Would Nietzsche have been a moral error theorist if he lived today?
For those who do not know, moral error theory makes two claims about morality; one conceptual and one ontological claim.
The conceptual claim: Morality claims the existence of objective values and obligations that would be unreasonable or irrational to ignore. For example, if a person wants to punch babies but morality forbids it, then morality would override his desire at pain of him otherwise being unreasonable or irrational.
The ontological claim: Morality is systematically false and does not really exist. The world as we know it does not support this kind of mysterious overriding nature of moral demands. It follows from this that nothing is morally right or wrong, morally good or bad, and so on. There could be good, bad and what should be done in other senses of practical reasoning (such as desire-derived instrumental value), but not from morality.
Which brings me back to Nietszche, who I must confess that I remember very little about as it was over 10 years I read a couple of his books. For those who have better knowledge of him than myself, I wonder how his positions and reasoning would compare to moral error theory as outlined above.