r/ChunghwaMinkuo

From late November to early December 2024, with the Ma Ying-jeou Foundation (马英九基金会) serving as a bridge, faculty and students from several universities in mainland China, together with Olympic champions, traveled to Taiwan for exchanges, visiting a number of Taiwanese universities as well as natural and cultural attractions.

During the visit, however, the delegation encountered protests from some Taiwanese citizens and students. Moreover, Song Siyao (宋思瑶), a mainland student from Fudan University (复旦大学), referred to the “Chinese Taipei Team”/“Taiwan Team,” which had recently won the world baseball championship, as the “China Taipei Team” (中国台北队). This further provoked dissatisfaction ranging from officials in the Democratic Progressive Party government to some Taiwanese students and members of the public, intensifying the wave of protests.

As the mainland Chinese faculty and students passed by, many protesters held signs bearing messages such as “This Is Not China Taipei,” “Chinese Students, Come Experience Democracy…,” “Taiwan Independence,” “Xinjiang Concentration Camps,” “Tibetan Human Rights,” “Democratization of China,” “June Fourth Tiananmen” (六四天安门), “White Paper Revolution” (白纸革命), and “Gender Equality,” while also chanting slogans. Members of the mainland delegation, including the young students, generally kept their heads down or ignored the protests, remaining silent and hurriedly walking past the protesters.

During the mainland delegation’s nine days in Taiwan, protesters held signs and shouted slogans at almost every public event they attended. Yet the faculty and students in the delegation did not utter a single word in response and also refused to accept leaflets thrust toward them by the protesters, weathering the wave of protests in almost complete silence. Faced with the protests, quite a few mainland students also displayed obvious avoidance, nervousness, and shyness. These reactions were captured on camera and mocked by figures from Taiwan’s pan-Green camp and other opponents.

Such scenes are not isolated cases. Whether in previous cross-strait exchanges, when mainland Chinese visitors—including officials and private citizens, such as Chen Yunlin (陈云林), then president of the mainland’s Association for Relations Across the Taiwan Straits (海峡两岸关系协会), during his 2008 visit to Taiwan—were attacked; when Chinese international students participating in official or civil-society activities in Europe, the United States, and other countries encountered political protests; or when exchanges and confrontations arose over controversial political issues, Chinese international students and other people from mainland China have more often responded with silence. In particular, when the other side displays or mentions political topics or taboo terms considered sensitive in mainland China, mainland students are even more eager to avoid them. On many sensitive yet important issues, mainland Chinese students have “lost their voice.”

There are multiple reasons why mainland Chinese students engage in such avoidance and “lose their voice” when confronted with sensitive political issues and protests. On the one hand, mainland China’s distinctive political system and mechanisms of speech censorship expose mainland students to various uncertain risks when they encounter or mention these issues. Out of concern for their personal safety and future prospects, mainland students choose across-the-board silence and avoidance regarding topics that could potentially bring them trouble.

More fundamentally, however, under this particular system and environment, mainland Chinese students have, in terms of their thinking, values, and patterns of behavior, already lost the ability to actively understand and think about, and to respond appropriately to, certain sensitive but important political and international issues that must nevertheless be confronted.

Over the past several decades, people in mainland China, including young students, have generally been indifferent, silent, and evasive toward various political controversies and heavily ideological issues. Although there are also some people on the internet who engage in “keyboard politics” (键政, online political discussion), this is confined to a minority who are enthusiastic about political and international issues, and “keyboard politics” itself remains subject to various restrictions, such as the deletion of posts and account bans. Moreover, these discussions take place almost entirely online and anonymously. People do not publicly express such views offline, on campus, or in their actual workplaces and everyday lives, much less participate in political activities such as demonstrations and marches. Most Chinese students and young people either devote themselves to their academic specialties and rush about seeking employment and earning money, or enjoy a tranquil, carefree life of romance and leisure—or do both. Yet in all these cases, they stay far away from politics, avoid sensitive issues at all costs, and become “sophisticated egoists.”

Mainland China’s educational system and educational practices also tend to avoid multifaceted, critical, and analytical discussion of controversial topics such as democracy and authoritarianism, unification and separation, ethnic relations, gender inequality and equal rights, speech restrictions and freedom of the press. Nor is much relevant knowledge taught. When such topics are mentioned, they are generally summarized and conclusively defined through politically correct platitudes, such as “a community for the Chinese nation” (中华民族共同体), “people on both sides of the Taiwan Strait are one family, compatriots connected by blood” (两岸一家亲，同胞血脉相连), “the people’s democratic dictatorship” (人民民主专政), and “the state respects and safeguards human rights/freedom” (国家尊重和保障人权/自由), with dissent and debate not permitted. Education in China is almost entirely lacking when it comes to general education, logic, pluralism, and related areas.

Consequently, when confronted with controversial issues, even mainland Chinese students who are interested in them are unable to obtain relevant knowledge effectively and systematically, nor do they have the ability to understand the causes and consequences with reasonable accuracy or make sound judgments about right and wrong. Even when they have a reasonable case on certain matters, they are unfamiliar with the internationally prevalent, complex discourse and rules that are based on universal values yet contain numerous twists and turns; they do not understand the various hidden “rules of the game” within modern democratic societies; and they lack the skills to rebut opponents and win sympathy and support. Even when reason is on their side, they do not know how to articulate their case; and when they force themselves to do so, what they say lacks persuasiveness and emotional resonance.

Such mainland Chinese students naturally find it difficult to withstand the criticism and questioning of students from Hong Kong, Taiwan, or foreign countries who have received civic education, are accustomed to “sensitive issues,” and are well versed in debate. Of course, there are also some mainland Chinese young people who are knowledgeable, understand the various rules of democratic societies, and possess skills in expression and debate, yet still remain silent out of selfishness and an unwillingness to become embroiled in controversy, displaying self-interested cynicism.

During the 2010s, when mainland China’s national strength and economic and social conditions were on an upward trajectory, there were also some pro-government, establishment-aligned, and Chinese nationalist-leaning mainland students who “actively expressed themselves” in debates with Hongkongers, Taiwanese, and foreigners—for example, through the so-called “online expeditions” (出征). Yet their responses to various criticisms of the regime and mainland China largely consisted of repeating empty slogans such as “uphold the Core Socialist Values” (社会主义核心价值观), posting internet memes, using sarcastic “coded jargon” or “witticisms” from online political discussions, and repeatedly hurling obscenities such as “NMSL.”

This was not normal, effective, or substantive political expression. On the contrary, it fully reflected the lack of knowledge and poverty of language among many mainland Chinese people, from elites to the general public, including young people, students, and internet users. At the time, some Chinese international students in Hong Kong, Taiwan, Europe, and the United States engaged in various unreasonable and thuggish forms of behavior, verbally abusing and physically attacking dissenters offline. Such conduct was an even clearer manifestation of a lack of civility and the ability to communicate normally, and in some cases also potentially constituted violations of law or criminal offenses. These crude forms of “expression” by Chinese nationals also damaged China’s national image, stigmatized Chinese people, and caused other Chinese people to suffer by association.

In recent years, however, as mainland China has faced difficulties both at home and abroad and found itself in a weaker position in the arena of public opinion, mainland Chinese people, including young students, have generally become extremely low-profile and silent again—including those “patriots” who once actively participated in campaigns against Taiwan independence, against perceived “insults to China,” and in “online expeditions”—and have even completely “lost their voice.” They choose silence even on some China-related and international-relations issues where the mainland side has a reasonable case, or where debate could at least clarify right and wrong and examine the complexity of the matter. These include racial discrimination and acts of hatred against mainland Chinese people in Hong Kong, Taiwan, Japan, Europe, and the United States; the question of where China should go amid the global wave of conservative populism; cross-strait differences and disputes that are relatively easier to discuss apart from the issues of unification versus independence and political systems; China’s policies in Xinjiang and Tibet and its ethnic relations; and various other major historical and contemporary political controversies.
Some foreign universities invite Chinese international students enrolled there to participate in debates on such issues, but Chinese students often decline to participate, ignore the invitations, or merely sit in as observers while being too apprehensive to speak. This “political apathy,” of course, is widespread not only among students but also among the broader Chinese public and overseas Chinese communities. Even many ethnic Chinese students and citizens who have already acquired foreign citizenship remain quite indifferent to politics and avoid controversial issues.

Based on what the author has directly witnessed and heard, as well as learned indirectly, other ethnic and identity groups around the world—whether White or Black, Christian, Muslim, or atheist; whether Indian or Arab; whether members of the Iranian or Korean diasporas; as well as Taiwanese and overseas Hongkongers, Uyghurs, and Tibetans—in short, people from various ethnic and identity groups, especially university students from these groups, actively participate in discussions of public issues, including political topics, and speak out on behalf of their own communities.

Yet mainland Chinese Han/ethnic Chinese people, who account for more than one-sixth of the world’s population and include large numbers of international students overseas, are generally silent and “invisible.” When confronted with controversial matters that require them to express their positions and defend their own interests, as well as protests and contentious public discourse, they either repeat stale official rhetoric without any independent views or remain silent. These people are not entirely unconcerned about their own rights, but they focus more on their own “private affairs” and “private sphere,” lacking a sense of national community as well as care and responsibility toward their compatriots. They lack concern for, discussion of, and participation in the “public affairs” and “public sphere” of their broader community and country, and are unwilling to defend the public interest and the dignity of their community.

As a result, on important international issues related to mainland China and mainland Chinese people—including mainland-Hong Kong and mainland-Taiwan issues—there is a severe lack of voices from mainland Chinese people, especially the voices of specific individuals and ordinary citizens that reflect the circumstances, emotions, and demands of the general public. The “loss of voice” among young students at prominent mainland Chinese universities and elites in various professions is the most worrying and potentially the most damaging, because it signifies the “loss of voice” of the nation’s core and the future of its people. A weak voice and a lack of discursive power inevitably mean that the country and its citizens will be disadvantaged in terms of rights, dignity, and interests, with the harmful consequences that their community will not be understood internationally and will be stigmatized by others.

There are many reasons for these harmful consequences. The most direct is that mainland Chinese people, especially young students, “lose their voice” on important controversial topics because they lack both the ability and the desire to express themselves, compounded by constraints imposed by real-world conditions. (Of course, there are also some radical anti-government individuals, including some international students and young people, who have gone down another misguided path: irrationally “opposing anything Chinese” and indiscriminately hating Chinese people regardless of right and wrong. This is equally wrong, tragic, and shameful.)

At the same time, within mainland China, on domestic media and social media platforms and in relation to events occurring within the mainland, the Chinese public is likewise voluntarily or involuntarily “losing its voice.” This is starkly different from the public-opinion environment of roughly a decade or more ago, when traditional media and the internet, despite restrictions, still retained a certain degree of freedom and openness. The “loss of voice” of mainland Chinese people toward the outside world and their “loss of voice” regarding domestic mainland affairs not only substantially overlap in time but are also interconnected.

When mainland China lacks normal education, the free flow of information, freedom of speech, relatively outspoken and impartial media platforms and channels for expression, and a healthy environment for debate, how can mainland Chinese people possibly participate actively and rationally in discussions of disputes between the mainland and the outside world and avoid being put at a disadvantage in debate?

The recent protests encountered by mainland students visiting Taiwan and the students’ collective silence are merely one typical example—the tip of the iceberg—of the broader “loss of voice” among mainland Chinese students, young people, and the general public in both domestic and international public discourse. Such a “loss of voice” should not exist. Reticence and closing oneself off emotionally are not states that young people should be in; nor is a public afflicted by “political apathy,” in which people generally “do not discuss affairs of state,” the kind of character a national community should have. More seriously, this gravely damages the discursive power of the country, the nation, and every citizen; their presence and value in the arena of public opinion and the public sphere; and their concrete interests in every respect.

The author fully understands that the “loss of voice” and “political apathy” of many Chinese people have also been shaped by China’s broader environment over the past several decades, and that individuals should not be blamed excessively. But everyone also possesses individual agency, the ability to maneuver within various constraints and restrictions, and obligations as a citizen.
In particular, Chinese people and members of overseas Chinese communities who have higher social status, come from better-off families, and possess broader knowledge clearly have more favorable conditions for speaking out on behalf of their compatriots. They therefore also bear a greater responsibility to speak up for the vulnerable, rather than choosing complete silence merely because of environmental restrictions and constraints—or praising the system and painting a falsely rosy picture. Moreover, the darker and more oppressive the environment becomes, and the more universal the silence, the more precious and necessary it is for people to break that silence and speak out.

China’s political system and all sectors of Chinese society should foster both the capacity and the environment for young people and the general public to actively discuss current affairs, speak courageously on controversial topics, and dare to engage with and respond to sensitive issues internationally. China and its people today should return to the kind of vibrant public-opinion environment in which “a hundred flowers bloom and a hundred boats compete,” as seen during the New Culture Movement (新文化运动) and the May Fourth Movement (五四运动) a century ago, during the Republican era, and during the 1980s, and restore a sense of civic responsibility in which people care about the nation’s affairs and the people’s livelihood and speak out not only for themselves but also for their compatriots.

Most importantly, young people in mainland China and students at its universities should “shoulder responsibility for the rise and fall of all under heaven,” and show toward workers, farmers, and all vulnerable groups the empathy and compassion embodied in the principle of “when others are hungry, feel as though you yourself are hungry; when others are drowning, feel as though you yourself are drowning.” While taking their own circumstances and safety into consideration, they should participate as boldly as possible in discussions of public affairs, think dialectically about controversies, and, when necessary, express themselves independently and proactively. Only mainland Chinese youth of this kind can be the hope of China; and only a China with young people of this kind can become truly independent and free, prosperous and strong.

(The author of this article is Wang Qingmin(王庆民), a Chinese writer based in Europe, a researcher in international politics, and a supporter of the Republic of China.)

Novel: https://www.alternatehistory.com/forum/threads/swapped-fates-what-if-germany-and-japans-fates-were-swapped-after-wwii.560101/

Pixiv: https://www.pixiv.net/artworks/147324728

I am Chinese. Every year, August 15, Korea’s Liberation Day, is also the day on which China achieved victory in the War of Resistance Against Japanese Aggression. The government of the Republic of China actively supported the Korean independence movement and the Korean Liberation Army, and cooperated with Syngman Rhee and Mr. Kim Gu, assisting Korean independence activists in establishing the Provisional Government of the Republic of Korea in Shanghai, Nanjing, and Chongqing, China. During World War II, like Koreans, large numbers of Chinese people were forcibly conscripted by Japan as laborers or “comfort women,” subjected to enslavement, and killed.

Although the Chinese Communist Party later established the People’s Republic of China and cooperated with North Korea in confronting South Korea and the United States, resulting in many unfortunate events, the Chinese and Korean peoples stood together in resisting Japanese aggression and opposing Japanese imperialism.

China and Korea share a number of historical similarities. Both suffered invasions by foreign powers, and both experienced brutal civil wars. The Chinese people also yearn for freedom and democracy.

I hereby extend my congratulations to Korea on its Liberation Day. I hope that Korea will remain independent, prosperous, and strong, and that China will also achieve democracy in the future, so that together our two countries can become pillars of prosperity in Asia and peace in the world.