

Looking specifically at Content Solutions, my research so far suggests this is already a relatively mature market. Most government agencies already appear to have some form of records management or information governance platform in place. If that is true, then client expansion may be limited because governments are not waiting to discover records management software. They already have a solution, whether it is Objective, OpenText or another provider.

My current thinking is that growth comes mainly from renewals, additional users, increased usage and selling additional modules to existing customers. It is a bit like renewing a Microsoft 365 licence. Every year the customer has the option to leave, but once decades of documents, workflows, permissions, compliance records and audit trails are built inside a platform, migration becomes a major project.

This is one reason why ARR becomes such an important metric. Historically, total company ARR grew from approximately $47 million in FY19 to $120 million in FY25, which is where my script calculated approximately 17.8% annual growth. Content Solutions ARR itself grew from approximately $69 million in FY23 to $85 million in FY25, pointing to a lower growth profile for what is likely a more mature segment.

Based on my online research so far, I am leaning towards a long term growth assumption closer to 12% for the Content Solutions segment, which is what you can currently see flowing through the fair value calculations on the website.

That said, I have not yet completed my base case calculations. The assumptions currently shown are based largely on preliminary research and simple internet searches, so they remain subject to change as I continue working through the business and gain a better understanding of the Regulatory Solutions and Planning & Building segments.

As always, I'm not a financial advisor. I simply enjoy doing these deep dives and building tools that help me analyse businesses more effectively. The website itself is really just the outcome of solving problems that came up during my own investing research over time. Do your own research.

I started looking at OCL when the indicators from my deep dive scoring system and side by side comparison all went green. You can see the comparison in the link below on the website.

This is by no means a buy signal. It is simply a filtering tool that helps me decide which companies deserve further research. The first pass told me the financials looked attractive. The model obviously uses assumed growth rates, but it was enough to justify moving to the next stage.

The management side of the story is actually very interesting. The CEO has been with the company for 38 years and is also the founder. He owns a significant stake in the business which, in my opinion, is a positive because he has real skin in the game. He has also bought back shares when the stock has tanked, which suggests he believes in the business. After all, this is the company he founded.

The company has been compounding for a long time, but more recently the stock tanked after the Department of Defence decided not to renew an agreement related to Objective's software. This is where things started getting interesting.

We have a founder led company that has consistently created value for shareholders over many years. Looking at the dividends tab on the website, the company appears to have created more than 20x of shareholder value for every dollar retained over the last 10 years. Management has clearly demonstrated an ability to allocate capital effectively. Naturally, that led me to ask a few questions. Is the Defence issue really a big deal? What is the moat? Who are the competitors? And where is the future growth going to come from?

I am still only halfway through the research because I have been spending most of my spare time finishing the website, but so far the findings have been quite interesting.

One challenge when researching Objective is that the company operates across three business segments: Content Solutions, Regulatory Solutions and Planning & Building. At first glance, Content Solutions appears to be the crown jewel of the business and the segment contributing most of the revenue.

The products responsible for most of the revenue in this segment appear to be Objective Nexus, Objective ECM and Objective Connect. These are essentially records management and information governance platforms used by government departments, councils, regulators, justice agencies and healthcare organisations across Australia, New Zealand and the UK. Their job is to organise, secure, govern and share information while maintaining a clear auditable trail. The main competitor appears to be OpenText, a much larger company operating in the same space with broadly similar products.

This is where the moat starts becoming visible to me. These systems manage millions of documents, compliance records, regulatory records and governance workflows. Once all that information is embedded inside a platform, migrating away becomes incredibly difficult, expensive and risky. Every workflow, permission structure, retention policy and audit trail needs to be recreated somewhere else. The switching costs can be enormous.

That naturally led me to look more closely at the Department of Defence issue because initially I assumed Defence had decided to replace Objective. That does not appear to be what happened.

From what I could find, Defence did not renew the Objective ECM Upgrade & Support Program agreement. At the same time, Defence confirmed it remains committed to the widespread use of Objective ECM across approximately 140,000 users. Objective also stated that the parties have not yet reached agreement on ongoing licence entitlements for those users. In other words, Defence is still running Objective ECM, but the commercial arrangements around support, upgrades and licensing remain unresolved, and the public announcements do not explain why the agreement was not renewed.

To me, that distinction matters. Defence did not announce a migration away from Objective and did not announce a replacement vendor. Defence continues to use the software. That alone suggests the software is deeply embedded within Defence operations, reinforcing the switching cost argument. The way I see it, Defence appears willing to keep using what is effectively a 1990s version of the software rather than undertake the complexity, cost and risk of migrating such a massive volume of information to a new provider. It is a bit like continuing to run Windows XP because replacing it across an organisation of that size is harder than living with the limitations of the existing system. Whether that changes in the future remains to be seen, but to me it highlights how powerful the moat can become once a platform is embedded across an organisation with 140,000 users.

The market reacted badly to the news, which is not surprising….. ARR expectations effectively flatlined following the announcement and investors immediately started questioning the future growth outlook.

This takes me to the next question: how does this business actually grow?

Looking specifically at Content Solutions, my research so far suggests this is already a relatively mature market. Most government agencies already appear to have some form of records management or information governance platform in place. If that is true, then client expansion may be limited because governments are not waiting to discover records management software. They already have a solution, whether it is Objective, OpenText or another provider.

My current thinking is that growth comes mainly from renewals, additional users, increased usage and selling additional modules to existing customers. It is a bit like renewing a Microsoft 365 licence. Every year the customer has the option to leave, but once decades of documents, workflows, permissions, compliance records and audit trails are built inside a platform, migration becomes a major project.

This is one reason why ARR becomes such an important metric. Historically, total company ARR grew from approximately $47 million in FY19 to $120 million in FY25, which is where my script calculated approximately 17.8% annual growth. Content Solutions ARR itself grew from approximately $69 million in FY23 to $85 million in FY25, pointing to a lower growth profile for what is likely a more mature segment.

Based on my online research so far, I am leaning towards a long term growth assumption closer to 12% for the Content Solutions segment, which is what you can currently see flowing through the fair value calculations on the website.

That said, I have not yet completed my base case calculations. The assumptions currently shown are based largely on preliminary research and simple internet searches, so they remain subject to change as I continue working through the business and gain a better understanding of the Regulatory Solutions and Planning & Building segments.

As always, I'm not a financial advisor. I simply enjoy doing these deep dives and building tools that help me analyse businesses more effectively. The website itself is really just the outcome of solving problems that came up during my own investing research over time. Do your own research.

OCL Research

A few people have asked for more data to support the numbers I've been publishing in my CSL and RMD posts. Others have suggested the work is AI generated. I can confirm that everything is 100% HI generated, powered by the drive to beat inflation that is slowly eating away at my day job salary.

To make the research more transparent, I've been building this website to share the data behind my analysis. Over time, I've also developed a number of investing tools, scoring systems, and research frameworks that I think are worth putting out there for discussion and feedback.

Most of the CSL and RMD data available on the site comes directly from my mega research spreadsheet. I've simply imported the data and presented it graphically to make it easier to read and interpret. The analysis is organised into seven tabs, which mirror the structure of my spreadsheet and the order in which I conduct my research.

Each tab serves a specific purpose. I start by testing the financial quality of the business and validating the numbers. Once those checks pass, I move into assessing the company's future potential. That's where things become more difficult. At that stage, the process becomes less about mathematics and more about understanding the quality of the business, its competitive advantages, its future prospects, and ultimately whether the company is likely to make money and whether that translates into making money for shareholders.

I've also included a number of screening tools that help me identify potential investment candidates. The goal is to spend my time researching businesses that are worth investigating and avoid wasting hundreds of hours on companies that don't meet my initial criteria. As you can probably tell from the amount of data presented, the research process is fairly extensive, so filtering opportunities efficiently is essential.

The stock universes currently available in the tools are limited because this is very much a one man DIY project. I'm an engineer but definitely not a software engineer. Some of the tools take a little time to run, so please be patient. There are definitely gaps and lots of rough edges.

As a small victory, I managed to build a "Tell Us What You Think" button at the top of the website. It took me an entire public holiday to get it working so feel free to test it and let me know if it actually sends a message.

A quick warning about OCL: the analysis isn't finished yet. Unfortunately, once I uploaded the data, the script read everything, it became hard coded, and I honestly have not been able to remove it. I wanted this to work that way for complete transparency but I've ended up becoming a victim of my own invention. I can refresh the data and update the timestamp, but I currently can't remove any of the stocks that are already there. So OCL stays until I finish my research and publish the entire thing, so cover your eyes and don't look at OCL.

One final note: the spreadsheet used to upload the analysis data refreshes whenever I open it, but the website only updates when I upload a new version. Because of that, you'll see a timestamp in the top right corner showing when the analysis was last updated. Please keep that in mind when reviewing the data. The analysis section is static between uploads, while the screening and research tools use live data. The stocks in the website are the research for the last 3 months.

Hopefully you find it useful. Feedback, criticism, suggestions, and challenges to my assumptions are all welcome. After all, the whole point is to improve the process. Keep in mind that this I’m not a financial advisor nor do I pretend to be one. This is just the work of one random guy trying to beat inflation.

RMD Research

CSL Research

I started looking at OCL when the indicators from my deep dive scoring system and side by side comparison all went green. You can see the comparison in the link below on the website.

This is by no means a buy signal. It is simply a filtering tool that helps me decide which companies deserve further research. The first pass told me the financials looked attractive. The model obviously uses assumed growth rates, but it was enough to justify moving to the next stage.

The management side of the story is actually very interesting. The CEO has been with the company for 38 years and is also the founder. He owns a significant stake in the business which, in my opinion, is a positive because he has real skin in the game. He has also bought back shares when the stock has tanked, which suggests he believes in the business. After all, this is the company he founded.

The company has been compounding for a long time, but more recently the stock tanked after the Department of Defence decided not to renew an agreement related to Objective's software. This is where things started getting interesting.

We have a founder led company that has consistently created value for shareholders over many years. Looking at the dividends tab on the website, the company appears to have created more than 20x of shareholder value for every dollar retained over the last 10 years. Management has clearly demonstrated an ability to allocate capital effectively. Naturally, that led me to ask a few questions. Is the Defence issue really a big deal? What is the moat? Who are the competitors? And where is the future growth going to come from?

I am still only halfway through the research because I have been spending most of my spare time finishing the website, but so far the findings have been quite interesting.

One challenge when researching Objective is that the company operates across three business segments: Content Solutions, Regulatory Solutions and Planning & Building. At first glance, Content Solutions appears to be the crown jewel of the business and the segment contributing most of the revenue.

The products responsible for most of the revenue in this segment appear to be Objective Nexus, Objective ECM and Objective Connect. These are essentially records management and information governance platforms used by government departments, councils, regulators, justice agencies and healthcare organisations across Australia, New Zealand and the UK. Their job is to organise, secure, govern and share information while maintaining a clear auditable trail. The main competitor appears to be OpenText, a much larger company operating in the same space with broadly similar products.

This is where the moat starts becoming visible to me. These systems manage millions of documents, compliance records, regulatory records and governance workflows. Once all that information is embedded inside a platform, migrating away becomes incredibly difficult, expensive and risky. Every workflow, permission structure, retention policy and audit trail needs to be recreated somewhere else. The switching costs can be enormous.

That naturally led me to look more closely at the Department of Defence issue because initially I assumed Defence had decided to replace Objective. That does not appear to be what happened.

From what I could find, Defence did not renew the Objective ECM Upgrade & Support Program agreement. At the same time, Defence confirmed it remains committed to the widespread use of Objective ECM across approximately 140,000 users. Objective also stated that the parties have not yet reached agreement on ongoing licence entitlements for those users. In other words, Defence is still running Objective ECM, but the commercial arrangements around support, upgrades and licensing remain unresolved, and the public announcements do not explain why the agreement was not renewed.

To me, that distinction matters. Defence did not announce a migration away from Objective and did not announce a replacement vendor. Defence continues to use the software. That alone suggests the software is deeply embedded within Defence operations, reinforcing the switching cost argument. The way I see it, Defence appears willing to keep using what is effectively a 1990s version of the software rather than undertake the complexity, cost and risk of migrating such a massive volume of information to a new provider. It is a bit like continuing to run Windows XP because replacing it across an organisation of that size is harder than living with the limitations of the existing system. Whether that changes in the future remains to be seen, but to me it highlights how powerful the moat can become once a platform is embedded across an organisation with 140,000 users.

The market reacted badly to the news, which is not surprising….. ARR expectations effectively flatlined following the announcement and investors immediately started questioning the future growth outlook.

This takes me to the next question: how does this business actually grow?

Looking specifically at Content Solutions, my research so far suggests this is already a relatively mature market. Most government agencies already appear to have some form of records management or information governance platform in place. If that is true, then client expansion may be limited because governments are not waiting to discover records management software. They already have a solution, whether it is Objective, OpenText or another provider.

My current thinking is that growth comes mainly from renewals, additional users, increased usage and selling additional modules to existing customers. It is a bit like renewing a Microsoft 365 licence. Every year the customer has the option to leave, but once decades of documents, workflows, permissions, compliance records and audit trails are built inside a platform, migration becomes a major project.

This is one reason why ARR becomes such an important metric. Historically, total company ARR grew from approximately $47 million in FY19 to $120 million in FY25, which is where my script calculated approximately 17.8% annual growth. Content Solutions ARR itself grew from approximately $69 million in FY23 to $85 million in FY25, pointing to a lower growth profile for what is likely a more mature segment.

Based on my online research so far, I am leaning towards a long term growth assumption closer to 12% for the Content Solutions segment, which is what you can currently see flowing through the fair value calculations on the website.

That said, I have not yet completed my base case calculations. The assumptions currently shown are based largely on preliminary research and simple internet searches, so they remain subject to change as I continue working through the business and gain a better understanding of the Regulatory Solutions and Planning & Building segments.

As always, I'm not a financial advisor. I simply enjoy doing these deep dives and building tools that help me analyse businesses more effectively. The website itself is really just the outcome of solving problems that came up during my own investing research over time. Do your own research.

OCL Research

I started looking at OCL when the indicators from my deep dive scoring system and side by side comparison all went green. You can see the comparison in the link below on the website.

This is by no means a buy signal. It is simply a filtering tool that helps me decide which companies deserve further research. The first pass told me the financials looked attractive. The model obviously uses assumed growth rates, but it was enough to justify moving to the next stage.

The management side of the story is actually very interesting. The CEO has been with the company for 38 years and is also the founder. He owns a significant stake in the business which, in my opinion, is a positive because he has real skin in the game. He has also bought back shares when the stock has tanked, which suggests he believes in the business. After all, this is the company he founded.

The company has been compounding for a long time, but more recently the stock tanked after the Department of Defence decided not to renew an agreement related to Objective's software. This is where things started getting interesting.

We have a founder led company that has consistently created value for shareholders over many years. Looking at the dividends tab on the website, the company appears to have created more than 20x of shareholder value for every dollar retained over the last 10 years. Management has clearly demonstrated an ability to allocate capital effectively. Naturally, that led me to ask a few questions. Is the Defence issue really a big deal? What is the moat? Who are the competitors? And where is the future growth going to come from?

I am still only halfway through the research because I have been spending most of my spare time finishing the website, but so far the findings have been quite interesting.

One challenge when researching Objective is that the company operates across three business segments: Content Solutions, Regulatory Solutions and Planning & Building. At first glance, Content Solutions appears to be the crown jewel of the business and the segment contributing most of the revenue.

The products responsible for most of the revenue in this segment appear to be Objective Nexus, Objective ECM and Objective Connect. These are essentially records management and information governance platforms used by government departments, councils, regulators, justice agencies and healthcare organisations across Australia, New Zealand and the UK. Their job is to organise, secure, govern and share information while maintaining a clear auditable trail. The main competitor appears to be OpenText, a much larger company operating in the same space with broadly similar products.

This is where the moat starts becoming visible to me. These systems manage millions of documents, compliance records, regulatory records and governance workflows. Once all that information is embedded inside a platform, migrating away becomes incredibly difficult, expensive and risky. Every workflow, permission structure, retention policy and audit trail needs to be recreated somewhere else. The switching costs can be enormous.

That naturally led me to look more closely at the Department of Defence issue because initially I assumed Defence had decided to replace Objective. That does not appear to be what happened.

From what I could find, Defence did not renew the Objective ECM Upgrade & Support Program agreement. At the same time, Defence confirmed it remains committed to the widespread use of Objective ECM across approximately 140,000 users. Objective also stated that the parties have not yet reached agreement on ongoing licence entitlements for those users. In other words, Defence is still running Objective ECM, but the commercial arrangements around support, upgrades and licensing remain unresolved, and the public announcements do not explain why the agreement was not renewed.

To me, that distinction matters. Defence did not announce a migration away from Objective and did not announce a replacement vendor. Defence continues to use the software. That alone suggests the software is deeply embedded within Defence operations, reinforcing the switching cost argument. The way I see it, Defence appears willing to keep using what is effectively a 1990s version of the software rather than undertake the complexity, cost and risk of migrating such a massive volume of information to a new provider. It is a bit like continuing to run Windows XP because replacing it across an organisation of that size is harder than living with the limitations of the existing system. Whether that changes in the future remains to be seen, but to me it highlights how powerful the moat can become once a platform is embedded across an organisation with 140,000 users.

The market reacted badly to the news, which is not surprising….. ARR expectations effectively flatlined following the announcement and investors immediately started questioning the future growth outlook.

This takes me to the next question: how does this business actually grow?

Looking specifically at Content Solutions, my research so far suggests this is already a relatively mature market. Most government agencies already appear to have some form of records management or information governance platform in place. If that is true, then client expansion may be limited because governments are not waiting to discover records management software. They already have a solution, whether it is Objective, OpenText or another provider.

My current thinking is that growth comes mainly from renewals, additional users, increased usage and selling additional modules to existing customers. It is a bit like renewing a Microsoft 365 licence. Every year the customer has the option to leave, but once decades of documents, workflows, permissions, compliance records and audit trails are built inside a platform, migration becomes a major project.

This is one reason why ARR becomes such an important metric. Historically, total company ARR grew from approximately $47 million in FY19 to $120 million in FY25, which is where my script calculated approximately 17.8% annual growth. Content Solutions ARR itself grew from approximately $69 million in FY23 to $85 million in FY25, pointing to a lower growth profile for what is likely a more mature segment.

Based on my online research so far, I am leaning towards a long term growth assumption closer to 12% for the Content Solutions segment, which is what you can currently see flowing through the fair value calculations on the website.

That said, I have not yet completed my base case calculations. The assumptions currently shown are based largely on preliminary research and simple internet searches, so they remain subject to change as I continue working through the business and gain a better understanding of the Regulatory Solutions and Planning & Building segments.

As always, I'm not a financial advisor. I simply enjoy doing these deep dives and building tools that help me analyse businesses more effectively. The website itself is really just the outcome of solving problems that came up during my own investing research over time. Do your own research.

OCL Research

I started looking at OCL when the indicators from my deep dive scoring system and side by side comparison all went green. You can see the comparison in the link below on the website.

This is by no means a buy signal. It is simply a filtering tool that helps me decide which companies deserve further research. The first pass told me the financials looked attractive. The model obviously uses assumed growth rates, but it was enough to justify moving to the next stage.

The management side of the story is actually very interesting. The CEO has been with the company for 38 years and is also the founder. He owns a significant stake in the business which, in my opinion, is a positive because he has real skin in the game. He has also bought back shares when the stock has tanked, which suggests he believes in the business. After all, this is the company he founded.

The company has been compounding for a long time, but more recently the stock tanked after the Department of Defence decided not to renew an agreement related to Objective's software. This is where things started getting interesting.

We have a founder led company that has consistently created value for shareholders over many years. Looking at the dividends tab on the website, the company appears to have created more than 20x of shareholder value for every dollar retained over the last 10 years. Management has clearly demonstrated an ability to allocate capital effectively. Naturally, that led me to ask a few questions. Is the Defence issue really a big deal? What is the moat? Who are the competitors? And where is the future growth going to come from?

I am still only halfway through the research because I have been spending most of my spare time finishing the website, but so far the findings have been quite interesting.

One challenge when researching Objective is that the company operates across three business segments: Content Solutions, Regulatory Solutions and Planning & Building. At first glance, Content Solutions appears to be the crown jewel of the business and the segment contributing most of the revenue.

The products responsible for most of the revenue in this segment appear to be Objective Nexus, Objective ECM and Objective Connect. These are essentially records management and information governance platforms used by government departments, councils, regulators, justice agencies and healthcare organisations across Australia, New Zealand and the UK. Their job is to organise, secure, govern and share information while maintaining a clear auditable trail. The main competitor appears to be OpenText, a much larger company operating in the same space with broadly similar products.

This is where the moat starts becoming visible to me. These systems manage millions of documents, compliance records, regulatory records and governance workflows. Once all that information is embedded inside a platform, migrating away becomes incredibly difficult, expensive and risky. Every workflow, permission structure, retention policy and audit trail needs to be recreated somewhere else. The switching costs can be enormous.

That naturally led me to look more closely at the Department of Defence issue because initially I assumed Defence had decided to replace Objective. That does not appear to be what happened.

From what I could find, Defence did not renew the Objective ECM Upgrade & Support Program agreement. At the same time, Defence confirmed it remains committed to the widespread use of Objective ECM across approximately 140,000 users. Objective also stated that the parties have not yet reached agreement on ongoing licence entitlements for those users. In other words, Defence is still running Objective ECM, but the commercial arrangements around support, upgrades and licensing remain unresolved, and the public announcements do not explain why the agreement was not renewed.

To me, that distinction matters. Defence did not announce a migration away from Objective and did not announce a replacement vendor. Defence continues to use the software. That alone suggests the software is deeply embedded within Defence operations, reinforcing the switching cost argument. The way I see it, Defence appears willing to keep using what is effectively a 1990s version of the software rather than undertake the complexity, cost and risk of migrating such a massive volume of information to a new provider. It is a bit like continuing to run Windows XP because replacing it across an organisation of that size is harder than living with the limitations of the existing system. Whether that changes in the future remains to be seen, but to me it highlights how powerful the moat can become once a platform is embedded across an organisation with 140,000 users.

The market reacted badly to the news, which is not surprising….. ARR expectations effectively flatlined following the announcement and investors immediately started questioning the future growth outlook.

This takes me to the next question: how does this business actually grow?

Looking specifically at Content Solutions, my research so far suggests this is already a relatively mature market. Most government agencies already appear to have some form of records management or information governance platform in place. If that is true, then client expansion may be limited because governments are not waiting to discover records management software. They already have a solution, whether it is Objective, OpenText or another provider.

My current thinking is that growth comes mainly from renewals, additional users, increased usage and selling additional modules to existing customers. It is a bit like renewing a Microsoft 365 licence. Every year the customer has the option to leave, but once decades of documents, workflows, permissions, compliance records and audit trails are built inside a platform, migration becomes a major project.

This is one reason why ARR becomes such an important metric. Historically, total company ARR grew from approximately $47 million in FY19 to $120 million in FY25, which is where my script calculated approximately 17.8% annual growth. Content Solutions ARR itself grew from approximately $69 million in FY23 to $85 million in FY25, pointing to a lower growth profile for what is likely a more mature segment.

Based on my online research so far, I am leaning towards a long term growth assumption closer to 12% for the Content Solutions segment, which is what you can currently see flowing through the fair value calculations on the website.

That said, I have not yet completed my base case calculations. The assumptions currently shown are based largely on preliminary research and simple internet searches, so they remain subject to change as I continue working through the business and gain a better understanding of the Regulatory Solutions and Planning & Building segments.

As always, I'm not a financial advisor. I simply enjoy doing these deep dives and building tools that help me analyse businesses more effectively. The website itself is really just the outcome of solving problems that came up during my own investing research over time. Do your own research.

OCL Research

I started looking at OCL when the indicators from my deep dive scoring system and side by side comparison all went green. You can see the comparison in the link below on the website.

This is by no means a buy signal. It is simply a filtering tool that helps me decide which companies deserve further research. The first pass told me the financials looked attractive. The model obviously uses assumed growth rates, but it was enough to justify moving to the next stage.

The management side of the story is actually very interesting. The CEO has been with the company for 38 years and is also the founder. He owns a significant stake in the business which, in my opinion, is a positive because he has real skin in the game. He has also bought back shares when the stock has tanked, which suggests he believes in the business. After all, this is the company he founded.

The company has been compounding for a long time, but more recently the stock tanked after the Department of Defence decided not to renew an agreement related to Objective's software. This is where things started getting interesting.

We have a founder led company that has consistently created value for shareholders over many years. Looking at the dividends tab on the website, the company appears to have created more than 20x of shareholder value for every dollar retained over the last 10 years. Management has clearly demonstrated an ability to allocate capital effectively. Naturally, that led me to ask a few questions. Is the Defence issue really a big deal? What is the moat? Who are the competitors? And where is the future growth going to come from?

I am still only halfway through the research because I have been spending most of my spare time finishing the website, but so far the findings have been quite interesting.

One challenge when researching Objective is that the company operates across three business segments: Content Solutions, Regulatory Solutions and Planning & Building. At first glance, Content Solutions appears to be the crown jewel of the business and the segment contributing most of the revenue.

The products responsible for most of the revenue in this segment appear to be Objective Nexus, Objective ECM and Objective Connect. These are essentially records management and information governance platforms used by government departments, councils, regulators, justice agencies and healthcare organisations across Australia, New Zealand and the UK. Their job is to organise, secure, govern and share information while maintaining a clear auditable trail. The main competitor appears to be OpenText, a much larger company operating in the same space with broadly similar products.

This is where the moat starts becoming visible to me. These systems manage millions of documents, compliance records, regulatory records and governance workflows. Once all that information is embedded inside a platform, migrating away becomes incredibly difficult, expensive and risky. Every workflow, permission structure, retention policy and audit trail needs to be recreated somewhere else. The switching costs can be enormous.

That naturally led me to look more closely at the Department of Defence issue because initially I assumed Defence had decided to replace Objective. That does not appear to be what happened.

From what I could find, Defence did not renew the Objective ECM Upgrade & Support Program agreement. At the same time, Defence confirmed it remains committed to the widespread use of Objective ECM across approximately 140,000 users. Objective also stated that the parties have not yet reached agreement on ongoing licence entitlements for those users. In other words, Defence is still running Objective ECM, but the commercial arrangements around support, upgrades and licensing remain unresolved, and the public announcements do not explain why the agreement was not renewed.

To me, that distinction matters. Defence did not announce a migration away from Objective and did not announce a replacement vendor. Defence continues to use the software. That alone suggests the software is deeply embedded within Defence operations, reinforcing the switching cost argument. The way I see it, Defence appears willing to keep using what is effectively a 1990s version of the software rather than undertake the complexity, cost and risk of migrating such a massive volume of information to a new provider. It is a bit like continuing to run Windows XP because replacing it across an organisation of that size is harder than living with the limitations of the existing system. Whether that changes in the future remains to be seen, but to me it highlights how powerful the moat can become once a platform is embedded across an organisation with 140,000 users. Is yet to be seen whether Defence comes back to the table, you can draw your own conclusions.

The market reacted badly to the news, which is not surprising….. ARR expectations effectively flatlined following the announcement and investors immediately started questioning the future growth outlook.

This takes me to the next question: how does this business actually grow?

Looking specifically at Content Solutions, my research so far suggests this is already a relatively mature market. Most government agencies already appear to have some form of records management or information governance platform in place. If that is true, then client expansion may be limited because governments are not waiting to discover records management software. They already have a solution, whether it is Objective, OpenText or another provider.

My current thinking is that growth comes mainly from renewals, additional users, increased usage and selling additional modules to existing customers. It is a bit like renewing a Microsoft 365 licence. Every year the customer has the option to leave, but once decades of documents, workflows, permissions, compliance records and audit trails are built inside a platform, migration becomes a major project.

This is one reason why ARR becomes such an important metric. Historically, total company ARR grew from approximately $47 million in FY19 to $120 million in FY25, which is where my script calculated approximately 17.8% annual growth. Content Solutions ARR itself grew from approximately $69 million in FY23 to $85 million in FY25, pointing to a lower growth profile for what is likely a more mature segment.

Based on my online research so far, I am leaning towards a long term growth assumption closer to 12% for the Content Solutions segment, which is what you can currently see flowing through the fair value calculations on the website.

That said, I have not yet completed my base case calculations. The assumptions currently shown are based largely on preliminary research and simple internet searches, so they remain subject to change as I continue working through the business and gain a better understanding of the Regulatory Solutions and Planning & Building segments.

As always, I'm not a financial advisor. I simply enjoy doing these deep dives and building tools that help me analyse businesses more effectively. The website itself is really just the outcome of solving problems that came up during my own investing research over time. Do your own research.

OCL Research

A few people have asked for more data to support the numbers I've been publishing in my CSL and RMD posts. Others have suggested the work is AI generated. I can confirm that everything is 100% HI generated, powered by the drive to beat inflation that is slowly eating away at my day job salary.

To make the research more transparent, I've been building this website to share the data behind my analysis. Over time, I've also developed a number of investing tools, scoring systems, and research frameworks that I think are worth putting out there for discussion and feedback.

Most of the CSL and RMD data available on the site comes directly from my mega research spreadsheet. I've simply imported the data and presented it graphically to make it easier to read and interpret. The analysis is organised into seven tabs, which mirror the structure of my spreadsheet and the order in which I conduct my research.

Each tab serves a specific purpose. I start by testing the financial quality of the business and validating the numbers. Once those checks pass, I move into assessing the company's future potential. That's where things become more difficult. At that stage, the process becomes less about mathematics and more about understanding the quality of the business, its competitive advantages, its future prospects, and ultimately whether the company is likely to make money and whether that translates into making money for shareholders.

I've also included a number of screening tools that help me identify potential investment candidates. The goal is to spend my time researching businesses that are worth investigating and avoid wasting hundreds of hours on companies that don't meet my initial criteria. As you can probably tell from the amount of data presented, the research process is fairly extensive, so filtering opportunities efficiently is essential.

The stock universes currently available in the tools are limited because this is very much a one man DIY project. I'm an engineer but definitely not a software engineer. Some of the tools take a little time to run, so please be patient. There are definitely gaps and lots of rough edges.

As a small victory, I managed to build a "Tell Us What You Think" button at the top of the website. It took me an entire public holiday to get it working so feel free to test it and let me know if it actually sends a message.

A quick warning about OCL: the analysis isn't finished yet. Unfortunately, once I uploaded the data, the script read everything, it became hard coded, and I honestly have not been able to remove it. I wanted this to work that way for complete transparency but I've ended up becoming a victim of my own invention. I can refresh the data and update the timestamp, but I currently can't remove any of the stocks that are already there. So OCL stays until I finish my research and publish the entire thing, so cover your eyes and don't look at OCL.

One final note: the spreadsheet used to upload the analysis data refreshes whenever I open it, but the website only updates when I upload a new version. Because of that, you'll see a timestamp in the top right corner showing when the analysis was last updated. Please keep that in mind when reviewing the data. The analysis section is static between uploads, while the screening and research tools use live data. The stocks in the website are the research for the last 3 months.

Hopefully you find it useful. Feedback, criticism, suggestions, and challenges to my assumptions are all welcome. After all, the whole point is to improve the process. Keep in mind that this I’m not a financial advisor nor do I pretend to be one. This is just the work of one random guy trying to beat inflation.

CSL.AX Research

RMD.AX Research

A few people have asked for more data to support the numbers I've been publishing in my CSL and RMD posts. Others have suggested the work is AI generated. I can confirm that everything is 100% HI generated, powered by the drive to beat inflation that is slowly eating away at my day job salary.

To make the research more transparent, I've been building this website to share the data behind my analysis. Over time, I've also developed a number of investing tools, scoring systems, and research frameworks that I think are worth putting out there for discussion and feedback.

Most of the CSL and RMD data available on the site comes directly from my mega research spreadsheet. I've simply imported the data and presented it graphically to make it easier to read and interpret. The analysis is organised into seven tabs, which mirror the structure of my spreadsheet and the order in which I conduct my research.

Each tab serves a specific purpose. I start by testing the financial quality of the business and validating the numbers. Once those checks pass, I move into assessing the company's future potential. That's where things become more difficult. At that stage, the process becomes less about mathematics and more about understanding the quality of the business, its competitive advantages, its future prospects, and ultimately whether the company is likely to make money and whether that translates into making money for shareholders.

I've also included a number of screening tools that help me identify potential investment candidates. The goal is to spend my time researching businesses that are worth investigating and avoid wasting hundreds of hours on companies that don't meet my initial criteria. As you can probably tell from the amount of data presented, the research process is fairly extensive, so filtering opportunities efficiently is essential.

The stock universes currently available in the tools are limited because this is very much a one man DIY project. I'm an engineer but definitely not a software engineer. Some of the tools take a little time to run, so please be patient. There are definitely gaps and lots of rough edges.

As a small victory, I managed to build a "Tell Us What You Think" button at the top of the website. It took me an entire public holiday to get it working so feel free to test it and let me know if it actually sends a message.

A quick warning about OCL: the analysis isn't finished yet. Unfortunately, once I uploaded the data, the script read everything, it became hard coded, and I honestly have not been able to remove it. I wanted this to work that way for complete transparency but I've ended up becoming a victim of my own invention. I can refresh the data and update the timestamp, but I currently can't remove any of the stocks that are already there. So OCL stays until I finish my research and publish the entire thing, so cover your eyes and don't look at OCL.

One final note: the spreadsheet used to upload the analysis data refreshes whenever I open it, but the website only updates when I upload a new version. Because of that, you'll see a timestamp in the top right corner showing when the analysis was last updated. Please keep that in mind when reviewing the data. The analysis section is static between uploads, while the screening and research tools use live data. The stocks in the website are the research for the last 3 months.

Hopefully you find it useful. Feedback, criticism, suggestions, and challenges to my assumptions are all welcome. After all, the whole point is to improve the process. Keep in mind that this I’m not a financial advisor nor do I pretend to be one. This is just the work of one random guy trying to beat inflation.

RMD Research

CSL Research

After analysing most of ResMed's (RMD) business, I came across three major headwinds:

1. GLP‑1 drugs
2. Philips recovery
3. Regulatory and Medicare-related changes in the United States

Initially, I thought GLP‑1s and Philips would be the biggest threats to my RMD investment thesis. However, after spending a significant amount of time analysing both, I came to a different conclusion.

The data suggests that GLP‑1s are not the existential threat many investors believe they are. Most OSA patients are actually non obese, meaning GLP‑1s only directly address a portion of the sleep-apnea market. Likewise, while Philips will likely recover some of the market share it lost during the recall, the impact appears manageable. Combining both factors in my model reduced my estimate of ResMed's long term owner earnings growth from roughly 15%-18% historically to around 12%. A slowdown, yes, but nowhere near a broken business.

Everything changed when I reached the Medicare and regulatory side of the analysis.

ResMed operates through two segments:

• Sleep & Breathing Health (87.5% of revenue)
• Residential Care Software (12.5% of revenue)

What struck me was that both segments have significant exposure to Medicare.

The Sleep & Breathing segment is directly exposed because Medicare reimburses CPAP equipment, masks and respiratory devices through Home Medical Equipment providers. Residential Care Software is indirectly exposed because many of its customers, including home health agencies, hospice providers, skilled nursing facilities and senior living operators, derive a significant portion of their revenue from Medicare and Medicaid funding. I estimate this combined exposure to be in the order of 80%.

The indirect exposure is particularly interesting. Commercial insurers often use Medicare reimbursement rates as a benchmark when determining their own payment structures. In other words, Medicare does not just influence Medicare patients. It influences the economics of a large portion of the healthcare ecosystem.

The more I researched Medicare, the more I realised that this risk is fundamentally different from GLP‑1s or Philips.

• GLP‑1s attack patient growth.
• Philips attacks market share.
• Medicare attacks margins and pricing power.

Historically, RMD handled reimbursement pressure quite well. During prior competitive bidding periods, the company continued delivering double digit revenue growth while expanding margins. However, today's situation is different because Medicare pressure is no longer occurring in isolation.

Individually, none of these risks are particularly alarming. Philips recovering market share is manageable. GLP‑1 drugs appear more likely to slow growth than destroy demand. Medicare reimbursement changes, viewed in isolation, look more like a margin headwind than a threat to the business model. However, once I stepped back and looked at all three together, my perspective changed completely.

The conclusion that ultimately stopped my research is that I no longer see the primary risk as a business risk. I see it as an investment risk.

I do not believe ResMed is at risk of becoming a bad business. I do not believe CPAP is at risk of being replaced anytime soon. I do not believe Philips will regain industry leadership. In fact, most of the evidence suggests the underlying business remains strong.

What concerns me is something much more subtle. Historically, ResMed has been capable of compounding earnings at approximately 15%-18% annually. If GLP‑1 adoption reduces patient growth, Philips recovers a portion of its lost market share, and Medicare reimbursement pressure continues to compress industry economics, the company could eventually find itself compounding earnings at only 7%-10% annually.

The business would still be growing. The moat could still be intact. The products would still be relevant. Yet the intrinsic value of the company would be dramatically different.

That is why I believe the market may be asking the wrong question.

The real question is not whether ResMed will continue growing.

The real question is:

What happens to the valuation of ResMed if it remains a great company, but no longer remains a great compounder?

For me, the answer is significant.

My valuation for RMD under a Philips recovery and GLP‑1 scenario is approximately $32 per share. When I incorporate all three headwinds, including Medicare and reimbursement pressure, my estimated valuation falls to approximately $25-$28 per share.

At the current share price, I no longer find the risk reward attractive for a long term investment. While I still believe ResMed is a high quality business, my work suggests the market is largely pricing the company based on a future that incorporates Philips recovery and GLP‑1 headwinds. However, I do not believe it fully accounts for the additional risk posed by Medicare reimbursement pressure.

For that reason, I have decided to stop my research on RMD and start researching OCL.

Not financial advice, just showing my work DYOR.

After analysing most of ResMed's (RMD) business, I came across three major headwinds:

1. GLP‑1 drugs
2. Philips recovery
3. Regulatory and Medicare-related changes in the United States

Initially, I thought GLP‑1s and Philips would be the biggest threats to my RMD investment thesis. However, after spending a significant amount of time analysing both, I came to a different conclusion.

The data suggests that GLP‑1s are not the existential threat many investors believe they are. Most OSA patients are actually non obese, meaning GLP‑1s only directly address a portion of the sleep-apnea market. Likewise, while Philips will likely recover some of the market share it lost during the recall, the impact appears manageable. Combining both factors in my model reduced my estimate of ResMed's long term owner earnings growth from roughly 15%-18% historically to around 12%. A slowdown, yes, but nowhere near a broken business.

Everything changed when I reached the Medicare and regulatory side of the analysis.

ResMed operates through two segments:

• Sleep & Breathing Health (87.5% of revenue)
• Residential Care Software (12.5% of revenue)

What struck me was that both segments have significant exposure to Medicare.

The Sleep & Breathing segment is directly exposed because Medicare reimburses CPAP equipment, masks and respiratory devices through Home Medical Equipment providers. Residential Care Software is indirectly exposed because many of its customers, including home health agencies, hospice providers, skilled nursing facilities and senior living operators, derive a significant portion of their revenue from Medicare and Medicaid funding. I estimate this combined exposure to be in the order of 80%.

The indirect exposure is particularly interesting. Commercial insurers often use Medicare reimbursement rates as a benchmark when determining their own payment structures. In other words, Medicare does not just influence Medicare patients. It influences the economics of a large portion of the healthcare ecosystem.

The more I researched Medicare, the more I realised that this risk is fundamentally different from GLP‑1s or Philips.

• GLP‑1s attack patient growth.
• Philips attacks market share.
• Medicare attacks margins and pricing power.

Historically, RMD handled reimbursement pressure quite well. During prior competitive bidding periods, the company continued delivering double digit revenue growth while expanding margins. However, today's situation is different because Medicare pressure is no longer occurring in isolation.

Individually, none of these risks are particularly alarming. Philips recovering market share is manageable. GLP‑1 drugs appear more likely to slow growth than destroy demand. Medicare reimbursement changes, viewed in isolation, look more like a margin headwind than a threat to the business model. However, once I stepped back and looked at all three together, my perspective changed completely.

The conclusion that ultimately stopped my research is that I no longer see the primary risk as a business risk. I see it as an investment risk.

I do not believe ResMed is at risk of becoming a bad business. I do not believe CPAP is at risk of being replaced anytime soon. I do not believe Philips will regain industry leadership. In fact, most of the evidence suggests the underlying business remains strong.

What concerns me is something much more subtle. Historically, ResMed has been capable of compounding earnings at approximately 15%-18% annually. If GLP‑1 adoption reduces patient growth, Philips recovers a portion of its lost market share, and Medicare reimbursement pressure continues to compress industry economics, the company could eventually find itself compounding earnings at only 7%-10% annually.

The business would still be growing. The moat could still be intact. The products would still be relevant. Yet the intrinsic value of the company would be dramatically different.

That is why I believe the market may be asking the wrong question.

The real question is not whether ResMed will continue growing.

The real question is:

What happens to the valuation of ResMed if it remains a great company, but no longer remains a great compounder?

For me, the answer is significant.

My valuation for RMD under a Philips recovery and GLP‑1 scenario is approximately $32 per share. When I incorporate all three headwinds, including Medicare and reimbursement pressure, my estimated valuation falls to approximately $25-$28 per share.

At the current share price, I no longer find the risk reward attractive for a long term investment. While I still believe ResMed is a high quality business, my work suggests the market is largely pricing the company based on a future that incorporates Philips recovery and GLP‑1 headwinds. However, I do not believe it fully accounts for the additional risk posed by Medicare reimbursement pressure.

For that reason, I have decided to stop my research on RMD and start researching OCL.

Not financial advice, just showing my work DYOR.

After analysing most of ResMed's (RMD) business, I came across three major headwinds:

1. GLP‑1 drugs
2. Philips recovery
3. Regulatory and Medicare-related changes in the United States

Initially, I thought GLP‑1s and Philips would be the biggest threats to my RMD investment thesis. However, after spending a significant amount of time analysing both, I came to a different conclusion.

The data suggests that GLP‑1s are not the existential threat many investors believe they are. Most OSA patients are actually non obese, meaning GLP‑1s only directly address a portion of the sleep-apnea market. Likewise, while Philips will likely recover some of the market share it lost during the recall, the impact appears manageable. Combining both factors in my model reduced my estimate of ResMed's long term owner earnings growth from roughly 15%-18% historically to around 12%. A slowdown, yes, but nowhere near a broken business.

Everything changed when I reached the Medicare and regulatory side of the analysis.

ResMed operates through two segments:

• Sleep & Breathing Health (87.5% of revenue)
• Residential Care Software (12.5% of revenue)

What struck me was that both segments have significant exposure to Medicare.

The Sleep & Breathing segment is directly exposed because Medicare reimburses CPAP equipment, masks and respiratory devices through Home Medical Equipment providers. Residential Care Software is indirectly exposed because many of its customers, including home health agencies, hospice providers, skilled nursing facilities and senior living operators, derive a significant portion of their revenue from Medicare and Medicaid funding. I estimate this combined exposure to be in the order of 80%.

The indirect exposure is particularly interesting. Commercial insurers often use Medicare reimbursement rates as a benchmark when determining their own payment structures. In other words, Medicare does not just influence Medicare patients. It influences the economics of a large portion of the healthcare ecosystem.

The more I researched Medicare, the more I realised that this risk is fundamentally different from GLP‑1s or Philips.

• GLP‑1s attack patient growth.
• Philips attacks market share.
• Medicare attacks margins and pricing power.

Historically, RMD handled reimbursement pressure quite well. During prior competitive bidding periods, the company continued delivering double digit revenue growth while expanding margins. However, today's situation is different because Medicare pressure is no longer occurring in isolation.

Individually, none of these risks are particularly alarming. Philips recovering market share is manageable. GLP‑1 drugs appear more likely to slow growth than destroy demand. Medicare reimbursement changes, viewed in isolation, look more like a margin headwind than a threat to the business model. However, once I stepped back and looked at all three together, my perspective changed completely.

The conclusion that ultimately stopped my research is that I no longer see the primary risk as a business risk. I see it as an investment risk.

I do not believe ResMed is at risk of becoming a bad business. I do not believe CPAP is at risk of being replaced anytime soon. I do not believe Philips will regain industry leadership. In fact, most of the evidence suggests the underlying business remains strong.

What concerns me is something much more subtle. Historically, ResMed has been capable of compounding earnings at approximately 15%-18% annually. If GLP‑1 adoption reduces patient growth, Philips recovers a portion of its lost market share, and Medicare reimbursement pressure continues to compress industry economics, the company could eventually find itself compounding earnings at only 7%-10% annually.

The business would still be growing. The moat could still be intact. The products would still be relevant. Yet the intrinsic value of the company would be dramatically different.

That is why I believe the market may be asking the wrong question.

The real question is not whether ResMed will continue growing.

The real question is:

What happens to the valuation of ResMed if it remains a great company, but no longer remains a great compounder?

For me, the answer is significant.

My valuation for RMD under a Philips recovery and GLP‑1 scenario is approximately $32 per share. When I incorporate all three headwinds, including Medicare and reimbursement pressure, my estimated valuation falls to approximately $25-$28 per share.

At the current share price, I no longer find the risk reward attractive for a long term investment. While I still believe ResMed is a high quality business, my work suggests the market is largely pricing the company based on a future that incorporates Philips recovery and GLP‑1 headwinds. However, I do not believe it fully accounts for the additional risk posed by Medicare reimbursement pressure.

For that reason, I have decided to stop my research on RMD and start researching OCL.

Not financial advice, just showing my work DYOR.

When I started researching ResMed (RMD), I thought I was analysing a medical device company. The debate seemed simple: Philips lost share after the recall, Fisher & Paykel is a capable competitor, and GLP 1 drugs may reduce future sleep apnea demand. After working through more than twenty questions design to analyse RMD’s competitive advantage, I reached a very different conclusion. The CPAP device is probably one of the weakest parts of ResMed's moat. ResMed generates roughly 87.5% of revenue from Sleep & Breathing Health and 12.5% from Residential Care Software. In sleep therapy, RMD currently holds about 62% market share compared with Philips at 20% and F&P at 13%. Before the Philips recall, ResMed and Philips each held roughly 42.5% share. Most investors focus on the recall, but I increasingly believe the more important event was ResMed's decision to build a healthcare software ecosystem through acquisitions such as Brightree, HEALTHCAREfirst, MatrixCare, and MEDIFOX DAN.

At first glance, the software business looks insignificant because it contributes only 12.5% of revenue. However, under my base case assumptions, the Residential Care Software ecosystem may represent a patient opportunity pool equivalent to roughly 55% of ResMed's connected device ecosystem. This does not mean 55% of revenue comes from software customers. It means the software network may give ResMed access to a much larger population than investors realise. These software platforms serve home health agencies, HME providers, senior living operators, skilled nursing facilities, hospice providers, and other post acute care organisations. These populations are generally older, medically complex, and more likely to suffer from respiratory and sleep disorders. They are also less exposed to the GLP 1 thesis because much of their sleep apnea risk comes from aging and chronic disease rather than obesity alone.

The biggest insight from my research is that the moat is the software. Philips can build a CPAP. Fisher & Paykel can build a CPAP. What appears much harder to replicate is an ecosystem that sits inside provider operations and touches billing, reimbursement, claims, referrals, patient intake, inventory management, compliance, resupply programs, and patient monitoring. ResMed increasingly sits inside the information flow between providers and patients. That creates meaningful switching costs. A provider moving away from platforms like Brightree or MatrixCare may need to migrate data, rebuild integrations, redesign workflows, retrain staff, and potentially disrupt reimbursement processes. Importantly, ResMed built this moat over roughly a decade through acquisitions, which is why I believe even a well executed Philips strategy would likely require 5-10 years to build something comparable.

This changes how I think about competition and valuation. My base case assumes Philips eventually recovers 8.2 percentage points of share, leaving ResMed with roughly 54% market share long term. Even after accounting for both Philips recovery and GLP 1 headwinds, I still arrive at approximately 12% long run owner earnings growth, down from a historical range of roughly 15%-18%. That's a slowdown, not a collapse. ResMed also appears to convert innovation spending into economic value efficiently, generating approximately $15.5 of revenue and $4.2 of profit for every $1 spent on R&D, compared with roughly $9.8 of revenue and $2.0 of profit for Fisher & Paykel. My biggest takeaway is simple: ResMed should not be analyzed primarily as a CPAP company. It should be analyzed as a healthcare ecosystem company. Philips and Fisher & Paykel can compete on devices and masks, but what appears far harder to replicate is the combination of software, provider workflows, connected patients, recurring revenue streams, and information flow that ResMed has spent years assembling. The machine is what the patient sees. The ecosystem is what protects the business. The next question I'm researching is:  has the market become so focused on GLP 1 fears and Philips recovery that it has pushed ResMed below intrinsic value? That will be the focus of the next stage of my research.

When I started researching ResMed (RMD), I thought I was analysing a medical device company. The debate seemed simple: Philips lost share after the recall, Fisher & Paykel is a capable competitor, and GLP 1 drugs may reduce future sleep apnea demand. After working through more than twenty questions design to analyse RMD’s competitive advantage, I reached a very different conclusion. The CPAP device is probably one of the weakest parts of ResMed's moat. ResMed generates roughly 87.5% of revenue from Sleep & Breathing Health and 12.5% from Residential Care Software. In sleep therapy, RMD currently holds about 62% market share compared with Philips at 20% and F&P at 13%. Before the Philips recall, ResMed and Philips each held roughly 42.5% share. Most investors focus on the recall, but I increasingly believe the more important event was ResMed's decision to build a healthcare software ecosystem through acquisitions such as Brightree, HEALTHCAREfirst, MatrixCare, and MEDIFOX DAN.

At first glance, the software business looks insignificant because it contributes only 12.5% of revenue. However, under my base case assumptions, the Residential Care Software ecosystem may represent a patient opportunity pool equivalent to roughly 55% of ResMed's connected device ecosystem. This does not mean 55% of revenue comes from software customers. It means the software network may give ResMed access to a much larger population than investors realise. These software platforms serve home health agencies, HME providers, senior living operators, skilled nursing facilities, hospice providers, and other post acute care organisations. These populations are generally older, medically complex, and more likely to suffer from respiratory and sleep disorders. They are also less exposed to the GLP 1 thesis because much of their sleep apnea risk comes from aging and chronic disease rather than obesity alone.

The biggest insight from my research is that the moat is the software. Philips can build a CPAP. Fisher & Paykel can build a CPAP. What appears much harder to replicate is an ecosystem that sits inside provider operations and touches billing, reimbursement, claims, referrals, patient intake, inventory management, compliance, resupply programs, and patient monitoring. ResMed increasingly sits inside the information flow between providers and patients. That creates meaningful switching costs. A provider moving away from platforms like Brightree or MatrixCare may need to migrate data, rebuild integrations, redesign workflows, retrain staff, and potentially disrupt reimbursement processes. Importantly, ResMed built this moat over roughly a decade through acquisitions, which is why I believe even a well executed Philips strategy would likely require 5-10 years to build something comparable.

This changes how I think about competition and valuation. My base case assumes Philips eventually recovers 8.2 percentage points of share, leaving ResMed with roughly 54% market share long term. Even after accounting for both Philips recovery and GLP 1 headwinds, I still arrive at approximately 12% long run owner earnings growth, down from a historical range of roughly 15%-18%. That's a slowdown, not a collapse. ResMed also appears to convert innovation spending into economic value efficiently, generating approximately $15.5 of revenue and $4.2 of profit for every $1 spent on R&D, compared with roughly $9.8 of revenue and $2.0 of profit for Fisher & Paykel. My biggest takeaway is simple: ResMed should not be analyzed primarily as a CPAP company. It should be analyzed as a healthcare ecosystem company. Philips and Fisher & Paykel can compete on devices and masks, but what appears far harder to replicate is the combination of software, provider workflows, connected patients, recurring revenue streams, and information flow that ResMed has spent years assembling. The machine is what the patient sees. The ecosystem is what protects the business. The next question I'm researching is:  has the market become so focused on GLP 1 fears and Philips recovery that it has pushed ResMed below intrinsic value? That will be the focus of the next stage of my research.

After running the numbers on GLP‑1s, I started digging into the parts of the thesis that don't get discussed nearly as much.

The first thing that stood out was sleep apnea itself. The market narrative often treats sleep apnea as an obesity problem, but the underlying condition is far more complex. Ageing, genetics, airway anatomy etc and other factors all play significant roles. While GLP‑1 may reduce obesity related demand, they do not address many of the other causes of sleep apnea.

I also looked at management. CEO Mick Farrell has been with ResMed since 2000 and has led the company since 2013. Despite a lengthy search, I couldn't find any major governance, accounting, integrity, or personal controversies. Most criticism centres on whether management is too optimistic about GLP‑1 (I'm starting to agree with then on this one) and Philips rather than any questions about competence or character. Given his tenure and the value created under his leadership, management has become a positive rather than a negative in my assessment.

The balance sheet was another surprise. The company operates with a net cash position, low leverage, and very limited refinancing risk. Inflation exposure also appears lower than I initially expected because sleep apnea treatment is a medically necessary product with meaningful pricing power. Wage and manufacturing inflation are real headwinds but they are not unique to ResMed and appear manageable.

On the legal side, the disclosed risks are largely patent disputes rather than product liability or recall type claims. None of the currently disclosed matters appear large enough to materially change the investment case.

Perhaps the most interesting finding is that ResMed is not simply a CPAP manufacturer anymore. The company has spent decades building an ecosystem of connected devices, software platforms, remote monitoring tools, and patient data. That creates switching costs and increases the value of each patient relationship over time.

My research is increasingly shifting away from the question, "Will GLP-1s destroy ResMed?" and toward, "How much of ResMed's historical growth was driven by the Philips product recall in 2021, and how much of that growth is sustainable going forward?" In other words, was the growth abnormal and event driven, or was it primarily the result of the company's underlying performance? At this point, that feels like the more important question, along with what ResMed's potential growth rate is likely to be going forward after taking all this into account.

I've been tracking CSL (ASX: CSL) in my own model for a while, and since it's had such a wild year, 52-week range of roughly $90 to $275.79, I figured I'd share how I actually think about "what's it worth," rather than just reacting to the headline swings.

I run CSL through a handful of methods, but I only really trust three of them as decision inputs.

Everything else is just noise checking.

The three I actually anchor on:

- My own equity method (10-year):~$135.65/share. This is my own build, I roll EPS forward on a 10-year growth assumption and back into an implied share price with a few adjustments. It's the one I weight the most because it's mine end to end and I understand every input.

- DCF / free cash flow method: ~$172.66/share. Built off CSL's reported free cash flow (~$4.1B).

- PE forward method: $182.34/share. Applies a fair/average multiple to forward EPS).

The one I don't act on: Benjamin Graham's formula spits out $76.02/share. I still run it every time, but honestly it's just a gut check,not a decision input. Graham's formula is intentionally brutal, it punishes any stock with a premium multiple, growth expectations, or ROIC well above cost of capital, which is basically CSL's entire profile. If I let Graham veto every quality compounder I looked at, I'd own almost nothing. I use it purely to keep myself honest about how far my other numbers have drifted from the most conservative possible read.

So how does that stack up against today's price?

Close on July 17 was $123.32

Against that:

- PE forward ($182.34) says CSL says: 48% undervalued.

- My equity method ($135.65) says: 10% undervalued.

- The FCF/DCF method ($172.66) says: 40% undervalued.

- Graham ($76.02) says the price is ~62% above what it thinks is "fair", which is exactly why I don't use it as anything more than a feel check.

That spread matters more than any single number. When my three core methods land in three different places, one screaming cheap, one saying roughly fair, one saying cheap, that's not a reason to get excited about the biggest number. It's a reason to lean on the most conservative one and treat the rest as upside optionality, not a floor.

Margin of safety, specifically:

- FCF/DCF method: 1.4x soIf my DCF assumptions are even slightly optimistic, this method alone wouldn't clear my bar for a buy signal today.

- Equity method (10y): ~1.10x, The margin only shows up once you extend the compounding runway to 10 years, which is a real assumption risk, not a guarantee.

- PE forward: the fattest margin (~1.48x), but it's also the most multiple dependent of the three it lives or dies on what "fair" PE you assume, so I discount it accordingly rather than taking it at face value.

Why I'm still willing to hold/build a position:

This is where the Company Potential side of my model matters more than any single price target. A few things that keep this on my radar rather than my "pass" pile:

- CSL Behring (plasma) is 72% of revenue and it's the most efficient large scale operator in the industry on a per litre basis, that's a real, structural moat, not a story.

- ROIC has compressed from a historical ~20%+ down toward an estimated ~11–14%, but that's still comfortably above my ~9% discount rate / cost-of-capital assumption, meaning the business is still creating value on incremental capital, just less of it than it used to.

- Management has been substantially reset (new CEO/CFO/board) after the Vifor-related write-downs, and there's an active on-market buyback (up to A$750m through mid-2026) a real signal, not just talk.

- My own read (probability-weighted) puts this closer to "temporary quality compression" than "structural decline" I land around a 65–70% chance of a reasonable recovery in returns on capital over the next several years vs a real but smaller chance to stay at the current low levels.

None of that is a promise. It's just the qualitative backdrop that makes me comfortable treating the equity/PE/DCF margin as a real option instead of noise.

Curious how others here are framing CSL right now especially anyone running their own DCF on it, since that's the method I trust least in terms of margin right now and would like more eyes on.

Not financial advice, just showing my work DYOR.

I've been trying to quantify the actual risk of GLP‑1 drugs (Wegovy, Ozempic, Zepbound, etc.) to ResMed instead of relying on the common narrative that weight loss drugs will permanently destroy CPAP demand.

Starting from estimated GLP‑1 users, OSA prevalence, ResMed's market share, and OSA improvement data, I arrived at a theoretical 3.4m-4.3m at risk ResMed patient pool. Converting that into economics implied an annual earnings impact of roughly A$243m-A$308m, or about 12%-15% of earnings under a fairly aggressive assumption that affected patients stop generating value for RMD.

The next surprise came from GLP‑1 adoption data. Prescription growth has been enormous, rising from 1,884 per 100,000 adults in 2021 to 8,819 per 100,000 adults in 2026, which works out to roughly 36.1% CAGR. However, a large study also found that 64.8% of non diabetic users discontinue within one year and 36.3% of discontinuers later restart treatment. After adjusting for discontinuation and reinitiation, I estimated an effective GLP‑1 pressure growth rate of roughly 14.9% annually.

What makes this interesting is that ResMed's historical growth has been remarkably similar. Shareholders' equity grew from approximately US$1.7B in FY2016 to US$6.0B in FY2025, implying about 15% annual growth. Book value per share compounded at around 14.4% annually over the same period. Free cash flow and owner earnings growth have also been in the mid teens range historically.

I then built two scenarios: an evidence based case using the 14.9% GLP‑1 pressure growth rate, and a more aggressive bear case assuming 30% GLP‑1 pressure growth for a decade.

Equity Growth Outcomes

Scenario	Equity CAGR	Year 10 Equity
No GLP‑1 Impact	15.0%	US$24.3B
Evidence-Based Case (14.9% pressure growth)	13.3%	US$20.8B
Bear Case (30% pressure growth)	9.6%	US$15.0B

Owner Earnings / FCF Outcomes

Scenario	CAGR
Historical Growth Assumption	16.5%
Evidence-Based Case (14.9% pressure growth)	~16.0%
Bear Case (30% pressure growth)	12.7%-13.7%

What surprised me was that even under the aggressive bear case, the model still produces roughly 10% equity growth and 13% owner earnings growth over the next decade. Under the evidence based case, the impact is even smaller. Equity growth slows from roughly 15% to 13.3%, while owner earnings growth only falls from 16.5% to around 16%.

My takeaway is that the debate shouldn't be whether GLP‑1s affect ResMed. They probably do. The more important question is whether GLP‑1-related disruption can compound faster than ResMed's ability to grow earnings, free cash flow, and equity. Based on the numbers above, the evidence-based scenario looks much less damaging than the market narrative suggests, while the aggressive bear case still results in a business that compounds at respectable rates.

Interested to hear where people think the flaw is in this approach, especially around the overlap assumptions, discontinuation rates, and long term GLP‑1 adoption curve.

This is the math behind my earlier CSL post and how I sized my position. I run this through a Bayesian split rather than a single-point forecast, and it comes out to a 69% probability of a full recovery case: plasma volumes keep growing, cost-per-litre pressure eases as the network expansion and efficiency programs land, ROIC climbs back toward 14–15% (still under the historical 20%+ peak, but strong for a healthcare oligopoly), earnings grow ~9–10% a year, and the stock delivers 7–10% annual returns from here. Against that sits a 31% probability of a slower recovery — plasma/donor cost pressure lingers longer than expected, ROIC settles at a lower-but-still-decent 11–13%, and returns come in closer to 5–6% a year. Neither branch of that tree is a capital-loss scenario; the "bear case" here isn't CSL breaking, it's CSL compounding more slowly than it used to.

Zooming into what actually drives the downside branch: a genuinely damaging donor/labour cost spiral only shows up in about 14% of my modeled scenarios (the worst-case combination of wage inflation and demand), regulatory tightening has a >50% chance of hitting the sector over the next decade but CSL has a 100-year unbroken track record navigating it (~80% modeled chance of success this cycle too), and even a full write-off of the underperforming Vifor segment wouldn't be enough to seriously damage group financials — it would just be a bad year. Blend the two scenarios and you get a probability-weighted expected return of roughly 6.5–8.5%, versus ~3–5% for bonds, which on my risk/reward scoring comes out around a 3 (risk) against a 4 (reward) — a favourable asymmetry, not a coin flip. That's the actual reasoning behind the staged entry I laid out last time (40% now, 35% on a dip toward support, 25% on trend confirmation): it's not a conviction that CSL definitely recovers, it's that the odds and the payoff both lean my way even in the slower scenario. Not financial advice, just showing my work — DYOR.

CSL is one of the few genuine oligopoly businesses on the ASX, and I think the market has badly mispriced it. Roughly 70% of profit comes from CSL Behring, its plasma therapies division (immunoglobulins, albumin, clotting factors), where CSL out-executes rivals like Grifols and Takeda through superior collection technology and the largest single-site fractionation capacity in the industry (10m+ litres a year). That business throws off 40–50% margins and rides genuine, non-discretionary demand — chronic and rare-disease treatment growth of roughly 3–5% a year, not a speculative bubble. Layer on CSL Seqirus (vaccines, ~14% of revenue) with the strongest government relationships in the pandemic-preparedness space, and CSL Vifor (iron/nephrology, ~14%) now in a complementary JV with Fresenius, and you get a business with real behavioural and regulatory moats: doctors and health systems are deeply habituated to these products, and CSL has a 100% historical success rate navigating regulatory tightening. The stock is currently trading on a forward P/E of around 11 after the market punished it hard for the Vifor impairment and a rough FY — a reaction that looks more like an overcorrection (loss aversion, social proof, analyst herding) than a re-rating justified by the underlying economics.

The bear case is real but, in my view, cyclical rather than structural. ROIC has slipped from its historical 20%+ down to roughly 13–14%, and the key swing factor going forward is plasma collection cost, which is exposed to donor/labour cost pressure (modelled at a modest ~14% probability of a meaningfully bad combination) and industry-wide supply-demand dynamics. Management has also just been almost entirely replaced — new CEO, CFO, CCO and a reshuffled board with more pharma expertise — specifically to fix execution rather than a broken business model, and there's a A$750m buyback running through to mid-2026 signalling confidence. Weighing a roughly 69% probability of full recovery (7–10% returns) against a 31% chance of a slower grind (5–6% returns), even the downside case is bond-like rather than capital-destructive, which is a favourable asymmetry. Technically, CSL looks to be stabilising near strong support around A$105–115 with resistance at ~A$117 short-term and A$124–165 medium-term, which is why I'm treating this as a staged accumulation rather than an all-in bet: roughly 40% around current levels (~A$110–115), 35% if it dips toward A$100–105, and the last 25% on confirmation of a trend reversal above ~A$125. Not financial advice — just my own notes and DYOR before following any of it.

Analyzing $RMD, high P/B but a relatively low P/E compared with historical records.... The market seems to have highly valued RMD’s intangibles — brand, IP, distribution, and trust. The question I have is: can the returns still justify a high P/B? What do u think?