▲ 28 r/NoNukes+1 crossposts

Nuclear power is failing, and AI can’t rescue it: Nuclear generation is expensive and slow to develop. Claims that past failures won’t recur have convinced politicians to socialize investments

utilitydive.com
u/Soft_Grass8428 — 28 days ago
▲ 14 r/NoNukes+1 crossposts

Groups file complaint against Utah’s pro-nuclear energy campaign “They’re outright misleading. To compare nuclear energy and nuclear waste to things like candles … is so utterly offensive to me as someone who has suffered the consequences of radiation exposure.”

missoulacurrent.com
u/Soft_Grass8428 — 28 days ago
▲ 38 r/NoNukes+2 crossposts

Japanese utility halts nuclear reactor restart after data manipulation scandal: independent committee found pressure from senior management led workers to manipulate earthquake data

ft.com
u/Soft_Grass8428 — 1 month ago
▲ 24 r/NoNukes+2 crossposts

Major irregularities and financial risk discovered in Doicesti’s small reactor project | DOCUMENT – Prime Minister’s Control Body Report Published (Romania)

Autotranslation:

>Nuclearelectrica shareholders voted on Friday to publish the report of the Prime Minister’s Control Body after the control targeted the small reactors (SMR) project in Doicesti, and the published document indicates major irregularities and financial risk discovered by the inspectors.

Report PDF scan: https://bvb.ro/infocont/infocont26/SNN_20260911180447_11-09-2026---Raport-curent-publicare-raport-ccpm-bvb.pdf (RO)

>The Small Modular Reactors (SMR) project in Doicesti is presented as the future of Romania’s energy independence. The project is developed in partnership 50%-50%, through the project company RoPower, the state-owned company Nuclearelectrica and by the private partner Nova Power & Gas. The project is based on NuScale American technology and would be funded by U.S. loans.

>The full report of the Control Body reveals irregularities such as delays of almost two years, the choice of the site without a rigorous economic analysis or the formation of the association with the private partner in the absence of transparent selection procedures. The report criticises the fact that key decisions on buying the land and extending management's decision-making powers were taken with the avoidance of public procurement procedures, which placed most of the financial and commercial risks to the state-owned company.

># The main problems identified:

>Delays

>The project is a significant delay. For example, the completion of the FEED 2 phase was carried out with a delay of 20 months in relation to the originally set timetable.

>Depth of costs

>The cost of the project has increased significantly. The December 2025 estimate was $6.5 billion, with about $3.8 billion ashore high from the original estimate.

>Location selection

>Doicesti was not the best choice. The evaluation of the consultant Sargent&Lundy showed that the Doicești location was ranked 2nd, in the analysis on the possible sites of the project, but it was chosen without a solid comparative analysis of the technical and economic advantages/disadvantages of the better ranked variants.

>Association with Nova Power & Gas

>The selection of Nova Power & Gas as a private partner in the project company was made without an association procedure approved at Nuclearelectrica level (for over 9 months SNN did not draft a procedure under the ME Order no. 1180/2021).

>The association was made without an assessment of compliance with European rules governing public intervention in the economy and on state aid.

>The approach that ended with the decision to associate Nuclearelectrica with equal shares with Nova Power & Gas does not have a logical or economic justification.

>There was no comparative assessment of potential private entities, carried out on the basis of quantifiable criteria, whereby the private partner should have proved (through the qualifications and experience gained and, possibly through evaluatable offers), the financial, technical, technological (possibly complementary Nuclearelectrica) capacity and to assume the risks of the project company’s activity in the same report in which they would have divided, after the association, its decision-making control and results.

>Nuclearelectrica did not request a formal point of view from the Competition Council on the association, although the need for the prudent private investor (TIPP) test was aware.

>Disproportionate risks

>There are no symmetrical rights and obligations between the two shareholders during the operation of the project company and the implementation of the project. This also had the effect of a disproportionate risk division, to the dear Nuclearelectrica.

>The participation in the project of Nova Power & Gas was secured through the Investor Agreement, which grants excess rights and financial protections to the private partner.

>Instead, Nuclearelectrica assumes most of its financing and lending obligations.

>Nuclearelectrica has not reserved, by the Agreement of investors, at least one conditional on the yield, depending on Nova Power & Gas’s effective financial participation.

>Nuclearelectrica does not even hold a right of withdrawal from the association and the capitalization of the loan held with the project company, according to the one established for the benefit of Nova Power & Gas.

>Nova Power & Gas benefits from the right to sell its shares to Nuclearelectrica and to assign its loans at face value plus a yield (up to 12%), while Nuclearelectrica cannot unilaterally exercise its decision-making control nor benefit from similar withdrawal rights.

>Nuclearelectrica cannot decide on the activity of the project company in any aspect, in the absence of the decision of the private shareholder.

>Nova Power & Gas did not credit the project company similarly to Nuclearelectrica.

>Weakening of shareholder control and bypassing public procurement legislation

>The constitutive act of the project company RoPower Nuclear was amended before the acquisition of the land, so that the representatives of Nuclearelectrica would no longer have to formally approve the transaction. The limits of the powers of conclusion and approval of contracts were changed, so the minimum limit from which the shareholders had to approve a contract was raised from more than 5,000,000 euros to more than EUR 50,000,000, and the approval of the contracts between EUR 20,000,000 and EUR 50,000,000 (inclusive) was provided for in the competence of the Board, while the competence of the approval of the contracts with a value of up to EUR 20,000,000 was awarded to the Director.

>Thus, the way of structuring the project company has removed the activity of purchasing goods, services and works (required for the logistical preparation of the site) from the scope of the national and European legislation on public/sectoral procurement.

>Acquisition of land

>The land acquisition transaction was carried out by concluding a contract of sale and an effect agreement, which was intended to create the appearance that the acquisition of the site was a transaction that respects market rules.

>Through the re-billing agreement associated with the acquisition of the land, the buyer (RoPower) was burdened with additional expenses relative to the market value of the asset (financial, capital, acquisition of some works/services performed by companies from the Nova Power & Gas group without a prior explicit mandate or made before the association), not respecting the principle of a good financial management.

...

economedia.ro
u/Soft_Grass8428 — 1 month ago
▲ 25 r/NoNukes+2 crossposts

Protracted exposure to low-dose ionising radiation and cancer incidence among Canadian nuclear power plant workers: Canadian NPPWs have increased risks of prostate cancer and melanoma from low-dose ionising radiation exposure

oem.bmj.com
u/Soft_Grass8428 — 2 months ago
▲ 587 r/NoNukes+5 crossposts

Germany just blew up two massive nuclear cooling towers to make way for something incredible - a 700 MWh battery storage facility! Here's why this matters.

Germany blew up two nuclear cooling towers and had a 700 MWh battery under construction four days later. France just set a regulatory floor to keep nuclear power on the grid even when nobody wants it.

While Germany decommissions plants and repurposes the sites for storage, France spent this summer cutting nuclear output by 4 to 6+ GW across repeated heatwaves, over a tenth of national demand at points, because rivers ran too warm to safely cool the reactors. That's happened in 2022, 2023, 2025, and 2026. But heat isn't the only thing France is throttling for. Solar capacity nearly doubled from 16 GW in 2022 to over 30 GW in 2025, and on sunny days generation now regularly exceeds what the grid needs once nuclear baseload is accounted for. The result: nearly 3 TWh of renewable power curtailed in 2025, almost double 2024, with solar taking the brunt of it.

Here's the protectionism part. In March 2026, France's energy regulator approved an agreement between grid operator RTE and EDF setting a minimum output level for nuclear generation. EDF keeps selling that output onto the day-ahead market "at any price," even when prices go negative, which they now do in over 90% of April days. So instead of flexing nuclear down when solar floods the grid at midday, France is flexing solar down to protect nuclear's market share. That's not a technical constraint. That's a policy choice to keep sunk-cost reactors running full tilt and make newer, cheaper generation absorb the cutbacks instead.

Compare the build economics on top of that. Gundremmingen's replacement battery: about 230 million euros, groundbreaking days after demolition, reusing existing grid infrastructure. France's EPR2 program: tens of billions of euros, over a decade of construction, and a track record of slipping deadlines going back to Flamanville. Germany bet on the option that gets built fast and gets out of its own way. France is spending both money and grid capacity defending an asset it already sunk the cost into.

Check out the full story https://interestingengineering.com/energy/germany-detonates-dead-nuclear-plant

u/HairyPossibility — 3 months ago